ЛУДВИГ ВИТГЕНЩАЙН И АНАЛИТИЧНАТА ФИЛОСОФИЯ

НАУЧНА КОНФЕРЕНЦИЯ, ПОСВЕТЕНА НА 115 ГОДИНИ ОТ РОЖДЕНИЕТО МУ

Под редакцията на Мария Стойчева

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

PAPERS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE OCCASION OF THE 115TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS BIRTH

Edited by Maria Stoicheva

СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ

INTRODUCTION

This volume of essays is a tribute to the 115th anniversary of the birth of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It contains most of the papers delivered at the three conferences held in three Bulgarian Universities in 2004. The conferences brought together academics from Sofia University, the South-West University in Blagoevgrad and Veliko Turnovo University in Bulgaria and from the University of Bergen, Norway, Innsbruck and Graz University in Austria, presenting a variety of topics inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein - one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century. This volume is also an acknowledgement to the new community of ideas that Wittgenstein by his own work, whether he wished it or not, created.

We owe special thanks to the Embassy of the Republic of Austria and the Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in Bulgaria for their support. We would also like to take the opportunity of thanking Prof. Edmund Runggaldier, the President of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (ALWS), for his encouragement and commitment to our project.

The Editor

Този сборник е посветен на 115-годишнината от рождението на Лудвиг Витгенщайн. В него са публикувани изказванията на участниците в три конференции, организирани в България през 2004 година. Те събраха представители и изследователи от три български университета – Софийски университет "Св. Климент Охридски", Югозападния университет в Благоевград и Великотърновския университет, както и учени от Университета в Берген, Норвегия, Университет в Инсбрук и Университета в Грац, Австрия, които представиха теми, вдъхновени от философията на Лудвиг Витгенщайн, един от най-забележителните философи на 20-ти век. Този сборник е също признание за новата общност от идеи, която Витгенщайн създаде, независимо дали то желаеше или не, със своята дейност.

Изразяваме специална благодарност на Посолството на Република Австрия и на Посолството на Кралство Норвегия в България за подкрепата им. Използваме също така възможността да благодарим на проф. Едмунд Рунгалдиър, президент на Австрийското дружество "Лудвиг Витгенщайн", за ангажираността му с този проект.

От редактора

WITTGENSTEIN'S *NACHLASS*: SITUATING THE BERGEN ELECTRONIC EDITION

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When died on 29 April 1951, he left behind a philosophical *Nachlass* of some 20,000 pages. Apart from the source texts for the *Tractatus* (1921, 1922, 1933), these papers were at that point unpublished and largely unknown. The extent of the material was a surprise, even to his friends. In his testament, Wittgenstein had entrusted the management of this *Nachlass* to G.E.M. Anscombe (1919-2001), Rush Rhees (1905-1989), and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003), and he had instructed them to "publish as many of my unpublished writings as they think fit" (Wittgenstein's testament, January 29th 1951). Later, in 1969, a body of trustees was formed, to consist of the three original "beneficiaries" Anscombe, Rhees and von Wright, and additional trustees, to be appointed by the original three. The trustees "were to hold the copyrights and royalties on trust for the beneficiaries while they survived, and after the death of the last of them on trust for Trinity College" (Kenny 2005: p. 343) On the death of Georg Henrik von Wright, the last surviving original trustee, the copyright in Wittgenstein's unpublished papers passed to Trinity College, Cambridge. A board of trustees is still in existence and acts in an advisory role. After that the original manuscripts and typescripts had to be collect from several places, almost all of the *Nachlass* – as far as known - is now preserved at the *Trinity College Library* at Cambridge, the *Austrian National Library* in Vienna and the *Bodleian Library* at Oxford.[2]

