Ms-148,FCr Ms-148,FCv Ms-148,1r      The experience of fright appears (when- we philosophise) to be an amorphous- experience behind the experience of- starting.

All I want to say is that it is- misleading to say that the word- “fright” signifies something which goes- along with the experience of expressing fright.

There is here again the queer case of- a difference between- what we say, when we actually- try to see what happens, & what- we say when we think about it- (giving over the reins to language).

The ‘far away’ look, the dreamy voice- seem to be only means for conveying- the real inner feeling.

“Therefore there must be something- else” means nothing unless it expresses- a resolution to use a certain- mode of expression.

Suppose you tried to separate the feeling- which music gives you from hearing music. Ms-148,1v

Say & mean “long, long ago–”, “lang- ist es her–”& now put instead- of these words new ones with many- more syllables & try if you can- put the same meaning into the words.- Put instead of the copula a very- long word say “Kalamazoo”.

Puella, Poeta “‘masculine’ & ‘feminine’ feeling” ‘attached’ to a.

Aren't there two (or more) ways to- any event I might describe?

We say “making this gesture isn't all”.- The first answer is: We are talking about- the experience of making this gesture.- Secondly: it is true that different- experiences can be described by- the same gesture; but not in the- sense that one is the pure one- & the others consist ….

Wie ist es wenn man einmal die- besondere Klangfarbe eines Tones- merktmerkt || hört ein andermal nur den Klang als- solchen? Ms-148,2r

<…>      “Ich nenne diesen Eindruck ‘blau’”.

Wie kann man denn die genaue Erfahrung in ‘Poeta’ etc. beschreiben?

The philosophical problem is:- “What is it that puzzles me- aboutabout || in this matter?”

To give names is to label things;- but how does one label impressions.

Das Auge & der Wald Das männliche a & das weibliche a.

Es läßt sich über die besonderebesondere || bestimmte Erfahrung einiges sagen & außerdem- scheint es etwas, & zwar das Wesentlichste, zu geben was sich nicht beschreiben- läßt.

Man sagt hier, daß ein bestimmter- Eindruck benannt wird. Und darin- liegt etwas Seltsames & Problematisches. Denn es ist als wäre der Eindruck - Ms-148,2v etwas zu Ätherisches um ihn zu- benennen. (Den Reichtum einer Frau- heiraten.)

Du sagst Du hast einen ungreifbaren- Eindruck. Ich bezweifle nicht, was Du sagst aber ich frage ob Du damit- etwas gesagt hast. D.h. wozu hast Du- diese Worte geäußert, in welchem Spiel.

It is as though, ifif || although you can't tell- me exactly what happens inside you,- you can nevertheless tell me- something general about it. By saying- e.g. that you are having an impression- which can't be further described.

As it were: There is something further- about it, only you can't say it; you- can only make the general statement.      It is this ideaidea || form of expression which plays hell with- us.

Ms-148,3r

“There is not only the gesture but- a particular feeling which I can't- describe”: instead of that you might- have said: “I am trying to point- out a feeling to you” this would- be a grammatical remark showing- how my information is meant to be- used. This is almost similar as- though I said “This I call ‘A’ &- I am pointing out a colour to you not a shape”.

How can we point to the colour- & not to the shape? Or to the- feeling of toothache & not to the- tooth etc.?

What does one call “describing- a feeling to someone”?

“Never mind the shape,– look at the colour!”

“Was there a feeling of pastness- when you said you remembered …?”- ‘I know of none’.

How does one point to a number, draw- attention to a number, mean a number?

How do I call a taste “lemon-taste”?- Ms-148,3v Is it by having that taste & saying- the words: “I call the taste …”?

And can I give a name to any one- taste-experience without giving- the taste a common name - which is to be used in common language?– “I give my feeling a name,- nobody else can know what the- name means.”

A slave has to remind me of- something & isn't to know what- he reminds me of.

I note down a word in my diary which serves- to bring back a taste. Ms-148,4r

Ms-148,4v

Ms-148,5r

“I use the name for the impression- directly & not in such a way- that anyone else can understand it.”

Buying something from oneself. Going- through the operations of buying.

My right hand selling to my left- hand.

Gefühls-(Gedanken)übertragung.

Eine gute Art eine Farbe zu- benennen wäre, in einer entsprechend- gefärbten Tinte den Namen schreiben.

“I name the feeling”– I don't quite- know how you do this, what use you- are making of the wordword || name.

“I'm giving the feeling, which I haveI have || I'm having just- now a name”.– I don't quite know- what you are doing.

One might say: “What is the use- of talking of our feeling at all. Let Ms-148,5v us devise a language which really only- says what can be understood.” - Thus I am not to say “I have a- feeling of pastness”: But

“This pain I call ‘toothache’ & I can- never make him understand what- it means”.

We are under the impression that we can- point to the pain, as it were unseen by- the other person, & name it.

For what does it mean that this painpain || feeling- is the meaning of this name?

Or, that the pain is the bearer of the- name?      It is the substantive ‘pain’ which- puzzles us. This substantive seems- to produce an illusion. What would- things look like if we expressed pains- by moaning & holding the painful spot?      Or that we utter the word pain pointing- to a spot.      “But that the point is that we should- Ms-148,6r say ‘pain’ when there really is pain.”      But how am I to know if there really is- pain? if what I feel really is pain? Or,- if I really have a feeling?‒ ‒ ‒

Es ist sehr nützlich zu bedenken: Wie würde- ich in einer Gebärdensprache ausdrücken:- “ich hatte keine Schmerzen, aber stellte- mich, als ob ich welche hatte”?

“Surely it isn't enough that he moans;- I must be able to describe the- state when he moans & hasn't got pains.”

“He has pains, says he has pains & saying- ‘pains’ he means his pains.” How does he- mean his pains by the word ‘pain’ or- ‘toothache’?

“He says ‘I see green’ & means the colour- he sees.”– If asked afterwards what- did you mean by ‘green’ he might answer- ‘I meant the colour’, pointing to it. Ms-148,6v

“In my own case I know that when- I say ‘I have pain’ this utterance- is accompanied by something;– but- is it also accompanied by something- in another man?”      In as much as his utterance needn't- be accompanied by my pain. I may- say that it isn't accompanied by- anything.

“I know what I mean by ‘toothache’- but the other person can't know it.”

Als negation: “The deuce he is ….”

Die Philosophie eines Stammes der- als Negation nur den Ausdruck benütztbenützt || kennt:- “I'll be damned if …”.

On a beau dire ….

