Ms-150,FCr Ms-150,FCv Ms-150,1      Wenn wir uns fragen; worin besteht- der Eindruck, den uns ein Wort macht,- so denken wir zuletzt an das, was wir- sehen, wenn wir das Wort anschauen. Wir- nehmen an das Bild des Wortes selbst- sei ziemlich nebensächlich & der Eindruck- liege irgendwie hinter dem Wortbild. Und diesen- Fehler machen wir immer wieder. Aber die- Gestalt eines Wortes, das wir – wie alle- Wörter der gewöhnlicher Sprache – unzählige male gesehen haben, macht uns einen- tiefen Eindruck. Denke nur an die Schwierigkeiten, die wir empfinden wenn die Rechtschreibung geändert wird. Solche Änderungen sind als Sakrileg empfunden worden. Freilich nur- gewisse Zeichen machen uns einen tiefen- Eindruck, andere nicht. Ein neu erfundenes Zeichen etwa “ ⌵ ” für “oder” kann- ohne in uns etwas aufzuregen durch- ein beliebiges anderes ersetzt werden.- Denke daran daß das geschriebenegeschriebene || gesehene- Wort uns in ähnlicher Weise vertraut- ist wie das gehörte. Denke an Esperanto & wie seltsam es uns anmutet einen Ausdruck der Herzlichkeit in diese Kunstsprache übersetzt zu hören. Wir könnten ja auch nicht den Händedruck willkürlich durch ein anderes Zeichen ersetzen. Das hängt damit zusammen, daß wir Ms-150,2 uns das Gefühl der Trauer als etwas- hinter den Empfindungen des Weinens,- schweren Atmens etc. etc. vorstellen- & diese geneigt sind als etwas Nebensächliches zu vernachlässigen.      Auch hängt das mit der Frage zusammen- ob der Eindruckder Eindruck || der Ausdruck des Gesichtes gesehen- wird oder hinter dem gesehenen- gefühlt. Denke an & …      Wenn wir in gewöhnlicher Schrift einen- englischen Satz lesen, so können wir dabei eine wohlbekannte Empfindung oder Erfahrung haben.      Was heißt das: “Wir haben da eine- ganz bestimmte Erfahrung”?!! in wiefern bestimmt?      Lies eine Reihe gewöhnlicher etwa englischer- Sätze in gewöhnlicher Schrift. Du wirst dann- die Erfahrung des Lesens empfinden, nämlich eine fortlaufende, quasi gleichbleibende, Erfahrung.

Worin besteht die Ausdruck eines Gesichts,- eines Worts.

Ein ‘bestimmter’ Eindruck, im Gegensatz- wozu?      ‘Das Gesicht hat einen bestimmten Ms-150,3 Ausdruck; – im Gegensatz wozu?      Man kann die Aufmerksamkeit auf- den Ausdruck des Gesichts heften.- Was heißt das? Was tut man da? Es- ist ähnlich als wenn man es plastisch- sähe.

Ist der Ausdruck zum rein Visuellen- addiert? – Nun, weißt Du daß er addiert- ist? – Also ist der Fall verschieden- von dem im welchen ich etwas sehe &- zugleich Schmerzen im Magen empfinde.

“Wenn Du diesen Strich machst, so- ändert das den Ausdruck des Gesichts- ganz”.      “Wenn Du diesen Strich ziehst so ändert- sich der Ausdruck dieser Tiere ganz”.

Nehmen wir an ich sage: der Eindruck- (Ausdruck) ist durch unsere Attitude- zu dem Bild bestimmt. Wechselt diese- durch einen neuen Strich so sagen wir es wechselt der Ausdruck.      Was aber an dieser Erklärung wesentlich ist sehen wir daran daß wir verschiedene- Annahmen mache können. Wir können z.B.- annehmen unser Gesicht mache immer ein- gezeichnetes Gesicht nach. Aber es genügt- auch wenn wir annehmen, daß ein neuer Ms-150,4 Strich die Art & Weise etwa den Weg ändert wie unser- Auge immer wieder über die Zeichnung- gleitet.

“Ein Punkt an diesen Ort ändert den- Ausdruck, aber ein Punkt hier ändert- ihn nicht.”

“Früher war der Ausdruck freundlich, jetzt- ist er traurig”. Heißt das: ‘ich weiß daß- ein trauriger Mensch so aussieht &- ein freundlicher so’?

Man könnte sagen: durch diesen Strich- wird unsere Erfahrung beim Sehen des- Bildes in einer anderen Weise geändert- als durch einen ‘nichtssagenden’ Strich- & diese Änderung ist ähnlich der- welche geschieht wenn durch den- Strich die räumliche Erscheinung der- Zeichnung geändert wird.

Es ist das Wort ‘bestimmt’, welches- wir verstehen müssen.

Ich lese etwa eine Reihe gewöhnlicher- Sätze & beobachte mich dabei selbst.- Ich merke ich tue “etwas ganz- bestimmtes”, d.h. immer ungefähr das Gleiche. Ms-150,5      Es ist, als sagte ich: Wenn ich schreibe- tue ich immer ungefähr das Gleiche. D.h.- ich bewege meine Hand immer in ungefähr- der gleichen Weise.

Vergleiche die Familie dessen was man- ‘SchriftSchrift || Schreiben’ nennt mit der Familie ‘Lesen’.

Wir fühlen das Gleichbleiben der- Erfahrung.

Änderung der Interpunktion verglichen- mit einer Änderung der Zeichnung die- den Gesichtsausdruck ändert. (“Der- Schülero sagt der Lehrero↙ ist ein Esel.”) Nicht ein- Wissen ist es daß uns die Änderung- bedeutsam erscheinen läßt.

Gegensatz der Ausdrücke. –      Gegensatz: Ausdruck – kein Ausdruck.

Das Eine ist: Die Besonderheit des Eindrucks verführt uns zu der Frage:- was ist das wesentliche des Lesens.      Das Andere: Ich muß die Rolle des- typischen Beispiels klarer machen.- Nämlich: die Rolle die Ms-150,6 die Erklärung spielt: Das- ist jedenfalls ein typisches Beispiel – - einer Regierung, des kulturellen Verfalls,- das Raffinement des Geschmacks.       Zuerst glaubt man nämlich man- rede von einem Gemeinsamen & - es ist das Ideal dieses anzugeben- darzustellen. Dann aber ist das- Feststehende nicht mehr ein Gemeinsames- sondern ein Beispiel. (Sozusagen ein- Zentrum der Variationen.)

Die geschriebenen Wörter einer mir geläufigen- Sprache sind mir wohlbekannte Gesichter. Und sie zu lesen sind- mir wohlbekannte Erlebnisse. Wenn- ich gefragt würde, was tue ich besonderes wenn- ich die Wörter lese, müßte ich sagen:- ich sehe sie & spreche sie aus. Und die- Hauptsache des Erlebnisses liegt in- der Wohlbekanntheit der Wörter. Aber- diese Wohlbekanntheit ist eine besondere- im besondern Fall sie ist z.B. nicht das- Erlebnis der Wohlbekanntheit eines- Gesichts & hier gibt es ja auch verschiedene Fälle. Geläufige Schrift zu lesen ist ein besonderes- Erlebnis anders z.B. als etwas zu buchstabieren oder eine graphische Darstellung ablesen etc. Ms-150,7

“Ich weiß nicht, das Wort kommt mir auf- einmal so fremd vor”. –

Es ist ganz abgesehen vom Lesen eine- andere Art des Erlebnisses, wenn der- Blick über ihm geläufige Wortbilder- gleitet als über fremde.

Was heißt das: “das Lesen einer uns- geläufigen Sprache ist ein ganz besonderes Erlebnis”? D.h. wir haben beim lesenden- Durchlaufen der Zeilen ein gleichförmiges Erlebnis, & es unterscheidet sich vom- Durchlaufen beliebiger anderer Formenreihen.- Es wäre auch unrichtig zu sagen, daß- das Lesen darin bestehe, daß wir- Zeichenreihen durchlaufen & uns dabei- Laute einfallen. Denn wenn ich die Reihe durchlaufe & lasse mir dabei- Laute Einfallen – was ganz leicht ist – so ist- das doch kein Lesen. Es ist anders ob ich- ‘a’ lese & ausspreche, als wenn mir derselben- Laut bei ‘’ einfällt.      Und diese Art des Erlebnisses ist- charakteristisch für jedes fließende Lesen- alles dessen was wir für gewöhnlich ‘Schrift’- nennen; aber nicht für das ‘Lesen’ überhaupt. Ms-150,8      Vergleiche ‘Lesen’ & ‘Bild’. Auch- in diesem Fall ein eng begrenztes Gebiet- an welches wir vorerst denken, dann- aber ein Drang der uns in immer weitere- Ferne zieht.

Kreise.

Regel Glied eines Systems.

Eine Regel verstehen heißt manchmal- das System verstehen. Was aber heißt das? In welchem Falle sagen wir es- verstehe Jemand das System- dieser Befehle? Er reagiert- auf Glieder des Systems in bestimmter- Weise; er kann das System erklären.- Wie tut er das?

“Es ist eine Einstellung sich dem Befehl- wie er auch lauten mag hingeben”.      Beispiel des Sich-leiten-lassens.- Die Hand leiten lassen. Maschine.