When referring to Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* we mean the texts listed and classified in Georg Henrik von Wright's *Nachlass* catalogue.[3] There, von Wright divides the *Nachlass* manuscripts and typescripts into three numbered sets, groups 101-183, 201-245 and 301-311. The 100-numbers classify manuscripts, written in Wittgenstein's hand and consisting primarily of notebooks and bound volumes; the 200-numbers classify typescripts, dictated by Wittgenstein directly from his manuscripts or prepared at an office for typewriting from the manuscripts or from other typescripts; the 300-numbers classify dictations written either by hand or typed, that had been dictated to friends, colleagues and students, for example in connection with lectures and seminars. Thus, the typescript which is the *Nachlass* source for *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I, for example, has been assigned the number 227, while the first manuscript version of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I, §§1-188, has been assigned the number 142. In assigning numbers to the *Nachlass* items, von Wright took into account a range of different criteria, such as their physical characteristics, their chronological order, or Wittgenstein's own grouping of certain items into various series, for example the "Bände". One has to remember, that von Wright's

numbers refer to the separate physical parts of the *Nachlass*, not to thematically ordered units of text. In the case of the manuscripts this generally means that the hand-written material is given catalogue numbers according to the separate physical manuscript units, irrespective of the arrangement and sequence of the text. This seems quite reasonable and natural, but it has sometimes surprising effects, for example in the case of item 115, where we encounter *one* physical book with *one* catalogue number, but at least two "works", and within them, different text sequences.

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[1] An earlier version of this paper was published as "Encoding Wittgenstein. Some remarks on Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*, the *Bergen Electronic Edition*, and future electronic publishing and networking" in the Austrian internet journal *TRANS. Internet-Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften* (Pichler 2002). The 2002 version is in some respects more comprehensive, while this one is more compact and brought up to date.

[2] For more details on locations see Pichler 1994: p.5.

[3] First published 1969 in a special supplement in the *Philosophical Review 78*; later revisions include *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Occasions* (1993), ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann, and the catalogue in the *Bergen Electronic Edition* (2000).

Facsimile of p. 118 of *Nachlass* item 115 (1936), reproduced by permission of the Master and Fellows of Trinity College Cambridge, Oxford University Press, and the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen

Wittgenstein's writings contain deletions, over-writings, insertions, marginal remarks and annotations, re-orderings, as well as orthographic errors and slips of the pen, and the like. While these features are quite normal for modern author manuscripts in general, there are certain features which make Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* more special and which are results from his specific working methods. One such feature is the habit of constantly working with variants and alternative expressions. Even when revising his work, in such cases Wittgenstein often did not clearly decide in favour of a specific variant, leaving many possible readings open. The facsimile of *Nachlass* item 115: p.118 gives an impression of Wittgenstein's - often extensive - production of variants. A synoptic rendering of part of the variants on this page may look like the following (text which was deleted by Wittgenstein is omitted):

Das Lernen der menschlichen Sprache beschreibt Augustinus so:	Augustinus beschreibt das Lernen der menschlichen Sprache so:
(Confessiones I,8) "... cum ... appellabant rem aliquam et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere".	
Wer [das Lernen der Sprache I es] so beschreibt, denkt vorerst an eine gewisse Klasse von Wörtern, wie etwa 'Mann', 'Brot', 'Tisch', und [erst in zweiter Linie I nur entfernt] an Wörter, wie 'nicht', 'aber', 'vielleicht', 'heute'.	Wer das Schachspiel beschreiben wollte, aber in seiner Beschreibung die Bauern und ihre Funktion im Spiel nicht erwähnte, von dem könnte man sagen,
Wenn jemand das Schachspiel beschreiben wollte, aber [seine Beschreibung vergäße die Bauern und ihre Züge I in seiner Beschreibung [die Bauern I die Bauern und ihre Funktion im Spiel] [unerwähnt ließe I nicht erwähnte]], so könnte man sagen,	er habe das Schachspiel unvollständig beschrieben; aber auch: er habe ein einfacheres Spiel als unser Schach beschrieben. Und [in diesem Sinne I so] kann man sagen Augustins Beschreibung gelte für eine einfachere Sprache als die unsere.
— Denken wir uns die folgende Sprache:	— So eine einfache Sprache wäre die:

Another special feature is Wittgenstein's habit of continuously taking over passages from one text corpus to another and developing and modifying them further there. As a result, the *Nachlass* is highly "intertextual" and, in a certain sense, repetitious. One may even say that the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* consists of a great number of different versions and modifications of a relatively small set of primary units of text, or of thought.[4] The *Nachlass* can be seen as characterized by yet another feature, namely a strong *multi-notational* aspect. Wittgenstein wrote in different languages, though mainly in German, and used different functions of language, thereby applying both linguistic and non-linguistic means, such as mathematical and logical notation, diagrams and graphics.[5]

Two years after Wittgenstein's death G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees published *Philosophical Investigations/Philosophische Untersuchungen* (1953) which became the first book

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[4] On this see further Huitfeldt 1994 and Pichler 1994.
[5] This aspect has been studied in detail by Michael R. Biggs; see for example Biggs 2001.

edition to be produced from the *Nachlass*.[6] Until the end of the 20th century more than twenty substantial books and articles had been published from the *Nachlass*, mainly edited by the literary executors.[7] Against the background of the above remarks on Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* and his working methods more generally, it is understandable that the *Nachlass* presents several problems to one who wants to prepare it for publication. How shall an editor deal with a text which prompts several different readings? How, in book publications, shall one edit similar *Nachlass* texts without making the publication products too repetitive? We see that the above described *Nachlass* features, including textual repetitiveness and textual openness, create a challenge. It is not astonishing, then, that the posthumous book publications show considerably different editorial approaches. Some of them involve much editorial intervention, others less, and some of them include the features of critical editions.[8] Wittgenstein's editors, mainly his trustees, have often been criticised for putting together selections from a range of different manuscripts for their publications from the *Nachlass*. But what gives ground for criticism is not so much that this is what they have done, but that they sometimes have done it without indicating the sources in more detail. This concerns in particular Rush Rhees' edition of *Philosophical Grammar*, but much of the criticism of Rhees' edition is indeed exaggerated.[9] Other aspects of criticism concern more particular questions, e.g. the editors' dealing with Wittgenstein's graphics, which has lead to revisions of the graphics' rendering by Michael Biggs in all the published works, including the *Philosophical Investigations* (1997).

One must acknowledge that most of the "mistakes" of Wittgenstein's editors seem natural and understandable when viewed with due regard for the specific conditions under which Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* was to be made available. An impression of the editorial tasks and heavy work undertaken by the trustees can be gained from the source catalogues given in Biggs/Pichler 1993. An alternative to the difficult task of balancing publication interests and scholarly standards, incl. comprehensive documentation of editorial decisions, or at least, a first concern, would appear to be that of publishing Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* in facsimile. This in fact was done in 1967, when under the supervision of von Wright and Malcolm a microfilm was made for Cornell University of the entire *Nachlass*, such as it was known at that time, first in Oxford, and then for the remaining – Austrian - items at Cornell University. The microfilm was published in 1968 as *The Wittgenstein Papers*, and shortly afterwards this valuable resource was supplemented with the already mentioned von Wright catalogue of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*. Many research institutes bought bound copies of printouts produced from this microfilm or copies of the microfilm itself, and together with the catalogue one was now equipped with both the source materials, a reference system and introductory information to them. But, despite its great value, the Cornell edition was incomplete, and its technical quality was uneven. And even without these limitations, it is clear that a facsimile as such is bound to be inadequate for certain purposes. For someone unfamiliar with Wittgenstein's handwriting, a facsimile is clearly of limited use.

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[6] In the German Suhrkamp *Werkausgabe* Georg Henrik von Wright is mistakenly described as one of the editors of the *Investigations*.
[7] For detailed bibliographies see Biggs/Pichler 1993: pp.9ff, Pichler 1994: pp.. 112ff or Pichler 2004, p.298ff; Biggs/Pichler 1993 contains detailed catalogues of the parts selected from the Nachlass for these publications.
[8] See for example the critical editions of the *Tractatus* (1989) and the *Philosophical Investigations* (2001).
[9] Rhees defends his editorial decisions in Rhees 1996, posthumously edited and introduced by D.Z. Phillips. Phillips justly points out in the introduction: "What cannot be sustained is the view that there is only one conception of editing, so obvious that it can be taken for granted, and that Rhees (sharing this conception) ignored its elementary requirements."