“Man kann nie einen ganzen Körper sehen- sondern nur immer einen Teil seiner Oberfläche.” Ms-148,7r

Ms-148,7v

They have the same number if to one 1- there always corresponds one.- If for one of these there is always- one of the others. “Two rods are equally long if for any- inch of the one there is an inch- of the other”. “There are these couples, whether I- write them down or not.” Ms-148,8r

“Give the impression a name!”      that seems to have sense.      “It seems to me that I can mean- the impression”. It seems to me that I can will- the table to approach.      “Can one push air?” Ms-148,8v

For each member of α there is a member- of β.      The classes α & β fall into couples.      This is similar with a proposition of say physics,- e.g. “they join & form couples when they are- brought together”.      But this is just not what is meant. - We mean something that follows from- what there exists in these classes. And- we have an image of them, something- like this: If now we say for this there is this, for this- there is this etc., this sounds as if we- said something about the dots; like- “this belongs to this etc.” whereas we - Ms-148,9r are saying words & gestures to put them- into couples. And this is a way of- finding whether they have the same number.      And now we must say that there are many different phenomena- of equality of number or of having a certain- number. Just as having a length & having- equal lengths. Let me remind you- of the problem “are these two rods- now of the same length.” Take the definition- you have to give of this expression- when the rods have to be measured- & on the other hand when you use this- difference. “These bodies have the same- weight” etc.. Now consider: “There are as- many grains of sand in this heap as- in the other”. How do we know this?- (This is no psychological question.)- Now suppose we said we test it by- connecting the classes one-one; then the -question is: how shall we know that- we have connected them? For there- are several utterly different criteria.- But further what shall we say in the- cases where no such connection is possible? What about saying then that- the members of the two similar classes- still fall into couples?? Is this now- an explanation? For when we gave it we- thought of it as reducing the statement - Ms-148,9v of numeric equality to simpler terms.- The falling into couples was an- image which in some cases was most- natural namely in those in which- there was the possibility of joining- terms into couples. But in fact- it wasn't at all the only- aspect of numeric equality. The- term “having the same number” in fact- suggests a different aspect. I mean this Having the same number can be interpreted- as having the same one of these- schemata. Of course this aspect- too is only natural in a very limited number of cases. Aspect of stars.      The explanation, that two classes- have the same number if they fall into- couples, is really taken from - a case like “The pentagram has twice- as many points as the - Ms-148,10r pentagon”. Demonstration      Timelessness of the demonstrated- proposition: blue & red = purple. - Ms-148,10v

We said that what we described- as “numeral equality”, “being- 1-1 correlated”, “having the number- n” were widely differing phenomena.- That therefore it was an illusion- to think that to say “the classes- fall in pairs” is, generally speaking- an analysis of what we call- numeric equality in simpler terms.- We can if we like put “being numerically- equal” = “falling into pairs” but- the use of the one expression just as of the- other has got to be explained- in the particular case. This we- only forget. Thinking about a very- special class of examples.       The idea is that if they- have the right existential- structure they do fall- into couples & this is- demonstrated. The- question how we find out in the- special case that they do have- the right structures is neglected.      One could also say that a- length a was twice another one b- if two a superimposed gave- b. Application for wavelengths.      This brings me to the topic of - Ms-148,11r demonstration.      1) number of outer vertices = 5.      Compare with “the Hand has 5 Fingers.”      Timelessness. The same holds of- “The number of outer vertices = number of inner- vertices”.      Question which is answered by- this proposition timeless. Apparent generality of demonstration.      The copula has no tenses.      <…> idea is that the idea of a pentagram is bound up with a cardinal- number. Now, we could make all sorts of- connections. “It is the essence of these figures- to be capable of being divideddivided || connected in- this way”. Ms-148,11v

Pythagoras      Is the result of the process taken- as a standard or not.       “These two triangles by this- nature give the rectangle”. This aspect might never have struck- you. - Ms-148,12r a + (<…>) = (<…> + b) + c a + (b + 1) = (a + b) + 1 a + (b + 2) = (a + b) + 2      It seems you can't get out. You- must adopt a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c if you- adopt a + (b + 1) = (a + b) + 1.

But need we really say that- a + (b + 2) = (a + b) + 2 follows from- a + (b + 1) = (a + b) + 1?

The reasoning is:       a + (b + 2) = a + (b + (1 + 1)) = a + ((b + 1) + 1) = = (a + (b + 1)) + 1 = ((a + b) + 1) + 1 = (a + b) + (1 + 1) 5 + (6 + 1) = (5 + 6) + 1 5 + (6 + 2) =

I show you a curve drawn in a pentagon which you had never thought of- & I say: I am showing you that - Ms-148,12v this curve can be drawn,– or: that there- is such a curve in the pentagon.      That there are two twos in four.

Is there really no way out of saying,- say, that a triangle which has- 3 equal sides has also three- equal angles.

Does consist of & ?- It depends what kind of dispute- it is. You could say it consisted of & . Is the dispute- one about facts or mode- of description? Counting - Ms-148,13r This doesn't- show that- a + b fits but it shows that it looks like it does. “What kind of figure do you- get if you draw the diagonals in a Pentagon?”- What sort of body do you get if you draw the diagonals on a dodecaeder. What kind of number do you get- if you draw 3s in 9.      What kind of colour do you get- if you mix red with yellow?       “The figure shows him that a pentagram- fits into a pentagon”.- Is this an experimental result? Ms-148,13v

I am now talking always of a particular- kind of demonstration; what one- might call a visual demonstration.

In what sense could I say that- I didn't know that the pentagram- fitted the pentagon? Could I- have imagined the opposite?      Suppose I had imagined the- opposite in some sense then- in the same sense I could- still hold the opposite after- the demonstration.

We are talking of the star of which- I did not know whether it fitted- the pentagon or not.       Then I try & find that they- fit. This is just like making- an experiment. - Ms-148,14r

“I never knew that I could- see the Pentagon & its diagonals- in this aspect.”      “Oh, that's how it fits!”       - Ms-148,14v

“I don't know whether the pentagram fits the pentagon. If so the- diagonals of a pentagon must give- a pentagram. Let's try it.”      Is to see the figure an experiment? Or to see side by side the figures ? But doesn't it teach us something?      “It never struck me.”

It seems we are learning by experience- a timeless truth about the shape of a- Pentagon & of a Pentagram.

“I never knew that one could look at it- Ms-148,15r that way. I had never seen the pentagram- in the pentagon.”

It is a new experience to me. But is- it the experience teaching me that the- pentagram fits the pentagon?

We feel that here are two visual individualities which in the third picture- we see combined & that we see that- they are capable of this particular combination. The fact is that the combination (not- meaning Relation but Complex) strongly- strikes us.

“The visual image p fits the visual image P.”- The importance of this proposition lies in this- that it seems a proposition of experience- & that on the other hand it also is- used as a proposition of geometry i.e. of grammar.

What is the use of the proposition that p fits P? - Ms-148,15v “If you draw the diagonals in P you- get p.”       “If you do this & this & this & this- you get Napoleon.”

Problem: “Draw that Star which will- fit the Pentagon.” This is a mathematical problem.

“What do the diagonals of a P look- like?”

We look at a puzzle picture & find a- man in the foliage of a tree. Our- visual impression changes. But- can'tcan't || mustn't we say that the new experience would have been impossible- if the old one hadn't been what it- was? Such that we seem bound- to say the new experience was already- preformed in the old one. Or that- I found something new which was- already in the essence of the- first picture.

We seem to have demonstrated an- internal property of the old picture. - Ms-148,16r

Demonstrating that this is contained in this “It is in the nature of this to contain this.”

If you do this & this etc. you get 55.

Die mathematische Frage. Could the Pythagorean theorem be assumed instead- of being deduced?

- Ms-148,16v

“It never struck me that this was this .” Something timeless seems to have- struck us: How can the identity- of these entities strike us? It never struck me that 5 consisted- of 3 + 2.

To see five figures as 3 figures + 2 figures. If 5- is = 2 + 3 it can't mean anything to- see 5 as 2 + 3.       You could divide 5 into 2 + 3 but not- into 3 + 3 as you could 6.       Obstacle - Ms-148,17r

The whole question is really: “can it- strike you what a thing is?” It seems you can find out something about the nature of a thing- by experience. About its internal nature.            Thus e.g. a similarity can strike- you; the fact that a complex- contains a constituent; even - Ms-148,17v identity of shape. Two tunes fitting.