Betrachte einen allgemeinen Satz, wie “die- Regel leitet uns, wenn sie das Glied Ms-150,9 eines Systems ist”! Was sind die Beispiele dafür? Wie gehen sie in die Umgebung über?

Wenn wir die gewöhnliche- Schrift lesen geschieht immer ein & dasselbe & man könnte sagen: beobachte- doch was geschieht & Du wirst sehen- worin das Lesen besteht. Du hast sozusagen Zeit genug um es zu beobachten.      Nun was sehe ich da?      (Da ist etwas interessant: daß- man nicht im Stande ist ein geschriebenes- oder gedrucktes Wort anzusehen ohne es zu lesen.)      Ich gehe mit meinem Blick der Zeile- entlang & schon das geschieht nicht so- wie wenn ich ihn einer beliebiger Reihe- von Bildern entlang führe (ich rede hier- nicht von dem was experimentell durch- Beobachtung der Augenbewegung festgestellt werden kann). Der Blick- gleitet möchtemöchte || könnte man sagen besonders- reibungslos & doch nicht flüchtigreibungslos & doch nicht flüchtig || widerstandslos ohne hängen zu bleiben & doch rutscht er nicht (die- Wohlbekanntheit der Wortgestalten, – anders- wieder wenn man von rechts nach links liest).      Dabei geht ein ganz unwillkürliches ‘Sprechen- in der Vorstellung’ vor sich. Und so verhält es sich wenn- ich deutsch, englisch, französisch, & gedruckt, Ms-150,10 geschrieben in lateinischer Schrift oder gotischer- Schrift lese.      Was aber von dem allem ist für- das Lesen als solches wesentlich?- Nicht ein Zug der in allen Fällen von Lesen- vorkäme.

Verstehen       Bedeutung       Denken       Erwarten       Wünschen       Fürchten       Glauben       Überzeugung Ms-150,11

A: “Warum nennst Du diese beiden- Farben ‘rot’?” – B: “Weil eine gewisse- Ähnlichkeit zwischen ihnen besteht.” A: “Ach darum!”

Was heißt es “diese beiden Farben- sind ähnlich”; – wie gebraucht man diesen- Ausdruck?

“Die beiden Farben haben ein Element- gemeinsam & das nenne ich ‘rot’”.

A: “Diese beiden Farben sind doch sehr- ähnlich”. B: “Ich finde sie sehr verschieden”.

Warum nennt man das Suchen im- Gedächtnis ein ‘Suchen’?

Warum nennt man eine Stimmung “trübe”?      Wie wenn man sagt, “weil beide das Wetter & die Stimmung uns- denselben Eindruck machen”?       Besteht die Gleichheit des Eindrucks nicht zum Teil gerade darin daß wir- geneigt sind in beiden Fällen das gleiche Wort- & in ähnlichen Verbindungen zu gebrauchen?- Auch darin daß wir das Wort im gleichen- Ton sagen. Ms-150,12

“Ach Sie sind's!”

(Die Problematik der Philosophie- ist die Problematik des Witzes.)

Wie ist es wenn sich uns ein Vergleich- aufdrängt? Etwa der des ‘Suchens’- im Gedächtnis.

Das Wort ‘gleichsam’. “Er schaut gleichsam trübe aus”. “Ich möchte immer- sagen ‘trübe’”.

Eine geistige Spannung. Wir würden wahrscheinlich sagen sie sei etwas ähnlich- wie eine körperliche Spannung.      “Nun weiß ich auch warum ich das- immer ‘eine Spannung’ nennen wollte.” (Ich- habe etwa herausgefunden, daß dabei- gewisse Muskeln gespannt sind. –- Aber das wußte ich eben nicht als ich- geneigt war es Spannung zu nennen.) Ms-150,13

⋏      “Wenn wir in beiden Fällen von ‘trübe’‘trübe’ || ‘schwarz’ reden,- so gebrauchen wir das Wort in verschiedener Bedeutung.” – Was ist das- Kriterium für den Gebrauch in verschiedener- Bedeutung?

Wie würde ich die eine Bedeutung von- der andern absondern? ⋎

Oder auch: Wie weißt Du das? oder- besteht der Gebrauch in verschiedenen Bedeutungen eben- darin? Was willst Du sagen?

Ich würde nun als Erklärung Verschiedenheiten der beiden Spiele aufzählenaufzählen || hervorheben.      In der einen z.B. legt man etwas Schwarzes- an das andere um zu sehen ob die beiden Ms-150,14 gleich sind im andern Spiel ist dies nicht- der Fall. Es heißt also mein- Satz: Wenn Du das Wort- ‘schwarz’ in beiden Verbindungen- gebrauchst so kann ich Dich- auf andere Verschiedenheiten in- den beiden Spielen aufmerksam- machen.

Darauf aber gäbe es keine Antwort,- wenn nun jemand sagte “aber ich- nenne, was Du zwei Spiele nennst, ein- Spiel”.

“But why do you speak both of physical- & mental ‘strain’?” – “Because they- have a certain similarity, they have a- common element.” What is this common- element? Can you point to it as you- pointed in …?      “It is a certain tension.” That doesn't get us- any further, for why do you talk of tension- in these different cases.      “A certain feeling of tension is part of- both experiences”. Are you not just translating- what you said before, into other language Ms-150,15 or are you referring to an experience- like that of feeling your heart beat, as you could say that this feeling - is a constituent both of certain sensations- of fear & of joy.

“But why should we call both experiences- a strain if there was no similarity between- them?” But can't the similarity just- consist in this that you are inclined to- use in both cases the same metaphor,- the same expression.

And we are not only inclined to- use the phrase a deep sorrow & a deep- well but very often to accompany both- by the same gestures & to say them in the- same tone of voice.

“There is something in common between the- two experiences only I don't know what”. Well- this too characterizes your experience &- I should say when you'll say that you know what is in common- between them your experience will be different.-

To say that you use the same word ‘strain’- in all the different cases because of a- similarity is all right if you wish to distinguish Ms-150,16 this case from the case of the word ‘bank’.- The river bank & the money bank are- not so called because of any similarity.

“But isn't there a particular experience- of similarity which you have when you- compare physical & mental strain; just- the experience you don't have when- you compare a river bank & a money bank?”

But do you also experience a similarity between this similarity and - other similarities? For what makes you- call this a similarity (if you think- there always must be something to- make you call a thing what you call it).

Consider uses of the word similar:- We say these two pieces of paper have- similar colour if it is difficult for us- to distinguish them to say which of them is darker. Now compare the - experience of difficulty to say which is- darker with the experience of similarity when it is impossible- not to distinguish them but when I say I- like my trousers & jacket to have similar- colours so as not to have too strong- a contrast. Ms-150,17

“The feeling of familiarity is a feeling of at-homeness.”

Aren't my chairs etc. familiar to me- & do I always have a feeling of at-homeness when I see them?

“But what else does it mean ‘that- you are familiar with them’?” I am not- surprised to see them; I should on- being asked, say that I see them- every day, that I have sat in them hundreds- of times. I could describe on what occasions they were used & tell you a lot- about them. All the experiences which go- along with saying these things & the- experience of doing so we can call experiences of familiarity.

“Why do we call all these different experiences- experiences of strain?” – “Because there is a common- element in them all.”

I can imagine a case in which this kind of answer- is certainly correct: Say I call all kinds of- states of excitement in which I feel the blood- rush up into my head congestional experiences. Ms-150,18

Now should we say that- all the experiences of strain have a common element?

‘Perhaps we had better say that they- are all in some respect similar.’

Do you mean there must be a common- element, or there actually is one.      If the latter, what makes you say ‘there- is a common element’?

There seems to be a difference between this case- & that when we say “well, we- call this colour ‘red’ because it is red.”- I.e. we seem to use the word ‘strain’- here in a derivative sense, as opposed to- a direct sense.

What does it consist in to use a word- in a derivative sense? “In this that its- derivative sense is not the same but only- similar to the direct one.” –

There is something very queer in the proposition- ‘when we look at a well known word- we have a particular sensation’.      “When we pronounce the words ‘and’, ‘if’- etc. we have peculiar sensations”. Ms-150,19 ↓ 648 “When we understand an ordinary word like ‘tree’,- ‘table’, we have a peculiar sensation.”      “As opposed to what”. The word ‘and’ = + gives me a different sensation from the word “and” = “and”.

I can, as it were, direct my attention to- the sensation. “The face has a peculiar- expression”.      The question is: is what you call- the peculiar expression bound up with this- face or could a different face have- the same expression?

“This face gives me a peculiar impression,- the same impression which the other one -gave me.”      “This face & the other make me- smile.”

“These faces make a particular impression- on me which I can't describe.” What does- it mean ‘I can't describe’? Is there- anything to describe? What is this impossibility of describing like? For there are many- different cases. And in one ‘I can't describe’- is really a grammatical remark.

“I had a definite sensation a moment ago Ms-150,20 & I have it now”.

“I'm seeing this as a ship now, whereas- I always saw it just as a decoration before.” – “But what's it like to see- it ‘as a ship’”. “I can't describe”.- “But what made you say you saw it- ‘as a ship’, what made you use this- expression?” – “I saw as it were how- the sails were inflated by the wind.” –- “But did they look as though they- bulged more?” – “No, I just had a feeling- & these words suggested themselves- for it.”

