Title: | Ms-149: C5 (WL) - Normalized transcription [Draft] [Currently not available:] |
Author: | Ludwig Wittgenstein |
Editor: | Edited by Organization: Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB). Editors: Alois Pichler, WAB (text and facsimile) |
Funders & Partners: | Trinity College, Cambridge; Oxford University Press, Oxford; Uni Research, Bergen; University of Bergen, Bergen; L. Meltzers Høyskolefond, Bergen; COST Action A32, Brussels; eContent+ DISCOVERY, Luxembourg; ICT PSP DM2E, Brussels |
Transcription: | Øystein Hide, William Boos (transcription in MECS-WIT markup: 1998, 1999) |
Alois Pichler (2001-: coordination and editorial guidelines; amendments; conversion from MECS-WIT to XML-TEI; XML-TEI markup) | |
Claus Huitfeldt, Kjersti Bjørnestad Berg, Sindre Sørensen, MLCD project (2001: parser for conversion from MECS to XML) | |
Vemund Olstad, Øyvind L. Gjesdal (2002-: stylesheets) | |
Tone Merete Bruvik, Øyvind L. Gjesdal (2006-: XML-TEI validation) | |
Heinz Wilhelm Krüger, Deirdre C. P. Smith (2006-: amendments; XML-TEI markup) | |
Špela Vidmar (2013-14: proofreading) | |
Alexander Berg (2014: proofreading) |
Rights: | Copyright holders: The Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge; University of Bergen, Bergen. Released under the Creative Commons General Public License Attribution, Non-Commercial, Share-Alike version 3 (CCPL BY-NC-SA). |
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But after all only I can lastly decide- whether what he said, is
right.
“We can't- assume that he knows what I see-
& I don't!”
We can absolutely do this!
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Can a man doubt whether what he- sees is red or green?
[Elaborate this]
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“Surely if he knows
anything he must know- that he sees!”–
It is true that the- game of “showing or telling what one
sees” is one- of the most fundamental language- games, which means
that what we- in ordinary life call using language- mostly
presupposes this game.
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I can for what I see use the- impersonal form of
description & the- fact that I say “for what I see”-
doesn't say at all that after all- this is only a disguised
personal- description!
For I just expressed myself in
English.For I just expressed myself in
English. || For I just expressed myself in our
ordinary form of expression.
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Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger- symmetrischer Körper, oder das
Unregelmäßige was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn vor einer-
Ecke aus sehe?
Was soll ich- hervorheben?
Soll ich sagen er sei primär- unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas-
Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert- darstellen, oder er sei primär
regelmäßig- sei aber unregelmäßig projiziert gesehen?
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What's the difference between me being- angry and
him being angry?
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If I wish to write down my experiences the two experiences that- I am
angry & that he is angry are- absolutely entirely different
(although- the words used to describe them- are very
similar.)
I might therefore- naturally object to this way
of- expression.
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“Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten & 3-
imaginäre.”
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If I write down my own experiences- nothing is more natural than to- refer
by ‘I’ only to my bodybody || or
Ludwig Wittgenstein's body
as- opposed to other bodies, but not to distinguish my
toothache from his by the- words I & he.
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The usual game played with the word ‘toothache’-
involves the distinction of bodies which- have the
toothache.
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Does the solipsist also say that only he can- play chess?
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But he will say that behind the sentence- ‘I see
…’ when he says it & it's true there
stands- something which does not stand behind- “he sees” or
‘I see’ when the other man says it.
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I'll start with a description of- what ‘I
see’ but in impersonal form.
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‘Ich spreche’ & ‘der Andere
spricht’ sind zwei
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Ich sage “Es ist schön”, dann sage ich-
“das habe ich gesprochen”.
Damit habe ich- weder mir noch dem Andern gesagt wer- es
gesprochen hat.
Ich habe einen gezeigt.
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“Aber woher weiß ich daß ich- gesprochen haben wenn
nicht aus der- eigentümlichen motorischen Erfahrung des
- Sprechens.”
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Das Wort ‘Ich’ bezeichnet keine Person.
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Remember that, whatever the word- ‘I’ means to you, to
the other- man it showsshows || draws his attention to a
human body & is- of no value otherwise.
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Hat es einen Sinn zu- sagen, der Stern bleibt- beim gleichen
Punkt?
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I could write say a book- on Physics in
which every sentence- starts with “I
remember”.
Could one say: Here the sentences- are all directly backed by real experiences- or by primary reality. We must be misled in- a queer way! |
“Surely”, I want to say, “if I'm
to be really quite frank- I must say that I have something- which
nobody has”.–
But who's I?–-
Hell! I don't express myself properly- but
there's something you can't- deny that there is
my personal- experience & that this in a most- important sense
has no neighbour.–-
But you don't mean by that that it happens to be alone
but that its grammatical position is that of having no
neighbour.
“But somehow our language doesn't- bring it out, that there is something- unique namely real present experience, & do- you just wish to advise me to resign myself- to that?” |
[A philosophical book might be entitled
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(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel- that we have to
resign ourselves to- something by using ordinary
language!)
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How is it that the Auszeichnung I
might propose- for those sentences which describe my- personal
experience does not really quite- satisfy
me?
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Partly because of what we call “imagining- that the other person
sees (feels pain etc.)”.
D.h. wir sind geneigt dasselbe- Bild für <…> Vorgänge zu verwenden. |
Now imagine this: as soon as even he- has learnt enough of language to-
express
it he tells us that- he saw blue when he said ‘Is not
red’.
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⋏This sounds as if then we
really ought- to be convinced that he saw blue
etc.
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The person who paints his memories.
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Augustine, about expressing
the- wishes inside him.
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Why shouldn't we consider the case that the- child learns
to think & always dreams that it had a private language before it learnt
ours.
Only: What do we mean by learning- the language? In what sense can- we be said to teach the child the- natural gesture-language? Or can't- we teach him that? |
Kreis & Ellipse.
Soll ich sagen: “er- hat der Kreis gestern als
Ellipse- gesehen”, oder so stellt er den- folgende Tag
einen Kreis dar”.
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[Sich daran erinnern das & das gedacht- zu haben.
“Ich erinnere mich nicht an- ihn aber ich weißweiß || erinnere
mich daß er mir einen dümmlichen- Eindruck gemacht hat.”]
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“He mostly sees red where we see red.”
The normal use of the expression “he- sees green where …” is this: We take- it as the criterion for meaning- the same by ‘red’ as we do- that as a rule he argues with us in giving- the same names to the colours of- objects as we do. If then in a particular- instant he says something is red when we- should say that it's green we say that- he sees it differently from us. Notice how in such a case we would- behave. We should look for a cause- of his differing judgement & if we had found- one we should certainly be inclined to- say he saw red when we saw green.
It is further clear that even before- ever finding such a cause we- might under circumstances be- inclined to say this. But also- that we can't give a strict rule- for …. |
Consider this case: someone says it's queerit's queer || I can't understand it- I see everything red blue today & vice versa.- We answer: it must look queer! He says- it does & e.g. goes on to say how cold- the glowing coal looks & how warm- the clear (blue) sky. I think we should- under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that he saw red what- we saw blue. And again we should say- that we know that he means by- the words blue & red what we do- as he has always used them as we diddid || had. |
On the other hand: Someone tells us- today that
yesterday he always saw- everything red blue and
so on.
We say: But you called the
glowing- coal red you know & the sky blue.
He- answers: That was because I had also
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Case of contradictory- memory images.
Tomorrow he remembers this, the day after
tomorrow- something else.
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The whole trend, to show that - the expression “letting one look into
his soul” is often misleading.
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Back to the example of the number of afterimages.-
We can say that these cases are- not cases of
communications of personal
experiences if there- were no
personal experiences
but only ‘the- outward signs’?
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Now I ask what are our criteria- for there being or there having been a
personal- experience
besides the expression?
And here- the answer seems to be that for- the outsider the
other man the criteria- are indeed more outside expressions,- but
that I myself know whether- I have an experience or not; in
particular
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But let me ask what is knowing- that I see red like. I mean:
look at- something red ‘know that it is red’ &-
askask || observe || mark yourself what
you're doing.
Don't- you mean seeing red & impressing it on- your mind
that you are doing so?