“One can see immediately that- 4 consists of 2 + 2”. This is nonsense- if 4 = 2 + 2.

~ [~p ∙ ~(~r ∙ ~s)] ∙ ~[~(~t ∙ ~~s ∙ ~t)) ∙ ~p]

What do I do when I draw your attention to a fact about, say, this formula? It seems I make you see- something about its essence. You get- a new experience; but this experience,- it seems, teaches you something about- the essence the internal nature of the- formula. It seems to teach you- a mathematical (or logical) truth- & this does not seem to be a rule- of grammar but a truth about the - Ms-148,18r nature of things.

If I made an experiment with a certain- figure we can <…> imagine this or that result.- But if I draw your attention to a- feature …

It consists of … appears to have 1)- a grammatical meaning 2) a physical- meaning & 3) a meaning lying between- these two.

We seem to learn something about- the very sense-datum.

Tribe describing as - or .

A certain symbolism will easily go with- a certain aspect of looking at a- thing.

“They regard the square as a double- right angle.”

“ consists of & ”. “ consists of & ”.      In one case you say that it - Ms-148,18v consists if it is divided. In the- other case you seem to say that the- undivided object consists (timelessly) if you have seen a- similar object divided.      Or you say that the object is- divided if you have divided its- picture.

I dispose about 5 soldiers, I imagine- them & say: I'll send ||| to this- place and || to that. Have I- thereby divided them into 2 + 3- Soldiers & seen that it's possible. - What if I had imagined- this picture & said- I'll send ||| to this place- & ||| to that?

What happens if our attention is drawn- to something.

One couldn't call 0˙3 a shorthand for- 0˙333 …. Except insofar as 0˙33 … is also a shorthand- for 0˙333 ….

“Don't try to find a 4 in the development- it's hopeless!”– “Don't multiply 25 × 25- Ms-148,19r again & again in the hope to find 600; it's- hopeless!”      What's it like to try to find a- 4 in the development of 1 : 3?      And what is it like to find a 4.

What is the importance of the question:- “What is it like?” or “What is the verification?”

Kein Kalkül ist im “Widerspruch mit- der Logik” d.h. mit gewissen Regeln die- über allen andern stehen. Die Annahme- einer obersten Logik ist es, die - hier irreführt.

What we should call finding a 4 in 1/3- obviously depends upon the operations in- this case.

What does it mean to imagine- getting a result from a calculation?      How far is this imagination to go?

“There isn't a 4 in the first million- places”– “You've got a quick way of- calculating that!”

Imagine this operation: A decimal - Ms-148,19v fraction constructed by multiplying- again & again 25 × 25 : 0˙625625625 … Look for an 8 in it!”      “You know that you will never- find an 8” means:       “Don't try to divide 2476 without- remainder by 3 it's hopeless”.

In which case is it hopeless to find- a particular result by a calculation?

Calculating is the process of imagining- a calculation.

“I can hope to find an 8 in the Product - 284 × 379.”

To say “it's hopeless to find a certain- result really means: our calculation- has already shown it to be wrong.

Or: we have a calculation which- we make have that opposite result.

What is the 56th place of 1 : 7?- You can now say it seems what the- 1010 place ‘will’ be. Ms-148,20r

How can one calculation anticipate- the result of another?

Or: Our calculuscalculus || calculation has already decided- against it.

What does it mean: to prophesy what one- will correctly find.

29 × 34 = 34 × 29 3102 × 2331 2331 × 3102

Das Bild “Alle” angewandt auf die- Unendlichkeit.

To show mathematically that a 4- can be found is to describe what it is- like to find a 4. And to find a 4 is here- a process in space and time.

“Find, as the result of a calculation” &- “Find, otherwise”.

In 1 : 7 gibt es ein endliches Problem & ein- unendliches. - Ms-148,20v

Two processes of calculation- lead to the same result.

“What if they at some stage- did not lead to the same result”. – “That is impossible, we- couldn't imagine their not leading- to the same result.” But- then the proof of their leading- to the same result showed us- what it was like to lead to the- same result.

Ms-148,21r

The difficulty consists in this that it- here seems impossible to imagine anything but what really is the case: And- that of course means nothing!      We don't seem to be able to- imagine finding a 4, because there- is a three there. But then how are- we capable of imagining to find- a 3 as there is a 3 there?

If I say I can't imagine a 4 - Ms-148,21v to result it means that the- calculation shows me what it- means to imagine a 3 to result- & gives no sense to the proposition “I imagine- a 4 to result”.

x² + ax + b = 0 “Solve this equation algebraically!”

“Do something that has an analogy- to ….”      But we can't be sure that- we shall not in the end give up- the idea of something being analogous- to ….

The existence of aa || something we call the ‘solution’ seems- to show clearly that there was- a clear & definite problem.

Suppose we said that a solution is- a solution only so far as it- could have been described before it was found.

“Solve x² + 2ab + b² = 0.” “Solve x² + 4x + 5 = 0.” Ms-148,22r

“We can't imagine that 1:7 should- not repeat itself after the dividend- has come back.”

We have two ways of calculating- the 1010th place & we can't imagine- that they lead to different results.

Ist es eine Bestätigung hierfür wenn- die beiden Bemerkungen in einem- bestimmten Fall übereinstimmen?

Is it different to say “they lead- to the same result” & “they- must lead to the same result”?

Does it mean anything to “prophesy”- the result of a calculation?

We say we can't imagine that the two- processes should not lead to - the same result.      What does it mean, we can't imagine it? Ms-148,22v

Must we recognise Periodicity as- a proof that there will be no- 6 in the development of 1:7?

“How does it happen that 3 × 4 is 4 × 3?”

“An dieser Stelle muß eine Primzahl- kommen”– “An dieser Stelle kommtkommt || steht eine- Primzahl”.

‘Gibt es einen Zufall in der Mathematik?’

How does the returning to the- dividend show me the periodicity of- the quotient.

We seem in one kind of thought to- make jumps in the other to fill in- step by step. And the latter process- seems to justify the former. - Ms-148,23r “You see it just leads to the same- result!”

Denke an den Fall wenn man mehrere- Züge in einem Spiel zusammenzieht &- etwa im Schach gar nicht erst mit- der ersten Position anfängt.

“Die Form ‘1 2 3 4 5’ paßt auf die Form- .”      Was für ein Faktum ist das, daß die Reihenfolge das Resultat nicht ändert. The process we are going through just- does lead to the same result;– but- so far as it “leads to the same result” we- could imagine it to lead to a different - Ms-148,23v result. And so far as we couldn't- imagine it to lead to a different- result it doesn't lead to any- result but shows what it's- like to lead to the same- result.      I.e.: If we look at the Forms- & 12345 as equivalent- there ceases to be a question of- whether the two processes lead- to the same or to different- results & the apparent experiment serves only to show- what sort of fact we take- as the standard of our expression.

Ms-148,24r

“How can you impose two rules on- your arithmetic unless you know- that they must lead to the same- result?”      You wish to say: “These rules by- their very nature, lead to the- same result.” And you would therefore- have recognised something about- the very nature of them.

Now it is time that you - make a man look into the casecase || working- of these rules; that is, you can prove something about them.

“You go through this way of thinking- & then you go through another way- of thinking which independently leads to the same- result.”

