Ms-149,FCr Ms-149,FCv Ms-149,1r “But what if he describes it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't - I say he was mistaken?” Why should- I say this & not rather, he has forgotten- the meanings of his words.

But after all only I can lastly decide- whether what he said, is right. “We can't- assume that he knows what I see- & I don't!” We can absolutely do this!

Can a man doubt whether what he- sees is red or green? [Elaborate this]

“Surely if he knows anything he must know- that he sees!”– It is true that the- game of “showing or telling what one sees” is one- of the most fundamental language- games, which means that what we- in ordinary life call using language- mostly presupposes this game.

I can for what I see use the- impersonal form of description & the- fact that I say “for what I see”- doesn't say at all that after all- this is only a disguised personal- description! For I just expressed myself in English.For I just expressed myself in English. || For I just expressed myself in our ordinary form of expression. Ms-149,1v

Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger- symmetrischer Körper, oder das Unregelmäßige was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn vor einer- Ecke aus sehe? Was soll ich- hervorheben? Soll ich sagen er sei primär- unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas- Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert- darstellen, oder er sei primär regelmäßig- sei aber unregelmäßig projiziert gesehen?

What's the difference between me being- angry and him being angry?

If I wish to write down my experiences the two experiences that- I am angry & that he is angry are- absolutely entirely different (although- the words used to describe them- are very similar.) I might therefore- naturally object to this way of- expression. Ms-149,2r

“Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten & 3- imaginäre.”

If I write down my own experiences- nothing is more natural than to- refer by ‘I’ only to my bodybody || or Ludwig Wittgenstein's body as- opposed to other bodies, but not to distinguish my toothache from his by the- words I & he.

The usual game played with the word ‘toothache’- involves the distinction of bodies which- have the toothache.

Does the solipsist also say that only he can- play chess?

But he will say that behind the sentence- ‘I see …’ when he says it & it's true there stands- something which does not stand behind- “he sees” or ‘I see’ when the other man says it.

I'll start with a description of- what ‘I see’ but in impersonal form.

‘Ich spreche’ & ‘der Andere spricht’ sind zwei Ms-149,2v total verschiedene Erfahrungen.

Ich sage “Es ist schön”, dann sage ich- “das habe ich gesprochen”. Damit habe ich- weder mir noch dem Andern gesagt wer- es gesprochen hat. Ich habe einen gezeigt.

“Aber woher weiß ich daß ich- gesprochen haben wenn nicht aus der- eigentümlichen motorischen Erfahrung des - Sprechens.”

Das Wort ‘Ich’ bezeichnet keine Person.

Remember that, whatever the word- ‘I’ means to you, to the other- man it showsshows || draws his attention to a human body & is- of no value otherwise.

Hat es einen Sinn zu- sagen, der Stern bleibt- beim gleichen Punkt? Ms-149,3r

I could write say a book- on Physics in which every sentence- starts with “I remember”.      Could one say: Here the sentences- are all directly backed by real experiences- or by primary reality.      We must be misled in- a queer way!

“Surely”, I want to say, “if I'm to be really quite frank- I must say that I have something- which nobody has”.– But who's I?–- Hell! I don't express myself properly- but there's something you can't- deny that there is my personal- experience & that this in a most- important sense has no neighbour.–- But you don't mean by that that it happens to be alone but that its grammatical position is that of having no neighbour.      “But somehow our language doesn't- bring it out, that there is something- unique namely real present experience, & do- you just wish to advise me to resign myself- to that?”

[A philosophical book might be entitled Ms-149,3v “the wonders of the jungle”.]

(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel- that we have to resign ourselves to- something by using ordinary language!)

How is it that the Auszeichnung I might propose- for those sentences which describe my- personal experience does not really quite- satisfy me?

Partly because of what we call “imagining- that the other person sees (feels pain etc.)”.      D.h. wir sind geneigt dasselbe- Bild für <…> Vorgänge zu verwenden.

Now imagine this: as soon as even he- has learnt enough of language to- express it he tells us that- he saw blue when he said ‘Is not red’.

⋏This sounds as if then we really ought- to be convinced that he saw blue etc.

The person who paints his memories.

⋎      It reminds one misleadingly of: “as soon as even Ms-149,4r he had learnt enough of their language- the stranger informed his hosts of …” ⇒

Augustine, about expressing the- wishes inside him.

Why shouldn't we consider the case that the- child learns to think & always dreams that it had a private language before it learnt ours.      Only: What do we mean by learning- the language? In what sense can- we be said to teach the child the- natural gesture-language? Or can't- we teach him that?

Can't the child learn to wish for an- apple by learning to draw an apple?       This hangs together with the- idea that the child remembers- before it says it does.      Consider the case of the child- drawingdrawing || painting its memories.      It has painted a blue light- instead of a red one. Ms-149,4v

Kreis & Ellipse. Soll ich sagen: “er- hat der Kreis gestern als Ellipse- gesehen”, oder so stellt er den- folgende Tag einen Kreis dar”.

[Sich daran erinnern das & das gedacht- zu haben. “Ich erinnere mich nicht an- ihn aber ich weißweiß || erinnere mich daß er mir einen dümmlichen- Eindruck gemacht hat.”]

“He mostly sees red where we see red.” The normal use of the expression “he- sees green where …” is this: We take- it as the criterion for meaning- the same by ‘red’ as we do- that as a rule he argues with us in giving- the same names to the colours of- objects as we do. If then in a particular- instant he says something is red when we- should say that it's green we say that- he sees it differently from us.      Notice how in such a case we would- behave. We should look for a cause- of his differing judgement & if we had found- one we should certainly be inclined to- say he saw red when we saw green. Ms-149,5r      It is further clear that even before- ever finding such a cause we- might under circumstances be- inclined to say this. But also- that we can't give a strict rule- for ….

Consider this case: someone says it's queerit's queer || I can't understand it- I see everything red blue today & vice versa.- We answer: it must look queer! He says- it does & e.g. goes on to say how cold- the glowing coal looks & how warm- the clear (blue) sky. I think we should- under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that he saw red what- we saw blue. And again we should say- that we know that he means by- the words blue & red what we do- as he has always used them as we diddid || had.

On the other hand: Someone tells us- today that yesterday he always saw- everything red blue and so on. We say: But you called the glowing- coal red you know & the sky blue. He- answers: That was because I had also Ms-149,5v changed the names. We say: But- didn't it feel very queer & he- says: No it seemed all perfectly- ordinaryordinary || natural. Would we in this case- too say: …?

Case of contradictory- memory images. Tomorrow he remembers this, the day after tomorrow- something else.

The whole trend, to show that - the expression “letting one look into his soul” is often misleading.

Back to the example of the number of afterimages.- We can say that these cases are- not cases of communications of personal experiences if there- were no personal experiences but only ‘the- outward signs’?

Now I ask what are our criteria- for there being or there having been a personal- experience besides the expression? And here- the answer seems to be that for- the outsider the other man the criteria- are indeed more outside expressions,- but that I myself know whether- I have an experience or not; in particular Ms-149,6r whether I see red or not.

But let me ask what is knowing- that I see red like. I mean: look at- something red ‘know that it is red’ &- askask || observe || mark yourself what you're doing. Don't- you mean seeing red & impressing it on- your mind that you are doing so? But- there are, I suppose, several things that- you are doing: You probably say to yourself the word ‘red’ or ‘this is red’ or something of the sort, or perhaps glance from- the red object to another red one- which you're taking to be the paradigm- of red & such like. On the other hand you- just intently stare at the red thing.

In part of their uses the expressions- ‘visual image’ & ‘picture’ run parallel- but where they don't the analogy- which does exist tends to delude us. Tautology      The grammar of ‘seeing red’ connected- to the expression of seeing red- closer than one thinks.

“You talk as though one couldn'tcouldn't || can't- see a red patch if one can't say Ms-149,6v that one does; asas || As if seeing something- was saying that one sees it”.      “Seeing something” of course doesn't mean- the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of these expressions are closer related than- it might appear to you.      We say a blind man does not see- anything. But not only do we say so- but he too says that he does not- see. I don't mean “he agrees with us- that he does not see”, “he does not- dispute it”, but rather, he too describes- the facts in this way having learnt- the same language as we have. Now- whom do we call blind, what is our- criterion for blindness? A certain- kind of behaviour. And if the person- behaves in that particular way we- not only call him blind but teach- him to call himself blind. And in this- sense his behaviour also determines- the meaning of blindness for him.- But now you will say: “Surely- blindness isn't a behaviour;- it's clear that a man can behave- like a blind man & not be blind. Therefore ‘blindness’ means something different:- this behaviour only helps him Ms-149,7r to understand what we mean by ‘blindness’. The outward circumstances are- what both he & we know. Whenever- he behaves in a certain way we say that he- sees nothing & he notices that a certain- private experience of his coincides with- all these cases & thereby knowsthereby knows || so concludes that- we mean this experience of his by saying- that he sees nothing.      The idea is that we teach a person- the meaning of expressions relating to- personal experiences indirectly.– Such an- indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. I teach a child- the names of colours & a game, say, of- bringing objects of a certain colour when- the ‘name of the colour’ is called out.- I don't however teach him the colour-names by pointing to a sample which I & he see- saying e.g. the word ‘red’. Instead - I have various spectacles each of which- when I look through it makes me see- the white paper in a different colour. These spectacles are also distinguished by their Ms-149,7v outside appearance: the one that makes me see red has circular- glasses another one elliptical ones etc.- We now teach the child in this way that- when I see it - putting the circular ones on his nose I- say the word ‘red’, when the elliptical- ones ‘green’ & so forth. This one might- call teaching the child the meanings of the colour- names in an indirect way because- one could herehere || in this case say that I- led the child to correlate the- word red with something that I- didn't see but hoped the child- would see if it looked through- the circular glasses. And this way- is indirect as opposed to the direct- way of pointing to a red object etc..