When you say, you have a definite- feeling which you can't describe, is this- a peculiar experience, don't you- always have aa || some definite feeling? Isn't- all you want to say something like: “I- feel very interested now.”

We must do with these expressions- something similar as with such expressions as “war is war!”

The form of the expression “I have- a particular feeling which I can't describe” is misleading. Ms-150,21      It would be just like saying “everything has a particularparticular || peculiar character”.

“A chair has a particular character- about it.”

Aber ist nicht ein Unterschied zwischen- den Dingen die eine gewisse Wärme um sich- haben & denen die uns fremd sind?

Man kann doch von Dingen reden die uns,- sagen wir, häuslich anmuten.

Ich kann auch ein bestimmtes- gezeichnetes Gesicht einmal als das- Gesicht des so & so sehen & einmal- anders.

“Jeder der geschriebenen Buchstaben hat- einen eigenen Charakter”. Das meint man aber- nicht im Gegensatz zu den gedruckten oder- zu denen einer andern Schrift.

Vergleiche “Jede dieser Wohnungen hat einen besonderen- Geruch.”

Könnte man also Zeichen ohne Charakter- & Zeichen mit Charakter unterscheiden? Ms-150,22

Kann ich aber darum sagen, daß - die Buchstaben mir jeder ein bestimmtes- Gefühl geben? Es könnte so sein,- beim einen würde mir warm beim andern- kühl, – aber muß es so sein?      Es kann das Erlebnis des ‘bestimmten Charakters’ auch bloß damit bestehen daß man mit bestimmten- Tonfall sagt “er hat einen bestimmten- Charakter”.

Das Wort als ‘Ausdruck des Gefühls’

“Er legt alles Gefühl in dieses Wort”.

Wenn man einen Gegenstand abzeichnet ist man geneigt zu sagen:- “er hat (oder die Krümmung hat) einen- ganz bestimmten Charakter”. Und man- ruft sich z.B. das Gefühl, Erlebnis,- dieses Charakters immer von neuem- vor. Das Erlebnis mag nun z.B.- darin bestehen daß uns ein Wort ein- Gegenstand vor dem Geist tritt, das wir- eine bestimmte Geste, ein bestimmtes Gesicht- machen. Aber auch daß uns nur- die Worte kommen: “diese Kurve hat- nämlich einen ganz bestimmten Charakter”. Ms-150,23 Und das ist eigentlich nur eine- Betonung der Kurve selbst. D.h.- es hat die Multiplizität einer Betonung dessen was z.B. beim Sehen des- Gegenstands erlebt wird.

Wenn man den Ausdruckden Ausdruck || die Geste für das- Gefühl findet so findetfindet || sucht man auch- ein neues Gefühl.      Es ist nicht wie wenn man etwa- nachschlägt was ‘Trauer’ auf Russisch- heißt.

“Eine erinnerungsreiche Gegend”. Formen -sind manchmal assoziationsreich. Aber- kann man den Assoziationsreichtum eingeführt nennen?

“Er hat das Lied ausdrucksvoll gesungen”. – Kann man fragen “mit welchem- Ausdruck?”?      Wenn man fragte: “Worin bestand- es daß er ausdrucksvoll gesungen hat”,- so käme darauf etwas von der Art zur- Antwort: “er hat z.B. diese Stelle … so & so- gesungen & nicht, z.B., so …”. Aber diese Feststellung hat eigentlich eine ganz andere- Multiplizität als die erste, denn sie- ließe sich nicht auf ein anderes Lied an Ms-150,24 wenden das ausdrucksvoll gesungen- wurde. Die Erklärung könnte- sein: “ausdrucksvoll ist es wenn es- so gesungen wird wie ich es mir gesungen wünsche.”

“Wenn man dieses Gesicht ansieht, wird- einem warm.” Wenn man fragen würde:- “wird Dir wirklich warm”, würde er sagen- “nein, nur bildlich gesprochen”.

“Eine warme Farbe”

“Ist weiches Wasser nur bildlich gesprochen ‘weich’ oder im eigentlichen Sinn- des Worts?”

Denken wir uns jemand würde statt von- einem ‘rötlichen Blau’ von einem ‘roten- Blau’ sprechen & sagen das Wort “rot”- sei hier in übertragener Bedeutung- gebraucht.

Nun glaubt man aber sagen zu- können: Es kommt einfach darauf- an was Du mit dem Wort meinst; meinst- Du das was geistige Anstrengung & körperliche Anstrengung mit einander Ms-150,25 gemein haben so brauchst Du das Wort- in beiden Fällen in der eigentlichen Bedeutung;- wenn nicht dann hat es in den beiden verschiedene Bedeutung & man kann von- direkter & übertragener reden.

Aber was heißt es das meinen was den beiden- gemeinsam ist? (Ich kann [Beispiel gehört hierher] doch nicht darauf- zeigen.) Heißt ‘das Gemeinsame meinen’- in dem Fall nicht einfach ‘beides- meinen’?

Denke, man sagte: “Man nennt das- siedende Wasser & das Blut des Menschen warm,- weil ‘warm’ das heißt, was beide Wärmegrade gemeinsam haben”.

a) Wenn gefragt wird was haben diese- Bilder gemein so zeigt man einen Fleck- mit einer Farbe die in beiden vorkommt.      b) Wenn gefragt wird was haben die beiden- Farben gemein (z.B. ein rötliches blau & ein rötliches gelb)- so zeigt man einen Fleck mit gelber Farbe.      Hier sieht man wie verschieden man das- Wort “das & das gemeinsam haben”- gebrauchen kann. Und keine der beiden- Arten ist direkter oder richtiger!

Man könnte nun z.B. sagen mit Ms-150,26 ‘gelblich’ meine ich was der beiden Farben- gemeinsam ist & ich tue es indem- ich mir dabei etwas gelbes vorstelle.

“Man meint was den beiden gemeinsam- ist wenn man an das denkt was ihnen- gemeinsam ist” aber wie tut man- das? Wie denkt man z.B. an das- was den Buchstaben R & B gemeinsam ist.- Daran denken heißt manchmal- darauf zeigen, es sich vorstellen- u.a..

“Denke an das was allen Pflanzen- gemeinsam ist!”.

“Ich nenne beides eine ‘Anstrengung’, weil ich damit das meine, was beiden- gemeinsam ist”.

Die Aufgabe die Vokale nach ihrer- Dunkelheit zu ordnen ist in vielem ganz- analog einem sogenannten mathematischen- Problem.

“Warum nennst Du das ‘rot’?” –- “Ich dachte Du nennst ‘rot’ alles- was diese Farbe gemeinsam hat”. Ms-150,27      Dagegen kann man sagen: “Ich dachte- Du nennst Schmetterlingsblütler alles- das was so eine Blüte trägt.”      Auch: “Ich dachte du nennst ‘rötlich’- alles was diesen Ton gemeinsam hat”.

Ich meine nicht- daß man den Ausdruck “diese beiden- Farben haben das → (auf eine Farbe zeigend) gemeinsam” nicht gebrauchen kann. Man- könnte z.B. gefragt was zwei Schattierungen von Rot mit einander gemein haben- auf das reine Rot zeigen. Aber was das- heißt muß erst in einem Sprachspiel festgelegtfestgelegt || bestimmt werden. Man könnte z.B. nun nicht- fragen: “Ist es wahr, daß sie dieses Rot mit- einander gemein haben?”

“Warum nennst Du das ‘Schmerz’?”- – “Nun daß heißt ‘Schmerz’.” “Warum sprichst Du von einem seelischen- Schmerz?” – “Weil es wie ein Schmerz ist.”

Sprachspiel: ‘Hell’ & ‘dunkel’ wird an Farben- erklärt & verwendet. – Dann sage ich:- “Ordne die Vokale nach ihrer Helligkeit”.      Hier würden wir von übertragener Bedeutung- reden. Ms-150,28

Philosophieren besteht darin daß- einem Beispiele in der rechten Reihenfolge- einfallen.

Denken wir uns jemand würde sagen: “Die- Wörter ‘hoch’, ‘tief’ sind auf Töne- in ihrer ursprüngliche Bedeutung angewandt;- das ist auch im Fall von ‘hoch’ & ‘tief’.”

Jemand lernt die Farbwörte ‘rot’, ‘grün’ etc.- für die reinen Farben gebrauchen. Dann- zeigt man auf einen Haufen von- rötlich & grünlich blauen Stücken &- sagt: “sondere die roten von den grünen.”- War das Wort in der ursprünglichen oder- in einer anderen Bedeutung gebraucht worden.      Man könnte hier sagen: Wenn Du mir- aufgetragen hättest einen roten Fleck zu- malen so hätte ich nicht diese Farbe gemalt.

In einem Fall fühlen wir, wir gebrauchen- eine Metapher, im andern Fall, wir- gebrauchen das Wort in direkter Weise.

Worin besteht der Unterschied dieser- Erlebnisse?      Wir sehen den einen Gebrauch als Ms-150,29 etwas Abgeschlossenes an. Handelt es sich- hier um zwei klar getrennte Erlebnisse?- Das Erlebnis, ‘schwarz’ zu nennen,- was schwarz ist; & das, ‘schwarz’ zu- nennen, was gleichsam schwarz ist? –

Ich könnte mir denken, daß Einer gewohnt- nur von ‘körperlicher Anstrengung’ zu- reden sagte: “das Denken ist gleichsam- eine Anstrengung.”.