123456 123456       2 2 2

After you have seen that 1000 : 3 must- lead to 333 is it a confirmation to calculate- it & see what it does? Hadn't you calculated it by “seeing that it was 333”? And- what does it mean that one calculation- confirms the result of the other? Ms-148,24v      If you first see that the two calculations- must lead to the same result- is it a confirmation to find that- they do?

“If this goes on this way & that- goes on that way they must- meet there!”

25 25 25 25 ‒ ‒ ‒ 16 times 16 16 16 16 25 times They must meet at the end. “Are you surprised that they meet?- Didn't you know that they had to- meet?”

“I wasn't surprised I always followed- the 25s while going on with the 16s.” Ms-148,25r

Must a series of dots give- the same number counted this →- way & that ←? (There are two cases.)

Can wewe || I try whether the result is the- same?– It seems, yes.       “Can you imagine the calculation 16 × 34- to lead to something else …?”– “Can- you imagine these two calculations- leading to different results?”

1:7 = ‒ ‒ ‒ “The division must give the same- result as it gave before.”       Can we try whether- it does?

Can we imagine the same calculation- to lead the second time to a different result?

The question is really whether there- can be a “must” in a proposition about the - Ms-148,25v nature of things.

“In the sense in which they ‘must’- lead, we can't say- they do lead.

“Wenn die Überlegung richtig ist”, so- muß diese Rechnung zu demselben Resultat führen.

Sie führen unabhängig- zu selben Resultat.

Let's imagine that we possessed- only the second criterion for- determining divisibility!       But there seems to- be the difference between “they lead” &- “they must lead”. a b b c = c b a b Ms-148,26r

Wir nehmen ein falsches Verhältnis von- Prozeß & Resultat an.      Denn es heißt nicht daß ein gewisser Prozeß zu einem bestimmten Resultat führen muß.

Denn ein Prozeß muß nur dazu führen- daß er geschehen ist.

We sometimes substitute for the description of a result- the description of a result.

Ich kann mir eine Blume auf gewisse- Weise gewachsen denken. Und das Wachstum- ist dann ein Prozeß dessen Ende der- Zustand der Blume ist.

In welchem Sinne ist es möglich- nicht zu wissen wohin ein mathematischer- Vorgang führt. Man könnte antworten- es ist möglich nicht zu wissen, wohin er- führen wird aber nicht, nicht zu wissen- wohin er führt.       In one sense you can't know the- process without knowing the result, as- the result is the end of the process. In- Ms-148,26v the other you may know a process & not- know the result.

In mathematics we object to say- these processes have the …

A calculation leads to a result mathematically- apart from the fact whether I have- actually performed it.

‘If I say this calculation must- lead to this result it has - already led to it.’

“I knew it beforehand what it must - Ms-148,27r lead to.”

If I say ‘this calculation must- lead to the same result’ by “this- calculation” I am referring to whatever I call a- method of calculating.

Does calculating that there isn't- a six … confirm the result that- there couldn't be?

“You already see what happens, it- must always go on like this.”- Now suppose you actually went on- would this confirm what you saw- before?

A man says, “I see that the two calculations- so far agree but I don't know why they should- go on agreeing”. Shall we say that- he doesn't see a truth which the- other sees?– He tries always again & again.- We ask him: “But don't you see that- you must get to the same result again?”      Should we say that he must go- the long way of experience, where we- go the shorter one of seeing? Ms-148,27v

“If the multiplication led to this- result once, it must lead to itit || the same result again.”

“What is the criterion of periodicity?”- Here we are inclined to think that- we have a criterion the reappearance- of the remainder & the actual periodicity i.e., the repetition ad infinitum of the period.

The infinite & the huge. Absolute idea- of large & small.

“I never looked at it this way, before”. Ms-148,28r

“These people don't see a simple- truth ….”

They are resolved to write- this: instead of .

But not “because it had to lead- through to the same result”.

It is a remarkable fact that people- almost always agree how to count.

Supposing I said this is the 100th- house of this street, although there- are only 5 houses built. Ms-148,28v

Am I to be guided by this- or by this? And how- do I know that they will- guide me to the same result? We have a general kind of idea- of how it goes on; but can't- this after all be contradicted- by the actual detailed calculation? Isn't there a danger of it going- wrong after all?      What is the truth which we- see (& which is ‘obvious’)? That This shows us that this- was justified”.       But then- we leave behind us these- justifications. At first imagination- accompanies us a stretch- & then we are left alone.

If there are 777 in the first 100- places there are 777 in the infinite- development. Ms-148,29r

“I have found 777 somewhere in- π.”

“The calculation guides you to- the result.” “You know that the- two rules must always lead you- to the same result.”

The process of calculation cancan || may- be regarded as a process where- there is no compulsion or being guided- & on the other hand, as a process- where we move under some strict- guidance.

- Ms-148,29v

“If I follow this chain of- steps it's bound to lead me- there.”

“The question are there 777 in π- is all right because surely there either- are 777 in π or there aren't”. Queer- use of p ⌵ ~p. Images characteristic- for this statement.      It really means: “The question is- all right because there is a method- of verifying it although we can't- use it.”

“The third place of π is 4- whether I know it or not.”

“What if we had proved it to be- self-contradictory that there should- be no 777 in π, mustn't we then say that- there are 777?”

Our prose expressions in mathematics- are highly metaphorical.

“Every algebraic equivalent has a root”.- Is this to be called a proposition? - Ms-148,30r      The question corresponding to this- proposition as answer is vague. But once- the proposition this piece of mathematics has- been done we are inclined to call- it the proof that our question had- to be answered is the positive. But,- as one might say, there was much- less in the question than there is- now in the answer.– Compare- this with: “Is 25 × 25 = 600?”

Propositions which seem only to have sense- if their truth or falsehood is known.

What kind of proposition will the proposition- be that there can't (or must)- be 777 in π.

Will it be possible e.g. to calculate- whether any given proposition of digits occurs- or how often it does.

Relation between proof showing that- 777 must be between n & m & - proof that they are at the vth place- (v being between n & m). Ms-148,30v

Negation of a mathematical proposition &- fault in a calculation.

25 × 25 = 600x <…>x ∙ cos x = sin x      “Are there an infinite number of 777 in- π?”      “There aren't”.

“Question” corresponds to “investigation”.

Heptagon must there have been an- investigation.

“Is 5. a cardinal number?”

There is a contradiction between the- normal use of the word “proposition”,- “question.” Ms-148,31r

“Wouldn't one like to know with- real certainty whether the other had- pains?”

Feeling of pastness. “The experiences bound- up with the gesture etc. aren't the- experience of pastness, for they could- be there without the feeling of pastness”.– But, on the other hand, would- it be that experience of pastness without- those experiences bound up with the- gesture?– Why should we say that- the characteristiccharacteristic || essential part is- the part outside those experiences?- Isn't the experience at least partially- described if I have described the gestures- etc.?

Auch so: Die Worte “lang ist es her–”- rufen in mir manchmal ein bestimmtes- Gefühl wach. Manchmal nicht. Aber wenn- sie es wachrufen so sind sie, ihr <…>- Teil der charakteristischen Erfahrung.

Sprechen mit Andern & mit mir selbst:- “Wenn ich eine gewisse Erfahrung habe, gebe- ich (nur) das Zeichen ✢ ….” Ms-148,31v

When one says “I talk to myself” one- generally means just that one speaks & is the- only person listening.

If I look at something red &- say, to myself, this is red, am I- giving myself an information? Am- I communicating a personal experience- to myself. Some philosophising people might be inclined to say that this is the only real- case of communication of personal- experience because only I know- what I really mean by ‘red’.