[mind-reading]

From this it should follow that- we sometimes rightly sometimes wrongly teach a man to say that he is- blind: For what if he saw all the- time but nevertheless behaved exactly like- a blind man?– Or should we say:- “Nature wouldn't play such a trick on- us!”.      We can see here that we don't quite Ms-149,8r understand the real use of the expression- “to see something” or “to see nothing”.       And what is so misleading to us- when we consider this use is- the following: We say “Surely we can- see something without ever saying or- showing that we do & on the other hand- we can say that we see so & so without- seeing it, therefore seeing is one process- & expressing that we see another, & all- they have to do with each other is that- they sometimes coincide; they have the- same connection as being red & being- sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet etc.”      Now this is obviously not quite true & not- quite false. It seems we somehowwe somehow || that we- look at the use of these words with- some prejudice. It is clear that we in our language- use the words ‘seeing red’ in such - a way that we can say “he sees …he sees … || A sees red, but- doesn't show it” on the other hand it is- easy to see that we would have no- use for these words if their application- was severed from the criteria of behaviour, that is to say, to the language -game which we play with these words- it is, both, essential that the people- who play it (should) behave in the- particular way we call expressingexpressing || saying, showing what Ms-149,8v they see, & also that sometimessometimes || under certain circumstances they- should more or less or entirely conceal what they see.      Balance: The point of the game depends- upon what usually happens.      Point of a game      ⋎ How does he know that he seessees || has the visual image red i.e. how- does he connect the word ‘red’ with ‘a particular- colour’? In fact what does the expression- ‘a particular’ here mean. What is- the criterion for his connecting itit || the word- always to the same colourcolour || experience? Is it not- often just that he calls it red?

⋏ But doesn't then the word “seeing red”- mean to me a particular processparticular process || certain (private) experience or- (mental) event(mental) event || fact in the realm of primary experience – which surely is utterly- different from saying certain words?

In fact if he is to play a language- game the possibility of this will- depend upon his own & the other people's- reactions. The game depends upon- the agreement of these reactions i.e.- they must describe the same things ‘red’.      “But if he speaks to himself- surely this is different. For then he needn't- consult other people's reactions &- he just gives the name ‘red’ to the- same colour to which he Ms-149,9r gave it on a previous occasion.on a previous occasion. || on previous occasions. || in previous cases. But how does- he know that it is the same colour.- Does he also recognize the sameness of colour- as what he used to call sameness of- colour & so on ad infinitum? It is quite true- he uses, in agreement with ordinary use,- the word ‘red’ & the same colour such that he- would not say that he saw now- the colour he had seen before that- that colour is red but that what he- sees now is not red etc.      It is quite true, he connects the word & the experience.

The words “‘seeing red’ means a- part experience” are senseless unless- we can follow them up by: ‘namely- this → (pointing)’. Or else they may say- experience as opposed to physical object, but- then this is grammar.

But I could- use language just for making entries- in my diary & without even having- learnt it I could have invented a name- for the particularthe particular || a colour sensation say- the name ‘red’ & then used this name- to write down whenever I had that Ms-149,9v colour sensation. That means, you- (would) play a private language game- with yourself. But let's see, how- are we to describe this game?

When you say “the expression- ‘‒ ‒ ‒’ means to you a certain private- experience” you are (indeed) supplementing- this statement by imagining a red colour, or looking- at a red object, (which- supply the ‘namely this’), but how- do you useuse || make use of the expression &- the experience you thus connect with it?- For what we call the- meaning of the word lies in the game- we play with it.

But it seems to me that I either see- red or don't see red. Whether I express- it or not.      Picture we use here.      This picture not questioned but its- application.      Other cases of tautologies.

“Surely seeing is one thing, & showing that- I see is another thing”.– This certainly, - is like saying “skipping is one thing & Ms-149,10r jumping another”. But there is a- supplement to this statement “skipping is this (showing it) & jumping- this (showing it)”. Now how about this- supplement in the first case? “Seeing red is- this (showing it) & showing that we see red, this- (showing it).” The point is just that there- isn't a ‘showing that I see’ except showing- that I see. “But can't I say: seeing- red is what I'm doing now” (looking at- something red)? And although in a sense- the other man can't directly see what-see what- || be aware of the acting or activity I'm talking about, I certainly know- what it is that I'm talking about. That is although- for him I can't point directly to the my- seeing red, for myself I can point to it,- & in this sense I can give an ostensive- definition of the expression to myself.- ← But an ostensive definition is not a magic act.      If I explain to someone the use- of ‒ ‒ ‒ by ‒ ‒ ‒ Giving the ostensive definition simply- consists in ‒ ‒ ‒.      One might be inclined to say that- castling was not just the act of ….      But it is the game of which it is part …. So what does giving to myself the ostensive definition- of red consist in? – Now how am I to- describe it shall I say seeing red & Ms-149,10v saying to myself ‘I see red.’– - Or is it- “seeing a certain colour sensation & saying ‘I see- red’”? The first version it seems doesn't account- for the factdoesn't account- for the fact || won't- do as it isn't essential to us that- when I do for myself what I call ‘seeing red’ that should necessarily be what- the others mean by seeing red.- So I would rather leave it open- what colour I am concentrating my attention on.- But then how can I call it a colour?- Isn't it just as uncertain that I- mean by colour what he means as that I mean- by red what they mean & - the same of course applies to ‘seeing’ (for- what here I mean by the word is not an- activity of the human eye). (The second- version is justified only if I wish to- say that it does not matter here- to which of the colours (say, red, green, blue,- yellow) he assigns the name ‘red’ & so- we might have - said “he sees a same colour, say, blue & says- ‘I see red.’”.)

But it's a blatant error to mix up- ‘seeing red’ with showing that you see red!- I know what seeing red is & I know- what showing … is. Couldn't we say- that knowing what showing … is, is seeing Ms-149,11r showing now what is knowing what seeing is.       Consider the proposition: He makes sure what it- means to him by …. Would you say the word- had meaning to him if it ‘meant something else’ every- time? And what is the criterion of the same colour coming twice.-      In knowing what seeing red is you seem- to give yourself a sample but you- don't because the usual criteria- for the sameness of the sample- don't apply. I can say I call ‘red’- always the same colour or whenever- I explain red I point to a sample- of the same colour.

If we describe a game which he- plays with himself is it relevant that- he should use the word red for the- same colour in our sense or would we- also call it a language game if he used- it anyhow. Then what is the criterion- for using it in the same way? Not merely the- connection between ‘same’, ‘colour’ & ‘red’?

Which is the same colour as that I- saw? Not the one to which I apply- the words ‘this is the same colour’?

“Let me see if I still know which of these- colours is red? – (looking about) Yes I know.” (Here I could - have said “is called red”.)

So he can make sure of what it means in this private- way!of what it means in this private- way! || in this private- way of what it means by having a private sensation Making sure that you know what ‘seeing Ms-149,11v red’ means is good only if you can- make use of this knowledge in a future- case. Now what if I see a colour- again, can I say I made sure- I knew what ‘red’ waswas || meant so now I- shall know that I'll recognize- it correctly? In what sense is- having said the words ‘this is red’- before a guarantee that I now- see the same colour when I say- again I see red?

We can indeed imagine a Robinson- using a language for himself but- then he must behave in a certain- way or we shouldn't say that he- plays language games with himself.

The grammar of ‘private sense data’.

Das Interessante ist nicht daß ich- nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muß- um zu wissen, daß ich Zahnschmerzen habe,- sondern, daß mir mein Benehmen gar- nichts sagt. Ms-149,12r

“I sent him to the doctor because- he moans” is just as correct as “I- sent him to the doctor because he has- toothache”.

“I moan because I have pain”.– Are- you sure that that's why you moan?

“But d. a. the nucleus of our language- remains untouched whatever we might- imagine our behaviour to be!” The nucleus- is the word together with its meaning.

“‘Toothache’ is a word which I use in- a game which I play with other people,- but it has a private meaning to me.”

“Christen toothache.”

Changing the meaning of a word.- Meaning connected with the use of- the ostensive definition.

In the use of the word meaning it is essential Ms-149,12v that the same meaning is kept - throughout a game.

Consider a game in which this isn't so.- Would you call this sort of- activity a game?

“Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’- always the same private experience?”

‘I recognize it as being the- same’. And are you also recognizing- the meaning of the word the same,- so you can be sure that “recognizing- it to be the same” now means the- same to you which it did before?

“But in ostensively defining a word- for myself I impress its meaning on- me so as not to forget it later on”. But- how do you know that this helps. How- do you know later on whether you remember it- rightly or wrongly.

Can you recognize something to be- red which isn't red?

To be sure that so & so is the case.- To know: Does ‘p’ follow from ‘I know p’? Ms-149,13r The normal case of being sure,- of a strong conviction.      Does it make sense to say, that- what you see is green, & you recognize- it to be red?

“It seems to me to have sense”.      You are undoubtedly using a picture- therefore it ‘seems to you to have- sense’. But ask yourself what use- you are making of that picture?- We shall have to talk about sense- & nonsense later.

