









What is Wittgenstein trying to do in the *Tractatus*?

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). (TLP, preface)

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	W « tlp	/ith TLP, analytic philosophy took a inguistic turn» gave analytic philosophy a linguistic orientation it had not had before, by	
	1.	aiming at setting the limits of thought by thought "from within" by setting the limits of <i>language</i> (by determining the bounds between sense and nonsense)(preface, 5.6, 5.61)	
	2.	formulating the task of philosophy as the <i>logical clarification of thought</i> , which is to be achieved through the <i>clarification of propositions</i> (4.112) Thus, All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (4.0031)	i
	3.	demonstrating that there are things <i>that cannot be said</i> due to the intrinsic natur of language (6.53)	re
	4.	clarifying the nature of the propositional sign; elucidating <i>the general propositional form</i> by giving a description of the propositions of any sign-languag whatsoever (4.5)	;e
	5.	emphasizing that the logical investigation of phenomena is to be achieved by logical analysis of the <i>linguistic descriptions</i> of phenomena (the logical syntax of language must be isomorphic with the logical structure of reality)(RLF)	
	6.	elucidating the nature of logical truth through an investigation of <i>symbolism</i> (6.113)	
	Afte	r PMS Hacker: Wittgenstein's Place in 20th Century Analytic Philosophy	
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Background
Engineering, problems of mathematics and its foundations, logic -> Frege and Russell
Wittgenstein inherits from Frege and Russell the view that logical analysis is fundamental: the analysis of inference (in mathematics, but by extension in any language) presupposes an analysis of the structure of propositions.
See Anscombe, ch. 2 and 7 for details of F's and R's influence



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Linguistic expression (sentence)	Logical syntax of proposition	Logical form of «is»
"Alois is diligent"	D(a)	predication
"2 times 2 is four"	2*2=4	Sign of equality, Identity
"There is a book on the table"	∃x (B(x) ∧ T(x))	Existential quantification











3. The distinction between object and concept

- •Different parts of the proposition play different roles
- •Names (such as 'John', 'the cat', etc) refer to objects, and predicates (such as 'is good', 'was asleep', etc) to concepts.
- •Names refer to concrete individual objects, while concepts are abstract general entities that represent our ways of thinking and classifying objects
- •Frege uses "name" broadly, It is meant to apply to any definite singular noun phrase including both proper names ('Cicero', 'Plato', 'Kitty') and definite descriptions ('the most famous Roman orator', 'the teacher of Aristotle', "my favourite cat").

























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4.01

The proposition is a picture of reality.

The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is.

4.011

At the first glance the proposition—say as it stands printed on paper—does not seem to be a picture of the reality of which it treats. But nor does the musical score appear at first sight to be a picture of a musical piece; nor does our phonetic spelling (letters) seem to be a picture of our spoken language.

And yet these symbolisms prove to be pictures—even in the ordinary sense of the word—of what they represent.

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The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world.

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To all of them the logical structure is common.