But- there are, I suppose, several things that- you are doing:
You probably say to yourself the word
‘red’ or ‘this is red’ or
something of the sort, or perhaps glance from- the red object to
another red one- which you're taking to be the
paradigm- of red & such like.
On the other hand you- just intently stare at the red thing.
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In part of their uses the
expressions- ‘visual
image’ & ‘picture’ run parallel- but where
they don't the analogy- which does
exist tends to delude us.
Tautology
The grammar of ‘seeing red’ connected- to the expression of seeing red- closer than one thinks. |
“You talk as though one
couldn'tcouldn't || can't- see a red patch
if one
can't say
“Seeing something” of course doesn't mean- the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of these expressions are closer related than- it might appear to you. We say a blind man does not see- anything. But not only do we say so- but he too says that he does not- see. I don't mean “he agrees with us- that he does not see”, “he does not- dispute it”, but rather, he too describes- the facts in this way having learnt- the same language as we have. Now- whom do we call blind, what is our- criterion for blindness? A certain- kind of behaviour. And if the person- behaves in that particular way we- not only call him blind but teach- him to call himself blind. And in this- sense his behaviour also determines- the meaning of blindness for him.- But now you will say: “Surely- blindness isn't a behaviour;- it's clear that a man can behave- like a blind man & not be blind. Therefore ‘blindness’ means something different:- this behaviour only helps him
The idea is that we teach a person- the meaning of expressions relating to- personal experiences indirectly.– Such an- indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. I teach a child- the names of colours & a game, say, of- bringing objects of a certain colour when- the ‘name of the colour’ is called out.- I don't however teach him the colour-names by pointing to a sample which I & he see- saying e.g. the word ‘red’. Instead - I have various spectacles each of which- when I look through it makes me see- the white paper in a different colour. These spectacles are also distinguished by their
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[mind-reading]
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From this it should follow that- we sometimes rightly sometimes
wrongly teach a man to say that he is- blind: For what if
he saw all the- time but nevertheless behaved exactly like- a blind
man?–
Or should we say:- “Nature wouldn't play
such a trick on- us!”.
We can see here that we don't quite
And what is so misleading to us- when we consider this use is- the following: We say “Surely we can- see something without ever saying or- showing that we do & on the other hand- we can say that we see so & so without- seeing it, therefore seeing is one process- & expressing that we see another, & all- they have to do with each other is that- they sometimes coincide; they have the- same connection as being red & being- sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet etc.” Now this is obviously not quite true & not- quite false. It seems we somehowwe somehow || that we- look at the use of these words with- some prejudice. It is clear that we in our language- use the words ‘seeing red’ in such - a way that we can say “he sees …he sees … || A sees red, but- doesn't show it” on the other hand it is- easy to see that we would have no- use for these words if their application- was severed from the criteria of behaviour, that is to say, to the language -game which we play with these words- it is, both, essential that the people- who play it (should) behave in the- particular way we call expressingexpressing || saying, showing what
Balance: The point of the game depends- upon what usually happens. Point of a game ⋎ How does he know that he seessees || has the visual image red i.e. how- does he connect the word ‘red’ with ‘a particular- colour’? In fact what does the expression- ‘a particular’ here mean. What is- the criterion for his connecting itit || the word- always to the same colourcolour || experience? Is it not- often just that he calls it red? |
⋏ But doesn't then
the word “seeing red”- mean to me a particular
processparticular
process || certain (private) experience or-
(mental) event(mental) event || fact in the realm of primary
experience – which surely is
utterly- different from saying certain words?
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In fact if he is to play a
language- game the possibility of
this will- depend upon his own & the other people's-
reactions.
The game depends upon- the agreement of these reactions
i.e.- they must
describe the same things
‘red’.
“But if he speaks to himself- surely this is different. For then he needn't- consult other people's reactions &- he just gives the name ‘red’ to the- same colour to which he
It is quite true, he connects the word & the experience. |
The words “‘seeing red’ means a- part
experience” are senseless unless- we can follow them up by:
‘namely- this → (pointing)’.
Or else they may say- experience as opposed to
physical object, but-
then this is grammar.
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But I
could- use language just for making entries- in my diary & without
even having- learnt it I could have invented a name- for
the particularthe particular || a
colour sensation say- the name ‘red’ & then
used this name- to write down whenever I had that
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When you say “the expression- ‘‒ ‒ ‒’ means to
you a certain private-
experience” you are
(indeed) supplementing- this statement by imagining
a red colour, or looking- at a red object, (which- supply the ‘namely this’),
but how- do you useuse || make use of the expression
&- the experience you thus connect with it?-
For what we call the- meaning of the word lies in the
game- we play with it.
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But it seems to me that I either see- red or don't see
red.
Whether I express- it or not.
Picture we use here. This picture not questioned but its- application. Other cases of tautologies. |
“Surely seeing is one thing, & showing that- I see is
another thing”.–
This certainly, - is like saying “skipping is one thing &
If I explain to someone the use- of ‒ ‒ ‒ by ‒ ‒ ‒ Giving the ostensive definition simply- consists in ‒ ‒ ‒. One might be inclined to say that- castling was not just the act of …. But it is the game of which it is part …. So what does giving to myself the ostensive definition- of red consist in? – Now how am I to- describe it shall I say seeing red &
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But it's a blatant error to mix up- ‘seeing
red’ with showing that you see red!-
I know what seeing red is & I know- what showing …
is.
Couldn't we say- that knowing what showing …
is, is seeing
Consider the proposition: He makes sure what it- means to him by …. Would you say the word- had meaning to him if it ‘meant something else’ every- time? And what is the criterion of the same colour coming twice.- In knowing what seeing red is you seem- to give yourself a sample but you- don't because the usual criteria- for the sameness of the sample- don't apply. I can say I call ‘red’- always the same colour or whenever- I explain red I point to a sample- of the same colour. |
If we describe a game which he- plays
with himself is it relevant that- he should use the word red
for the- same colour in our sense or would we- also call it
a language game if he used- it anyhow.
Then what is the criterion- for using it in the same
way?
Not merely the- connection between ‘same’,
‘colour’ & ‘red’?
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Which is the same colour as that I- saw?
Not the one to which I apply- the words ‘this is the same
colour’?
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“Let me see if I still know which of these- colours is
red? – (looking about) Yes I know.”
(Here I could - have said “is called
red”.)
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So he can make sure of what it means in this private- way!of what it means in this private- way! || in this private- way of what it means by having a private sensation Making sure that you know what ‘seeing
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We can indeed imagine a Robinson-
using a language for himself but- then he must behave in a certain-
way or we shouldn't say that he- plays
language games with himself.
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The grammar of ‘private sense data’.
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Das Interessante ist nicht daß ich- nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muß- um
zu wissen, daß ich Zahnschmerzen habe,-
sondern, daß mir mein Benehmen gar- nichts sagt.
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“I sent him to the doctor because- he moans” is
just as correct as “I- sent him to the doctor
because he has- toothache”.
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“I moan because I have pain”.–
Are- you sure that that's why you moan?
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“But d. a. the nucleus of
our language- remains untouched whatever we might- imagine our behaviour to
be!”
The nucleus- is the word together
with its meaning.
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“‘Toothache’ is a word which I use in- a game
which I play with other people,- but it has a private meaning to
me.”
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“Christen toothache.”
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Changing the meaning of a word.-
Meaning connected with the use of- the
ostensive
definition.
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In the use of the word meaning it is essential
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Consider a game in which this isn't so.-
Would you call this sort of- activity a game?
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“Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’- always the same private experience?” |
‘I recognize it as being the- same’.
And are you also recognizing- the meaning of the word the
same,- so you can be sure that “recognizing- it to be the
same” now means the- same to you which it did before?
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“But in ostensively defining a word- for myself I impress
its meaning on- me so as not to forget it later
on”.
But- how do you know that this helps.
How- do you know later on whether you remember it-
rightly or wrongly.
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Can you recognize something to be- red which isn't red?
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To be sure that so & so is the case.-
To know: Does ‘p’ follow from
‘I know p’?
Does it make sense to say, that- what you see is green, & you recognize- it to be red? |
“It seems to me to have sense”.