What's the use here of being sure- if it doesn't follow that- it is so & if your being sure- is the only criterion there is for- it being so? That means: This isn't at all a- case of being sure, of conviction.

The word ‘recognizing as …’ is used where- you can be wrong in recognizing.

–Sometimes these bodies change their- weight & then we look for the cause (of it)(of it) || of the change- & find, say, that something's come off the body. - Ms-149,13v

Sometimes however the weight of a body changes & we- can't account for the change at all. But we - nevertheless don't say that weighing it- had lost its point “because now the- body really doesn't have any one weight”.- Rather we say that the body had- changed somehow that this was the- cause of the change of weight but- that hitherto we have not- found this cause. That is, we shallshall || will- go on playing the game of weighing- & we try to find an explanation- for the exceptional behaviour.       We use the formal expression “the weight- of aa || this body” to designate something- inherent in the body something which- could only be demolished by destroying- part of the body. The same body – the- same weight. (And this is a grammatical proposition.)      Green.      Supposing what in fact is the rule- became the exception. Under certain- peculiar circumstances indeed a body - kept on weighing the same. Say iron in- the presence of mercury. A piece- of cheese on the other hand though- keeping its size, calories, etc., weighed Ms-149,14r different weights at different times unaccountably.            On the one hand it seems that if there- wasn't the behaviour of toothache …      “So & so has excellent teeth, he never had- to go to the dentist, never complained- about toothache; but as toothache is a- private experience we can't know whether- he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life”. ⋎      What is an assumption that e.g. ‘A- has toothache’? Is it saying- the words “A has toothache”? Or doesn't- it consist in doing something with- these words?- ⋏ How does one assume- such & such to be the case?

A game of assumption: ‒ ‒ ‒

Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming:- a gesture.

“But the point is just that we don't- assume that we have toothache. Therefore- even if we have no ground for assuming- that anyone else has toothache we may nevertheless know that we have.” But would- we in this case at all talk of a Ms-149,14v (particular) behaviour as a symptom- of pains? “Suppose no one knew- pains except I, & I- just invented a name ‘abracadabra’- for it!”

Showing his grief,, || – hiding his grief.

Certain behaviour under certain circumstances we call showing our toothache- other behaviour, hiding our toothache. Now would- we talk about this behaviour in- this way if people didn't ordinarily behave- in the way they do? Suppose I & they described- my behaviour without such a word- as pain, would the description be- incomplete? The question- is: do I consider it incomplete?- If so I will distinguish between- two cases of my behaviour & the- others will say that I use- two words alternately for my- behaviour & thereby they will acknowledge- that I have toothache.

“But can't he have toothache without in- any way showing it? And this shows- that the word ‘toothache’ has a meaning- entirely independent of a behaviour- connected with toothache.” Ms-149,15r

“The game which we- play with the word ‘toothache’ entirely depends- upon there being a behaviour which we- call the expression of toothache.

“We use ‘toothache’ as the name of a personal- experience”.– Well let's see how we- use the word!

“But you know the sensation of toothache! So- you can give it a name, say, ‘toothache’.”

But what is it like to give a sensation- a name? Say it is pronouncing the name- while one has the sensation & possibly- concentrating on the sensation, – but- what of it? Does this name thereby- get magic powers? And why on earth- do I call these sounds the ‘name’ of- the sensation? I know what I do- with the name of a man or of a number- but have I by this act of- ‘definition’ given the name a use?

“I know what toothache is”. But how do- I know that I know it? Because- something comes before my mind? ButBut || And- how do I know that that is the right Ms-149,15v thing? Because I recognize it? But then- it doesn't matter what it is, as long- as I recognize it as toothache! …

“But when you ask me “do you- know what toothache is” I answer- yes after having brought before- my mind a certain sensation.” But- now is this certain sensation characterised? Only by that that it- comes when you say the word ‘toothache’?- Or that it comes & you are in- some way satisfied?

“To give a sensation a name” means- nothing unless I know already- in what sort of a game this- name is to be used.

I've described certain behaviour by:- ‘it is obvious that he was hiding his- pain’ or: ‘I think he was hiding- his pain’ or ‘I don't know at all whether he was hiding pain’.

But can't I just assume with- some degree of certainty that he has Ms-149,16r pain although I have no reason whatever- for it? To any particular use of the word. I can say “I assume …”, but- if I sent them all to the doctor although- they showed no sign of illnessillness || pain, I should- just be called mad.

That we try to account for something is due to the fact that we- often can account for it. If I- saw no regularity whatever I- should not be inclined to say- that there is one which I haven't- as yet discovered. What usually happens- makes me take this point of view.

The ‘private definition’ is not binding.

In our private language game we- had, it seemed, given a name to an- impression, – in order, of course, to use the- name for this impression in the future. The- def., that is, should have determined- on future occasions for what impressions to use- the name & for which not to use it.- Now we said that on certain occasions after having given the def. we did use the word and on other we didn't;- but we described these Ms-149,16v occasions only by saying that we had ‘certain- impressions’ that is we didn't describe them- at all. The only thing that characterized them was that we used- such & such words. What seemed - to be a definition- didn't play the role of a def.- at all, it did not justify one- subsequent use of the word and- all that remains of- one's private language game is therefore that- I sometimes without justifying my particular reason write the word ‘red’ into my diary – without- any justification whatever.

“But surely I feel justified when- normally I use the word ‘red’ although- I don't think of a def. while doing so.” Do you mean that- whenever normally you use the word- ‘red’ you have a particular feeling- which you call a feeling of justification. I wonder if that is true. But- true or nottrue or not || anyhow by ‘justification’ I didn't- mean a feeling. But I think I know- what makes you say that on- saying e.g. this chairchair || book is red you- have a feeling of being justified in- using the word. For you might ask:- isn't there an obvious difference Ms-149,17r between the case in which I applyapply || use- a word in its well known meaning as when I say to someone ‘the sky is blue today’ - & the case in which I say any- arbitrary word on such an occasion- e.g. ‘the sky is moo’. In this case,- you will say, I either know that- I am just fixing a meaning to the word ‘moo’- or else I shall feel that I have no- justification whatever to useI have no- justification whatever to use || there is no justification whatever- for using the- word. The word is just any word & not- the appropriate word. I quite agree that- there is a difference in experience between- the cases of ‘using the name of the colour’,- ‘giving a new name to the colour’ & ‘using some- arbitrary word in the place of the name- of the colour’. But that doesn't- mean that it is correct to say that- I have a feeling of appropriateness- in the first case which is absent in- the third. “But ‘red’ somehow- seems to us to fit this colour”. We certainly- may be inclined to say this sentence- on certain occasions but it would be- wrong to say that therefore we had a- feeling of fitting when ordinarily we- said that something was red.

“But do you mean that one man couldn't- play a game of chess with himself & Ms-149,17v without anyone else knowing that- he did?”– What, would you say,- he should do in order that we- may say he is playingthat we- may say he is playing || to be playing- with himself a private- game of chess?- Just anything?– - Would you say he must go- through certain private experiences- which- I can indirectly describe- by saying that they are the- experiences which he has when- playing a certain game chess (in the ordinary- sense of the word)?- I suppose you would say e.g. that- he imagines a chessboard with the- chessmen on it, that he imagines- certain moves etc.. And if you were- asked what it means- to imagine a chessboard, you would- explain it by pointing to a real chessboard or, say to a- picture of one and analogously if- you were asked what does it mean- to imagine the king of chess, a pawn, a knight's move etc..- - Or should you have said: He must go through- certain …. But what- private experiences are there & will- any of them do in this case? For Ms-149,18r instance feeling hot? “No!” The private- experience I am talking of must have the multiplicity- of the game of chess: But again does he recognize- two private experiences to be different by- a further private experience & this to be the [Private experiences in fiction.] same in the different cases? Mustn't- we say in this case that we- can't say anything whatever- about private experiences & are in fact not- entitled to use the words- experiences at all? What makes- us believe that we are is, that- we really think of the case in- which we can describe his private- experiences describing different ways- of playing chess in one's imagination.

How can we say he may see red- although nobody may be able to- find it out?

If we go through with this idea- of thethe || a private experience which we don't- know we can't talk of a certain- private experience either, because Ms-149,18v this expression is taken from the- case in which what we don't know- is say, whether- if he says he sees red he- sees red & not perhaps blue green or yellow.      In which it alludes to a certain- class of experiences which we know- though we don't know which one- of its members he has. Rather- the private experiencesexperiences || impressions- which we imagine as the background to the foreground of our actions dissolve into a mist- which we wished to talk about- & imagined to be back of our action- Rather- the private experiencesexperiences || impressions- which we imagine as the background to the foreground of our actions dissolve into a mist- which we wished to talk about- & imagined to be back of our action- ||       Rather the private experiences- which we imagined as an unknown x, y, z etc.- behind our actions, dissolve into a- mist & into nothing.

One might suggest–: The word- ‘toothache’ stands on the one hand for- a behaviour & on the other hand- for a private experience. The connection is that when a man has- the private experience he tends to behave- in the particular way. Ms-149,19r      But why should you talk of- a private experience & not 100 private experiences,- as you don't know whether there is any- red or whether there are 100?

What is so confusing here is- to talk of the meaning of the- word instead of the use.      The idea of different kinds of objects.

Why should you know better what- experiencing is like with the other- person than what seeing red is like?      If you were very careful you- would say “a certain something”.

