

# A. Pichler, S. Säätelä: *Introduction to Wittgenstein*

Lecture 4 15.9.2022:

- 1929-51: Nachlass and works
- From the Tractatus to the later philosophy
  - From exactness to acceptance of vagueness
    - Meaning revisited
  - From word reference to human acting

# Nachlass and works


# Only two works?

- Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921/1922)
- Philosophical Investigations (1953)

It is now 100 years since Wittgenstein published his *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, and ca. 70 years that his heirs published *Philosophical Investigations*.

- At his death in 1951, Wittgenstein left behind a philosophical Nachlass of ca 20 000 pages.
- After Wittgenstein's death, many works have been edited and published from the Nachlass.
- Wittgenstein's Nachlass can be viewed and studied on Wittgenstein Source <http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/>. This includes facsimiles and transcriptions of the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* materials.

# Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE, 1998-2000)



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**PITHY QUOTE FROM WITTGENSTEIN: COLLECTED WORKS**

“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.”

*The Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations*, §109

**The Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Electronic Edition.**

ISBN: 978-1-57085-203-9  
Language: English translation  
MARC Records



Ludwig Wittgenstein  
Photograph by Moritz Napp. © Austrian National Library, c. 1930

**List of Contents**

*The Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein* contains the complete Wittgenstein corpus as published by Basil Blackwell. Most of the texts were written in German (and are included in *Wittgenstein's Nachlass*), but were edited and translated for publication in English. The German texts are not included.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks: 1914-1916*. Edited by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Index prepared by E. D. Klemke. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Philosophical Remarks*. Edited from his posthumous writings by Rush Rhees. Translated by Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Philosophical Grammar*. Edited by Rush Rhees. Translated by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Blue and The Brown Books*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. Edited by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Culture and Value*. Edited by G. H. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman. Translated by Peter Winch. Revised Edition of the Text by Alois Pichler. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Zettel*. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Vol. I. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. Edited by G. H. Von Wright and Heikki Nyman. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe and M. E. G. ... Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.

*The Bottom Line: Past Masters is an essential online resource for its target audience, upper-level undergraduates and scholarly researchers. Not only does it make key philosophical works accessible on users' desktops 24/7, but it also provides in-text citations and searchable text. In addition, à la carte database customization makes it financially accessible not only to large universities and research libraries but also to smaller academic institutions and medium to large public libraries, for which it is recommended highly.*

—Christopher Holly  
Reference Instruction  
DePaul University Libraries  
Library Journal

# Resources provided by the Bergen Wittgenstein Archives

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The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB)



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## WITTGENSTEINONLINE

- **Wittgenstein IDP:** The Nachlass in interactive dynamic presentation (continuous update)
- **Wittgenstein SFB:** Wittgenstein resources by semantic faceted search and browsing (continuous update)
- **Wittgenstein Source:** The *Bergen Nachlass Edition* and other primary sources (last update May 2022)
- **Wittgenstein WITTFind:** The Finder app for Nachlass text search (last update March 2020)

#### Recommended reading:

- About Wittgenstein Source:
- (2019) A. Pichler: *A brief update on editions offered by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and licences for their use (as of June 2018)*. In: Wittgenstein-Studien 10/1, 2019, pp. 139-146. Edited by Wilhelm Lütterfelds, Stefan Majetschak, Richard Raatzsch and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl.
- About Wittgenstein IDP and Wittgenstein SFB:
- (2021) A. Pichler: *Complementing Static Scholarly Editions with Dynamic Research Platforms: Interactive Dynamic Presentation (IDP) and Semantic Faceted Search and Browsing (SFB) for the Wittgenstein Nachlass*. In: Selected Papers from the CLARIN Annual Conference 2020. Virtual Event, 2020, 5-7 October. Edited by C. Navarretta, M. Eskevich. pp. 194-207.
- About WITTFind:
- (2018) M. Hadersbeck, A. Pichler, I. Röhrer, S. Ullrich & N. Gangopadhyay: *The FinderApp WITTFind for Wittgenstein's Nachlass*. In: Archives of Data Science, Series A 5/1, 2018, pp. 1-19.