You are undoubtedly using a picture- therefore it ‘seems to you to have- sense’. But ask yourself what use- you are making of that picture?- We shall have to talk about sense- & nonsense later. |
What's the use here of being sure- if it
doesn't follow that- it is so & if your being sure- is the
only criterion there is for- it being
so?
That means: This isn't at all a- case of being sure, of conviction. |
The word ‘recognizing as …’ is used where-
you can be wrong in recognizing.
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–Sometimes these bodies change their- weight & then we look
for the cause (of it)(of it) || of the change- & find, say, that something's come off the
body. -
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Sometimes however the weight of a body changes & we-
can't account for the change at
all.
But we - nevertheless don't say that weighing it- had
lost its point “because now the- body really doesn't have
any one weight”.-
Rather we say that the body had- changed somehow that this was the- cause of
the change of weight but- that hitherto we have not- found this cause.
That is, we shallshall || will- go on playing the game of weighing-
& we try to find an
explanation- for the exceptional behaviour.
We use the formal expression “the weight- of aa || this body” to designate something- inherent in the body something which- could only be demolished by destroying- part of the body. The same body – the- same weight. (And this is a grammatical proposition.) Green. Supposing what in fact is the rule- became the exception. Under certain- peculiar circumstances indeed a body - kept on weighing the same. Say iron in- the presence of mercury. A piece- of cheese on the other hand though- keeping its size, calories, etc., weighed
On the one hand it seems that if there- wasn't the behaviour of toothache … “So & so has excellent teeth, he never had- to go to the dentist, never complained- about toothache; but as toothache is a- private experience we can't know whether- he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life”. ⋎ What is an assumption that e.g. ‘A- has toothache’? Is it saying- the words “A has toothache”? Or doesn't- it consist in doing something with- these words?- ⋏ How does one assume- such & such to be the case? |
A game of assumption: ‒ ‒ ‒
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Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming:- a
gesture.
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“But the point is just that we don't- assume
that we have toothache.
Therefore- even if we have no ground for assuming- that
anyone else has toothache we may nevertheless
know that we have.”
But would- we in this case at all talk of a
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Showing his grief,, || – hiding his grief.
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Certain behaviour under certain
circumstances we call showing our
toothache- other behaviour, hiding our
toothache.
Now would- we talk about this behaviour in- this way if people
didn't ordinarily behave- in the way they do?
Suppose I & they described- my behaviour without such a
word- as pain, would the description be- incomplete?
The question- is: do I consider it
incomplete?-
If so I will distinguish between- two cases of my
behaviour & the- others will say that I use- two words alternately for
my- behaviour & thereby they will acknowledge- that I have
toothache.
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“But can't he have toothache
without in- any way showing it?
And this shows- that the word
‘toothache’ has a meaning-
entirely independent of a behaviour- connected with
toothache.”
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“The game which we-
play with the word ‘toothache’
entirely depends- upon there being a behaviour which we- call the expression
of toothache.
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“We use ‘toothache’ as
the name of a personal- experience”.–
Well let's see how we- use the
word!
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“But you know the sensation of
toothache!
So- you can give it a name, say,
‘toothache’.”
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But what is it like to give a sensation- a name?
Say it is pronouncing the name- while one has the sensation &
possibly- concentrating on the sensation, – but- what of it?
Does this name thereby- get magic powers?
And why on earth- do I call these sounds the ‘name’ of-
the sensation?
I know what I do- with the name of a man or of a
number- but have I by
this act of- ‘definition’ given the name a
use?
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“I know what toothache
is”.
But how do- I know that I know it?
Because- something comes before my mind?
ButBut || And- how do I know that that is the right
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“But when you ask me “do you- know what
toothache is” I answer- yes after having
brought before- my mind a certain sensation.”
But- now is this certain sensation
characterised?
Only by that that it- comes when you say the word
‘toothache’?-
Or that it comes & you are in- some way satisfied?
|
“To give a sensation a name” means- nothing unless I know
already- in what sort of a game this- name is to be used.
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I've described certain behaviour by:- ‘it is
obvious that he was hiding his- pain’ or: ‘I think he
was hiding- his pain’ or ‘I don't know at all
whether he was hiding pain’.
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But can't I just assume with- some degree of certainty
that he has
I can say “I assume …”, but- if I sent them all to the doctor although- they showed no sign of illnessillness || pain, I should- just be called mad. |
That we try to account for something is due to the fact that we-
often can account for it.
If I- saw no regularity whatever I- should not be inclined to
say- that there is one which I
haven't- as yet discovered.
What usually happens- makes me take this point of view.
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The ‘private definition’ is not
binding.
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In our private
language game we- had, it seemed, given a name to
an- impression, – in order, of course, to use
the- name for this
impression in the future.
The- def.,
that is, should have determined- on future
occasions for what impressions to use- the
name & for
which not to use it.-
Now we said that on certain occasions
after having given the def.
we did use the word and on
other
we
didn't;- but we described these
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“But surely I feel justified when- normally I use the word
‘red’ although- I don't think
of a def. while doing so.”
Do you mean that- whenever normally you use the word-
‘red’ you have a particular feeling- which you call a
feeling of justification.
I wonder if that is true.
But- true or nottrue or not || anyhow by
‘justification’ I
didn't- mean a feeling.
But I think I know- what makes you say that on- saying
e.g. this chairchair || book is red you- have a
feeling of being justified in- using the word.
For you might ask:- isn't there an obvious
difference
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“But do you mean that one man couldn't- play a game of
chess with himself &
[Private
experiences in fiction.]
same in the different cases?
Mustn't- we say in this case that we- can't say anything
whatever- about private experiences & are in fact not-
entitled to use the words- experiences at all?
What makes- us believe that we are is, that- we really think of the
case in- which we can describe his private-
experiences describing different
ways- of playing chess in
one's imagination. |
How can we say he may see red- although nobody may be able to- find it
out?
|
If we go through with this idea- of thethe || a private
experience which we don't- know we can't talk of a
certain- private experience either, because
In which it alludes to a certain- class of experiences which we know- though we don't know which one- of its members he has. Rather- the private experiencesexperiences || impressions- which we imagine as the background to the foreground of our actions dissolve into a mist- which we wished to talk about- & imagined to be back of our action- Rather- the private experiencesexperiences || impressions- which we imagine as the background to the foreground of our actions dissolve into a mist- which we wished to talk about- & imagined to be back of our action- || Rather the private experiences- which we imagined as an unknown x, y, z etc.- behind our actions, dissolve into a- mist & into nothing. |
One might suggest–: The word-
‘toothache’ stands on the one hand for- a
behaviour & on the other hand- for a private experience.
The connection is that when a man has- the
private experience he
tends to behave- in the particular way.
But why should you talk of- a private experience & not 100 private experiences,- as you don't know whether there is any- red or whether there are 100? |
What is so confusing here is- to talk of the meaning of the- word instead of
the use.
The idea of different kinds of objects. |
Why should you know better what- experiencing is like with the other- person
than what seeing red is like?
If you were very careful you- would say “a certain something”. |
What is it that
happens when in one- case I say “I have
toothachehave
toothache || see red & mean- it, &
am not lying,
& on the other hand I say- the words but know that they are not- true,
or say them not knowing what exactly- they mean
etc.?
|
The criteria for it being the truth- have to be laid down beforehand-
in common languagehave to be laid down beforehand-
in common language || are laid down in language
(rules, charts etc.).