Remember in which special cases- only it has sense to inform a persona person || an other person that the colour he sees now- is red.

One doesn't say to oneself “This is a chair.– Oh- really?”

Wie kann ich denn einer Erfahrung (etwa- einem Schmerz) einen Namen geben? Ist es- nicht als wollte ich ihm, etwa, einen Hut aufsetzen?

Nehmen wir an man sagte: “Man kann - Ms-148,32r ihm nur indirekt einen Hut aufsetzen” so würde- ich fragen: Glaubst Du daß man je auf die- Idee gekommen wäre davon zu reden wenn- man nicht daran gedacht hätte daß- man dem Menschen der Schmerzen hat einen- Hut aufsetzen kann? Zu sagen man- könne dem Schmerz nur indirekt einen Hut- aufsetze macht es erscheinen als gäbe es- dennoch einen direkter Weg der nur tatsächlich nicht gangbar sei. <…>

The difficulty is that we feel that we- have said something about the nature- of pain when we say that one person- can't have another person's pain.- Perhaps we shouldn't be inclined- to say that we had anything- physiological or even psychological- but something metapsychological- metaphysical. Something about- the essence, nature, of pain as- opposed to its causal connections to- other phenomena.

Es scheint uns etwa als wäre es zwar- nicht falsch sondern unsinnig zu- sagen “ich fühle seine Schmerzen”, aber- als wäre dies so infolge der Natur - Ms-148,32v des Schmerzes, der Person etc.. Als- wäre also jene Aussage letzten- Endes doch eine Aussage über- die Natur der Dinge.      Wir sprechen also etwa von- einer Asymmetrie- unserer Ausdrucksweise & fassen diese auf als ein- Spiegelbild des Wesens der Dinge.

Intangibility of impressions. (Anguish)- Some we should say were more tangible- than others. Seeing more tangible- than a faint pain; & this more tangible than a vague fear, longing etc.      In what way are these intangible experiences less easy to communicate- to describe than the ‘simpler’ ones?      In what way do we use the phrase:- “This experience is difficult to describe.”      And can it be even impossible to describe certain experiences?

Was für einen Sinn hat es zu sagen- diese Erfahrung ist nicht beschreibbar? Wir möchten sagen: sie ist zu komplex, zu subtil.

“Diese Erfahrung ist nicht mitteilbar, aber- ich kenne sie,– weil ich sie habe.” Ms-148,33r

“Es gibt die Erfahrung, & die Beschreibung- der Erfahrung.– Daher kann es nicht- gleichgültig sein, ob der Andere die selbe- Erfahrung hat, wie ich, oder nicht;– &- daher muß es wenn ich mit mir selbst rede- auf diesediese || meine Erfahrung ankommen. Es muß- dabei eine entscheidende Rolle spielen- daß ich diese Erfahrung kenne (während ich- mit der des Andern nicht direkt vertraut bin).”

Kann man sagen: “In demdem || das was ich über- die Erfahrung des Andern sage, spielt seine- Erfahrung (selbst) nicht hinein. In demdem || das was- ich über meine Erfahrung sage spielt diese Erfahrung- selbst hinein.”?      “Ich spreche über meine Erfahrung,- sozusagen, in ihrer Anwesenheit”.

Wie wenn jemand sagen würde: “Es gibt nicht- nur die Beschreibung des Tisches sondern- auch den Tisch.”

“Es gibt nicht nur das Wort ‘Zahnschmerz’,- es gibt auch such a thing assuch a thing as || etwas wie den Zahnschmerz- selbst.”es gibt auch such a thing assuch a thing as || etwas wie den Zahnschmerz- selbst.” || … es gibt auch Zahnschmerzen.” Ms-148,33v

Es scheint, daß, da ich etwa- eine Erfahrung nicht beschreiben- kann, sie aber habe, daß ich- sie daher genauer kennen kann,- als irgend ein Anderer. Aber was- heißt, die Erfahrung kennen,- wenn es nicht heißt, sie beschreiben- & nicht heißt, sie haben.      Gibt es eine Kenntnis der Erfahrung, die wir nicht mitteilen können?

Hat es Sinn zu sagen “ich kenne diese- Erfahrung besserbesser || genauer als irgend ein- Anderer sie kennen kann”? Gibt es Erfahrungen die der Andere ebensogut kennen- kann wie ich & solche, die er nicht so gut- kennen kann? Heißt das: er kann diese- selbe komplizierte Erfahrung nicht haben?– Es heißt wohl:- “Er kann sie haben, aber wir können nienie || nicht- wissen, daß er geradegerade || genau diese gehabt hat”.- Z.B. scheint es als könnten wir- sagen: “Wir können in einem Sinn wissen daß- er gerade diese einfärbige, glatte, rote Fläche- sieht, aber nicht, daß er genau dieses Flimmern- sieht. Weil sich das genaue Gesichtsbild- beim Flimmernbeim Flimmern || des Flimmerns nicht beschreiben läßt.

Es gibt ja auch den Fall, in dem wir ein Gesichtsbild genauer durch ein gemaltes Bild als durch - Ms-148,34r Worte beschreiben können.

Wie ist es damit: “Man kann eine Figur genauer- mit Hilfe von Maßzahlen als ohne diese beschreiben”.

Aber die Erfahrung, die ich habe scheint - eine Beschreibung dieser Erfahrung, im gewissen- Sinne, zu ersetzen. “Sie ist ihre eigene Beschreibung”.

Vermischen wir hier nicht zwei Dinge: die Zusammengesetztheit der Erfahrung &, was man- ihren ursprünglichen GeschmackGeschmack || Ton || flavour nennen könnte?- Ihre eigentliche natürliche Farbe?

Es ist die Auffassung, daß von der ursprünglichen Erfahrung nur ein Teil- beibei || in der Mitteilung erhalten bleibt, & etwas- anderes von ihr verloren geht. Nämlich eben ‘ihr timbre’,- oder wie man es nennen möchte. Es kommt- einem hier so vor als könnte man, sozusagen nur die farblose Zeichnung vermitteln & der Andere- setzte in sie seine Farben ein. Aber das ist- natürlich (eine) Täuschung.

Aber können wir nicht wirklich sagen, wir- hätten in dem Andern durch unsere Beschreibung ein Bild hervorgebracht aber wir- können nicht wissen ob dieses Bild nun - Ms-148,34v genau das gleiche ist, wie das unsere? - Denken wir hier an den Gebrauch- des Wortes “gleich” in solchen Sätze wie: “Diese- Kreise sind dem Augenschein nach- ganz gleich.”

Hierher gehört auch, daß wir gewöhnlich- unser Gesichtsbild nicht als etwas in- uns empfinden wie etwa einen Schmerz im Auge- daß wir aber wenn wir philosophieren- geneigt sind diesem Bild gemäß- zu denken.

The ‘if-sensation’. Compare with the ‘table-sensation’. There is the question “What's the table-sensation like” & the answer is a picture of a- table. In what sense is the if-sensation- analogous to the table-sensation? Is there- a description of this sensation & what do we- call a description of it. Putting the gestures instead of the sensation means just- giving the nearest rough description there- is of the Experience.