Könnten wir uns aber nicht auch diesen- Fall denken: Es kennte einer die rote- Farbe nur von der Gesichtsfarbe her;- er wollte nun die Farbe eines Apfels- beschreiben & sagte, der Apfel sei ‘gleichsam rot’. Wer das sagt denkt etwa- an Gesichter.

“Der Himmel ist gleichsam blau.”

“Das Gesicht macht einen dunkleren Eindruck- obwohl die Hautfarbe in Wirklichkeit heller ist.”

Denke an die Menschen die, wenn sie einen angeschlagenen- Ton nachsingen sollen die Quint davon- singen. Ist die Quint nun der gleiche Ton oder- nicht? Ms-150,30

Ich könnte mir einen Menschen denken- dem man gelehrt hätte färbige Gegenstände durch malen zu kopieren & der den Himmel immer weiß- kopierte. D.h. ich könnte mir, irgendwie,- leicht denken, daß ich es selbst so- machte. (Indem ich sozusagen eine- andere Projektionsmethode anwende.)

“Er hat gleichsam eine dunklere- Stimme.” – “Warum sagst Du nicht einfach ‘er hat eine dunklere Stimme’? Sie- ist doch dunkler”. – “Aber dunkler- nennt man ja eigentlich die Beziehung zwischen diesen beiden Farben.- Z.B. das (zeigend) ist dunkler als das.” –- “Ja, aber seine Stimme ist auch- dunkler als die des Andern.”

Man kann sich denken, daß ein Gesicht dunkler aussieht, als das andere- obwohl seine Hautfarbe nicht dunkler- ist.

Könnte man aber in diesem Falle- umhin von zwei Arten des Gebrauchs- zu reden? Ms-150,31

“Why do you call this ‘blue’?” – There- is no ‘why’ to it if you're referring to- a reason. –

But there is also this case: “I call- this blue because in daylight it- looks blue.”      But also: “I call this blue because- it is almost blue”.

“What do these two colours have- in common?” – What sort of answer do- you want? For imagine these different- games: ‒ ‒ ‒

The capacity of solving philosophical- problems is the capacity of remembering- the right examples (in the right order).-of remembering- the right examples (in the right order).- || of calling to memory the right examples.

“Why do you call this a ‘strain’ too?”- Because it has something in common- with bodily strain. – “What?” – I don't know- but there is obviously a similarity.

Then when you said the two experiences had- something in common this expression just- compared this case with that when one- primarily speaks of common elements between Ms-150,32 two things. (Nr. …)

(If philosophy deals with its own method- how cancan || does it come to an- end at all, how is it bounded? Its- domaindomain || field is that ofthat of || circumscribed bycircumscribed by || limited by the field of our philosophical troubles. It only devises- remedies for mental troubles & where- such troubles actually don't arise (as a matter of- psychology) it has nothing to sayit has nothing to say || there is no job for philosophy.)

It was then no explanation just to say- that the similarity consisted in the- occurrence of a common element.

Now shall we say that you have a feeling- of similarity if you compare, say, physical- & mental strain?

If you say you have let's hear some- more aboutlet's hear some- more about || let us ask a few questions about this feeling.      Would you say it was located in this- or in that place of your body?      And when is it present? Perhaps you say when you compare- physical & bodily strain, but comparing- is a complicated activity & do you have- the same feeling throughout the whole activity?

|(This face has no real expression, no- meaning, it doesn't click.)|

Perhaps you say: ‘Anyhow, if I have compared & say they are similar I mean what- I say & this too is some sort of mental- event & perhaps the feeling of similarity- is the feeling you have while you say the- word ‘similar’ meaning it.’

Pronounce the word ‘similar’ in a sentence very slowly- meaning it & see if you really have one- feeling accompanying it from beginning- to end. But surely it is a different experience- if I say similar & mean it & if on the other- hand I say it without meaning it.

It is no more true that you have- one peculiar feeling corresponding- to the meaning of ‘similar’ as it- would be to say that you have one- peculiar facial expression when you- say it. Although on the other hand- there will probably be one particular facial- expressionone particular facial- expression || some particular facial expressions with which you often say the- word but you won't always have it when- you say the word (meaning what- you say) & the same facial expression- will accompany other words & phrases too. Ms-150,34

It is often useful for us to speak about- gestures, facial expressions & the like instead- of of the experiences bound up with them.

What have these two figures in common ?

Beispiel von dem der auf den Befehl- Dinge ihrer Dunkelheit nach zu ordnen- auch die Vokale ordnet.

Ton des Befehles ordne die Töne nach- ihrer Dunkelheit & gewöhnlicher Ton.

Man ist versucht zu sagen er muß- etwas anderes unter ‘dunkel’ verstanden- haben.      Vergleich mit einem anderen Instrument- nach dessen Ablesungen er alles- ordnet.      Aber ein solches Instrument ist nicht- vorhanden. Es muß vorhanden sein,- heißt daß wir entschlossen sind- dieses Bild zu gebrauchen.

“Aber es ist doch gewiß ein anderer- Sinn von dunkel den wir hier gebrauchen.”      Was soll das heißen? Unterscheidest Ms-150,35 Du hier den Sinn von Gebrauch & willst- sagen daß wenn einer das Wort so- gebraucht daraus folge, daß auch- anderswo etwas anderes vorsichgehen- müsse, oder werde. – Oder willst Du nur sagen- dieser Gebrauch sei doch ein anderer als- jener?

Bist Du nun zufrieden wenn ich die- Unterschiede in den beiden Fällen aufzähle.- Oder muß ich noch etwas anderes zugebenzugeben || zugestehen.

Wie, wenn jemand sagte: “das sind doch- verschiedene Arten des Gebrauchs von- ‘rot’”. Ich würde sagen das eine ist hellrot das andere dunkelrot, aber warum- sollsoll || muß ich das verschiedene Arten des- Gebrauchs von ‘rot’ nennen?

Aber besteht die VerschiedenheitVerschiedenheit || Andersartigkeit des- Gebrauchs noch in etwas Anderem als- in den Verschiedenheiten die wir aufzählen können? Denn gewiß in einem Fall- lege ich etwa farbige Flecke zusammen- & vergleiche sie indem ich bald den einen bald- den andern ansehe, ich halte sie vielleicht- in ein besseres Licht; ich male eine Farbe- die heller ist als eine andere u.s.f. u.s.f. Im Ms-150,36 Falle der Vokale fand kein solches- zusammenlegen, malen etc. statt.

Aber ich sehe doch daß die Relation- zwischen einem helleren & einem dunkleren Stück Stoff eine andere ist- als zwischen dem e & dem u.- Wie ich anderseits sehe daß die- Relation zwischen u & e die selbe- ist wie die zwischen e & i.

Ob Du die Relationen dieselben- oder verschiedene nennt, das- hängt wohl davon ab, wie Du sie- vergleichst.      Ist → dieselbe Richtung wie ←- oder sind sie entgegengesetzt.      Spiegel Entsprechende Umstände können- uns veranlassen zu sagen die Relationen sind verschieden, andere, sie- seien die gleichen.

Es ist hier wie mit der Fortsetzung- einer Reihe. Intuitionismus.

“It isn't only that you use the- word red for this colour but you use- it with a particular experience.” Ms-150,37      “Experience when we use a word in- a derivative sense.” Tone of voice in- the order “now arrange the vowels- in order of their darkness”.

The tone of voice may be, all things being- equal, the decisive experience?

He said & meant it sounds as though two- activities here ran parallel.

But surely there is a difference between- saying something & meaning it, & saying it- without meaning it. There needn't be a- difference while he says it & if there- is a difference then this may be of all sorts- of different kinds according to the- surrounding circumstances.      It does not follow from the fact- that there is what we call a friendly- & an unfriendly expression of the eye that- there must be a difference between the- eyes of a friendly & of an unfriendly face. Ms-150,38

Suppose one said: “this line can't- make the face look friendly as- it could be belied by other lines.”

Under these circumstances we- call this activity reading. If he- does it we say he is reading & if- we order him to read & he does it we- are satisfied.      Under these circumstances we- call this picture of his eye a friendly eye.      Under these circumstances this- was what saying & meaning it consisted- in.

In a large group of cases believing- something is the same or something- very similar to utteringuttering || expressing your belief.

All the circumstances which- make believing intersect in the present- moment.

Now is he meaning it when he says it or isn't he? Ms-150,39

“I said it & meant it.” – How did- you do it? –

Compare meaning “I shall be delighted- to see you” with meaning “the train- goes at 3˙30”.

There are certain expressions characteristic of believing i.e. there is a large- group of cases in which they together- with other factors constitute what we- call believing. But because - these first components- aren't present in all cases of believing you mustn't conclude that- any of the others is.

Compare lying about the train- with lying about being delighted.

It is even possible while lying - feeling quite strongly what is usually- felt when one means sincerely what- one says.

And at the same time one refers to just these feelings sometimes when one says I- said it and meant it. I.e. one would- mention these feelings as characteristic Ms-150,40 for one's meaning what one said. And- if anyone said “But these same- feelings could also have been- present if you hadn't meant it”- one could answer: “not in the kind- of case this was”.

“He was very friendly, he smiled at- me most kindly”. – But he might have- done that & felt unfriendly.

“This is a friendly face, look at the eyes.”- – But these same eyes would not be friendly in- another face. “Still in this face they are- friendly”.