# E.g. the *Tractatus* translation by F.P. Ramsey

Wittgenstein SOURCE

EXPLORE RamseyTranslation Facsimile RamseyTranslation\_tr Facsimile

SEARCH Facsimile

EDITIONS

- Bergen Nachlass Edition (BNE)
- Moore Notes Facsimile Edition (MWN)
- Tractatus Publication Materials (LPA)
- Prototractatus Tools (PTT)
- Wörterbuch für Volksschulen Materials (WfV)

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RamseyTranslation,1r

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Handwritten notes on the manuscript page:

- inked on this side to be the same as in the German side
- New page here = 35
- drop to me
- No title to this section.
- First line to be inserted for every sentence & set out to the margin

1. The world is everything that is the case.<sup>1</sup>

1.1. The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

1.11. The world is determined by the facts, <sup>and by</sup> in that these <sup>being</sup> all the facts.

1.12. For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.

1.13. The facts in logical space are the world.

1.2. The world divides into facts.

1.21. Any one can either be the case or not be the case,



# Editions: Summary

- English / German book editions by Suhrkamp, Routledge, (Wiley-)Blackwell, Hackett, Haymon, Springer ...
- Book editions in many other languages
- The Bergen Electronic Edition (OUP 2000)
- Open access online resources and tools provided by WAB

Wittgenstein cared about the *form* (*gestalt*) of his works. Some claim that it is important – important for understanding his *philosophy* – that we pay close attention to the specific *gestalt* each of his philosophical works received. That it, for example, is important to see that the *Tractatus* received the *gestalt* of a *ladder*.

# E.g.: How to read the Tractatus?

- 1 The world is everything that is the case.
- 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- 1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being *all* the facts.
- 1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.
- 1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
- 1.2 The world divides into facts.
- 1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same.
- 2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
- ...

[Quotations from Wittgenstein are marked blue.  
If not indicated otherwise, the Ramsey & Ogden translation of the Tractatus is quoted.]

# See the author's own note about the Tractatus' decimal numbering

The decimal figures as numbers of the separate propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the emphasis laid upon them in my exposition. The propositions  $n.1$ ,  $n.2$ ,  $n.3$ , etc., are **comments** on proposition No.  $n$ ; the propositions  $n.m1$ ,  $n.m2$ , etc., are **comments** on the proposition No.  $n.m$ ; and so on.

# Reading the Tractatus' tree-wise lets you better see its main "branches" and their connections («chaining»)

1. Die Welt ist alles, was der **Fall** ist.
2. Was der **Fall** ist, die **Tatsache**, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.
3. Das **logische Bild** der **Tatsache** ist der **Gedanke**.
4. Der **Gedanke** ist der sinnvolle **Satz**.
5. Der **Satz** ist eine **Wahrheitsfunktion** der Elementarsätze.  
(Der Elementarsatz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion seiner selbst.)
6. Die allgemeine Form der **Wahrheitsfunktion** ist:  $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$  .  
Dies ist die allgemeine Form des Satzes.
7. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.

# The Tractatus' main "branches"

1. The world is everything that is **the case**.
2. What is **the case, the fact**, is the existence of atomic facts.
3. The **logical picture of the facts is the thought**.
4. **The thought** is the significant **proposition**.
5. **Propositions** are **truth-functions** of elementary propositions.  
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
6. The general form of **truth-function** is:  $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$  .  
This is the general form of proposition.
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.



See also the Iowa Tractatus map at <http://tractatus.lib.uiowa.edu/>

«Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* consists of a series of numbered remarks, arranged in numerical order. The seven most important are numbered 1 to 7; decimal numbers are used to indicate the structure of the supporting paragraphs. A footnote, attached to the first remark, tells the reader that

The decimal figures as numbers of the separate propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the emphasis laid upon them in my exposition. The propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc., are comments on proposition No. n; the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc., are comments on the proposition No. n.m; and so on....

The site is built around a subway-style map, with the aim of displaying the overall structure of the numbering system, and making it easy to look at the sequences of propositions described in the introductory footnote, together with the remark that they comment on.»