Example [“I have a peculiar feeling of pastness in my wrist.”] Ms-148,35r 6) “We shall never know whether he meant this- or that”. C died after the training in that- room. We say: “Perhaps he would have- reacted like B when taken into the daylight.” - But we shall never know.      α) We should say this question was decided- if he arose from his grave & we then made- the experiment with him. Or his ghost appeared- to us in a spiritualist séance & told- us that he has a certain experience.      β) We don't accept any evidence.- But what if we didn't accept the evidence- in 5) either & said (something like) “We can't- be sure that he is the identical man- who was trained in the room”, or: “he is- the identical man but we can't know whether- he would have behaved like this in the- past time when he was trained”. 7) We introduce a new notation for the- expression “If P happens then always (as a rule)- Q happens. P didn't happen this time & Q didn't- happen.” We say instead: “If P had happened- Q would have happened”. E.g. “If the gunpowder- is dry under these circumstances a spark of this strength explodes it. It- wouldn't dry this time & under the same circumstances didn't explode.” We say- instead “If the gunpowder had been dry this time- it would have exploded”. The point of this- notation is that it nears the form of this- preposition very much to the form: “The gunpowder- Ms-148,35v was dry this time so it exploded”. I mean- the new form doesn't stress the fact- that it did not explode but, we- might say, paints a vivid picture of- it exploding this time. We could imagine- two forms of expression in a picture language corresponding- to the two kinds of notations in the word- language. The second notation- will be particularly appropriate e.g. if- we wish to give a person a shock by- making him vividly imagine that which would- have happened, stressing only slightly that- it didn't happen.       8) Someone might say to us: “But are- you sure that the second sentence means- just what the first one means & not - just something similar or that & something else- as well? (Moore) I should say: I'm talking- of the case where it means just this,- & this seems to me- an important case (which you caused- by saying what you have said). But- of course I don't say that it- isn't used in other ways as well & then- we'll have to talk about these- other cases separately.       9) Someone says –“lowering one's voice some - Ms-148,36r times means that what you say is less important than- the rest & in other cases you lower your voice to show- that you wish to draw- special attention to what you now say .”      WeWe || It must be clear that our examples are- not preparations to the analysis- of the actual meaning of the expression- so & so (Nicod) but giving them effects- that “analysis”.      11) Have we now shown that to- say in 5 “We can't know whether he would have behaved- …” makes no sense? We should say- the sentencethe sentence || to say this sentence under these circumstances has- lost itsits || the point which it would have had- under other circumstances but this doesn't mean that we- can't give it another point.      10) We say “We can't know whether this spark- would have been sufficient to ignite that mixture;- because we can't reproduce the exact mixture- not having the exact ingredients or not having a- balance to weigh them etc. etc.” But suppose- we could reproduce all the circumstances & someone- said “we can't know whether it would have- exploded” as we can't know whetheras we can't know whether || & being asked why he said because under these- circumstances it would have exploded then.”- This answer would set our head whirling. We should- feel he wasn't playing the same game with- that expression as we do. We should be - Ms-148,36v inclined to say “This makes no sense!”- And this means that we are at a loss- not knowing what reasoning, what actions- go with this expression. Moreover we believe- that he made up a sentence analogous- to sentences used in certain language- games not noticing that he- took the point away.      In which case do we say that a- sentence has a point? That comes to- asking in which case do we call- something a language game. I- can only answer. Look at the family- of language games & that will show- you whatever can be shown about- the matter.

12) (The private visual image.) B is trained to- describe his afterimage when he has looked- say into a bright red light. He is made to- look into the light, & then to shut his eyes- & he is then asked “What do you see?”. This- question before was put to him only if he- looked at physical objects. We suppose he- reacts by a description of what he sees with- closed eyes.– But halt! This description- of the training seems wrong for what if- Ms-148,37r I had had to describe my own, not B's, training.- Would I then also have said: “I reacted- to the question by …” & not rather: “When- I had closed my eyes I saw an image &- described it”. If I say “I saw an image- & described it I say this as opposed to the- case wherewhere || in which I gave a description without- seeing an image. (I might have lied or not.)- Now we could of course also distinguish these cases- if B describes an afterimage. But we don't wish- to consider now- cases in which the mechanism of lying plays any- part. For if you say “I always know whether- I am lying but not whether the other - person is”, I say: in the case I'm considering- I can't be said to know that I'm not- lying, or let us say not saying the untruth,- because the dilemma saying the truth or the- untruth is in this case unknown to me. Remember that when I'm asked- “what do you see here” I don't always ask- myself: “Now shall I say the truth or - something else?” If you say “but surely if- you in fact speak the truth then you did see something & you saw what you said you saw” - I answer: How can I know that I see what I- say I see? Do I have a criterion or use one for the colour I see actually being red? Ms-148,37v

13) We imagine that the expression “I can't see what you see”- has been given sense by explaining it- to mean: “I can't see what you see being- in a different position relative to the object- we are looking at”, or “ … having not as- good eyes as you”, or “ … having found- as in … that B sees something which- we don't though we look at the same Object.”- etc. I can't see your afterimage might- be explained to mean I can't see what- you see if I close my eyes meaning- you say you see a red circle, I see- a yellow one.      14) Identity of physical objects, of shapes,- colours, dreams, toothache.      15) (The object we see) The physical Object &- its appearance. Form of expression: different- views of the same physical object are different- objects seen. We ask “What do you see”- & he can either answer “a chair”, or- „this” (& draw the particular view of the- chair). So we are now inclined to say- that each man sees a different object- & one which no other person sees, for- even if they look at the same chair from- the same spot it may appear different- to them & the objects before the other- mind's eye I can't look at.      16) (I can't know whether he sees anything - Ms-148,38r at all or only behaves as I do when I see- something.) There seems to be an undoubted- asymmetry in the use of the word “to see” (& all- words relating to personal experience). One- cancan || is inclined to state this in the way that “I know when- I see something by just seeing it, without hearing- what I say or observing the rest of my behaviour- whereas I know that he sees & what he sees- only by observing his behaviour, i.e. indirectly”.      a) There is a mistake in this <…>: I know what- I see because I see it”. What does it mean to- know that.      b) It is true to say that my reason for saying- that I see is not the observation of my- behaviour. But this is a grammatical proposition.      c) It seems to be an imperfection that I- can only know ‒ ‒ ‒. But this is just- the way we use the word ‒ ‒ ‒.– Could we then- … if we could? Certainly.

Does the person who has not learnt language- knowDoes the person who has not learnt language- know || Should we say that the person who has not learnt the language- knows that he sees red but can't express- it?– Or should we say: “he knows what he sees- but can't express it”?– So besides seeing it he- also knows what he sees?      Imagine we described a totally different- experiment; say this, that I sting someone with- a needle & observe whether he cries out or notcries out or not || makes a sound or not. Then- surely it would interest us if the subject - Ms-148,38v whenever wewhenever we || often when we stung him saw, say, a red circle. And- we would distinguish the case when he- cried out & saw a circle from the case- when he cried out & didn't see one.      This case is quite straightforward & there is- no problem about it.is- no problem about it. || seems- to be nothing problematic in it.

If I say “I tell myself that I- see red, I tell myself what I see”- it seems that after having told- myself I now know better what I- see, am better acquainted with it,- than before. (Now in a sense this may- be so …)

“When he asked me what colours I- saw, I guessed what he meantmeant || wanted to know & told- him.”

“It is not enough to distinguish- between the cases in which B or I say that- I see red & do see red & the case in which- I say this but don't see red; but we- must distinguish between the cases in- which I see red, say I- see red & mean to describe what I see- & the cases in which I don't mean this. Ms-148,39r

Consider the case in which I don't- say what I see in words but by pointing to a- sample. Here again I distinguish now- between the cases in which I ‘just react- by pointing’ & the case in which- I see & point.