Should we say “under these circumstances- I call this reading” or “under these- circumstances I regard this as carrying- out my order read” etc.?

One remembers just that feeling- when one says I meant what one- said, although etc.. This feeling then- stood out, it is a question just whether - one had it or not. And those circumstances which could have contradicted this feeling don't come here at all into- question. Ms-150,41      I would perhaps <…> be ready- to say in this case that I- meant by ‘I meant it’ I had this- feeling.

And there are cases where I- would be ready to give such an explanation of ‘I meant’ & cases like that- of ‘the train leaves at 3˙30’ where I might- say “well I just said it, why shouldn't I- have meant it”.

We very often find it impossible- to think without speaking to ourselves- half aloud; – & nobody asked- to describe what happened in this case- would ever say that something,- the thinking, accompanied the- speaking were they not temptedtempted || seduced to do so- by the existence of the two verbs- speaking & thinking & their- use in many of our common phrases.      If anything can be said to go with the speech it would be something- like the modulation of vocal means of expression.- But does the Ausdruck accompany- the words in the sense in which a- melody accompanies them? Ms-150,42

Wir zählen nur eine Verwandtschaft- zwischen der Dunkelheit der Farbe &- der Laute.

One thing is important if you say when I say- “blue” I have a particular experience, the word comes in a particular way you don't trouble- to think of (the) many different- experiences while saying the- word ‘blue’ & the word ‘three’.

Das gleiche Bild kann Vorstellung- von Verschiedenem sein. Die Umgebungen sind verschieden.      Der Gebrauch, die Atmosphäre.

But moreover, the difference between- observing & acting does not at all- necessarily consist in a difference- in every moment or phase of the- action. Exactly the same may- happen during the action Ms-150,43 but the surroundings will be- different. Moving in different circles.- Different atmosphere.

Es denkt

Absence of the experience of- saying “Oh that's where it's going- now”.

“Of course we aren't surprised as we do- it ourselves!”      We take as the criterion of- doing it ourselves the absence of surprise.

One might think the absence of surprise comes from knowing beforehand- what one is going to do.

Involuntary speech “Stop!”, “Oh”,- “Help!”      Like blinking one's eyelids or raising- a hand to protect one's face.

| Speaking as somebody's friend, doctor,- speaking as a private person, as a university- lecturer. One might think that whenever- a man speaks he speaks as someone. | Ms-150,44

Involuntary = without effort = with an effort to the contrary = unpremeditated = it would have been impossible to stop it =      Is moving one's fingers in example No … involuntary- should we call it so?      Is breathing voluntary?

Should we say that when we shout- “Help!” there is no act of volition,- whereas when we say “Hallo!” to a- friend there is?

Compare the cases when you raise - your hand with an effort       or move it without effort in a particular- curve (say writing a letter in the air)       or after deliberating whether- you lift it or not, you ‘find yourself- lifting it’.

Ordinary speaking is called voluntary not because there is a- particular effort present, the act of will.

Premeditated acts Ms-150,45

If against my will I shriek with- pain the overcoming of my will is not- like the overcoming of a muscular- effort.

One might say “surely shrieking with- pain is a good example of involuntary- speaking because here far from- there being an act of volition which- worked the speaking far from- there being an act of volition which- worked the speaking || not only there is no- act of volition by which we speak there even was- one against it.” I should say: Certainly I too should call this involuntary speaking. - And I agree that an act of volition- preparatory to or accompanying the- speech is absent if by ‘act of- volition’ you refer to certain acts of intention, premeditation or- effort. But then in many cases of voluntary- speech I don't feel an effort, many- were not premeditated & as to intentions- sometimes the unintentional- action is characterized as such by- an experience of surprise in others- the intentional is characterized by- a spoken or imagined expression of intention. Ms-150,46

“All that happens is that I get out of bed”.      “All that happens when I mean it- is in this case that I say it”. - That is to say: I don't call it ‘meaning what I say’ because of any- peculiar experience which I have- while I say it. But what is a peculiar experience? Isn't the absence of an experience an experience? Yes but we don't call- the absence of a feeling a feeling or the- absence of pain a pain. It is certainly- sometimes misleading to say: “Not- the presence of something characterizes- this case but the absence of something”.- But when we are inclined to look- out for a sensation it makes sense- to point out that in such & such a- case we don't find a peculiar sensation but we do in the opposite case.

In a great many cases the difference- is not one lying in the action- or an accompaniment of it, but- in the surrounding circumstances- the environment of the action. Ms-150,47

It is as though I said “these- two people move in different circles”- does not mean that they are never- surrounded by exactly the same- people, e.g. when they walk in the- street.

A kind & an unkind expression might- look exactly alike only what- goes before & after asas || may be different.

Our tendency is to describe- something that is a matter of- atmosphere round a situation in a too primitive- way as a difference in the situation.

Thus one says: “something peculiar- happens when the name of a colour- comes, something different when the- numeral comes.” But we have no reason- at all to say this. But I agree- that the surroundings of these- two are different.

Why do you say “something does- happen when I understand a word!”.- Do you remember that the same- thing always happens or do- you know that one of, say, four Ms-150,48 things happen? “Es drückt etwas aus. Es sagt mir etwas.”

One face reminds you of someone,- one strikes you as Chinese, one makes- you think of an illustration you- have seen.

I'm seeing this as a face as opposed- to seeing it as a wineglass in a round- hole.      And when you change over from- the one to the other you change- the ‘attention’ & you look at it with a- different face.

Look at W, alternately as a W and- as an M upside down. How queer that you- can comply with this order. And what- do you do to comply with it? Ms-150,49 “I see it resting on the upper end”.- But what does that mean? Aren't there- lots of possibilities? & isn't one- of them that you read it M instead- of W?

Do I get all sorts of impressions- from these figures and all along see them as- faces?

And how about a real face, – does one see- that too as a face always?      Is it correct to say that if we- don't see it as something else we have- one particular attitude towards it?      And don't (or do) you look in a particular way at everything you look- at? Or: couldn't you look at everything- in several ways? Look at your tea kettle- & see its spout as a nose. –

Do you wish to say this soap has- a particular smell as opposed- to no particular smell; or that it has- this smell as opposed to another one- or both the first & the second.

We are tempted to ask: “What does- seeing something as a face consist Ms-150,50 in?”      And we feel tempted to ask:- “does it consist in anything obviously superadded to the mere- seeing of the strokes, or is there- only a ‘seeing it as a face’ as- distinguished from seeing it as- something else?”

Are we aware of seeing a table- which we see ‘as table’?

Suppose I said “I am in a particular bodily position now”; What- happens is that I am concentrating my attention on the - sensations I have in this situation.

Ich sehe an einem Kleiderhaken- einen Rock & eine Kappe aufgehangen,- sie machen mir – bin ich versucht- zu sagen – gleich einen ganz bestimmten Eindruck. Aber vergleichen wir den- Eindruck eines Pelzrockes mit dem- einer Regenhaut, eines neuen glatten- Rockes & eines alten schäbigen. Ein- Hals macht einen andern Eindruck- als ein Gesicht & einen anderen machen- Füße. Aber diese Eindrücke erhält Ms-150,51 man nicht immer wenn man diese Dinge- sieht. Kann man dagegen nicht sagen:- wie ich den Rock gesehen habe, habe ich- ihn sofort als Rock gesehen, - ehe ich irgend einen besonderen Eindruck,- etwa der Wärme oder Weichheit hatte?

Aber bist Du sicher daß Du eben- nicht bloß diese bestimmte Form- des Rockes, gesehen hast, – & freilich- nicht mit Staunen, nicht mit der Frage- “was ist das?” u. dergl.?

The answer to the question “how does- he enter the room?” might in this case be- a picture showing him entering the room.

“The word ‘red’” – we are inclined to say – - “comes in a particular way, namely in this- way.” But “in this way” here only means: it comes in the way it comes.

It is as though calling it a particular- feeling when one sees red still hadhad || makes sense although- the feeling was to be bound up with seeing- red.

We use the word “particular” here as- an emphasis whereas it seems that Ms-150,52 we use it transitively &, in particular,- reflexively.

You think you compare it with a paradigm & it agrees or it fits into a- mould ready for it in your mind. But- in your experience no such mould- or comparison enters there is only- this shape not any other to- compare it with & you, as it were,- say “of course” to it(but not because it fits anything, but because of no reason).

You layYou lay || You are laying an emphasis on it but you- express this in a form which tempts- you to believe thattempts- you to believe that || makes- it seem that you are recognizing it.

Instead of saying “it comes with- a particular experience” you should- have said: “I concentrate my attention on the way it comes or on its- coming” (compare ‘I draw the way he- comes into the room’).

The word in this case comes with- a particular experience should- in this case mean ‘it always comes Ms-150,53 with the same experience’, but you aren't- ready to confirm that! So why are you- tempted here to use the phrase- while contemplating the way it- comes? Because you are contemplating it. You thereby lay an emphasis- on it.

If you try to see what it is you- are comparing it with you should- be inclined to say that you compare- it with itself.      And this is a most characteristic- situation.

The way can't in this case be separated- from him.