“But how am- I to know how in the particular- case to apply
them?” –
For in so far as
they
| They join the rest of the rules of common language.They join in with all the rest of … not helping menot helping me || & don't help me in- my particular private- decision. | They join the rest of the rules of common language. Is there- such a thing as justifying what- in the particular case I do just- by what then further is the- case and not by rule? Can I say: I am now- justified in using the sentence just by what is now the case …? No! Nor can I saycan I say || does it help me to say I am justified- “when I feel justified”. For about- feeling justified the same things can- be said as about feeling toothache. |
My criteria for having toothache are the same ashaving toothache are the same as || saying I have toothache is no other than for the
others saying I have toothache,- for I
can't say that feeling,- or having,
toothache is my criterion- for having a right to say
it.
|
Examine: ‘These two operations bring- about the same pain’. The pain- which they all bring about I- shall call toothache. What does this shew?? Now I might explain. - Did I give the name ‘toothache’ to a behaviour?- Did I call a behaviour “having toothache”?- Did I call a behaviour “having the same pain”?- But showing toothache can never be- saying … Ich glaube ich wollte zeigen, daß ‘toothache’ hier nicht als Name eines- Benehmens gegeben wird & daß man auch nicht auf eine Erfahrung- hinten dem Benehmen zeigt. I must assume an expression- which is not lying. Now do I say that there is
|
When I say that moaning is the- expression of
toothache then under certain-
circumstances the possibility of- it
being the expression without- the feeling behind it mustn't- enter
my game.
|
Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der- Ausdruck kann immer lügen.
|
The language games with expressions- of feelings
(private experiences)- are based on games with expressions of-
which we don't say that they may- lie.
|
“But was I when a baby taught- that
toothache meant my expression- of toothache?”–
I was told that- a certain behaviour was called- expression of
toothache.
|
“But isn't it possible that a child- should behave just
as a normal- child when it has toothache &
not have toothache?”
|
But does if we speak of the baby,- ‘having
toothache’ mean the same as-
‘behaving such & such’?
|
We say “poor thing, it moans”.
|
“Can't I in the child too, separate- the moaning from
the pain.
Can't- I say that I pity it because- it has pain not because it
moans?
|
You ought I suppose to say- that you pity it because you- believe that it
has pains.
But- what is believing that it has- pains like, as opposed to
believingbelieving || just seeing- that it moans?
It doesn't- here consist in believing that- he doesn't
cheet but in- a different
experience.
|
“Something clicked in my brainbrain || mind when-
I came to this colour”.
(This is a gesture.) But did- you know from the clicking
that- it was red.
Supposing looking at- this colour your eyes opened wider- & you gave
a jerk, – was it by its producing this- reaction that
you recognized
|
“But surely there is a case in- which I'm justified to
say “I see red”,- where I'm not lying, &
one where I'm- not justified in saying
so!”
Of course- I can be justified by the ostensive def.- or by
asking the others “now isn't this- red?”
& they answer that it is.
But you- didn't mean this justification, but one-
thatthat || which justifies me privately whatever others
will say.
|
“But do you mean to say that the- truth or falsehood
of my saying- ‘I see red’ does not consist in there- being
red before my mind's eye in one- case & not in the
other; but that- it depends on such things as ⌇ whether-
I say it in this or that tone of- voicein this or that tone of- voice || with a
certain tension or without?”
⌇
|
If I say “I see red” without- reason, how can I
distinguish- between saying it with truth &- saying it as a
lie?
|
It is important here that there- is no such case asthat there- is no such case as || that I exclude the case of saying the untruth by mistake. |
Hier haben wir keinen Vergleich des Satzes- mit der Wirklichkeit!
(Kollationen)
|
Don't I know, when I say “I- see red” &
am lying, that I am- lying?–
When do I translate- my experience into the words expressing- my
knowledge?
One might say: knowing- that I am lying doesn't mean- saying
that I do but being- ready to say it.
|
I could say: Lying is characterised- by a
peculiara
peculiar || an experience of
tension.
What is it- like to know that I don't see red- & to say
that I do?
|
“Well it is simply not seeing red- & saying
“I see red”!
There is nothing
|
“What I now call …” |
[We never dispute the opinions of common sense- but we
question the expression of common sense.]
|
Suppose I said “I see red” & was- lying for I
actually saw red – but had made- a slip of the tongue.
But which lie was it I had said,- or (rather) thought? Of course I- may say later “I wanted to say- “I see green”” but did anything correspond- to these words while I said “I see red”? |
But suppose that he felt that he- was lying but never said so, –
- did he know that he was lying or- not?
|
“Did he know that he was doing, what- we call
lying?”
“Did he know that- he was doing what on other occasions- he called
lying?”
|
What is his criterion for saying
|
Do these two sentencesDo these two sentences || Are these two sentences to say the- same: “He says he sees red- &
really sees red” & he says he sees-
red with convictionwith conviction || and has the experience of not
lying?
|
“So you think seeing red consists- in saying ‘I see
red’ in a certain- tone of voice?”–
No, but saying- “I see red” &
seeing it might be saying- it in a particular tone of-
voice.
|
How do I imagine myself seeing- red?
Isn't- it by imagining red?!
But how do I- imagine myself addressing a meeting?
|
Imagine a Robinson lying to-
himself.–
Why is this difficult to- imagine?
Look at something red & say to yourself “I see green” a) meaning- by ‘green’ what usually you mean- by ‘red’ (i.e. speaking the truth) b)- lying.
|
But one might call it lying to- oneself if one
e.g. turns one's watch- forward to
make oneself - get up
earlier.
|
Falsifying an account.
I add up numbers- arrive at 2730 then rub out 3 &- put a 5
instead.
|
When in this discussion we talk of- lying it ought always to mean- subjectively lying- &
subjectively lying to the other- person & not to
oneself.
|
If I see green without saying- I see
green, in what way- can these words be said to describe what
I see?
|
One could imagine someone constantly- lying subjectively but not
objectively.
|
Imagine this case: Someone has a particular way; if lying,
he …
He always lies calling red ‘green’ &- green ‘red’, but as a matter of fact- what he says agrees with the usage- of the other people & so his lying is- never noticed. taken notice of.
|
Supposing one said: To see red means- to see that
which makes me inclined- to describe it by saying
‘ …’.
“To know that I am lying means- to have an experience which- I should describe by the words ‘ …’.” |
[Our language on the one hand has- very much more possibilities of
expression than logicians admitadmit || dream
of || imagine &- on the other hand the uses of-
itsits || these modes of expression are very much-
more limited than logicianslogicians || they imagine.]
|
What makes lying “I see red” into
lying?-
The private experience of not-
seeing red or the private experience- of feeling a certain
tension?
|
Is it wrong to say that lying in- such & such cases consists in- saying so & so & feeling a tension? Man könnte sehr wohl sagen- daß manchmal die Lüge dadurch- charakterisiert ist daß ich mir- bewußt bin daß es sich anderes
|
Wenn ich nun sage “der lügt, der sagt- ‘ich sehe
rot’ & sieht grün”, so stimmt- das nicht, denn ich
mußte sagen “der- lügt der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’
& weißt (oder- glaubt) er sieht
grün”.
|
“Der lügt, der sagt “ich sehe rot” &
sieht- die Farbe, die er selbst mit dem Worte- grün bezeichnen
würde.”
Aber das- heißt doch wahrheitsgemäß-
so bezeichnen würde.
Oder können wir- sagen, “für sich so bezeichnen
würde”?
Daher ja die Idee daß man lügen- kann sondern man laut das eine &- leise das andre sagt & was man laut- sagt ist hier die Lüge. |
“Der weiß, welche Farbe er sieht, der es- irgendwie
ausdrücken könnte.”
Was ist das- Kriterium dafür daß, er
es könnte?
|
Was soll es dann heißen: einer Farbeneindruck wahrheitsgemäß
mit ‘rot’ bezeichnen?-
Paßt das Wort dem einen Eindruck besser- als dem anderen?
|
Man könnte hier auch sagen- man solle gar nicht von
subjektiver Wahrheit der Farben sprechen.
Die Wahrheit- des Satzes “Ich habe Zahnschmerzen” habe-
nur objektiv beurteilt zu werden.
|
“Das Wahre Wort kommt anders als- das falsche.”
|
Man kann sagen: “Alle diese Worte- sind in derselben
Weise gekommen.”
|
Das Wort welches Du sprichst ist- eine
Reaktion.
Die Reaktion die- wir in dem
Satz übersehen “er sieht- …”.–
Aber ist es nicht wahr daß- der Andere nicht wissen braucht, daß- meine
Reaktion in dieser & dieser- Weise vor sich geht?
Er meint, ich- sage ihm geradeheraus was ich- sehe & es
ist nicht so, sondern ich- erfinde eine Lüge.
|
“Er weiß nicht was ich sehe, bis- ich es ihm sage; ich weiß es
schon- vorher ehe er es
erfährt.”
Könnte- es auch umgekehrt sein?
|
Ich habe jetzt lange mit einem Bleistift- geschrieben: wußte ich
in diesem Satz daß die Schrift- grau & das Papier weiß
ist?