What is it that happens when in one- case I say “I have toothachehave toothache || see red & mean- it, & am not lying, & on the other hand I say- the words but know that they are not- true, or say them not knowing what exactly- they mean etc.?

The criteria for it being the truth- have to be laid down beforehand- in common languagehave to be laid down beforehand- in common language || are laid down in language (rules, charts etc.). “But how am- I to know how in the particular- case to apply them?” – For in so far as they Ms-149,19v are laid down in common language- they join the rest of what is- thus laid downjoin the rest of what is- thus laid down || areare || become just part of the common language game i.e. they don't help me in any particular case. They join in with all the rest of … not helping menot helping me || & don't help me in- my particular private- decision. | They join the rest of the rules of common language.They join in with all the rest of … not helping menot helping me || & don't help me in- my particular private- decision. | They join the rest of the rules of common language. Is there- such a thing as justifying what- in the particular case I do just- by what then further is the- case and not by rule? Can I say: I am now- justified in using the sentence just by what is now the case …?      No!      Nor can I saycan I say || does it help me to say I am justified- “when I feel justified”. For about- feeling justified the same things can- be said as about feeling toothache.

My criteria for having toothache are the same ashaving toothache are the same as || saying I have toothache is no other than for the others saying I have toothache,- for I can't say that feeling,- or having, toothache is my criterion- for having a right to say it.

Examine: ‘These two operations bring- about the same pain’. The pain- which they all bring about I- shall call toothache.      What does this shew?? Now I might explain. - Did I give the name ‘toothache’ to a behaviour?- Did I call a behaviour “having toothache”?- Did I call a behaviour “having the same pain”?- But showing toothache can never be- saying … Ich glaube ich wollte zeigen, daß ‘toothache’ hier nicht als Name eines- Benehmens gegeben wird & daß man auch nicht auf eine Erfahrung- hinten dem Benehmen zeigt.      I must assume an expression- which is not lying. Now do I say that there is Ms-149,20r not the experience of toothache but only- the behaviour?!?

When I say that moaning is the- expression of toothache then under certain- circumstances the possibility of- it being the expression without- the feeling behind it mustn't- enter my game.

Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der- Ausdruck kann immer lügen.

The language games with expressions- of feelings (private experiences)- are based on games with expressions of- which we don't say that they may- lie.

“But was I when a baby taught- that toothache meant my expression- of toothache?”– I was told that- a certain behaviour was called- expression of toothache.

“But isn't it possible that a child- should behave just as a normal- child when it has toothache & not have toothache?” Ms-149,20v

But does if we speak of the baby,- ‘having toothache’ mean the same as- ‘behaving such & such’?

We say “poor thing, it moans”.

“Can't I in the child too, separate- the moaning from the pain. Can't- I say that I pity it because- it has pain not because it moans?

You ought I suppose to say- that you pity it because you- believe that it has pains. But- what is believing that it has- pains like, as opposed to believingbelieving || just seeing- that it moans? It doesn't- here consist in believing that- he doesn't cheet but in- a different experience.

“Something clicked in my brainbrain || mind when- I came to this colour”. (This is a gesture.) But did- you know from the clicking that- it was red. Supposing looking at- this colour your eyes opened wider- & you gave a jerk, – was it by its producing this- reaction that you recognized Ms-149,21r the colour as being red? I saw a particular colour concentrated on it & the word red came without tension. Indeed this- is the phenomenon we call recognition but we call it that because- it happens under circumstances- where we have other criteria for- saying that we've recognized the- object.

“But surely there is a case in- which I'm justified to say “I see red”,- where I'm not lying, & one where I'm- not justified in saying so!” Of course- I can be justified by the ostensive def.- or by asking the others “now isn't this- red?” & they answer that it is. But you- didn't mean this justification, but one- thatthat || which justifies me privately whatever others will say.

“But do you mean to say that the- truth or falsehood of my saying- ‘I see red’ does not consist in there- being red before my mind's eye in one- case & not in the other; but that- it depends on such things as ⌇ whether- I say it in this or that tone of- voicein this or that tone of- voice || with a certain tension or without?” ⌇ Ms-149,21v

If I say “I see red” without- reason, how can I distinguish- between saying it with truth &- saying it as a lie?

It is important here that there- is no such case asthat there- is no such case as || that I exclude the case of saying the untruth by mistake.

Hier haben wir keinen Vergleich des Satzes- mit der Wirklichkeit! (Kollationen)

Don't I know, when I say “I- see red” & am lying, that I am- lying?– When do I translate- my experience into the words expressing- my knowledge? One might say: knowing- that I am lying doesn't mean- saying that I do but being- ready to say it.

I could say: Lying is characterised- by a peculiara peculiar || an experience of tension. What is it- like to know that I don't see red- & to say that I do?

“Well it is simply not seeing red- & saying “I see red”! There is nothing Ms-149,22r problematic aboutabout || in this, as seeing- & saying something are utterly- independent.”

“What I now call …”

[We never dispute the opinions of common sense- but we question the expression of common sense.]

Suppose I said “I see red” & was- lying for I actually saw red – but had made- a slip of the tongue.      But which lie was it I had said,- or (rather) thought? Of course I- may say later “I wanted to say- “I see green”” but did anything correspond- to these words while I said “I see red”?

But suppose that he felt that he- was lying but never said so, – - did he know that he was lying or- not?

“Did he know that he was doing, what- we call lying?” “Did he know that- he was doing what on other occasions- he called lying?”

What is his criterion for saying Ms-149,22v – wanting to speak the truth, – that- he isis || was lying? Is there a- criterion?

Do these two sentencesDo these two sentences || Are these two sentences to say the- same: “He says he sees red- & really sees red” & he says he sees- red with convictionwith conviction || and has the experience of not lying?

“So you think seeing red consists- in saying ‘I see red’ in a certain- tone of voice?”– No, but saying- “I see red” & seeing it might be saying- it in a particular tone of- voice.

How do I imagine myself seeing- red? Isn't- it by imagining red?! But how do I- imagine myself addressing a meeting?

Imagine a Robinson lying to- himself.– Why is this difficult to- imagine?      Look at something red & say to yourself “I see green” a) meaning- by ‘green’ what usually you mean- by ‘red’ (i.e. speaking the truth) b)- lying. Ms-149,23r

But one might call it lying to- oneself if one e.g. turns one's watch- forward to make oneself - get up earlier.

Falsifying an account. I add up numbers- arrive at 2730 then rub out 3 &- put a 5 instead.

When in this discussion we talk of- lying it ought always to mean- subjectively lying- & subjectively lying to the other- person & not to oneself.

If I see green without saying- I see green, in what way- can these words be said to describe what I see?

One could imagine someone constantly- lying subjectively but not objectively.

Imagine this case: Someone has a particular way; if lying, he …       He always lies calling red ‘green’ &- green ‘red’, but as a matter of fact- what he says agrees with the usage- of the other people & so his lying is- never noticed. taken notice of. Ms-149,23v

Supposing one said: To see red means- to see that which makes me inclined- to describe it by saying ‘ …’.      “To know that I am lying means- to have an experience which- I should describe by the words ‘ …’.”

[Our language on the one hand has- very much more possibilities of expression than logicians admitadmit || dream of || imagine &- on the other hand the uses of- itsits || these modes of expression are very much- more limited than logicianslogicians || they imagine.]

What makes lying “I see red” into lying?- The private experience of not- seeing red or the private experience- of feeling a certain tension?

Is it wrong to say that lying in- such & such cases consists in- saying so & so & feeling a tension?      Man könnte sehr wohl sagen- daß manchmal die Lüge dadurch- charakterisiert ist daß ich mir- bewußt bin daß es sich anderes Ms-149,24r verhält, & manchmal nicht so, sondern- dadurch, daß ich die Spannung des- schlechten Gewissens spüre; etc..

Wenn ich nun sage “der lügt, der sagt- ‘ich sehe rot’ & sieht grün”, so stimmt- das nicht, denn ich mußte sagen “der- lügt der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’ & weißt (oder- glaubt) er sieht grün”.

“Der lügt, der sagt “ich sehe rot” & sieht- die Farbe, die er selbst mit dem Worte- grün bezeichnen würde.” Aber das- heißt doch wahrheitsgemäß- so bezeichnen würde. Oder können wir- sagen, “für sich so bezeichnen würde”?      Daher ja die Idee daß man lügen- kann sondern man laut das eine &- leise das andre sagt & was man laut- sagt ist hier die Lüge.

“Der weiß, welche Farbe er sieht, der es- irgendwie ausdrücken könnte.” Was ist das- Kriterium dafür daß, er es könnte?

Was soll es dann heißen: einer Farbeneindruck wahrheitsgemäß mit ‘rot’ bezeichnen?- Paßt das Wort dem einen Eindruck besser- als dem anderen? Ms-149,24v

Man könnte hier auch sagen- man solle gar nicht von subjektiver Wahrheit der Farben sprechen. Die Wahrheit- des Satzes “Ich habe Zahnschmerzen” habe- nur objektiv beurteilt zu werden.

“Das Wahre Wort kommt anders als- das falsche.”

Man kann sagen: “Alle diese Worte- sind in derselben Weise gekommen.”

Das Wort welches Du sprichst ist- eine Reaktion. Die Reaktion die- wir in dem Satz übersehen “er sieht- …”.– Aber ist es nicht wahr daß- der Andere nicht wissen braucht, daß- meine Reaktion in dieser & dieser- Weise vor sich geht? Er meint, ich- sage ihm geradeheraus was ich- sehe & es ist nicht so, sondern ich- erfinde eine Lüge.