Now if I wished to draw him coming- in & was contemplating his coming- in I should while doing so be- inclined to say to myself & repeat: “He has- a particular way of coming in”. But- the answer to the question “What is- this way?” would be “it's this way” (perhaps drawing it). But there may be- no such answer & my phrase may Ms-150,54 only mean: “I contemplate- his position”.      Our expression on the other- hand made it appear as though- his position was not characterized by anything but itself.

We very often use the reflexive form- when we wish to lay an emphasis on something- & such expressions- can then always be straightened- out: Thus we say a man's a man       À la guerre comme, à la guerre.      If I can't I can't, I am what I am.      That's that.      Take it or leave it.      It either rains or it doesn't rain.      This is no piece of information; if- it rains we shall ‒ ‒ ‒ There must be a greatest number of examples- let it be 500.

“If the length of the one is L the length of- the other is L”. This is a form of various propositions- but not itself a proposition. But we could- say: “Let us put ‘L’ instead of ‘length’: then- they have the same L.      But it makes sense to say: “Let us consider propositions of the form “if A has the length- L so has B”.” Ms-150,55

“Denken wir daß der Radius r zwei- Verlängerungen habe”; – aber das ist- ja wirklich möglich! Wir machen keine- absurde Annahme.

Stelle Dir diesen indirekten Beweis- so vor daß das was bewiesen wird nicht- offenbar zu Tage tritt sondern durch- eine Kette von Transformationen- versteckt ist; & ich zeige dann- daß wenn dort ↗ ein Spalt klafft- auch da ↙ einer sein muß. Man denke- sich einen komplizierten Mechanismus- der zwischen zwei Stellungen vermittelt.

Der Beweis zeigt die Inkonvenienz der- Fortsetzung daß der Radius zwei- Fortsetzungen haben kann.      Der Widerspruch den der Beweis- ergibt ist harmlos.

Aber die Annahme erscheint auf Ms-150,56 den ersten Blick absurd. Aber- wenn sie wirklich absurd ist dann- kann man sie nicht machen.

“The two measure L feet” is the general form- of a proposition saying that they have- a particular length in common.

“This face has a particular expression?”      I'm inclined to say this when- I'm letting it make its full impression on me.      And this is something like letting- it govern you (sich ihm hingeben).      It is then as though I wished- to say what this expression consisted- in & really this is what one does when- one wants to find the right expression.

The question “What expression does- it have here” means, I wish to get- its full impression.

“But surely, this face has a peculiar expression!” What does this mean? Ms-150,57 Has it got something? Isn't it something?

It would be interesting to imagine beings- which consisted of nothing else than a- circular stroke & two eye strokes &- nose-stroke & one mouth-stroke & whose movements consisted in movements, changes- of the shape of these strokes.

Ich hebe es hervor!      Es ist als machte ich eine Stampiglie- davon.

Philosophizing is an illness & we are- trying to describe minutely its symptoms,- clinical appearance.

“It couldn't be just these strokes! You're obviously comparing them with- something else you know. There is- something behind those strokes!”

To say ‘it has the expression’ makes- it appear as though I could- separate the expression from the- face.

“You won't tell me that this tune- doesn't express something particular”. Ms-150,58      Does this mean that you make- particular movements to it?- But particular movements as- opposed to which?

“But these movements also- express something, they aren't- just movements!”-

Supposing you said: “You won't- tell me that this tune hasn't- a particular rhythm”! – “Why, of- course it has a particular- rhythm, which tune hasn't.”      It here seems as though the- peculiarity must consist- in our recognizing it as this- rhythm which we know- from somewhere else. But- this may be a delusion & it- has just its own rhythm but- a rhythm which strikes you, say- makes you sway.

“It says something” could in this- case be translated into “it speaks- to me”. Ms-150,59

Als müßte ich diesen Ausdruck (-des Gesichts) noch irgendwo anders- wiederfinden!

Oder ich frage “Was drückt es denn- aus?” und will doch eigentlich keine- Antwort.      Es heißt eigentlich es hat Ausdruck- es ist ein Gesicht.

Eine Zahl als Jahreszahl sehen.

There are experiences of familiarity.

“This is a serious face”. – What is it- that is serious?

Does it mean that it makes me serious,- that it has such & such an effect- on me?      And if eating a soup has this effect- do I call it serious? And can't a- smiling face somehow make me feel serious?

On the other hand: does a ‘serious face’ Ms-150,60 always strike me as serious?

Supposing I got its impression if I imitated- it! (This can still easier be- imagined if it is the posture of a man which I imitate.)

How is it that this kind of picture can look serious & not this ? What ‘can't’ is this?! Is it a hypothesis- to say this can never look serious?

But can't a chair look serious? “But- not in the sense in which a face does”. –- What does this mean?

If looking at it so that you get its- expression consists in imitating it,- what has the expression, the face or - me? Is it the face insofar as it- has a certain effect?      What is heavy the balance or the- weight?

How can I be sure that lengthening- the mouth is what makes it look serious?- Are any experiments needed for that?

Do I see it by introspection? Is Ms-150,61 it self-evident?-

Isn't it that I measure the picture- by a different kind of instrument;- weigh it on a different kind of- balance.

Does harmony treat of our feelings? Is- it psychology?

Is it a delusion consisting in “projecting” our own feelings into the thing- we see? Is there such a case of- projecting? Where do we take this- idea from?

Is the sugar sweet, or do we project- the feeling of sweetness into the- sugar?

Es ist als wäre jede Art & Weise des- Lebens etwas was beim Sehen gegenwärtig- ist. Als wäre jeder mögliche Kontrast- eine Färbung. Als hätten wir zuerst- das offenbar reine Sehen & dann träten verschiedene- andere Erfahrungen hinzu.

Es ist als bestünde der Eindruck eines Ms-150,62 Gesichts aus so & so vielen Teilen, dem- rein Optischen, dem Gesichtsausdruck- etc..

“A word (particularly a well known- one) has”, we should like to say,- “a particular expression (facial expression). - We don't just see it we feel something – or all sorts of things – when we- see it.”      This is almost as if one said- “if I see red I have all sorts of feelings,- the feeling of the absence of green,- of blue, of yellow, etc. etc.”.

It is as though we saw a face- first purely visual then in addition- to that as a face then in addition- to that as a Chinese face & in- addition to that as a well known- one.

Now we can imagine additional processes- corresponding to each such case- but these are not ‘directly perceived’.

The word that has a peculiar expression.- What do you contrast it with? Ms-150,63

Would you think about it as you do, if- you did not know something about- the optical apparatus of our eyes?

It is as though I had necessarily got- to say that I distinguish elements- in the seeing of a face or a word.

Should I say “This eye sparkles” or- that I, as it were, sparkle when looking at it.      Should I say that the lines of the- drawn cube recede or that, as it were,- I recede when looking at them?      Should I say “this aspect sparkles” or- “This drawing seems to sparkle in this- aspect”?

Die Wörter sind wohlbekannt; worin besteht ihre Wohlbekanntheit?

↘668 If I look at the word ‘this’, e.g., it- looks familiar to me, it looks at me- with a familiar face, like an old acquaintance. – But does it always? Am I always- touched when I see it?      Do I remember having seen it- before. Did you say to it “Oh, that's the Ms-150,64 word …”?

You are looking at this ‘as- a face’! As what are you looking- at it? Can you show me that as- what you are looking at it?

Seeing the word ‘That’ gives me the- feeling of familiarity whereas seeing- the word ‘continuity’ doesn't give- it to me. But does the first word- always give me that feeling?

Look at a word & let it seem- familiar. Then look at one of- its letters & ask yourself- whether that also seemed familiar (gave you the feeling of- familiarity) when the word as a- whole did. And on the other hand- the letter is, of course, familiar- too.

p ⊃ p = T            (p ⊃ p) ∙ q = q       T ∙ p = p       p ⌵ T = T         p ∙ q · ⊃ · p = T (p ∙ q ⊃ p) ∙ r = r            (p ∙ q) ∙ p = p ∙ q Ms-150,65       (p ∙ q) ⌵ p = p            p ∙ q = p       p ⌵ q = (p ∙ q) ⌵ p = p       ~p ⌵ q ~(p ∙ q) ⌵ p = T                  p ⊃ p ⌵ q (~(p ∙ q) ⌵ p) ⌵ (p ∙ q) = p ∙ q       P· ⊃ ·Q = T       ⊢(p ⊃ q) = p     ~p = ~p ∙ q =                  ~p ⌵ q = ~(p ∙ q) ⌵ q = p ∙ q ⊃ q       ⊢q                                q · ⊃ · p ⌵ q = Log.

Where a logical proposition has a main · ⊃ · we may infer- the right hand side from the left.

~~p = p Can we deduce this?

p ⌵ q = q

q· ⊃ · p ⌵ q = ~q · ⊃ · p ⌵ ~q Ms-150,66

When I read a line of writing- in a well known language trying to see what reading consists in I get- a particular experience which I- take to be the experience of- reading.

This experience doesn't simply- seem to consist in seeing & pronouncing but in some other, as it were, some kind of intimate experienceintimate experience || experience of intimacy. We are on an intimate ‘footing’ with the words.

The spoken words we are inclined to say- come in a particular way &- in fact the written ones themselves don't appear just- like any scratches. And at the- same time I seem unable to get hold- of that ‘way’. The processprocess || phenomena of reading out the word seems -we are inclined to say, enshrouded by a particular- atmosphere.      But here again I don't mean to- say that I recognize this atmosphere- rather I notice it when in philosophizing I read a line.      And here again it is as though- I didn't notice it & did notice it.