Wußte ich das,, || ? oder wußte ich bloß,- daß es ist wie es ist? |
“Ich weiß, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus- gesagt
habe.”–
“Ja, aber war nicht vor- dieser
‘Reaktion’ schon etwas da, nämlich eben das
Erlebnis, daß ich es ihm- nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe?”
|
“Können wir nicht doch sagen, daß etwas- jedem sichtbar
(äußerlich), geschahgeschah || geschieht & etwas
weiteres- nur mir wahrnehmbarwahrnehmbar || erkennbar, ‘in
mir’?”
|
“How am I justified in saying that- I
see this apple red”?
You are not- justified.–
But isn't it true that- when I say the truth I am- justified
& when I'm lying I'm not
justified.
|
How is a lie possible in a case- where there is no
justification?
|
Supposing one said, lying (here) consists- in applying one word to
the colour
|
I am justified if the word comes- in
one way, & not justified if it- comes
in an other way.
–But in- which way?–
If it comes in the- straightforward way I'm justified.-
But which is the straightforward- way?–
I know but can't explain- as the paradigm of it is in-
me.–
But as far as it's in you- it serves no purpose in the- future
application of the word.-
(private
ostensive
def.)
|
How do I know that it comes- in the straightforward way?-
What the straightforward way is must be fixed-
by a paradigm.
|
“Why on earth should it be wrong- to use a word not in the simple-
(‘straightforward’) way?”
Couldn't it not- even be my duty to use the word- which
doesn't come straightforwardly?-
Imagine the case where we had- laid down a code in which
‘red’- meant green.
|
“I said the word with a bad conscience.”
|
What troubles me are the propositions in which-
an action is described accompanied by- a ‘state of
mind’.
|
“Lying when you say “I see red” consists
in saying these words &- having a private experience which- I call
‘feeling unjustified’, or-
‘seeing green’ etc.”–
“But suppose- that I call the feeling of being- justified
“feeling
unjustified”!?”–
ThisThis || Now this- last sentence though it sounds- absurd
had sense.
|
“What you say comes to this: - when
I truly say
‘I see red’- I am not
justified in saying this- by a fact
that I see red”.–
No- I should say ‒ ‒ ‒
|
“You either have a feeling of being- unjustified or you
don't!”
|
“But surely there is a case in- which I say ‘I see
red’ & am- telling the (subjective) truth &-
one in which I
lie!”–
Yes,- that is, we distinguish between- telling thetelling the || a case of
telling the truth & not tellingnot telling || of not
telling- the truth.–
But what does lying- in thisthis || such a case, consist
in?
We may- try all sorts of explanations:-
“It consists in saying … & seeing
green”,- “It consists in saying … &
knowing that- I see …”, “It consists in saying-
… & feeling that I'm not justified in- saying
this” & others.
Now let me ask: do- all these
explanations come to the same- or do they
describe different facts?-
We mightmight || || can say: if they
describe different- casescases || facts the differences are
quite unimportant to us
(here)are
quite unimportant to us
(here) || don't matter to us here.
For our purpose they- can all be said to describe the same-
factfact || case.
(We might have said lying- consists in saying “I see
red” & having- stomach ache but
as stomach ache- is a private
sensation why not rather consider the
private sensation of
seeing a- colour other than red?)
We may say- therefore that these explanations- for our purpose were no
explanations at all.
They left us just
|
When we talk of the private experience- which the
others don't know we- don't originally
mean to talk of- a shapeless nothing but of a variable with- certain
definite values.
|
It is said sometimes that if I- & someone else are looking at some-
object I can never know what colour- the other really sees.
But with what
…. - But as long as ‘to have’ here- has any meaning at all it can't- help us & when it has no meaning- at all I think it can't help us either. |
“We distinguish between … & …”
that- means: We sometimes use- the expression
“I lied when I said- that I saw green”
as opposed to “I- told the
truth when I said ‘ …’”.
But- isn't this enough?–
“But under what- circumstances do you use the- expression
‘ …’”?
But must I necessarily- stop giving you circumstances-
when I have given you a- sample?
Why not when I have given- you a word, a verbal expression?-
Is the use of such an expression- necessarily indefinite as compared
|
The word lying is taught us in- a particular way in
which it was fastened- to a certain behaviour to the use-
of a certain expression under certain- circumstances.
Then we use it saying- that we have been lying when our- behaviour was not- like the one which first
constituted- the meaning.
Just in the same way we were- taught the word ‘red’ in a game- say like number one & then we use it when- the conditions are different (compare- the past in the description of a- dream) (and of course it isn't just the word ‘red’ we use but- the whole imagery connected with it). |
“But you talk as though there- was only the word
‘red’word
‘red’ || expression
‘I see red’ but not- an impression corresponding to
it.”-
On the contrary I don't say that
when a man- says … he also has the impression.
|
But is all that happens that- you say ‘I see
red’?
Isn't- there something else being the- case, happening, when you
say this- & it is true?
But if you ask- isn't there something else happening,- you
don't mean just anything- else e.g. that
it's raining.
So- after all you have to give- descriptions of what
it is that happensit is that happens || you mean is happening- & insofar
as you give a description- of it you must know what it is that
happens- & it is not a
x.
And keeping it partly- unknown doesn't help you either.-
On the other hand there is no- reason why you should
always- stop with giving a sample &- not with giving
a worda word || an expression. (In this- sense one can say
that an expression- acts as a picture)as a picture) || as much as a picture
as a sample).
|
The philosophical puzzle seems- insoluble if we are
frank with ourselves,-
& is, insoluble.
That is until
that is we change- our question.
|
‘Expression can always be
lying.’ How can we- say this of the expression to which
|
“But I always know whether I'm lying- or
not!” – You are
now obsessed with the use of- the word
‘lying’.
As a ruleAs a rule || In general you talk without- thinking
of lying & of whether you lie- or
not.
|
But (then) I'm always either lying or- not lying!
(Whether I always know it or not.)
|
|
Suppose a child learnt the word- ‘toothache’ as an
equivalent for its moaning & noticed that
whenever it said- the word or moaned the grown-ups treated- it
particularly well.
The child then- uses moaning or the word
‘toothache’ as a means- to bring
about the desired effect: is the- child lying?
|
You say: “Surely I can-
moan with toothache & I can moan- without toothache, so why
shouldn't- it be so with- the
child?
Of course I only see
Now one can moan because one has- pain, or e.g., one can moan on the- stage. How do I know that the- child, small as it is, doesn't already- act & in this case I teach it to- mean by ‘toothache’ something I- don't intend it to mean? |
I have taught the child to- use the expression ‘I have
toothache’
But now I also teach the- child to moan on the stage! That- is to say I even teach it to use- this expression in a different game.- I also teach it to read out the- sentence ‘I have toothache’ from- a book, when it hasn't toothache. In fact I could teach it to- lie, as a separate language game.- (In fact we often play this kind of- game with children.) |
“But doesn't what you say come to- this that it
doesn't matter what- the persons feel as long as only- they behave a
particular way?”
|
“Do you mean that you can- define pain
in terms of behaviour?”
But is this what we do if we teach- the child to use the expression- ‘I have toothache’? Did I saysay || define: “Toothache- is such & such a behaviour”? This would- obviously be againstThis would- obviously be against || This- obviously contradicts the normal use of- the word! “But can't you, on the other hand,
|
“But aren't you neglecting something – the
experience or whatever you- might call it –?
Almost the world- behind the mere words?”
|
But here solipsism teaches us a-
lesson; It is the thought which- isIt is the thought which- is || It is
that thought which is on the way to destroy this
error.
For if the world is idea it isn't- any
person's idea.
(Solipsism stops- short of saying this & says that it is- my
idea).
But then how could
‘I neglect that which goes without- saying.’ |
“What is seen I see” (pointing to
my- body), I point at my
geometrical eye,- saying this.
Or I point with- closed eyes & touch my breast
&- feel it.
In no case do I make- a connection between what is seen- & a
person.
|
Back to ‘neglecting’!
It seems- that I neglect life.
But not- life physiologically understood but- life as consciousness.
And consciousness- not physiologically understood; - or, understood
from the outside,- but consciousness as the very essence- of experience,
& the appearance of the world,- the world.
|
Couldn't I say: if I had to add- the world to my language
it would- have to be one sign for the whole of- language which sign could
therefore be- left out.
|
⋏
Isn't what you reproach me of- as though you said:
“In your- language you're only speaking!”
|
How am I to describe the way- the child learns the word
‘toothache’ – - like this?