By the middle of the '80s and even by 1990, then, neither the existing book editions, containing selections and compilations from the *Nachlass*, important though they are, nor the Cornell facsimile seemed to satisfy the requirements of Wittgenstein research. A *Gesamtausgabe*, although wished by many and attempted in at least two major projects, first at Tübingen and then in Cambridge,[10] was not available, nor had sufficient agreement been reached over what it should look like. Without either neglecting essential aspects of the *Nachlass*, or demanding from the publisher and/or from the reader too much in terms of finances, patience - or willingness to adapt to some very special editorial policies - it seemed a difficult thing indeed to put the entire Wittgenstein *Nachlass* into book form. The issue of a *Gesamtausgabe* in *book* form may still be a live issue today and by no means settled, but the situation is much less troubling now. The reason for this is that since 2000 an electronic edition of the *entire* Wittgenstein *Nachlass* is available, which fulfils most of the expectations that were to be fulfilled by a traditional *Gesamtausgabe*, and which deals with most of the hard difficulties which editing Wittgenstein in book form is faced with: *Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition* (BEE).[12] BEE, published by Oxford University Press in 2000, was prepared at the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) in Norway, as one result from its machine-readable version of the *Nachlass*, which in turn was produced in the period 1990-2000.

BEE edits the *Nachlass* in three versions: a diplomatic version, a normalized version and a facsimile version. The diplomatic version functions as a detailed *letter-by-letter* representation of the originals and represents deletions, overwritings, insertions, etc, in short, any result of Wittgenstein's "writing-acts". The normalized version on the other hand provides a "reading" version of the texts, or, we can say, Wittgenstein's "text-acts". In the normalized version, spelling is normalised, and certain features, such as deleted text, are suppressed. In addition to presenting the *Nachlass* in the diplomatic and normalized versions, BEE includes digital facsimile images of all the *Nachlass* pages. The normalized and the diplomatic versions are inter-linked with the facsimile images page by page, and they are also inter-linked moving between the diplomatic and normalized levels and the facsimile level. BEE is distributed on six CD ROMs, including one texts and software CD and five facsimile CDs. In a parallel version, it is, without facsimile, also available *online* in the *Past Masters* series from *InteLex Corporation*, which already for a long time has had an electronic Wittgenstein programme.[13] In fact, the standard book publications from the *Nachlass* have been available from InteLex in electronic form for quite a time before publication of BEE. However, BEE in being planned from the *beginning* as an electronic product and as a comprehensive edition with a uniform set of editorial principles, it is in this sense quite different from other electronic editions of Wittgenstein texts.

BEE was produced in the late 1990s at WAB on the basis of what we at WAB call the "machine-readable" version or base of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*. This machine-readable base consists of marked-up or encoded source transcriptions in DOS format, and it was exactly the

[10] These projects resulted later in the so-called *Vienna edition* (1993-) of the 1929-1933 part of the *Nachlass*.
[11] For further information on the history of the *Nachlass* publishing, see Kenny 2005.
[12] Further, McGuinness 2002 and Schulte 2002 regard it an excellent basis for a book-*Gesamtausgabe*, an "edition for other editors".
[13] Charlottesville, http://www.nlx [accessed 1.4.2005]. For detailed information on the technical features of BEE see Pichler 2002, Huitfeldt 2004 and the Oxford University Press and InteLex websites for the edition, http://www.oup.co.uk/academic/humanities/philosophy/wittgenstein/ and http://www.nlx.com/dlles/lillwnac.htm [accessed 1.4.2005].