# Does it make a difference?

- If you read the *Tractatus* in a linear way (from the first to its last page, and from the top of a page to its bottom), you are likely to miss the «chaining»-dimension of its cardinal propositions.
- Reading linearly, you will read #2 probably much later than in the case when you approach the text tree- or subway- or ladder-wise.
- If you read the *Tractatus* tree- or subway- or ladder-wise, you will also read the target of references such as "this", "here" ... differently.

# Example from Bazzocchi (Kirchberg 2012 paper)

- **5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm).**
- 5.631 ...
- 5.632 ...
- 5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.
- 5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this. ...
- 5.634 **This** is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is. Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a priori order of things.
- **5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.**
- 5.641 ...

# See Hacker 2015

- “The book was constructed as a logical tree, with propositions 1 to 6 as the basic propositions. From these, various branches are constructed as numerical sequences (e.g. 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). From each of these nodes further branches stem. Bazzocchi demonstrates that the book was not meant to be read linearly (as we all read it), but sequentially. This renders the argument of the book perspicuous, illuminates the anaphoric references, makes clear the dependence of proposition 7 on 6, rather than on 6.54. It shows that the conception of the book as a 526-rung ladder, as suggested by the American Wittgensteinians, is misguided.”

P.M.S. Hacker (2015): “How the Tractatus was Meant to be Read”,  
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 65, Issue 261, 648–668

TLP 6.54 only a comment on TLP 6.5? And  
TLP 6.5 only a comment on TLP 6?

TLP 6: The general form of truth-function is:  $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$ .

This is the general form of proposition.

TLP 6.5: For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.

*The riddle does not exist.*

If a question can be put at all, then it *can* also be answered.

TLP 6.54: My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless [*unsinnig*], when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

# The *Tractatus* as a ladder

- Rung 1: The world is everything that is the case.  
Rung 2: What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.  
Rung 3: The logical picture of the facts is the thought.  
Rung 4: The thought is the significant proposition.  
Rung 5: Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.  
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)  
Rung 6: The general form of truth-function is:  $[p, \xi, N(\xi)]$ .  
This is the general form of proposition.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Climbing the *Tractatus* ladder means reaching the insight of TLP 6 – i.e. **taking in the formula that shows the general form of the truth-function and of the proposition!**



# From the Tractatus to the later philosophy

- From exactness to acceptance of vagueness
- Meaning re-visited – and re-defined: From reference to rules
  - From rules to acting and practice

Some of the driving force behind  
the *Tractatus*: The ambition for  
exactness in thought and language

# A fact about ordinary language

In general, the meaning of expressions and phrases of everyday language is vague, ambiguous and context dependent.



# Vagueness, ambiguity, context dependency

- Vagueness: Many expressions have vague meanings.
  - "There are **about** twenty people in this room", "She is a **good** student" ...
- Ambiguity: Many expressions have a range of meanings.
  - «2 x 2 **is** 4»; «Kevin **is** American» ....; «Die **Bank** ist teuer" ...
- (Speaker) context dependency: Many expressions have context dependent meanings.
  - Deictic expressions, : «this», «here», «now», «I», «tomorrow» ...

# «But science (Wissenschaft) needs exactness!»

- «Luckily, ordinary language also includes some not speaker context dependent proper names and definite descriptions!»
  - «Simo Säätelä», «Bergen», «The Finnish professor at the Philosophy department in Bergen» ...

# The «ideal language» program

- «We need exact language; let's create it.»
- Or (Frege and *Tractatus!*): «Let's make the exactness, that actually already is *inherent* in our existing language (in our **thought**), explicit in a *Begriffsschrift*.»
- «In such an exact *Begriffsschrift*, we will be maximally *formal* and should as little as possible have to care about vague, ambiguous, context-dependent meanings – 'messy' – contents.»
  - An artificial and formal language, a **logical syntax**
  - Focus on *syntax* rather than on semantics!

# «We should aim for an exact language that ...»

- is a map. context independent / context explicit
  - «expert systems»
- permits exact operations on the basis of logical syntax alone
- can in principle be processed by machines (anti-psychologism!)
- is as much as possible a *calculus: a formal system with exact rules for how to process signs*
- establishes the truth of compound propositions on the basis of their *logical form alone*
  - The *Tractatus*' truth tables calculus!