The child sometimes- has toothache it moans
& holds its cheek, the
grown-ups say- “ …”
etc..
Or: The child sometimes- moans & holds its cheek,
– the grown-ups “ …”?
Does the first description- say something superfluous or false or
does the- second leave out something essential?-
Both descriptions are correct.
|
“But it seems as if you were neglecting-
something.”
But what more can- I do than distinguish the cases of- saying
‘I have toothache’ when I
really have toothache, &- the case
of saying the words without having the
toothache?
I am alsoalso || further ready to talk of any- x behind my words so long as- it keeps its identity. ⋎ |
‒ ‒ ‒But why shouldn't I say- “I have
toothache in his tooth”.
I would- insist on his tooth being extracted.
Who
|
What does it mean distributing primary- experience over all
subjects?
Imagine- that they have all real toothaches- in their
teeth.
The one which now only I- have.
I now describe certain facts.-
(Not metaphysical ones but facts- about the
connectionconnection || coincidence of certain experiences.)
|
He gets a blow & cries,– I think: “no
wonder- for it really hurts”.
But wouldn't I- say to myself: Queer that
he cries for- I feel the pain all right,– but
he?!
|
What does it consist in that I- have pain, I feel
myself crying,- I hear that I am crying, my
mouth- cries?
|
It seems there is a phenomenon which- in general I refer to as ‘my
toothache’- which, experience teaches me, is always
connected- with one particular person (not ‘I’ but)
Ludwig Wittgenstein. -
I now imagine facts other than they are- & connect up this
phenomenon to- all sorts of persons so as to make- it not at all tempting to
call this- phenomenon ‘my toothache’.
Isn't it a particular phenomenon- to hear myself speak (not, ‘to- hear Ludwig Wittgenstein speak’). ‒ ‒ ‒ |
“I see so & so” does not mean-
“The person so & so e.g.
L.W. sees so
& so”.
|
A language game in which everybody
calls- out what he sees but without- saying “I see
…”.
Could anybody- say that what I call out
is incomplete because I have left out- to mention the
person?!
|
A language game in which everybody (& I too)- call out what
I see without- mentioning me.
|
They always know what I see.
If- they don't seem to, I misunderstand- what they say.
|
I am tempted to say: “It seems at least
a- fact of experience that at the- source of the visual field there
is- mostly a small man with gray flannel- trousers in
fact L.W.”.–
Someone- might answer me to this: It is
true
|
“Ich bin doch bevorzugt.
Ich bin- der Mittelpunkt der Welt.”
Denken- wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel- das sagen & auf mich
zeigen!
Wäre es noch richtig?
When I say that I play a unique- role I really mean the geometrical eye. |
On the other hand if I describe- the usual appearance of my body- around the
geometrical eye this- is on the same level as saying- that in the
middle of the visual- field there is in general a brown- table & at
the edges a white wall- (as I generally sit in my room).
Now suppose I described this in- the form: The visual world in general- is like this: (follows the description). Would- this be wrong?–- Why should it be wrong?! But the question is, what game is to be playedis to be played || I intend to- be playing with this sentence, e.g.,- who is allowed to say it & what are the reactions to this statementwhat are the reactions to this statement || what the reactions- to this statement are to be, and howhow || in what way- are the people who hear itthe people who hear it || those to whom it is said to react to
|
Can't I say something to nobody,- neither to anybody else
nor to- myself?
What is the criterion- of saying it to myself?
|
If I see a fire he runs to extinguish- it.
|
At intervals I paint what I see.
But- can't someone else paint it for me?
Or- the picture be presented to me somehow, already
finished?
|
What, if I see before me a picture- of the room as I am seeing the
room?
Is this a language game? |
I want to say: “the visual world is like- this
…”,– but why say anything?
|
Die Auffassung- des
Solipsismus erstreckt sich nicht auf- Spiele.
Der Andere kann so gut- Schachspielen, wie ich.
I.e., when we play a language game we- are on the same level. |
“I am in the lucky position of being in the- source of the
visual worldworld || field.
It is I who- see it.”
I have a comfortable feeling- while saying this although the
statement- isn't one of the class of statement which- in general
give me this kind of feeling.
I- said it as though I had said I am the- wealthiest
man in the placeam the- wealthiest
man in the place || have more- money than anyone
else.
|
⋏
But the point is that I don't establish- a relation between a
person & what is seen.-
All I do is that alternately I point in- front of me & to
myself.
|
But what I now see, this roomthis room || this view of my
room,- plays a unique role, it is the visual- world!
(Der Solipsist flattert & flattert in der Fliegenglocke, schlägt sich an an den Wänden,- flattert weiter.schlägt sich an an den Wänden,- flattert weiter. || stößt sich an den Wänden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu
|
“‒ ‒ ‒‒ ‒ ‒ || Description: this
is what I now- see”.
Leave out the “see”, leave- out the
“now”, the “this”
& leave out the “I”.
|
“(Description): this is the visual
world”.-
But why do you say visual & why- do you say that it's the
world?
|
“A red patch is (now) at the
center”.-
All others must say “I see …”.
But- is this distinction necessary, as I- know anyhow who's saying
it, whether- I or one of the others?
|
But the real question for me is here: How- am I
defined?
Who is it, that is favoured?-
I.
But may I lift up my head to- indicate who it is?
– Supposing I constantly change- & my surrounding does: is there still- some continuity namely by it being- me & my surrounding that change?! |
(Isn't this similar to thinking that- when things in
spacethings in
space || spacial things have changed- entirely there's
still one thing that
|
But is my hand favoured as compared- to someone else's
hand I see?
This is ridiculous.-
Then either nobody is favoured or- I am, that is the person
L.W. whose- hand
is lifted.
|
All right, – when I, L.W., see what's seen!
|
Where is my toothache?
I.e. how is its- place determined?
|
“What I now see justifies me in saying- that I see red”. And what do you- now see? If the answer is “this”- it is no answer I give to myself.-If the answer is “this”- it is no answer I give to myself.- || The answer may be “this” but you <…>- answer I don't tell myself what it is I see. I don't see what I see more definitely- if at the same time I see my finger pointing- to it. (The question ought to have been- what are you now looking at). I don't tell myself what it is I see- by seeing my finger pointing to - something. Suppose I said: “What I now see- justifies me in saying “I see red” because- it is the same colour as this sample”,
|
Is the criterion for my playing- a private game of chess my- being however
strongly inclined to- say that I am playing one?
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How does one feel whether I am- strongly inclined?
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What would I say if I - in my
private judgements came- into contradiction with
all- other people.
I.e. if I could no - longer play a
language game with- them.
Or if all the facts around- me became
extraordinary?
Would I stick to my judgements?
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Suppose someone asked me “What- does it mean to play a
private- game of chess with oneself” &- I answered:
“Anything, because- if I said that I was playing-
a game of chess I would be so
Under what circumstances would we say that he did what we- call portraying & under what circumstances that he called something- portraying which we didn't call that? Suppose here we- said: Well I can never know what he does inwardly - would this be anything than resignation? |
Suppose someone painted pictures- of the landscape which surrounds it,- he
sometimes paints the leaves of trees- orange sometimes blue, sometimes- the
clear sky red etc.
Under what circumstances would we agree with him that- he was
portraying the landscape?
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We call something a calculation- if, for instance, it leads to a house
being built.
⋎ |
But can't he play a game with- the colour names against whatever
anybody else says?
But why should we- call it a game with the colour names.-
“But if I played it I would stick- to saying that I was
playing a game- with the colournames.”
But is that all- I can say about it; is all that I can- say for its being
this kind of game that- I stick to calling it so?
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⋏
We call something a language game if- it plays
a particular role in our
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Under what circumstances do- I say I am
entitled to say that- I'm seeing red.
The answer is showing- a sample i.e. giving the
rule.
But- if now I came into constant
contradiction with what anybody else said,- should I not say that I am-
applying the rule in a way which- prevents me from playing their-
game.
That is: is all that- is necessary that the rule
I- give should be the rule they- give or isn't besides this an
agreement in the application necessary?