“Er weiß nicht was ich sehe, bis- ich es ihm sage; ich weiß es schon- vorher ehe er es erfährt.” Könnte- es auch umgekehrt sein? Ms-149,25r

Ich habe jetzt lange mit einem Bleistift- geschrieben: wußte ich in diesem Satz daß die Schrift- grau & das Papier weiß ist?      Wußte ich das,, || ? oder wußte ich bloß,- daß es ist wie es ist?

“Ich weiß, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus- gesagt habe.”– “Ja, aber war nicht vor- dieser ‘Reaktion’ schon etwas da, nämlich eben das Erlebnis, daß ich es ihm- nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe?”

“Können wir nicht doch sagen, daß etwas- jedem sichtbar (äußerlich), geschahgeschah || geschieht & etwas weiteres- nur mir wahrnehmbarwahrnehmbar || erkennbar, ‘in mir’?”

“How am I justified in saying that- I see this apple red”? You are not- justified.– But isn't it true that- when I say the truth I am- justified & when I'm lying I'm not justified.

How is a lie possible in a case- where there is no justification?

Supposing one said, lying (here) consists- in applying one word to the colour Ms-149,25v & not another? A misleading word- instead of a not misleading one?

I am justified if the word comes- in one way, & not justified if it- comes in an other way. –But in- which way?– If it comes in the- straightforward way I'm justified.- But which is the straightforward- way?– I know but can't explain- as the paradigm of it is in- me.– But as far as it's in you- it serves no purpose in the- future application of the word.- (private ostensive def.)

How do I know that it comes- in the straightforward way?- What the straightforward way is must be fixed- by a paradigm.

“Why on earth should it be wrong- to use a word not in the simple- (‘straightforward’) way?” Couldn't it not- even be my duty to use the word- which doesn't come straightforwardly?- Imagine the case where we had- laid down a code in which ‘red’- meant green. Ms-149,26r

“I said the word with a bad conscience.”

What troubles me are the propositions in which- an action is described accompanied by- a ‘state of mind’.

“Lying when you say “I see red” consists in saying these words &- having a private experience which- I call ‘feeling unjustified’, or- ‘seeing green’ etc.”– “But suppose- that I call the feeling of being- justified “feeling unjustified”!?”– ThisThis || Now this- last sentence though it sounds- absurd had sense.

“What you say comes to this: - when I truly say ‘I see red’- I am not justified in saying this- by a fact that I see red”.– No- I should say ‒ ‒ ‒

“You either have a feeling of being- unjustified or you don't!” Ms-149,26v

“But surely there is a case in- which I say ‘I see red’ & am- telling the (subjective) truth &- one in which I lie!”– Yes,- that is, we distinguish between- telling thetelling the || a case of telling the truth & not tellingnot telling || of not telling- the truth.– But what does lying- in thisthis || such a case, consist in? We may- try all sorts of explanations:- “It consists in saying … & seeing green”,- “It consists in saying … & knowing that- I see …”, “It consists in saying- … & feeling that I'm not justified in- saying this” & others. Now let me ask: do- all these explanations come to the same- or do they describe different facts?- We mightmight || || can say: if they describe different- casescases || facts the differences are quite unimportant to us (here)are quite unimportant to us (here) || don't matter to us here. For our purpose they- can all be said to describe the same- factfact || case. (We might have said lying- consists in saying “I see red” & having- stomach ache but as stomach ache- is a private sensation why not rather consider the private sensation of seeing a- colour other than red?) We may say- therefore that these explanations- for our purpose were no explanations at all. They left us just Ms-149,27r where we were, and they only (seem)- (to) confirmconfirm || affirm say that the cases of lying- & saying the truth are distinguished- by the private experience accompanying the- sentence. So let us put our questions like this: lying in our case- consists in saying “I see red” & seeing- green,, || : What does seeing green consist- in? As an answer we immediately give- ourselves a sample of greenof green || ‘for green’. But is it- essential that this sample should- be what the others also call- green? No it might be what they call- yellow or blue or red etc.. But are- you inclined to say “it might be- what they call hot, cold or tepid”?- Then after all you are thinking of games played- with others though you left- a certain latitude ….

When we talk of the private experience- which the others don't know we- don't originally mean to talk of- a shapeless nothing but of a variable with- certain definite values.

It is said sometimes that if I- & someone else are looking at some- object I can never know what colour- the other really sees. But with what Ms-149,27v right do we here use ‘colour’- & seeing? Some philosophers - (e.g. Driesch) would here be inclined- to think that they can solve- the puzzlesolve- the puzzle || save- the situation by using the senseless- phrase “We can't know what the other- has”. Compare Driesch: ….      - But as long as ‘to have’ here- has any meaning at all it can't- help us & when it has no meaning- at all I think it can't help us either.

“We distinguish between … & …” that- means: We sometimes use- the expression “I lied when I said- that I saw green” as opposed to “I- told the truth when I said ‘ …’”. But- isn't this enough?– “But under what- circumstances do you use the- expression ‘ …’”? But must I necessarily- stop giving you circumstances- when I have given you a- sample? Why not when I have given- you a word, a verbal expression?- Is the use of such an expression- necessarily indefinite as compared Ms-149,28r with the use of a sample – can't a- sample be used, compared with objects, in many- different ways?

The word lying is taught us in- a particular way in which it was fastened- to a certain behaviour to the use- of a certain expression under certain- circumstances. Then we use it saying- that we have been lying when our- behaviour was not- like the one which first constituted- the meaning.      Just in the same way we were- taught the word ‘red’ in a game- say like number one & then we use it when- the conditions are different (compare- the past in the description of a- dream) (and of course it isn't just the word ‘red’ we use but- the whole imagery connected with it).

“But you talk as though there- was only the word ‘red’word ‘red’ || expression ‘I see red’ but not- an impression corresponding to it.”- On the contrary I don't say that when a man- says … he also has the impression. Ms-149,28v

But is all that happens that- you say ‘I see red’? Isn't- there something else being the- case, happening, when you say this- & it is true? But if you ask- isn't there something else happening,- you don't mean just anything- else e.g. that it's raining. So- after all you have to give- descriptions of what it is that happensit is that happens || you mean is happening- & insofar as you give a description- of it you must know what it is that happens- & it is not a x. And keeping it partly- unknown doesn't help you either.- On the other hand there is no- reason why you should always- stop with giving a sample &- not with giving a worda word || an expression. (In this- sense one can say that an expression- acts as a picture)as a picture) || as much as a picture as a sample).

The philosophical puzzle seems- insoluble if we are frank with ourselves,- & is, insoluble. That is until that is we change- our question.

‘Expression can always be lying.’ How can we- say this of the expression to which Ms-149,29r we fasten our words?

“But I always know whether I'm lying- or not!” – You are now obsessed with the use of- the word ‘lying’. As a ruleAs a rule || In general you talk without- thinking of lying & of whether you lie- or not.

But (then) I'm always either lying or- not lying! (Whether I always know it or not.)

Suppose a child learnt the word- ‘toothache’ as an equivalent for its moaning & noticed that whenever it said- the word or moaned the grown-ups treated- it particularly well. The child then- uses moaning or the word ‘toothache’ as a means- to bring about the desired effect: is the- child lying?

You say: “Surely I can- moan with toothache & I can moan- without toothache, so why shouldn't- it be so with- the child? Of course I only see Ms-149,29v & hear the child's behaviour but- from my own experience I know what- toothache is (like) I know toothache apart from behaviour & I am led- to believe that the others sometimes have- the pains I have”.– The first sentence- already is misleading: It isn't the- question whether I can moan- with & without toothache, - the point is that I distinguish- ‘moaning with toothache’ & ‘moaning- without toothache’ & now we- can't go on to say that of course- in the child we make the same- distinction. In fact we don't. We- teach the child to use the- words “I have toothache” to replace- its moans, & this was how I myselfmyself || too- was taught the expression. How do I know that I have learnt the word toothache to mean what they wanted me to express? I ought to say I believe I have toothache?      Now one can moan because one has- pain, or e.g., one can moan on the- stage. How do I know that the- child, small as it is, doesn't already- act & in this case I teach it to- mean by ‘toothache’ something I- don't intend it to mean?

I have taught the child to- use the expression ‘I have toothache’ Ms-149,30r under certain circumstances and now it uses the words under these circumstances.– But- what are these circumstances? Shall- I say “the circumstances under which- it moaned”, and what are these?      But now I also teach the- child to moan on the stage! That- is to say I even teach it to use- this expression in a different game.- I also teach it to read out the- sentence ‘I have toothache’ from- a book, when it hasn't toothache.      In fact I could teach it to- lie, as a separate language game.- (In fact we often play this kind of- game with children.)

“But doesn't what you say come to- this that it doesn't matter what- the persons feel as long as only- they behave a particular way?”

“Do you mean that you can- define pain in terms of behaviour?”      But is this what we do if we teach- the child to use the expression- ‘I have toothache’? Did I saysay || define: “Toothache- is such & such a behaviour”? This would- obviously be againstThis would- obviously be against || This- obviously contradicts the normal use of- the word! “But can't you, on the other hand, Ms-149,30v at least to yourself give an- ostensive def. of ‘toothache’. Pointing- to the place of your pain & saying- “this is …”?” Can't I give a name- to the pain I've got? Queer idea- to give one pain a name! What's it- to do with a name? Or what do I do- with it? What I do with the name- of a person whom I call by the- name. I mean to say: What connection- is the name to have with the pain. So far- the only connection so far is this that- you had toothache pointed to- your cheek & saidsaid || pronounced the word ‘moo’.- “So what?” Remember what we- said about private ostensive definition.