# Promotion of logical syntax is *one* ambition / tendency in the *Tractatus*

TLP #3.317

... Die Festsetzung wird also nur von Symbolen, nicht von deren Bedeutung handeln.

Und *nur* dies ist der Festsetzung wesentlich, *daß sie nur eine Beschreibung von Symbolen ist und nichts über das Bezeichnete aussagt.*

... The stipulation will therefore be concerned only with symbols, not with their meaning.

And the *only* thing essential to the stipulation is *that it is merely a description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified.*

TLP #3.33

In der logischen Syntax darf nie die Bedeutung eines Zeichens eine Rolle spielen; sie muß sich aufstellen lassen, ohne daß dabei von der *Bedeutung* eines Zeichens die Rede wäre, sie darf *nur* die Beschreibung der Ausdrücke voraussetzen.

In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a rôle. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the *meaning* of a sign: *only* the description of expressions may be presupposed.

# So, how does it work?

- One creates a calculus that permits identifying the truth value of a compound sentence purely on the basis of
  - writing down all possible truth value combinations for the simple sentences, plus
  - writing down the resulting truth value series for the compound sentence.
- By running a compound sentence (e.g. "p & q") through the truth table calculus we *show* how its truth value series results from the truth values of the simple sentences (i.e. "p", "q" for "p & q") it is composed of.

– "&" is shown by the T, F, F, F truth value series:      "¬" is shown by the F, T truth value series:

p	&	q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	F	T
F	F	F

¬	p
F	T
T	F

- TLP #4.31: The truth-possibilities can be presented by schemata of the following kind ("T" means "true", "F" "false". The rows of T's and F's under the row of the elementary propositions mean their truth-possibilities in an easily intelligible symbolism).
- See TLP #5.101 for all (16!) possible truth value series for two elementary propositions p and q.

# Problems?

- Well, no problem as long as the *Tractatus* concept of elementary proposition is presupposed and can do its work: as long as the elementary propositions are logically independent of each other and thus the truth value of one proposition has no bearing on the truth value of another proposition.
- But what happens if they *do*? I.e. if p and q actually exclude each other on the basis of their semantics, like for example colour statements can exclude each other?
  - Replace "p" with «This is red», and q with «This is green»:

$$\frac{p}{T} \quad \frac{\&}{T?} \quad \frac{q}{T?}$$

- Then the truth table-calculus no longer works!!!

Meaning:

If not reference – what is it then?




# From reference to rules

- *Tractatus*: Sense comes from **elementary propositions** consisting of **names** which (in the context of the proposition) **refer** to simple objects in the world.
- If there are no such elementary propositions – how can sense and reference be accounted for?
- "Middle period": Meaning is established through language-internal **rules** rather than language-external **reference**.
  - The meaning of a sentence does not come from reference to objects, but from a system of linguistic rules.

➤ **NB: RE-DEFINITION OF «MEANING»!**

# The chess analogy: Rules


The meaning of chess figures is given by rules:

- The chess figures are part of a game with **rules**.
- The meaning of a chess figure does not come from a relation of representation (picture theory!), but from a chess-internal system of **rules**. What would a chess figure represent / refer to?
- The **rules** for what to do with a chess figure (in chess) are purely conventional and not bound by reference to ontological entities. What would it mean that the chess rules are bound by «reality»?
- «This  the chess queen» has meaning because of the chess game and its **rules** – not because of a reference relation to reality.

➤ Meaning *is rules*.

# The chess analogy: Rules

Words are like chess figures in several aspects:

- Words are part of a game with **rules** - which also means that they are part of an activity (→ «language game»).
- A word's meaning does not depend on reference / representation, but on the language game internal **rules**.
- The **rules** for how to use words are purely conventional and not bound by reference to ontological entities.
- Not even linguistic ostensive definition ("This  is ...") is bound by a language-external world. Ostensive acts take place within a system of language and its **rules**.
- Language is autonomous and independent of the world.

➤ Meaning *is* **rules**.