It is the atmosphere of contemplation- which I provide. And of course I see- what I see. Ms-150,67      Look at a written word, say ‘read’.- It isn't just a scribble it's ‘read’. I- should like to say it has no definite- physiognomy. But what is it that I really- am saying about it?! What's this- statement, straightened out?! It falls- one is tempted to explain, into a mould- of my mind language prepared for it. But- as I can't see any such mould; this- simile must mean that my- experience is one of putting something into- a mould when I don't see the mould but- just feel it.

Knowing what a thing is a hat a spectroscope a piece of coal an ‘A’ some rubbish etc.

What do we contrast all the different- experiences of familiarity with?

Experience of familiarity added? It is misleadingmisleading || dangerous to say that the- experience of seeing a face is a compound- one.

“This word now somehow looks queer- to me”. Ms-150,68

We wish to say “it's that other thing”,- & yet …

It looks at me & I wish to- say “it looks at me in this way”!

I can't say “I see this as this face”- but “I see this as a face”.

Woher aber die starke Versuchung?

“This isn't just a scribble, but it's- this particular face.”

I am tempted to say “I don't- see this as a face, I see it as this- face!” …

Suppose I said “I see this scribble- like this”, – this would mean- something like: What at one time- appears to me like this, at another- appeared to me like that. ⇒

My languageMy language || What I say predicates something- but I don't really wish to predicate- anything, I don't want to say I Ms-150,69 look at this in such & such a way- which can be described without reference to this.

In fact I don't want to say- anything about it but I want- to say something to it.

This proposition, in what game can I- use it? I seem to have constructed a game & yet haven't done- so.

Why do I say what I say? What- do I contrast the word with of which- I say it has a particular essence? Or- don't I contrast it with anything? For that shows me what game I'm playing- with it. For, what is the use of this- phrase? Do I say it of everything I see- or only of certain shapes or of anyone- when I contemplate it in some special- way? Ms-150,70

The word … isn't just scribble, it's- this. (And if I say ‘this’, I let the- word make an impression on me, look- at it in a peculiar way.)

Now when I say there is particular- atmosphere about my reading a sentence- what do I contrast it with? What- is it that I notice?       Am I noticing that there is the- same tone throughout or one tone as- opposed to another tone?      Do I oppose the experience to seeing- some scribbles & saying words as they- come into my mind looking at the- scribbles in turn?

Now it is very easy to describe differences between these two cases but difficult if- possible at all to specify differences - between what is happening in the moment of saying- the words.

Ich kenne mich in dem Zeichen nicht aus. I don't know this sign properly, the- other I know. What is the difference while- I look at them. Ms-150,71

“I notice that the same thing happens- throughout.” – What, seeing scribbles &- speaking? – “Not that alone there- is something else - something particular about the way- it's done. I don't know what it is but- there is something happening?      Alright, but let us see what it- signifies that you don't know what happens- & still know that something particular- goes on.      For are you looking for that- which really happens? Have you a- method of finding it? Are you- attempting an analysis? And what are- your means of analysing?      If not, let us look at the- actual state of affairs. We have- just to take this as the description- of this state of affairs that you- notice something going on & can't say- what.

For the expression that the words came- in a particular way was misleading. You- don't even know what kind of thing the- word “way” alludes to. It doesn't for- instance allude to a process- of deriving the spoken word. If anything Ms-150,72 one might use it as opposed to- other ways for instance that of thinking- of any spoken word to associate with- the written one. Or the way is a lack- of any.

If you say you know that something goes on, are you ever clear- that this something might not - be the absence of anything?      Perhaps a certain smoothness.- Again the familiar look of the words.

But nothing of what we can- enumerate is anything that you should- care to call the process of reading.

Do you notice anything? Don't you- just direct your attention on your reading. You look at how you are- reading, but … Ms-150,73

Beobachte die spezielle Beleuchtung- die jetzt gerade in Deinem Zimmer ist, merkst- Du sie?? “Beobachte die bestimmte- Farbe Deiner Wand!” Ja was soll ich denn tun? Soll ich nur in- bestimmter intensiver Weise auf die- Wand schauen? Oder nur dabei etwas sagen???      “Look at the difference between- the colour of the chair & the colour of- the wall!” Well what about it?      “Look at the peculiar character of this- writing!”

‘Don't I notice something when- I observe myself reading?’      But what could you notice?!

“Notice this peculiar contrast of colours!”- But what about it?

With what sense am I to notice- the way the word comes when I'm- reading?

Aber kann ich nicht das bestimmte- Körpergefühl was ich jetzt habe mit- einem Namen belegen, es bemerken? Was- heißt das? Heißt es bemerken daß ich Ms-150,74 eines habe oder daß es das ist welches …- Oder?

Es gibt in der Musik eine eindrucksvolle Phrase- & wenn man so eine hört, mag man- sagen: “diese Phrase drückt doch- etwas aus!”       Nur will man aber sagen: sie ist- nicht bloß eindrucksvoll, sondern sie- drückt auch etwas bestimmtes aus.- Aber wir sagten ja, sie sei eindrucksvoll.

“It all happens in a peculiar way.”

“It makes a strong impression on me.” “It impresses itself on me”.

alsigon

“It all happens in the way A.”

Die “Art” ist wie eine bestimmte Färbung.- Aber das Merkwürdige ist daß ich in- dieser Färbung scheinbar nicht im- Gegensatz zu einer anderen- rede.

Now if I observe myself saying- it I find that I have to read a Ms-150,75 longish sentence. And I wish to say- “it's all the same colour”.      But it hasn't just gotit hasn't just got || I don't just notice that it has all the same colour- but one particular colour!      Yes, but you mistake the function- of language! It seems you wish to specify it, but you don't wish to say anything about it,- & it seems to you as if pointing to it specified it as though you could explain it by itself.       - It is as though what I pointed to was- at the same time the sample & what one compares it with.

You can, of course, take the reading of an English- sentence as a sample for reading.- But taking it as a sample doesn't say- anything about the sample. You can- then say something by means of the- sample.

In saying this wall has all one- particular colour we make the same- mistake one makes thinking that if we- give an ostensive definition we say something about- the object we point to.

This is a particular shape (colour) because I make a particular face when looking at it.

Als was funktioniert das Gesicht, die Farbe- etc. worauf ich schaue? Als Muster oder als- das worüber ich aussage? Ms-150,76

“Bei diesem Thema mache ich eine- ganz bestimmte Geste”.

Obwohl wir die ‘bestimmte’ Beleuchtung eigentlich keiner anderer- entgegenstellen wollen, so gebrauchen- wir doch diesen Ausdruck in demjenigen Fall, im welchen die Beleuchtung auf uns einen Eindruck- macht. – Und das ist eine Bestimmung die unabhängig von der- bestimmtenbestimmten || besonderen Beleuchtung ist –, & wir- können den Eindruck auch beschreiben, anderen Eindrücken entgegenstellen.

[You can't move a King of Chess in- this way .]

It is absurd to say “you can't use- negation this way” as the use determines whether it's negation.      What is to determine whether it is- negation or not. Ms-150,77

x = y, x = x       2 + 2 = 4 Is this the result of a- calculation or isn't it. If not it is a- definition & how could this be a tautology?

(∃x,y) ∙ x = y ·≡· φx ∙ φy

F(x,y)       f(a) ⊃ f(b)       f(a) ⊃ f(a)       f(2 + 2)· ⊃ ·f(4) Ms-150,78

But can't I say that I see- now, – what I do see?

When I said, …, I wished- to say that I didn't just see- anything, nor did I wish to- give any general- characteristic of what I saw but ‒ ‒ ‒.

“Write a sentence! – While you write do you- feel something?” – “Yes, I have a particular feeling while writing”.      I don't want to say just that I- have the same feeling the whole time- but also that I have this particular feeling. But what is this particular feeling characterized by except itself?

The word particular feeling belongs together- with the feeling itself.      One could just say “I have …- while writing”. And during ‘ …’ produce- the feeling.

“Observe the feeling which you have- while writing.” Ms-150,79

It seems it has sense to say “I- have this feeling while writing”. And- while saying this I produce a feeling.

“Surely I can say that I have- this feeling while I'm writing”.- Of course you can say it & when you- say “this feeling” you concentrate on- the feeling (which is comparable to looking- not to seeing). But what do you do- with the sentence? What use is it to you?

“Observe the feeling” can't mean- “feel it”. I can say look closely at- what you see, not see clearly- what you see.

I can't visually point to what- I see because I see the pointing- finger & it does not point to what I- see but is part of it.

It is as though I could say:- My act of concentrating the attention is an inward (act of) pointing.- An act which nobody else sees but that doesn't- matter. But I don't point to the feeling Ms-150,80 by attending to it but rather- produce it.

“Beim Lesen eines Satzes fühl ich einen bestimmten Vorgang.”- Was ist daran wahr?

Wenn ich wohlbekannte Dinge sehen- habe ich eine bestimmte Erfahrung; was ist daran- wahr?

“I notice that the wall has this- particular colour”.

“Do you only notice that it has the- same colour throughout or do- you also notice the particular colour it has?”      This might mean: are you impressed by- the particular colour it has.

“I know what colour it has because I see it”. Well, what colour- has it.      “I know which colour it has.”      “I know the colour.”