“But aren't you neglecting something – the experience or whatever you- might call it –? Almost the world- behind the mere words?”

But here solipsism teaches us a- lesson; It is the thought which- isIt is the thought which- is || It is that thought which is on the way to destroy this error. For if the world is idea it isn't- any person's idea. (Solipsism stops- short of saying this & says that it is- my idea). But then how could Ms-149,31r I say what the world is- if the realm of ideas has no neighbour. What- I do comes to defining the word world.      ‘I neglect that which goes without- saying.’

“What is seen I see” (pointing to my- body), I point at my geometrical eye,- saying this. Or I point with- closed eyes & touch my breast &- feel it. In no case do I make- a connection between what is seen- & a person.

Back to ‘neglecting’! It seems- that I neglect life. But not- life physiologically understood but- life as consciousness. And consciousness- not physiologically understood; - or, understood from the outside,- but consciousness as the very essence- of experience, & the appearance of the world,- the world.

Couldn't I say: if I had to add- the world to my language it would- have to be one sign for the whole of- language which sign could therefore be- left out. Ms-149,31v

⋏      Isn't what you reproach me of- as though you said: “In your- language you're only speaking!”

How am I to describe the way- the child learns the word ‘toothache’ – - like this? The child sometimes- has toothache it moans & holds its cheek, the grown-ups say- “ …” etc.. Or: The child sometimes- moans & holds its cheek, – the grown-ups “ …”? Does the first description- say something superfluous or false or does the- second leave out something essential?- Both descriptions are correct.

“But it seems as if you were neglecting- something.” But what more can- I do than distinguish the cases of- saying ‘I have toothache’ when I really have toothache, &- the case of saying the words without having the toothache?      I am alsoalso || further ready to talk of any- x behind my words so long as- it keeps its identity. ⋎

‒ ‒ ‒But why shouldn't I say- “I have toothache in his tooth”. I would- insist on his tooth being extracted. Who Ms-149,32r is supposed to cry out if it is?

What does it mean distributing primary- experience over all subjects? Imagine- that they have all real toothaches- in their teeth. The one which now only I- have. I now describe certain facts.- (Not metaphysical ones but facts- about the connectionconnection || coincidence of certain experiences.)

He gets a blow & cries,– I think: “no wonder- for it really hurts”. But wouldn't I- say to myself: Queer that he cries for- I feel the pain all right,– but he?!

What does it consist in that I- have pain, I feel myself crying,- I hear that I am crying, my mouth- cries?

It seems there is a phenomenon which- in general I refer to as ‘my toothache’- which, experience teaches me, is always connected- with one particular person (not ‘I’ but) Ludwig Wittgenstein. - I now imagine facts other than they are- & connect up this phenomenon to- all sorts of persons so as to make- it not at all tempting to call this- phenomenon ‘my toothache’. Ms-149,32v      Isn't it a particular phenomenon- to hear myself speak (not, ‘to- hear Ludwig Wittgenstein speak’). ‒ ‒ ‒

“I see so & so” does not mean- “The person so & so e.g. L.W. sees so & so”.

A language game in which everybody calls- out what he sees but without- saying “I see …”. Could anybody- say that what I call out is incomplete because I have left out- to mention the person?!

A language game in which everybody (& I too)- call out what I see without- mentioning me.

They always know what I see. If- they don't seem to, I misunderstand- what they say.

I am tempted to say: “It seems at least a- fact of experience that at the- source of the visual field there is- mostly a small man with gray flannel- trousers in fact L.W.”.– Someone- might answer me to this: It is true Ms-149,33r you almost always wear gray- flannel trousers & often look at them.

“Ich bin doch bevorzugt. Ich bin- der Mittelpunkt der Welt.” Denken- wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel- das sagen & auf mich zeigen! Wäre es noch richtig?      When I say that I play a unique- role I really mean the geometrical eye.

On the other hand if I describe- the usual appearance of my body- around the geometrical eye this- is on the same level as saying- that in the middle of the visual- field there is in general a brown- table & at the edges a white wall- (as I generally sit in my room).      Now suppose I described this in- the form: The visual world in general- is like this: (follows the description). Would- this be wrong?–- Why should it be wrong?! But the question is, what game is to be playedis to be played || I intend to- be playing with this sentence, e.g.,- who is allowed to say it & what are the reactions to this statementwhat are the reactions to this statement || what the reactions- to this statement are to be, and howhow || in what way- are the people who hear itthe people who hear it || those to whom it is said to react to Ms-149,33v this statementthis statement || it ? I should like- to say, that it's I who is to- say it, not L.W., but the- person at the source of the visual field.- But this I seem not to be able- to explain to anyone but me.anyone but me. || anyone. (Queer- state of affairs) The game played- might be the one which is in general played- with “I see so & so”.

Can't I say something to nobody,- neither to anybody else nor to- myself? What is the criterion- of saying it to myself?

If I see a fire he runs to extinguish- it.

At intervals I paint what I see. But- can't someone else paint it for me? Or- the picture be presented to me somehow, already finished?

What, if I see before me a picture- of the room as I am seeing the room?      Is this a language game?

I want to say: “the visual world is like- this …”,– but why say anything? Ms-149,34r – but why say anything? Ms-149,34r || but why say anything? ⋎

Die Auffassung- des Solipsismus erstreckt sich nicht auf- Spiele. Der Andere kann so gut- Schachspielen, wie ich.      I.e., when we play a language game we- are on the same level.

“I am in the lucky position of being in the- source of the visual worldworld || field. It is I who- see it.” I have a comfortable feeling- while saying this although the statement- isn't one of the class of statement which- in general give me this kind of feeling. I- said it as though I had said I am the- wealthiest man in the placeam the- wealthiest man in the place || have more- money than anyone else.

⋏      But the point is that I don't establish- a relation between a person & what is seen.- All I do is that alternately I point in- front of me & to myself.

But what I now see, this roomthis room || this view of my room,- plays a unique role, it is the visual- world!      (Der Solipsist flattert & flattert in der Fliegenglocke, schlägt sich an an den Wänden,- flattert weiter.schlägt sich an an den Wänden,- flattert weiter. || stößt sich an den Wänden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu Ms-149,34v bringen?)

“‒ ‒ ‒‒ ‒ ‒ || Description: this is what I now- see”. Leave out the “see”, leave- out the “now”, the “this” & leave out the “I”.

“(Description): this is the visual world”.- But why do you say visual & why- do you say that it's the world?

“A red patch is (now) at the center”.- All others must say “I see …”. But- is this distinction necessary, as I- know anyhow who's saying it, whether- I or one of the others?

But the real question for me is here: How- am I defined? Who is it, that is favoured?- I. But may I lift up my head to- indicate who it is?      – Supposing I constantly change- & my surrounding does: is there still- some continuity namely by it being- me & my surrounding that change?!

(Isn't this similar to thinking that- when things in spacethings in space || spacial things have changed- entirely there's still one thing that Ms-149,35r remains the same, namely space.) (Space- confused with room)

But is my hand favoured as compared- to someone else's hand I see? This is ridiculous.- Then either nobody is favoured or- I am, that is the person L.W. whose- hand is lifted.

All right, – when I, L.W., see what's seen!

Where is my toothache? I.e. how is its- place determined?

“What I now see justifies me in saying- that I see red”. And what do you- now see? If the answer is “this”- it is no answer I give to myself.-If the answer is “this”- it is no answer I give to myself.- || The answer may be “this” but you <…>- answer I don't tell myself what it is I see.      I don't see what I see more definitely- if at the same time I see my finger pointing- to it. (The question ought to have been- what are you now looking at).      I don't tell myself what it is I see- by seeing my finger pointing to - something.       Suppose I said: “What I now see- justifies me in saying “I see red” because- it is the same colour as this sample”, Ms-149,35v this is a justification only if I use the- word “the same colour” in a fixed- way. That is when we judge how- this word is used on the ordinary- grounds of behaviour etc.

Is the criterion for my playing- a private game of chess my- being however strongly inclined to- say that I am playing one?

How does one feel whether I am- strongly inclined?

What would I say if I - in my private judgements came- into contradiction with all- other people. I.e. if I could no - longer play a language game with- them. Or if all the facts around- me became extraordinary? Would I stick to my judgements?

Suppose someone asked me “What- does it mean to play a private- game of chess with oneself” &- I answered: “Anything, because- if I said that I was playing- a game of chess I would be so Ms-149,36r sure that I was that I would- stick to what I said whatever anyone- else anyhow say.” Under what circumstances would we say that he did what we- call portraying & under what circumstances that he called something- portraying which we didn't call that? Suppose here we- said: Well I can never know what he does inwardly - would this be anything than resignation?

Suppose someone painted pictures- of the landscape which surrounds it,- he sometimes paints the leaves of trees- orange sometimes blue, sometimes- the clear sky red etc. Under what circumstances would we agree with him that- he was portraying the landscape?

We call something a calculation- if, for instance, it leads to a house being built. ⋎

But can't he play a game with- the colour names against whatever anybody else says? But why should we- call it a game with the colour names.- “But if I played it I would stick- to saying that I was playing a game- with the colournames.” But is that all- I can say about it; is all that I can- say for its being this kind of game that- I stick to calling it so?