Now suppose I asked: “how do- I know that I see & that I see red? “I.e. how do I know- that I do what you call seeing (& seeing red)?” For we use- the word ‘seeing’ & ‘red’ between us.between us. || in a game we- play with one another.

Don't you say: “In order to- be a description of our personal experience what we say must not just be our reaction- but must be justified”? But- does the justification need another justification?

Suppose, we play the game 2)- & B calls out the word “red”. Suppose- A now asks B: “do you only say ‘red’ or did- you really see it?”.

“Surely there are two phenomena: one, just speaking,- the other, seeing & speaking accordingly.”- Answer: Certainly we speak of these two cases- but we shall here have to show how - Ms-148,39v these expressions are used; or, in other- words, how they are taught. For the- mere fact that we possess a- picture of them does not help us- as we must describe in what way this picture- is used. More especially as we are- inclined to assume a use different- from the actual one.      We have therefore to explain under- what conditions we say: “I say ‘red’ but- don't see red” or “I say ‘red’ & see red”, or- “I said ‘red’ but didn't see red” etc. etc..      Imagine that saying red was often - followed by some agreeable event. We found- that the child enjoyed that event & often- instead of ‘green’ said ‘red’. We would use- this reaction to play another language- game with the child. We would say- “you cheat, it's red”. Now again we are- dependent upon the subsequent reaction of the child.      Such games are actually played- with children: Telling a person the untruth- & enjoying his surprise at finding out- what really happened.

But couldn't we imagine some kind- of perversity in a child which made it- say red when it saw green & vice versa & at the - Ms-148,40r same time this not being discovered because- it happened to see red in those cases when we say green?- But if here we talk of perversity we- couldcould || might also assume that we all were- perverse. For how are we or B ever to- find out that he is perverse?      The idea is, that he finds out (& we do) when- later on he learns how the word ‘perverse’ is- used & then he remembers that he was- that way all along.      Imagine this case: The child looks- at the lights: says the name of the right- colour to himself in an aside & then loud- the wrong word. It chuckles while doing- so. This is, one may say, a rudimentary- form of cheating. One might even say:- “This child is going to be a liar”. But- if it had not said the aside but- only imagined itself pointing to one colour- on the chart & then said the wrong word,– - was this cheating too?      Can a child cheat like a banker without the knowledge of the banker?

“I can assure you that before when I- said ‘I see red’ I saw black.” Ms-148,40v

“He tells us his private experience,- that experience which nobody but he- knows anything about”.

“Surely his memory is worth more than- our direct criteria, as only he could- know what he saw.”

But let us see;– We sometimes say- outside philosophy such things as- “of course only he knows how he feels” or “I can't know what you feel”.- Now how do we apply such a statement? Mostly it is an expression of- helplessness like “I don't know what- to do”. But this helplessness is not due to an unfortunate metaphysical- fact, ‘the privacy of personal experience’, or it would worry us alwaysalways || constantly.- Our expression is comparable to this:- “What's done can't be undone!”.

We also say to the Doctor “Surely I must know whether- I have pains or not!” How do we use- this statement?

“All right if we can't talk in this way- about someone else I can certainly- say of myself that I either saw red- Ms-148,41r at that time or didn'tdidn't || had some other experience. I may- not remember now, but at the- time I saw one thing or the other!”- This is like saying “one of these- two pictures must have fitted”. And- my answer is not that perhaps neither of them- fits but that I'm not yet clear- about what ‘fitting’ in this case means.

Now is it the same case or are these- different cases: A blind man sees- everything just as we do but he acts- as a blind man does & on the other- hand he sees nothing & acts as- a blind man does. At first sight we- should say: here we have obviously two- clearly different cases although we- admit that we can't know which we have- before us. I should say: We obviously use two different pictures which- oneone || we could describe like this: …. But- we use the pictures in such a way- that the two games ‘come to the same’.

By the way,– would you say that he- surelysurely || certainly knew that he was blind if he- was so? Why do you feel more reluctant- about this statement? Ms-148,41v

“Surely he knew that he saw red- but he couldn't say so!”– Does that- mean “Surely he knew that he saw the colour- which we call ‘red’ …” – or- would you say it means “he knew- that he saw this colour” (pointing to a- red patch). But did he while he knew- it point to this patch?

Use of: “He knows what colour he sees”.- “I knew what colour I saw” etc..

“Nachdunkeln der Erinnerung” does this- expression make sense & in what cases. And isn't on the other hand the- picture which we use quite clear in- all cases?

The case of old people usually havinghaving || getting- memories of the time in which they learnt- to speak & understand speech:       a) They say or paint that such &- such things have happened although- other records always contradict them       b) The memories agree with the- records. Only in this case shall we- say that they remember ….

Suppose they paint the scenes they - Ms-148,42r say they remember & paint the faces- very dark;– shall we say that they- saw them that dark or that the- colour had become darker in their memory?

How do we know what colour a- person sees? By the sample he points- to? And how do we know - what relation the sample is meant to have- to the original? Now are we to say- “we never know …”? Or had we better- cut these “we never know …” out of our- language & consider how as a matter- of fact we are wont to use the- word “to know”?

What if someone asked: “How do I know- that what I call seeing red is not an entirely different- experience every time & that I am not deluded- into thinking that it is the same or nearly- the same?”? Here again the answer “I- can't know & the subsequent removal of the question”.

Is it ever true that when I call a- colour ‘red’ I serve myself of memory??serve myself of memory?? || make use of memory??

To use the memory of what happened - Ms-148,42v when we were taught language is all right- as long as we don't think that- this memory teaches us something- essentially private.

“A rod has one length or another- how ever we find it out.” Here again- the picture .

“Though he can't say what it is he- sees while he is learning No. 1, he'll- tell us afterwards what he saw.- We mix this case up with the one:- “When his gag will have been removed- he'll tell us what he saw”.

What does it mean ‘to tell someone what- one sees’? Or (perhaps), ‘to show someone what one sees’?

When we say “he'll tell us what- he saw” we have an idea that- then we'll know what he really saw- in a direct way (“at least if he isn't lying”).

“He is in a better position to say what he- sees than we are.”– That depends.–

If we say “he'll tell us what he saw”, it- is as though he would now make a - Ms-148,43r use of language which we had never taught- him.

It is as if now we got an insight- into something which before we had only- seen from the outside.

Inside & outside!

“Our teachingteaching || training connects the word ‘red’- (or is meant to connect it) with a particular impression of his (a private impression- an impression in him). He then communicates- this impression– indirectly, of course– - through the medium of speech.”

Where is our idea of “direct & indirect communication” taken from?

How, if we said, as we sometimes might be inclined: “We can only hope that- this– indirect way of communication really- succeeds”.

We so long see the facts about the usage of our- words crookedly asas || so long as we are still- tempted here to talk of direct & indirect.

As long as you use the picture indirect-direct in this case you can't trust yourself- Ms-148,43v about judging the grammatical situation- rightly otherwise.

Is telling what one sees something- like turning one's inside out? And learning- to say what one sees, learning to let- others see inside us?

“We teach him to make us see what he- sees”. He seems in an indirect way to- show us the object which he sees, the object- which is before his mind's eye. “We can't- look at it, it is in him.”

The idea of the private object of vision. - Appearance, sense-datum.

The visual field. (Not to be confused with visual- space.)