production of this machine-readable version, which was the objective the Wittgenstein Archives were set to achieve when they were established in 1990 on the initiative of Claus Huitfeldt, a Norwegian philosopher and computer specialist. Thus, the machine-readable base is not identical with BEE, but rather its source. BEE is a result, produced mechanically from the machine-readable base. The relationship between the machine-readable base and BEE is comparable to that of database and output; while the latter is a defined and fixed product, the former is the source from which such a result – but also alternative results – can be produced. For the scholar not involved in text encoding and electronic editorial philology, the relevance of the distinction between BEE and the machine-readable base may not seem very relevant. But it is an important fact, that, while BEE is produced from the machine-readable source transcriptions with the application of filters specially designed for BEE, these filters can be defined in a great number of different ways. Consequently, it would not be difficult to produce a series of quite different texts from the same machine-readable source transcriptions. BEE is therefore to be considered less open-structured than the basis from which it originates - the "mother" machine-readable base at WAB.

There are indeed scholars who wish that BEE was as flexible and open-structured as the basis from which it was produced, the machine-readable version. In practice, what these scholars want is a BEE so close to the machine-readable base that one hardly could call it an *edition* any longer, but rather a device to create one's own edition in accord with one's own specific research interests. Thus, although BEE is already a big step towards transparency, giving, as it does, the user the possibility of checking the editor's operations and decisions, the entrance channels to Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* provided by BEE still do not seem flexible and transparent enough for those scholars who want as much as possible to take the editorial decisions themselves. Consequently, although BEE is no print edition, it indeed seems to obey some of the rules of classical print editions. It is this which one of the first reviewers of BEE, Herbert Hrachovec from Vienna, saw as a serious limitation: BEE still imitates too much print culture and too little exploits the possibilities of the electronic medium.

The user is allowed to read and manipulate texts via FolioViews (...). She can copy selected texts, paste and print them - but neither can she touch the indexing mechanism nor modify any of the underlying data. There is a strict separation between interface and non-transparent, computational deep structure (...). But, it might be objected, where is the problem? Wittgenstein's writings are at one's disposal, all of them, and in an extremely comfortable fashion. True enough, judged by the standards of the printed book. Yet, as was discussed in section two, Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* transcends the limits of such standards and an electronic edition might be better suited to capture those peculiarities. It might be organized so as to mirror Wittgenstein's editorial techniques, starting with single remarks as elementary building blocks and putting them together in a variety of ways, following Wittgenstein's lead. His working process, not its result, could be taken as the guiding principle. (...) Yet, the Bergen edition does not offer any tools to actually rearrange its content or redesign its appearance on the primary level. For all its flexibility and ease of use the Bergen edition

is still in the conceptual grip of classical printed editions. Does it have to mimic the necessities of print culture? (Hrachovec 2000)

Let us ask with Hrachovec: Isn't it anachronistic if BEE seeks to mimic printed editions? After all, publishing techniques have changed, and with this change editing has been and is being remodelled by the electronic medium. The medium which for more than a hundred years has been without rivals, the book edition, has now been joined by a companion which both supports and competes with, and makes us reconsider, all the branches of book editing. During the book-age, *historical-critical* book editing, which is particularly important in this context, has had to face certain obvious restrictions attaching to the paper medium. Essentially it had to come up with one text to be *the right text*, with the text's relatives subsumed as pendants, and all the time cultivating a methodology which made all this work. But now, with the alternative electronic medium, it may seem nothing less than anachronistic to attach oneself to a culture of editing methods, the basis for which is changed. And it would seem even more of a mistake to adopt this culture into this new *electronic* medium. In Wittgensteinian terms, we might say, that such a mistake would amount to a confusion of "language games". Thus, we have to check very carefully where we stick to tradition and adhere to standards which help us follow up our interests in the use of a text, and where we adhere to standards which helped us once to do so, but now may be by-passed.

It is not at all out of the question that editing Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* will be crowned by a historical-critical *book-Gesamtausgabe*. But it is equally important to acknowledge how proper it was that such a prospect should not have set the standards for the Norwegian project of heading for a machine-readable version, at least *first*. If one wants canonical text as it has been traditionally provided by historical-critical editions, then such text *can* be prepared from the machine-readable version. After all, such text can be prepared more economically, more flexibly and with better control from electronic source transcriptions in a platform independent data format, than from a file destined for direct paper output, the format of which may be out of date when the file is finally ready for printout. Marked-up or "encoded" electronic transcriptions allow not only for a range of "translation" possibilities of the basis into different text outputs, but access to such transcriptions with accompanying software also allows the editorial processes of text construction to be questioned, verified and changed.

