FIL217 / FIL317 - Wittgenstein studies

1st lecture 21.8.2018:

- Nachlass & work(s)
- Problems of the Tractatus

100 years ago Wittgenstein finished his «Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung» (engl. «Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus»)

Facsimiles of the Tractatus typescripts can be studied in the Bergen Nachlass Edition on Wittgenstein Source:

- http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-202 f
- http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-203_f
- http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ts-204_f

Also see on Wittgenstein Source the Tractatus Publication Materials, esp.:

- http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/LPA/LPA_f
- http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/LPA/TLP_f

See http://wittgenstein-initiative.com/:

Exhibition

DIE TRACTATUS ODYSSEE - 100 Jahre Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

16. Oktober - 30. November 2018 Grillparzerhaus, Johannesgasse 6, 1010 Wien

Plan for today

1st hour

- Introduction to the course
- Wittgenstein's Nachlass and «works»
- How to read the Tractatus?

2nd hour

Problems of the Tractatus

 http://wab.uib.no/teaching/apss_Wittgenst ein-autumn2018.pdf

Wittgenstein's works


Only two works

- Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921/1922)
 - See Wittgenstein Source,
 Tractatus Publication Materials
- Philosophical Investigations (1953)


«Nachlass»

- At his death in 1951, Wittgenstein left behind a philosophical Nachlass of ca 20 000 pages
 - Manuscripts and typescripts, notebooks and fair copies, first drafts and elaborated versions, single sheets and bound volumes
- "Works" are, except for the Tractatus, edited after Wittgenstein's death from the Nachlass
 - For a bibliography see Pichler & Biggs & Szeltner
 2011
 - http://www.ilwg.eu/files/Wittgenstein_Bibliographie.pdf

The relation between Nachlass and editions: Example PG




The relation between Nachlass and editions: Example RFM




The relation between the Nachlass and editions thereof: Online resources

- http://wittgensteinrepository.org/agor a-wab/article/view/3232
- http://wab.uib.no/sfb/

Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE, 1998-2000)



InteLex version of BEE http://nlx.com/collections/124



Nachlass resources

- http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/
- http://wittgensteinonline.org/
 - http://wab.uib.no/transform/wab.php?modus=opsjoner
- http://wab.uib.no/sfb/
- http://wittfind.cis.uni-muenchen.de/

Editions: Summary

- English / German book editions by Suhrkamp, Routledge, (Wiley-)Blackwell, Hackett, Haymon, Springer ...
- Book editions in many other languages
- The Bergen Electronic Edition (OUP 2000)
- Nachlass Open Access editions, resources and tools on the Web

Wittgenstein was concerned not only with the contents, but also with the *form* of his works...

E.g.: How to read the Tractatus?

- 1 The world is everything that is the case.
- 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- 1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.
- 1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.
- 1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
- 1.2 The world divides into facts.
- 1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same.
- 2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.

. . .

[Quotations from Wittgenstein are marked blue; underlinings in quotations are mine. If not indicated otherwise, I quote the Ramsey & Ogden translation of the Tractatus.]

See the author's own note about the Tractatus' decimal numbering

The decimal figures as numbers of the separate propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the emphasis laid upon them in my exposition. The propositions *n*.1, *n*.2, *n*.3, etc., are comments on proposition No. *n*; the propositions *n*.*m*1, *n*.*m*2, etc., are comments on the proposition No. *n*.*m*; and so on.

Reading the Tractatus' tree-wise, lets you better see its main "branches" and their connections


- Die Welt ist alles, was der <u>Fall</u> ist.
- 2. Was der <u>Fall</u> ist, die <u>Tatsache</u>, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.
- 3. Das **logische Bild** der <u>Tatsache</u> ist der <u>Gedanke</u>.
- 4. Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz.
- 5. Der <u>Satz</u> ist eine <u>Wahrheitsfunktion</u> der Elementarsätze. (Der Elementarsatz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion seiner selbst.)
- 6. Die allgemeine Form der Wahrheitsfunktion ist: $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$. Dies ist die allgemeine Form des Satzes.
- 7. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.


The Tractatus' main "branches"

- 1. The world is everything that is the case.
- 2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
- 3. The **logical picture** of the facts is the thought.
- 4. The thought is the significant proposition.
- 5. <u>Propositions</u> are <u>truth-functions</u> of elementary propositions.
 - (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
- 6. The general form of <u>truth-function</u> is: $[\bar{p},\bar{\xi},N(\bar{\xi})]$. This is the general form of proposition.
- 7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Sequential vs. "tree"-reading (Bazzocchi 2010)

http://www.bazzocchi.com/wittgenstein/tractatus/





Does it make a difference?

- Depending on whether you read the *Tractatus* as a textual tree with main and side branches or,
 alternatively, in a linear way (sequentially from
 the top of a page to its bottom), you will read the
 text in different order.
- Reading sequentially, you will read #2 much later than in the case when you read the text tree-wise.
- You will also understand the target of references such as "this", "here" ... differently.

Example from Bazzocchi (Kirchberg 2012 paper)

- 5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm).
- 5.631 ...
- 5.632 ...
- 5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will
 say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really
 you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer
 that it is seen by an eye.
- 5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this. ...
- 5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is. Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a priori order of things.
- 5.64 <u>Here</u> it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it.
- 5.641 ...

The preface says something about what the Tractatus is about

The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language. Its whole meaning could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. ... the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved. And if I am not mistaken in this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved.

Tensions in the *Tractatus*

- TLP preface: the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive ...
- TLP #6.54: My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless [unsinnig], when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

The Iowa Tractatus map

http://tractatus.lib.uiowa.edu/

Reading list: See

http://wab.uib.no/teaching/litteraturliste-2018H-FIL217&317.pdf

- Primary sources
- Secondary sources
 - Coursebook
 - Articles and talks
- Recommended reference work:
 - Hans-Johann Glock: A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Wiley-Blackwell 1995