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If “having the
same pain” means- the same as
“saying
that one has- the same pain”
then “I have the- same pain” means the same as “I
say- that I have the same pain” & the- exclamation
‘oh!’ means “I say
‘oh!’”.
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Roughly speaking: The
expression
’I have
toothache‘ stands- for a moan but
it does not mean- ‘I moan’.
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But if “I have toothache”
stands for a
One might say: it too stands for- a moan, that of compassion. |
“Toothache, seeing etc.
I only know from myself & not from- the other.”
“I never know that he has toothache, I only know- when I have it.” “I can only believe that he has it, that- he has what I have.” “Has ‘toothache’ then a different meaning in my case & in- his?” “Isn't it possible that everybody should have- toothache but without expressing it?” “If it is possible that sometimes one can have- ‘toothache’ without expressing it, it is possible that- always this should be so.” “If my personal experience is all I know- how can I even assume that there is any- other besides?” “Does ‘toothache’ in the other mean behaviour?” “I only know what I mean by ‘toothache’.” “I was taught the word ‘toothache’ in connection- with my behaviour but interpreted it to- mean my pain.” “Only my ‘toothache’ is real toothache”. “What justifies me in saying that the other has toothache- is his behaviour, what justifies me saying that I have- is the experience of toothache.” “Is there only the expression of toothache & not the toothache?”
“I know what it means to say that- the other has ‘toothache’ even if I have no- means to find out whether he has.” |
“Only he knows whether he has toothache,
we can- never know.”
“Does the I enter into the personal- experience or not?” |
We aren't lyingaren't lying || are speaking the truth
if a fact corresponds- to the sentence.
This is no explanation at all but a mere repetition unless we
can supplement- it by ‘namely this↗’ & a
demonstration & the whole explanation lies just in this
demonstration.
The whole problem here only arose - through the fact
that in this case the demonstration is of a different
kind,- that the demonstration of ‘I see
red’, ‘I have toothache’
seems indirect.-
If I say we must assume an- expression which can't lie this-
can't be explained by saying, that- pain really corresponds to this-
expression.
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“But aren't you saying, that
I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning. |
“Do you deny that the moaning is- the expression of
something”.
No, that- is I too should call moaning an- expression (or even an
expression of something- though this is misleading).
But the word- expression here only characterizes the-
language game played with it.
I react- differently.
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“So, you don't really have pain, you- just
moan?!”–
There seems to be a description- of my behaviour & also, in the
same- sense a description of my experience- of my pain!
The one so to speak the description- of an external the other of an
internal- fact.
This corresponds to the idea- that in the sense in which I can- give
a part of my body a name -
I can give a name to a private- experience (only
indirectly).
And I am drawing your attention- to this that the language games are
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You couldn't call moaning- a description!
But this shows- you how far the
proposition “I have
toothache”- is from a
‘description’, & how far- teaching the use of the
word toothache is- from teaching the word
tooth.
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One could from the beginning teach- the child the expression “I
think- he has toothache” instead of “he has
toothache” with the
corresponding doubtfuldoubtful || uncertain tone of
voice.
This- mode of expression could be
described by saying that we- can only believe that the owner has
toothache.
But why not in the child's own- case? Because there the tone- of voice is simply determined by- nature. |
In “I have toothache” the
expression of- pain is brought to the same form- as a description “I
have a matchboxhave a matchbox || I have 5
shillings”.
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We teach the child to say “I- have been lying” when it
has behaved in a certain way.
Imagine here a typical case of a lie.
Also this- expression goes along with a
But doesn't the child know- that it is lying before ever I teach- him the wordword || verbal expression? Is this meant to be a metaphysical question or a question about facts? It doesn't know- it as words. And why should it know- it at all?– “But do you assume- that it has only the facial- expression of shame, e.g., without the- feeling of shame? Mustn't you describe- the inside situation as well as the- outside one?”– But what if I said- that by facial expression of shame I- meant what you mean by the facial expression- & the feeling, unless I explicitly- distinguish between genuine, & fakedfaked || simulated facial- expressions? It is, I think, misleading- to describe the genuine expression- as a sum of the expression & something- else, though it is just as misleading- to say that the genuine expression- is nothing butbut || besides a particular behaviour.- We just misunderstand / get the function of our- wordswords || expressions of language if weif we || by :
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We teach the child the use of- the word “to
speak”.
= Later it uses- the expression “I speakspeak || spoke
to myself”. = -
We then say “We never know whether &
what- a person speaks to himself”.
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Surely the description of
the facial expression can be- meant
(used)can be- meant
(used) || is used as a description of- feelings & can
be meantmeant || used otherwise.-
We constantly- use such
expressions as “When he- heard that he
mademade || pulled a long face” &- don't
add that the expression was- genuine.
In other cases we describe- the acting of a person in the same- words or
again we wish to leave it- open whether the expression was genuine- or
not.
To say that a description- of expressions used as a-
description of feelings is indirecta description- of expressions used as a-
description of feelings is indirect || we describe the feeling indirectly
by the description of expressions is-
wrong!
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Imagine a language in which toothache- is
called “moaning” & the difference- between just
moaning & moaning with- pain is expressed by the moaning or-
dry tone in which the word is pronounced.
People would not say in this language- that it became clear later on that
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Suppose he says to himself
“I- lie”, how do we know whether he means-
it?how do we know whether he means-
it? || what is to show that he means it?
But we would any
dayday || time describe- this lying by saying:
“He said … &- told himself at the same time that
he- was lying”.
Is this too an indirect- description of lying?
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But couldn't one say that if I - speak of a
man's angry voice meaning- that he was angry & again of his
angry- voice not meaning that he was angry- in the first case the meaning of
the description of his voice was much further reaching- than in the
second case?
I will admit- that our description in the first case-
doesn't omit anything & is as complete- as
though we had said that he really- was angry,– but somehow the meaning
of- the expression then reaches
below the surface.
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But how does it do that?
The answer- to this would be an explanation- of the useuse || two
uses of the expression.
But- how could this explanation reach
“Then is there nothing under the- surface?!” But I said that I was- going to distinguish two expressions,- one for the ‘surface’ & one for ‘what is- below the surface’ only remember that- these expressions themselves correspond to a picture, not to its- usage. It is just as misleading to- say that there is just surface- & nothing underneath it as that there is something below the- surface & that there isn't just the surface.- Because once we useuse || make use of the- picture of the ‘surface’ it is most- natural to use it such as to- express the distinction as that between- something on & something below the surface.-use it such as to- express the distinction as that between- something on & something below the surface.- || express with it the distinction as- on & below the surface. Because we naturally use- thethe || this picture to express the distinction- as that between ‘on the surface’ & ‘below- the surface’ But we misapply the picture- if we ask whether both cases are or- aren't on the surface.
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Now in order that with its normal- meaning we should teach a child the
expression “I have lied” the child must behave
in the normal way.
E.g. it must under- certain
circumstances ‘admit’ that it
lied, it must- do so with a certain facial expression- etc.
etc. etc..
We may not always find out- whether he lied or not but if we never- found
out the word would have a different- meaning.
“But once he has learnt the word- he can't be in doubt
whether he is lying or- not!”–
Consider the case of the person - who finds that his subjective lies
are - judged by the ordinary criteria,
truths.-
He says that he has been to school feeling- that
it's a lie but the teacher & the boys
confirm- that he has been etc.
etc..
You might say:- “But surely he can't
doubt that he- said a subjective
lie”.
This of course is like saying that he can't- be in doubt about whether he has toothache- or whether he sees red etc. On the- one hand: doubting whether I have- the experience E is not like doubting- whether someone else has it. Remember- what we said about the asymmetry- of the game No. 1. On the other hand
Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see- red” or “I see green”. “But this is- a simple doubt about the appellation- of a colour & it can be settled by asking- someone what this colour (pointing) is called”.- But are all such doubts removable by this- question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall- call this colour so & so”)? |
“What colour do you see?”–
“I don't know – - is it red, or
isn't it red; I don't know what colour it is I
see.”–
“What do you
mean?
Is the- colour constantly changing, or do - you see it so very faintly,
practically black?”
Could I say then: “don't
you- see what you see?”
This obviously would- make no sense.
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Colour: blackblack || red &
whitewhite || blue chequered.
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“What colour do you call: a, e, i, o or
u?”–
“I- don't know which colour I
see?”