⋏ We call something a language game if- it plays a particular role in our Ms-149,36v human life.

Under what circumstances do- I say I am entitled to say that- I'm seeing red. The answer is showing- a sample i.e. giving the rule. But- if now I came into constant contradiction with what anybody else said,- should I not say that I am- applying the rule in a way which- prevents me from playing their- game. That is: is all that- is necessary that the rule I- give should be the rule they- give or isn't besides this an agreement in the application necessary?

If “having the same pain” means- the same as “saying that one has- the same pain” then “I have the- same pain” means the same as “I say- that I have the same pain” & the- exclamation ‘oh!’ means “I say ‘oh!’”.

Roughly speaking: The expression ’I have toothache‘ stands- for a moan but it does not mean- ‘I moan’.

But if “I have toothache” stands for a Ms-149,37r moan, what does “he has toothache” stand for?      One might say: it too stands for- a moan, that of compassion.

“Toothache, seeing etc. I only know from myself & not from- the other.”      “I never know that he has toothache, I only know- when I have it.”      “I can only believe that he has it, that- he has what I have.”      “Has ‘toothache’ then a different meaning in my case & in- his?”      “Isn't it possible that everybody should have- toothache but without expressing it?”      “If it is possible that sometimes one can have- ‘toothache’ without expressing it, it is possible that- always this should be so.”      “If my personal experience is all I know- how can I even assume that there is any- other besides?”      “Does ‘toothache’ in the other mean behaviour?”      “I only know what I mean by ‘toothache’.”      “I was taught the word ‘toothache’ in connection- with my behaviour but interpreted it to- mean my pain.”      “Only my ‘toothache’ is real toothache”.      “What justifies me in saying that the other has toothache- is his behaviour, what justifies me saying that I have- is the experience of toothache.”      “Is there only the expression of toothache & not the toothache?” Ms-149,37v      “I know what it means to say that- the other has ‘toothache’ even if I have no- means to find out whether he has.”

“Only he knows whether he has toothache, we can- never know.”      “Does the I enter into the personal- experience or not?”

We aren't lyingaren't lying || are speaking the truth if a fact corresponds- to the sentence. This is no explanation at all but a mere repetition unless we can supplement- it by ‘namely this↗’ & a demonstration & the whole explanation lies just in this demonstration. The whole problem here only arose - through the fact that in this case the demonstration is of a different kind,- that the demonstration of ‘I see red’, ‘I have toothache’ seems indirect.- If I say we must assume an- expression which can't lie this- can't be explained by saying, that- pain really corresponds to this- expression.

“But aren't you saying, that Ms-149,38r all that happens is the moaning &- that there is nothing behind it?”–      I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning.

“Do you deny that the moaning is- the expression of something”. No, that- is I too should call moaning an- expression (or even an expression of something- though this is misleading). But the word- expression here only characterizes the- language game played with it. I react- differently.

“So, you don't really have pain, you- just moan?!”– There seems to be a description- of my behaviour & also, in the same- sense a description of my experience- of my pain! The one so to speak the description- of an external the other of an internal- fact. This corresponds to the idea- that in the sense in which I can- give a part of my body a name - I can give a name to a private- experience (only indirectly).      And I am drawing your attention- to this that the language games are Ms-149,38v very much more different than you- thinkyou- think || it- appears.

You couldn't call moaning- a description! But this shows- you how far the proposition “I have toothache”- is from a ‘description’, & how far- teaching the use of the word toothache is- from teaching the word tooth.

One could from the beginning teach- the child the expression “I think- he has toothache” instead of “he has toothache” with the corresponding doubtfuldoubtful || uncertain tone of voice. This- mode of expression could be described by saying that we- can only believe that the owner has toothache.      But why not in the child's own- case? Because there the tone- of voice is simply determined by- nature.

In “I have toothache” the expression of- pain is brought to the same form- as a description “I have a matchboxhave a matchbox || I have 5 shillings”.

We teach the child to say “I- have been lying” when it has behaved in a certain way. Imagine here a typical case of a lie. Also this- expression goes along with a Ms-149,39r particular situation, facial expressions,- say of shame, tones of reproach etc.      But doesn't the child know- that it is lying before ever I teach- him the wordword || verbal expression? Is this meant to be a metaphysical question or a question about facts? It doesn't know- it as words. And why should it know- it at all?– “But do you assume- that it has only the facial- expression of shame, e.g., without the- feeling of shame? Mustn't you describe- the inside situation as well as the- outside one?”– But what if I said- that by facial expression of shame I- meant what you mean by the facial expression- & the feeling, unless I explicitly- distinguish between genuine, & fakedfaked || simulated facial- expressions? It is, I think, misleading- to describe the genuine expression- as a sum of the expression & something- else, though it is just as misleading- to say that the genuine expression- is nothing butbut || besides a particular behaviour.- We just misunderstand / get the function of our- wordswords || expressions of language if weif we || by : Ms-149,39v

We teach the child the use of- the word “to speak”. = Later it uses- the expression “I speakspeak || spoke to myself”. = - We then say “We never know whether & what- a person speaks to himself”.

Surely the description of the facial expression can be- meant (used)can be- meant (used) || is used as a description of- feelings & can be meantmeant || used otherwise.- We constantly- use such expressions as “When he- heard that he mademade || pulled a long face” &- don't add that the expression was- genuine. In other cases we describe- the acting of a person in the same- words or again we wish to leave it- open whether the expression was genuine- or not. To say that a description- of expressions used as a- description of feelings is indirecta description- of expressions used as a- description of feelings is indirect || we describe the feeling indirectly by the description of expressions is- wrong!

Imagine a language in which toothache- is called “moaning” & the difference- between just moaning & moaning with- pain is expressed by the moaning or- dry tone in which the word is pronounced.      People would not say in this language- that it became clear later on that Ms-149,40r A didn't really have pain, but they would- perhaps in an angry tone say that at- first he moaned & then he suddenly laughed.

Suppose he says to himself “I- lie”, how do we know whether he means- it?how do we know whether he means- it? || what is to show that he means it? But we would any dayday || time describe- this lying by saying: “He said … &- told himself at the same time that he- was lying”. Is this too an indirect- description of lying?

But couldn't one say that if I - speak of a man's angry voice meaning- that he was angry & again of his angry- voice not meaning that he was angry- in the first case the meaning of the description of his voice was much further reaching- than in the second case? I will admit- that our description in the first case- doesn't omit anything & is as complete- as though we had said that he really- was angry,– but somehow the meaning of- the expression then reaches below the surface.

But how does it do that? The answer- to this would be an explanation- of the useuse || two uses of the expression. But- how could this explanation reach Ms-149,40v under the surface? It is an explanation about symbols & it states- in which cases these symbols are- used. But how does it characterize- thesethese || the cases? Can it in the end do- more than distinguish two expressions?- I.e. describe a game with two expressions?      “Then is there nothing under the- surface?!” But I said that I was- going to distinguish two expressions,- one for the ‘surface’ & one for ‘what is- below the surface’ only remember that- these expressions themselves correspond to a picture, not to its- usage. It is just as misleading to- say that there is just surface- & nothing underneath it as that there is something below the- surface & that there isn't just the surface.- Because once we useuse || make use of the- picture of the ‘surface’ it is most- natural to use it such as to- express the distinction as that between- something on & something below the surface.-use it such as to- express the distinction as that between- something on & something below the surface.- || express with it the distinction as- on & below the surface.       Because we naturally use- thethe || this picture to express the distinction- as that between ‘on the surface’ & ‘below- the surface’ But we misapply the picture- if we ask whether both cases are or- aren't on the surface. Ms-149,41r

Now in order that with its normal- meaning we should teach a child the expression “I have lied” the child must behave in the normal way. E.g. it must under- certain circumstances ‘admit’ that it lied, it must- do so with a certain facial expression- etc. etc. etc.. We may not always find out- whether he lied or not but if we never- found out the word would have a different- meaning. “But once he has learnt the word- he can't be in doubt whether he is lying or- not!”– Consider the case of the person - who finds that his subjective lies are - judged by the ordinary criteria, truths.- He says that he has been to school feeling- that it's a lie but the teacher & the boys confirm- that he has been etc. etc.. You might say:- “But surely he can't doubt that he- said a subjective lie”.      This of course is like saying that he can't- be in doubt about whether he has toothache- or whether he sees red etc. On the- one hand: doubting whether I have- the experience E is not like doubting- whether someone else has it. Remember- what we said about the asymmetry- of the game No. 1. On the other hand Ms-149,41v one can't say “surely I- must know what it is I see” - unless to know what I see is- to mean to see whatever I see. - The question is what are we- to call “knowing what it is I see”, “not- being in doubt about what it is I see”. - Under what circumstances are- we to say that a person is in no- doubt or in doubt about this? (Such cases as- being in no doubt about whether- this looks red to the normal eye- & analogous ones of course don't interest us- here.) I suppose that the- knowledge of what it is I see must- be the knowledge that it is so & so- I see. ‘So & so’ standing for some- expression verbal or otherwise. (But- remember that I don't give myself- an information by pointing to something- I see with my finger & saying to- myself I see this.) ‘So & so’ in fact- stands for an expressionan expression || a word of a- language game. And doubting what it is- I see is doubting e.g. what to call what I- see. Ms-149,42r      Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see- red” or “I see green”. “But this is- a simple doubt about the appellation- of a colour & it can be settled by asking- someone what this colour (pointing) is called”.- But are all such doubts removable by this- question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall- call this colour so & so”)?