In the case of historical-critical book editing such processes have in general been hidden from the user's view. In the case of machine-readable versions such processes can be made visible and, on instance, revisable. The editorial decisions once to be taken only by the editor, and its consequences handed to the user, are no longer necessarily to be taken only by the editors. Such decisions can now be taken by the user, with the freedom to construct "diplomatic", "normalized", or any other versions according to need, and to choose text portions as required, without being forced to set the needs of today as the standards for tomorrow. So, it appears that Hrachovec is right: To publish marked-up transcriptions, accompanied by software for the user to process them and facsimiles of the, on the basis of which the user can revise them, seems the, or at least, *a* right way to go.

However, there are also opposed views. Joachim Schulte expresses in his review a specific worry connected with the possibilities, which the electronic medium – including BEE - offers:

It is obvious that these possibilities of searching through Wittgenstein's writings are a great boon. What is less obvious is that they also present a certain danger (which, I hasten to add, is not the editors' fault). The ease of collecting passages containing certain words makes it easy for people who have a particular axe to grind to amass material the sheer bulk of which can make it look like 'evidence' for the most hare-brained kinds of theses. ... The problem I wish to highlight by mentioning this preposterous example is the following. The marvellous search functions of an electronic edition of this kind make it easy to collect material on all kinds of topics. The sheer bulk of passages containing certain phrases may then make it look as if one were dealing with 'evidence' even though the thesis thus 'established' has little to do with, or falls foul of, the direction of Wittgenstein's thought. The problem exists, and of course there is no way of safeguarding against possible (and likely) abuses of this extremely useful edition. (Schulte 2002: p. 244f)

We c conclude, that we surely need both, more freedom (as Hrachovec wants it) and also more guidance (Schulte's concern), at the same time. To the extent that we connect paradigmatic and stabilizing examples in text work with book culture, electronic editions incl. BEE may bee seen to imitate book culture. Consequently, if the entire Wittgenstein corpus was made available on the World Wide Web, easily processable and adaptable to fulfil the needs of different users, the expert and paradigmatic sampler will be needed not less, but *more*.

BEE is available for purchase world-wide, and therefore the Wittgenstein research community is now for the first time offered complete and efficient access to the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*. Future perspectives for Wittgenstein publishing are rich. They include possible linking of the edition with other electronic Wittgenstein editions and resources, like the edition of Wittgenstein's complete correspondence from the *Brenner Archives* in Innsbruck,[14] And it is only now, after publication of BEE, that we actually are enabled to discuss the editing of Wittgenstein in proper and comprehensive ways, and also more fully issues concerning electronic editions more generally. If we want to develop the *Nachlass* editions further towards more dynamic needs of e-learning, individual research agendas, collaborative networking etc., and last but not least, may be, an *open electronic text archive*, we can *now* discuss their preparation properly, thanks to the fact that with the BEE we surely share a sufficiently transparent and stable discussion basis. This has not been the case before. The project of making Wittgenstein and his *Nachlass* more and better available is therefore now in an exciting transitional and discussion stage, where, clearly, the research community is already an active participant in the further shaping of the endeavour.[15]

[14] Published in electronic form in October 2004 at InteLex as *Gesamtbriefwechsel/Complete Correspondence: The Innsbruck Electronic Edition*, see http://www.nlx.com/lilies/liliwgb.htm (accessed 1.4.2005).
[15] See for example the two international projects "Wittgenstein MS101 from September 1914" on http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_sept1914.page (accessed 1.4.2005), and "Wittgenstein MS115 in APE" on http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_115ape.page (accessed 1.4.2005). For further developments towards "digital Wittgenstein research" see McEwen 2005.

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