Telling someone what one sees seems- like showing him, if indirectly, the object- which is before one's mind's eye.

The idea of the object before one's mind's eye- is (firmly) tied up with the- idea of a comparison of such- objects in different persons - compared to which the comparison - Ms-148,44r really used is an indirect one.

Whence the idea of the privacy of sensedata?

“But do you really wish to say that they- are not private that one person can- see the picture before the other person's- eye?”

Surely you wouldn't think that telling someone what one sees isis || could be a- more direct way of communicating than- showing him by pointing to a sample!

“He'll tell us later what it was he saw”- means that we'll get to know in a (comparatively) direct & a sure way what he saw as opposed- to the guesses we could make before.

We don't realize that the answer he- gives us now is only part of a game like No. 1- only more complicated. Ms-148,44v

We don't deny that he can remember having- dreamt so & so before he was born. Denying- this to us would be like denying that- he can say he remembers having dreamt- so & so before he was born.      I.e. we don't deny that he can- make this move but we say that- the move alone or together with all- the sensations, feelings etc. he might- have while he is making it does not- tell us what game it is a move of.what game it is a move of. || to what game the move belongs.      We might e.g. never try to connect up- a statement of this sort with anything- past (in an other sense). We might treat- it as an interesting phenomenon &- possibly connect it up with the persons writing- in a Freudian way or on the other hand- we may look for some phenomena in the- brain of the embryo which might be- called dreams etc. etc.. Or we may just- say: “old people are liable to say such- things” & leave it at that.

Suppose now someone remembered that- yesterday he called red ‘green’ & vice- versa but that this didn't appear as he- also saw green what today he sees red- & vice versa. Now here is a case in which- we might be inclined to say that we- Ms-148,45r learn from him today something about- the working of his mind yesterday, that- yesterday we judged by the outside while- today we are allowed to look at the- inside of what happened. It is as though- we looked back but now got a glance- at something that was closed to usclosed to us || covered up yesterday.

If I say what it is I see how do- I compare what I say with what I- see in order to know whether I say- the truth?      Lying about what I see, you might say,- is knowing what I see & saying something- else. Supposing I said it just consists- of saying to myself ‘this is red’ & aloud- ‘this is green’.

Compare lying & telling the truth in the- case of telling what colour you see- with the case of describing a picture which- you saw or telling the right number- of things you had to count.

Collating what you say & what you see.

Is there always a collating? Ms-148,45v

Or could you call it giving a picture of- the colour I see if I say the word- “red”? Unless it be a picture by its- connection with a sample.

But isn't it giving a picture if I point to- a sample?

“What I show reveals what I see”;– - in what sense does it do that? The- idea is that now you can so to speak- look inside me. Whereas I only reveal- to you what I see in a game of- revealing & hiding which is altogether- played with signs of one category.- “Direct-indirect”.

We are thinking of a game in which- there is an inside in the normal sense.

We must get clear about how the- metaphor of revealing (outside & inside)- is actually applied by us; otherwise- we shall be tempted to look for- an inside behind that which in our- metaphor is the inside.

We are used to describing the case- by means of a picture which say- Ms-148,46r contains 3 steps. But when we think about language we forget how- this picture is actually applied in- practical cases. We then are often- tempted to apply it as it wasn't- meant originallymeant originally || originally meant & are puzzled- about a third step in the facts.

“I see a particular sense-datumsense-datum || image || thing & say- a particular thing”. This is all right- if I realise the way in which I specify- what I see & what I say.

“If he had learnt to show me (or tell me)- what he sees, he could now show me.”- Certainly,– but what is it like to- show me what he sees? It is pointing- to something under particular circumstances. Or is it something else (don't- be misled by the idea of indirectness).      You compare it with such a statement- as: “if he had learnt to open- up he could now open up & show- me what's insidehe could now open up & show- me what's inside || I could now see what's inside. I say yes, but- remember what opening up in this- case is like.

But what about the criterion whether- there is anything inside or not? Here we- say “I know that there is something- Ms-148,46v inside in my case. And this is how- I know of the ‘inside’ at all first- hand”.And this is how- I know of the ‘inside’ at all first- hand”. || And this is how I have first- hand knowledge of the inside at- all.” || This is how I know about an- inside & am led to suppose it in the other person too.” Further we are not inclined to say that only hitherto we have not known the mind of an other person but that the idea of this knowledge is bound up with the idea of myself.

“So if I say ‘he has toothache’ I am- supposing that he has what I- have if I have toothache.” Suppose I- said: “If I say ‘I suppose’ he has- toothache, I am supposing that he- has what I have if I have toothache”,– this would be like saying- “If I say ‘this cushion is red’ I mean- that it has the same colour which- the sofa has if it is red”. But- this wasn't what I intended to- sayI intended to- say || was meant with the first sentence. I- wished to say that talking about- his toothache at all was based- upon a supposition, a supposition which- by its very essence could not be verified.

But if you look closer you will see- that this is an entire misrepresentation of the use of the word “toothache”. Ms-148,47r

Can two people have the same- afterimage?

Language-game ‘Description of imaginingsimaginings || the picture before one's mind's eye.’

Can two persons have the- same picture before their mind's eye.

In which case would we say that- they had two images exactly alike but- not identical?

The fact that two ideas seem here- inseparably bound up suggests to- us that we are dealing with one idea- only & not with two & that by a- queer trick our language suggests a- totally different structure of grammar- than the one actually used. For- we have the sentence that only I- can know directly my experience &- only indirectly the experience of- the other person. ThisThis || Thus language suggests 4 possible- combinations but rules out 2. It is- as though I had used the 4 letters- Ms-148,47v a b c d to denote two objects only- but by my notation somehow- suggesting that I am talking of 4.

It seems as though I wished to- say that to me Ludwig Wittgenstein something applied- which does not apply to other- people. That is, there seems to be an- asymmetry. I express things asymmetrically & could- express them symmetrically; only then one- would see what facts prompt us to- the asymmetrical expression.

I do this by spreading the use of the word I- over all human bodies as opposed to- Ludwig Wittgenstein alone.

I want to describe a situation- in which I should not be tempted to- say that I assumed or believed that- the other had what I have. Or, in other- words a situation in which we would- not speak of my consciousness & his consciousness. And in which the idea would not- Ms-148,48r occur to us that we could only be- conscious of our own consciousness.

The idea of the ego inhabiting a- body to be abolished.

If what any consciousness spreads over- all human bodies then there won't be- any temptation to use the word ‘ego’.

Let's assume that hearing was- done by no organ of the body we know- of.

Let us imagine the following arrangement:      If it is absurd to say that I only- know that I see but not that the- others do,– isn't this at any rate less- absurd than to say the opposite?

Ist eine Philosophie undenkbar die das- diametrale Gegenteil des Solipsismus ist?       Ms-148,48v

The idea of the constituent of a- fact: “Is my person (or a person) a- constituent of the fact that- I see or not”. This expresses a question- concerning the symbolism just as- if it were a question about nature.

“Es denkt”. Ist dieser Satz wahr & “ich- denke” falsch?

Language-game: I paint, for myself, what I- see. The picture doesn't contain me.

A board game - in fact chess but the- board has a square- which must never be- used. This may be- misleading.

A board game in which only one man- is said to play the other- to ‘answer’.

What if the other person always- correctly described what I saw,- & imagined, would I not say he knows- what I see?– “But what if he describes it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't - I say he was mistaken?” Ms-148,BCr Ms-148,BCv