“What colour do you see?”– “I don't know – - is it red, or isn't it red; I don't know what colour it is I see.”– “What do you mean? Is the- colour constantly changing, or do - you see it so very faintly, practically black?” Could I say then: “don't you- see what you see?” This obviously would- make no sense.

Colour: blackblack || red & whitewhite || blue chequered.

“What colour do you call: a, e, i, o or u?”– “I- don't know which colour I see?”

“Primary colours are those used in flags.” Ms-149,42v      It is queer that one never uses- brown on a flag & says it is a blend- of yellow, black & red although nobody- can really produce a proper brown- by mixing these colours.

Is there a reason for not admitting- brown as a primary colour?      Is it not enough that we refuse- to group it with red, blue, green, etc.?

One sometimes thinks the reason is that we see transitions from brown to pure yellow, red, black; but so we do in the case of red etc.

Imagine all objects around us where- iridescent, I mean of the appearance- of a white paper on which the sun- is shining, you would see the surface covered with tiny specks- of red blue green yellow.

Shall we say that a pointillist sees- the objects as he paints them?

It seems as though, however the- outward circumstances change, once the Ms-149,43r word is fastened to a particular personal- experience, it now retains its meaning; and- that therefore I can now use it with- sense whatever may happen.       To say that I can't doubt whether- I see red is in a sense absurd as- the game I play with the expression- “I see red” doesn't contain a doubt- of this form.      It seems,– whatever the circumstances- I always know now whether to apply- the word or not. It seems, at first- it was a move in a special game, but- then it becomes independent of this- game.      (This reminds one of the way the idea- of length seems to become emancipated- from any particular method of measuring it.)

We are tempted to say: “damn it all,- a rod has a particular length however- I express it. And one could go on- to say that if I see a rod I always- see (know) how long it is although I can't say- how many feet, meters etc. – But suppose- I just say: I always know whether it looks- tiny or big! Ms-149,43v

But can't the old game loose its point- when the circumstances change, so that- the expression ceases to have a meaning- although of course I can still- pronounce it.

He sticks to saying that he has- been lying although none of the normal- consequences follow. What is there left- of the language game, except that he- says the expression?

We learn the word ‘red’ under particular- circumstances. Certain objects are usually- red & keep their colour, most people- agree with us in our colour judgements. Suppose all this changes:- I see blood unaccountably sometimes- one sometimes another colour & the- people around me all make different- statements. But couldn't I in- all this chaos retain my meaning- of ‘red’, ‘blue’, etc. although I couldn't- make myself understood to anyone?      Samples e.g. would all constantly- change their colour – ‘or does it only seem- so to me?’ “Now am I mad or have- I really called this ‘red’ yesterday?” Ms-149,44r

The situation in which we are inclined- to say “I must have gone mad!”

“But we could always call a colour-impression ‘red’ & stick to this application!”

Die Atmosphäre die dieses Probleme umgibt ist schrecklich. Dichte- Nebel der Sprache sind um den problematischen Punkt gelagert. Es ist beinahe- unmöglich zu ihm vorzudringen.

Suppose I had before- me drawings of what I &- other people now see & I said- of the drawing of what I see “there- is something unique about this- picture”.

If I can speak about ‘what is- seen’, why shouldn't anyone else- speak about it?– But I have a feeling- that only I can; if I assume that- others also speak about what- normally I should call my visual- image there seems to me to be something Ms-149,44v wrong with this assumption.      If ‘what I see’ has nothing- to do with a particular person- why should I feel that there's- something wrong in assuming that- anybody might talk about it i.e.- mean it when he speaks? Then of- course I can't tell them what- I see nor they me what they- see any more than I can tell- myself what I see.      But they could make conjectures- as to what might happen in future- in our visual field.      In the normal game I- say: “I don't know what they- see, they've got to say what they- see”, – but in the game I'm considering they would as much- know what I see as my hand- can write down what my mouth- can say.      And their different conjecture would- be like conjectures made by- myself at different times.      Can my mouth tell my hand- what I see in order that my hand- should be able to write it down? Ms-149,45r

Do I by painting what I see- tell myself what I see?

“This picture is unique, for it- represents what is really seen”.      What justification do I have to- say this?What justification do I have to- say this? || What is my justification- for saying this?

I see two spots on this wall -& lift two fingers. Do I tell- myself that I see two spots?- But on the other hand couldn't- this be the sign for my- seeing two spots?!

Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet oder- zeichne ich es aus?

“Today he points to me, & yesterday- he pointed to me also.”

The meaning of: “He points at me”.

“I see that he points at A.”      “I see that he points at me.”

You seem to be able to give- yourself a sort of ostensive explanation Ms-149,45v of what the expression “What- is seen” refers to.

Imagine a game: One- person tells the other what he- (the other) sees if he has guessed- it rightly he is rewarded. If A hasn't- guessed correctly what B sees- B corrects him & says what it is- he sees. This game - is more instructive if we imagine- the persons not to say what is- seen but to paint it or to make- models of it. – Now let me imagine- that I am one of the- players.      Wouldn't I be tempted to say:- “The game is asymmetrical, for only- what I say I see corresponds to- a visual image.”

The problem lies thus: This ↗) is- what is seen; & this is also what- I see.

Frage Dich: Kann das ↗) nur ich sehen,- ober kann es auch ein Andrer sehen? Ms-149,46r Warum nur ich?

Für mich existiert kein Unterschied- zwischen ich & das↗; & das Wort “ich”- ist für mich kein Signal, das einen Ort- oder eine Person hervorhebtdas einen Ort- oder eine Person hervorhebt || eines Orts oder einer Person.

Ich versuche das ganz Problem- auf das nicht verstehen <…> der Funktion- des Wortes ‘Ich’ & ‘↗’ zu reduzieren.

When I stare at a coloured object- & say “this is red” I seem to know- exactly to what I give the name- red. As it were to that which I am- drinking in.

It is as though there was a magic power- in the words “this is …”.

I can bring myself to say: There- is no toothache there ↗ (in the- man's cheek who says he has toothache). And what would be the expression- for this in ordinary language?- Wouldn't it be my saying “I have- no toothache there”?

“But who says this?”– “I!” And who says Ms-149,46v this?– “I!”‒ ‒ ‒

Suppose I give this rule: “Whenever- I said ‘I have toothache’, I shall- from now on say ‘there is toothache’”.

I tell the waiter bring me always- clear soup & thick soup to the- others. He tries to remember my face.      Suppose I change my face (body)- every day entirely, how is he to know- which is me. But it's a question- of the existence of the game. “If- all chessmen were alike how- should one know which is the king?”      Now it seems that, although- he couldn't know which is me, I- still couldcould || would know it.      Suppose now I said: “it wasn't- so & so, it was I who asked for- clear soup”, – couldn't I be wrong?- Certainly. I.e. I may think that- I asked him, but didn't. Now are- there two mistakes I can make:- one, thinking that I asked him,- the other, thinking that I asked- him? I say: “I remember having asked- you yesterday”, he replies: “You weren't- there at all yesterday”. Now I could say either Ms-149,47r “Well then I suppose I remember- wrongly” or: “I was here only I- looked like him yesterday”.

It seems that I can trace- my identity quite independent of- the identity of my body. And the- idea is suggested that I trace- the identity of something dwelling- in a body the identity of my mind.

Ms-149,47v

“If anybody asks me to describe what- I see, I describe what's seen.”

What we call a description of- my sense datum, of what's seen, independent of what is the case in the physical world,- is still a description for the other person.

If I speak of a description of my sense- datum I don't mean to give a particular person as its possessor.      (No more do I want to speak about- a particular person when I moan with- pain.)

It must be a serious & deep-seated disease of language (one- might also say ‘of thought’) which- makes me say: “Of course this ↗)- is what's really seen”.

“Property of space” Ms-149,48r

I can tell you the fact p - because I know that p is the- case. It has sense to say- “it rained & I knew it” but not- “I had toothache & knew that I had.”- “I know that I have toothache”- means nothing or the same as- “I have toothache”.      This, however, is a remark about the- use of the word “I”, whoever uses it.

Examine the propositionproposition || sentence || statement: “There is something there”, referring to the visual- sensation I am now having.      Aren't we inclined to think that this- is a statement making sense & being- true? And on the other hand, isn't it a- pseudo statement?      But what (what entity) do you- mean (refer to), when you say that- sentence?– Aren't we here up against- the old difficulty that it seems to- us that meaning something was a- special state or activity of mind? For it is Ms-149,48v true that saying these words- I am in a special state of mind,- I stare at something, – but this just- doesn't constitute meaning.

Compare with this such a statement as: “surelysurely || of course I know what I- am referring to by the word toothache”.

Think of the statestate || frame of mindstatestate || frame of mind || mental state in which- you say to yourself that p ∙ ~p- mustmust || does make sense & by repeating- a statement of this form you are,- as it were, by introspection trying to find out- what it means.

The statestate || phenomenon of staring is closely bound- up with the whole puzzle of solipsism.

“If I am asked ‘what do you see?’, I- describe the visual world.” – Couldn't- I say instead of this “ …I am- describing what'swhat's || what is there↗” (pointing before me)?

But now consider the case of- someone having a picture before him- of the part of his room he is seeing & that he's- saying: “this in the picture is like- this (a part of his visual field, as he- is looking at his room).” Ms-149,BCr Ms-149,BCv