It has a particular colour A & I Ms-150,81 know A.

Ich wäge einen Geschmack auf der Zunge.

You misunderstand the function of- language. It seems to you as though- you could say: I notice the colour- besides seeing that it has all one colour.

You think it makes sense to say:- the colour of this→ is this→.

Observe the feeling of writing. “Yes I'm- looking at it”, or “yes I'm impressing- it on my mind”.

If I observe the particular lighting etc. I don't do anything with it.

“I see this”. Surely it makes sense- to say what I see & how could I- do this better than by letting what- I see speak for itself.      But I can't point visually to- what I see. ‒ ‒ ‒      It seems as though I singled- something out but the sample- can't single out itself. Ms-150,82      When I said you mistake the- function of language it was- because a sentence seemed to- you to do what only the sample- itself does.      The sample seemed to be its- own description.

“The wall has now got this colour”.      Imagine someone asked “Has it really this colour now?”

Observe the lighting …. – Hasn't- it one particular lighting? Like doesn't the sentence read- give me one particular impression?      Observe the particular thing- that takes place when you read.      Impress the lighting of the- room on you.      Suppose someone said “I am- now observing the particular lighting- it has”. This would sound as if he- could point out which it was.

… because by its help you seem to be pointing Ms-150,83 out to yourself what colour you see.

You are orderedYou are ordered || This tells you to concentrate- your attention on the sample- and I could in fact have- said “look at the colour of- this sample”. But this would- have asked you to attend to it in a particular way, not to attend to a particular thing.

By attending, looking you produce- the impression. You can't- look at the impression.

Nothing yet is done with this- sample.

But you might thinkyou might think || it might seem to you that you- can look at the particular lighting- of this room. As though you- didn't look at the room- but at something else which- the room had. And you are- then in fact concentrating- your attention …- on the lighting which doesn't mean- to look at a particular thing but in a- particular way. Ms-150,84      (I must try to cheat- myself to believe that- I can look at the particular- lighting of this room.)

It doesn't say anything- about the appearance- of the room. (Rather) the appearance of the room is the sample.

Observe … is like saying- get hold of it whereas it- is obeyed by putting myself- into a certain state.

This <…> a particular- lighting, get hold of it.

The order could have been- “see what lighting the- room has”.

“There is a particular- lighting I must observe”. Ms-150,85

⋏ It seemed that I could- say: Now I've noticed it- something particular happens when I- readwhen I- read || in reading.

You read put yourself into the state of attention- & say: “Something peculiar happens undoubtedly”. You are inclined to- go on “There is a certain smoothness- about it.” But you feel that- this is only an inadequate description & that the experience can- only describedescribe || stand for itself.

“Something peculiar happens undoubtedly” is like saying- “I've had an experience!” But you- don't wish to make a general statement independent of the particular- experience you have had but rather- a statement into which this particular experience- enters. ⋎

You are under a particular impression.a particular impression. || an impression.

You are saying something general & at the- same time concentrating your attention- on a sample & so it seems as though- this sample entered your statement. Ms-150,86      It is as though you looked- into a microscope say observing the motions of animals & said to a- pupil: “Something peculiar goes on- there”; intending to let him look too- & to use what you observe as a- sample for further consideration.

You think you've noticed the- process of reading, the particular- way in which signs are transformed- into sounds. You've seen the particular process of transformation.

“This sentence is spoken in a particular- tone.” – Every sentence is spoken in a particular tone, what makes you say- that it's spoken in a particular tone- is that you're concentrating on this tone.

You are under an impression.- That's why you say what you say.      But the sentence that you are under- an impression, is a general statement.      You wish to make this impression- a sample drawing a circle round it.- And this action of saying something- to it you mistake for saying some Ms-150,87 thing about it.

You are under an impression. This- makes you say “I am under a particular impression. And this- sentence seemsthis- sentence seems || it seems to say to yourself- under what impression you areunder what impression you are || at least that you have told yourself under what impression you are.      As though you had pointed to- a picture ready in your mind & said- this is it.      Whereas you have only pointed to- your impression.      You did something like drawing a- circle round the colour …

“That's how one reads!” You seem to have observed reading- as under a magnifying glass &- discovereddiscovered || seen the reading process (which- had escaped the superficial observation.) But the case is more like that of observing something- through a coloured glass.

You interpret your impressionYou interpret your impression || You are under an impression which you interpretwhich you interpret || & you interpret this -as one of having noticed something which- was independent of the particular signs- you saw, the words you uttered, the writing etc. Ms-150,88

Thought expressed by architecture.

Stiefmütterchen, “jede Farbenzusammenstellung sagt etwas, speaks to me”.      Everyone of these men says- something.

“That's what happens when I read (at- least what happened in this case)”. What was it?- “Oh I got a particular impression”.

I am impressed by the reading. And that- made me say that I had observed something- besides the mere seeing & speaking.      “Something peculiar happens when- I read”. That is I am impressed.

The words old acquaintances of mine.- But do I always have towards old acquaintances the one feeling of old acquaintance.

The words easily awaken feelings- in me. Odd scratches don't.      I can easier feel at home in- well known things than in others. Ms-150,89

Music impresses you “sad”, “joyful”, etc..

The only adequate way of expressing- your impression might be to draw- what you see.

“An impression” sounds like something- amorphous.

I don't want to say I see this- & am impressed as though being- impressed meant something like- having a particular feeling & the- sentence meant something like- I see this & feel a pressure. Ms-150,90

“Do you remember having lived- yesterday?”

Can one remember without language.      Can one wish to be somewhere at- 5.05 o'clock if one knows no- clocks.

What is the difference between- a memory image & an image- we deliberately make up.

Russell doesn't really wish to say- that two classes are similar if they- are correlated. He needs a correlation- which isn't a grossly material one, which- in fact is the possibility of a material correlation. And that means that- when he says A & B are 1-1 correlated it really- means they can be, or it makes- sense to say that they are.      So we are driven to consider cases- in which it makes sense & such in which- it makes no sense to say that Ms-150,91 two classes are 1-1 correlated.      What is the condition of their- being 1-1 correlatable.

What in this case is the condition.- Or how would I get a contradiction?- E.g. if I said A B C D are equidistant, α β γ δ are not equidistant & parallel lines are drawn- between them.      And here Russell's correlation seems- to furnish a criterion of their correlatability. A logical criterion.      Isn't it very queer that by just looking- at the names I should be able to- say whether or not a certain relation- held between the objects?      But I correlate the names. And- why? To see whether a correlation can- existexist || subsist between the things. Correlation Correspondence We draw lines in our thought.

They are thus correlated whether anybody knows it or not. Ms-150,92

Ms-150,93

“Remembering is a characteristic experience.” But the experience isis || seems curiously elusive.- There are indeed experiences connected- with it which are not elusive. We have- e.g. memory images, we see so & so before us.- But then there are other images besides- memory ones.      They only seem elusive when we philosophise about them. Otherwise we say- without any hesitation: “I remember- so & so”. And not only very sensitive- people do so.      Take as example the feeling of ‘long, long ago’- because this is a strong & clearly circumscribed experience. And yet in a sense it- seems just as elusive as any other feeling- of memory. [“Far away look in his eyes.”]      Tone & gesture of memory.      The experience of singing- with expression without the feeling.      Suppose the feeling consists a) of feeling- the heartbeat b) of not feeling its- beat.

Wenn das Verständnis für ein Thema- kommt ändert sich freilich das- Erlebnis; aber kommt ein bestimmtes Gefühl- dazu? Ms-150,94

Language treats our ‘particular- feeling’ as something separate. As- an experience separate from the- other sense experiences.

I say “I remember seeing him yesterday” and now I look behind saying- these words for the experience of- remembering.

If we say “The words came in a- particular way”, how is this- way to be described? For what the- word “way” meant can only be- seen by looking at the kind- of specification.

Our sentence really meant no- more than: There is a difference between Ms-150,95 someone saying these words & remembering & saying these words without- remembering.

“The image has some indefinable- ‘past’ quality”. – Now do you say this- because you think you have to- say it or because you notice- a quality in the picture which you- want to give a name to.      Alright I don't ask you to define it as I don't ask you to define ‘blue’ either. Let's hear how you are going to- use the word for this quality, then- I'll know in what sense it is a quality.- (Is it, e.g., like size, shape, or colour?)

Representing memory images in the Film.

“Let me see what did I do before- that?”      “A particular way of looking for an- image”.

“Reading in the book of memory.” “Looking- up something in the book of memory.”

Rising hot air. Ms-150,96

“Kennst Du das Phänomen des ‘Suchens- im Gedächtnis’?”

“Intangible”

“He started – like this.” – “Was that- all, or did he have an experience- besides?”

Mischfarbe: “Sehe ich eine oder zwei Farben- wenn ich ein weißliches Grün sehe?”      “Macht die Erde zwei Bewegungen- oder eine Bewegung?”      Verwandt & doch sehr verschieden: Habe ich eine oder drei Klangerfahrungen wenn ich einen Dreiklang höre?”      Ist süßer Tee ein Geschmack- oder zwei Geschmäcker?

Couldn't a characteristic element- of fright be that of having a momentary- abnormally quick succession of- ideas.– Would I deny such a thing?

Zählen & Rechnen mit musikalischen Figuren. Ms-150,BCr Ms-150,BCv