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“Primary colours are those used in flags.”
It is queer that one never uses- brown on a flag & says it is a blend- of yellow, black & red although nobody- can really produce a proper brown- by mixing these colours. |
Is there a reason for not admitting- brown as a primary
colour?
Is it not enough that we refuse- to group it with red, blue, green, etc.? |
One sometimes thinks the reason is that we see transitions from brown to
pure yellow, red, black; but so we do in the case of red
etc.
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Imagine all objects around us where- iridescent, I mean of the appearance-
of a white paper on which the sun- is
shining, you would see the surface covered with tiny specks- of red
blue green yellow.
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Shall we say that a pointillist sees- the objects as he paints
them?
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It seems as though, however the- outward
circumstances change, once the
To say that I can't doubt whether- I see red is in a sense absurd as- the game I play with the expression- “I see red” doesn't contain a doubt- of this form. It seems,– whatever the circumstances- I always know now whether to apply- the word or not. It seems, at first- it was a move in a special game, but- then it becomes independent of this- game. (This reminds one of the way the idea- of length seems to become emancipated- from any particular method of measuring it.) |
We are tempted to say: “damn it all,- a rod has a
particular length however- I express it.
And one could go on- to say that if I see a rod I always- see
(know) how long it is although I can't say-
how many feet, meters etc. – But suppose- I just
say: I always know whether it looks- tiny or big!
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But can't the old game loose its
point- when the circumstances change, so
that- the expression ceases to have a
meaning- although of course I can still- pronounce it.
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He sticks to saying that he has- been lying although
none of the normal- consequences follow.
What is there left- of the language game,
except that he- says the expression?
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We learn the word ‘red’ under
particular-
circumstances.
Certain objects are usually- red & keep their colour, most people-
agree with us in our colour judgements.
Suppose all this changes:- I see blood unaccountably sometimes- one
sometimes another colour & the- people around me all make different-
statements.
But couldn't I in- all this chaos retain
my meaning- of ‘red’,
‘blue’, etc. although I
couldn't- make myself understood to anyone?
Samples e.g. would all constantly- change their colour – ‘or does it only seem- so to me?’ “Now am I mad or have- I really called this ‘red’ yesterday?”
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The situation in which we are inclined- to say “I must have gone
mad!”
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“But we could always call a colour-impression
‘red’ & stick to this
application!”
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Die Atmosphäre die dieses Probleme umgibt ist
schrecklich.
Dichte- Nebel der Sprache sind um den problematischen Punkt
gelagert.
Es ist beinahe- unmöglich zu ihm
vorzudringen.
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Suppose I had before- me drawings of what I &- other
people now see & I said- of the drawing of what I see “there-
is something unique about this- picture”.
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If I can speak about ‘what is- seen’, why
shouldn't anyone else- speak about it?–
But I have a feeling- that only I can; if I assume that- others also speak
about what- normally I should call my visual- image there seems to me to be
something
If ‘what I see’ has nothing- to do with a particular person- why should I feel that there's- something wrong in assuming that- anybody might talk about it i.e.- mean it when he speaks? Then of- course I can't tell them what- I see nor they me what they- see any more than I can tell- myself what I see. But they could make conjectures- as to what might happen in future- in our visual field. In the normal game I- say: “I don't know what they- see, they've got to say what they- see”, – but in the game I'm considering they would as much- know what I see as my hand- can write down what my mouth- can say. And their different conjecture would- be like conjectures made by- myself at different times. Can my mouth tell my hand- what I see in order that my hand- should be able to write it down?
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Do I by painting what I see- tell myself what I see?
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“This picture is unique, for it- represents what is
really seen”.
What justification do I have to- say this?What justification do I have to- say this? || What is my justification- for saying this? |
I see two spots on this wall -& lift two
fingers.
Do I tell- myself that I see two spots?-
But on the other hand couldn't- this be the sign for
my- seeing two spots?!
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Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet oder- zeichne ich es aus?
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“Today he points to me, & yesterday- he pointed
to me also.”
|
The meaning of: “He points at
me”.
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“I see that he points at A.”
“I see that he points at me.” |
You seem to be able to give- yourself a sort of ostensive
explanation
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Imagine a game:
One- person tells the other what he- (the other) sees if he has
guessed- it rightly he is rewarded.
If A hasn't- guessed correctly what B sees- B
corrects him & says what it is- he sees.
This game - is more instructive if we imagine- the
persons not to say what is- seen but to paint it or to make- models of
it. –
Now let me imagine- that I am one of
the- players.
Wouldn't I be tempted to say:- “The game is asymmetrical, for only- what I say I see corresponds to- a visual image.” |
The problem lies thus: This
↗) is- what is seen;
& this is also what- I see.
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Frage Dich: Kann das ↗) nur ich
sehen,- ober kann es auch ein Andrer sehen?
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Für mich existiert kein Unterschied- zwischen ich &
das↗; & das
Wort “ich”- ist für mich kein Signal, das einen Ort-
oder eine Person hervorhebtdas einen Ort-
oder eine Person hervorhebt || eines Orts oder einer
Person.
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Ich versuche das ganz Problem- auf das
nicht verstehen <…>
der Funktion- des Wortes ‘Ich’ &
‘↗’ zu
reduzieren.
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When I stare at a coloured object-
& say “this is red” I seem to know- exactly to what
I give the name- red.
As it were to that which I am- drinking in.
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It is as though there was a magic power- in the words
“this is …”.
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I can bring myself to say: There- is no toothache there
↗ (in the-
man's cheek who says he has toothache).
And what would be the expression- for this in ordinary language?-
Wouldn't it be my saying “I have- no
toothache there”?
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“But who says this?”–
“I!”
And who says
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Suppose I give this rule: “Whenever- I said
‘I have toothache’, I shall- from
now on say ‘there is
toothache’”.
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I tell the waiter bring me always- clear soup & thick soup to
the- others.
He tries to remember my face.
Suppose I change my face (body)- every day entirely, how is he to know- which is me. But it's a question- of the existence of the game. “If- all chessmen were alike how- should one know which is the king?” Now it seems that, although- he couldn't know which is me, I- still couldcould || would know it. Suppose now I said: “it wasn't- so & so, it was I who asked for- clear soup”, – couldn't I be wrong?- Certainly. I.e. I may think that- I asked him, but didn't. Now are- there two mistakes I can make:- one, thinking that I asked him,- the other, thinking that I asked- him? I say: “I remember having asked- you yesterday”, he replies: “You weren't- there at all yesterday”. Now I could say either
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It seems that I can trace- my identity quite independent of- the
identity of my body.
And the- idea is suggested that I trace- the identity of something
dwelling- in a body the identity of my mind.
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“If anybody asks me to describe what- I see, I describe
what's seen.”
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What we call a description of- my sense datum, of what's seen,
independent of what is the case in the physical world,- is
still a description for the other person.
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If I speak of a description of my sense- datum I don't
mean to give a particular person as its
possessor.
(No more do I want to speak about- a particular person when I moan with- pain.) |
It must be a serious & deep-seated
disease of language (one- might also say ‘of
thought’) which- makes me say: “Of course
this ↗)- is
what's really seen”.
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“Property of space”
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I can tell you the fact p - because I know that p is the-
case.
It has sense to say- “it rained & I knew
it” but not- “I had toothache & knew that I
had.”-
“I know that I have toothache”- means nothing
or the same as- “I have toothache”.
This, however, is a remark about the- use of the word “I”, whoever uses it. |
Compare with this such a statement as: “surelysurely || of course I know what I- am referring
to by the word toothache”.
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Think of the statestate || frame of mindstatestate || frame of mind || mental state
in
which- you say to yourself that p ∙ ~p-
mustmust || does make sense & by repeating- a statement of
this form you are,- as it were, by introspection trying
to find out- what it means.
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The statestate || phenomenon of staring is closely bound-
up with the whole puzzle of solipsism.
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“If I am asked ‘what do you see?’, I-
describe the visual world.” –
Couldn't- I say instead of this “ …I am- describing
what'swhat's || what is
there↗”
(pointing before me)?
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But now consider the case of- someone having a picture before him- of the
part of his room he is seeing & that he's-
saying: “this in the picture is like- this (a
part of his visual field, as he- is looking at his
room).”
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