# From rules to practice\*

- The "Meaning is rules"-view can be challenged on the basis of the "Rules regress" and the "Authority regress" problems.
- Rules regress: If not through reference to the language-external world – where do the words and sentences get their meaning from? From rules. But *what rules the rules?* Other rules. Other rules? What is it that rules the rules which rule the rules? Again other rules? ...?
- Authority regress: Who decides, *which* rules to adopt? Who decides which are the rules we should agree upon? And which changes are permitted? Even if rules are conventional – don't we still need an authority to approve of the convention, or to approve of its change? Where does such authority come from? ... ?
- Wittgenstein's "primacy of practice" and "meaning is use" views

\* See A. Newen & E. von Savigny, *Analytische Philosophie: Eine Einführung*, 1996; p. 92f

- The *Tractatus* has largely been a product of thinking about what it is that must be the case if there is to be meaning, sense, truth, reference ...
- PI §66: Don't think, but look!
- Look at what?
  - At the language game
  - At the language game – as it is embedded in life

# PI: Not logic; not reference; not even meaning and rules - but **practice** comes first

- Meaning, rules and authority are established by
  - **our practices** (linguistic and other)
  
- Language is
  - **an activity**
  - **a social activity**
  - embedded in **language games**
    - which are embedded in **(forms of) life**
  
- «Language games»: Language as embedded in activities / practices.
  - "Forms of life" : ... **And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.**

# A certain picture ...

A certain picture of the human language ...

PI §1: (...) the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names. (...) Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

– This was the picture of the Tractatus

- There is more to language than reference only
- It is *speakers* who refer to things, not words
  - The human agent
  - Cf. PI §1: Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. ...

# Focus on action rather than meaning

PI §1:

Now think of the following use of language: I **send** someone shopping. I **give** him a slip marked "five red apples". He **takes** the slip to the shopkeeper, who **opens** the drawer marked "apples"; then he **looks up** the word "red" in a table and **finds** a colour sample opposite it; then he **says** the series of cardinal numbers—I **assume** that he knows them by heart—up to the word "five" and for each number he **takes** an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—**It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.**—"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"—Well, I **assume** that he **acts** as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used.



# Focus on use rather than reference

- If meaning is tied to action, then one method for dealing with philosophical problems arising from questions of meaning is to pay attention to actual **use** of language in action.
- Studies of how words actually are used in contexts of action become key to the method of philosophy!
  - For any use there is a *context* of action
  - Variety and multiplicity: Not *one* "general form of proposition"; not *one* meaning of "simple" ...
  - Use in **ordinary language**
  - NB: Surface grammar vs. Depth grammar
- Focus on concrete examples of use in action
- Focus on the role of examples for learning language and communication - see PI §208

The PI are to “be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking”

# PI preface

Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.

## ... against the background of my old way of thinking

TLP philosophy of language	PI
?	Persons, humans (PI §1)
?	Body language (PI §1)
?	Human behaviour (PI §244)
?	Human <b>acting</b> (PI §1)
?	Examples (PI §1)
?	Real, everyday language and life (PI §§1, 108, 156, 241)
?	Life, biology (PI §§19, 23, 142, 441, 472; PI II xii / §365f)
The general form of proposition	Many kinds of sentences (PI §23)
The simple objects as perennial «substance of the world»	(Synchronic and diachronic) variation (PI §§ 11, 12, 14, 18, 23)
The problem of the nature of the proposition	Many problems (PI §133)
Logical analysis	Many methods (PI §133)
Reference	Use (PI §§ 1, 43, 432)
Determinacy and exactness	Vagueness and open-endedness (PI §§ 18, 66f, 71, 133)
Linear ladder structure	Criss-cross album structure (PI preface, §68)

# Introduction to the PI (§§1-88) under 7 headings

- 1) Acting
- 2) Language game
- 3) Can there be a philosophical language game?  
(«einfach», «Bedeutung», «Satz» ...)
- 4) Form of life
- 5) Mistakes of the «Augustinian picture»
- 6) Family resemblance
- 7) Übersichtliche Darstellung

# 1) Acting

# Acting

OC §204:

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; **it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.**

Ms-175,4v f:

Die Begründung aber, die Rechtfertigung der Evidenz kommt zu einem Ende; – das Ende aber ist nicht daß uns gewisse Sätze unmittelbar als wahr einleuchten, also eine Art Sehen unsrerseits, sondern **unser Handeln, welches am Grunde des Sprachspiels liegt.**

# PI: handeln

- 1 Denke nun an diese Verwendung der Sprache: Ich schicke jemand einkaufen. Ich gebe ihm einen Zettel, auf diesem stehen die Zeichen: "fünf rote Äpfel". Er trägt den Zettel zum Kaufmann; der öffnet die Lade, auf welcher das Zeichen "Äpfel" steht; dann sucht er in einer Tabelle das Wort "rot" auf und findet ihm gegenüber ein Farbmuster; nun sagt er die Reihe der Grundzahlwörter - ich nehme an, er weiß sie auswendig - bis zum Worte "fünf" und bei jedem Zahlwort nimmt er einen Apfel aus der Lade, der die Farbe des Musters hat. - So, und ähnlich, operiert man mit Worten. - "Wie weiß er aber, wo und wie er das Wort 'rot' nachschlagen soll und was er mit dem Wort 'fünf' anzufangen hat?" - Nun, ich nehme an, er **handelt**, wie ich es beschrieben habe. Die Erklärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende. - Was ist aber die Bedeutung des Wortes "fünf"? - Von einer solchen war hier garnicht die Rede; nur davon, wie das Wort "fünf" gebraucht wird.



# Pl: handeln

- 6 Wenn aber das das hinweisende Lehren bewirkt, - soll ich sagen, es bewirkt das Verstehen des Worts? Versteht nicht der den Ruf "Platte!", der so und so nach ihm **handelt**? - Aber dies half wohl das hinweisende Lehren herbeiführen; aber doch nur zusammen mit einem bestimmten Unterricht. Mit einem anderen Unterricht hätte dasselbe hinweisende Lehren dieser Wörter ein ganz anderes Verständnis bewirkt.
  
- 7 In der **Praxis** des Gebrauchs der Sprache (2) ruft der eine Teil Wörter, der andere **handelt** nach ihnen; im Unterricht der Sprache aber wird sich dieser Vorgang finden: Der Lernende benennt die Gegenstände. D.h. er spricht das Wort, wenn der Lehrer auf den Stein zeigt. - Ja, es wird sich hier die noch einfachere Übung finden: der Schüler spricht die Worte nach, die der Lehrer ihm vorsagt - beides sprachähnliche Vorgänge.

# PI: handeln

23 Führe dir die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele an diesen Beispielen, und andern, vor Augen: Befehlen, und nach Befehlen **handeln** - Beschreiben eines Gegenstands nach dem Ansehen, oder nach Messungen - Herstellen eines Gegenstands nach einer Beschreibung (Zeichnung) - Berichten eines Hergangs - Über den Hergang Vermutungen anstellen - Eine Hypothese aufstellen und prüfen - Darstellen der Ergebnisse eines Experiments durch Tabellen und Diagramme - Eine Geschichte erfinden; und lesen - Theater spielen - Reigen singen - Rätsel raten - Einen Witz machen; erzählen - Ein angewandtes Rechenexempel lösen - Aus einer Sprache in die andere übersetzen - Bitten, Danken, Fluchen, Grüßen, Beten.

- NB: The examples given in PI §23 are all examples of *acting*.

# PI: sich benehmen, sich verhalten

193"Die Maschine scheint ihre Wirkungsweise schon in sich zu haben" heißt: wir sind geneigt, die künftigen Bewegungen der Maschine in ihrer Bestimmtheit mit Gegenständen zu vergleichen, die schon in einer Lade liegen und nun von uns herausgeholt werden. - So aber reden wir nicht, wenn es sich darum handelt, das wirkliche **Verhalten** einer Maschine vorauszusagen. Da vergessen wir, im allgemeinen, nicht die Möglichkeit der Deformation der Teile, etc. - Wohl aber, wenn wir uns darüber wundern, wie wir denn die Maschine als Symbol einer Bewegungsweise verwenden können, - da sie sich doch auch ganz anders bewegen kann.

244Wie beziehen sich Wörter auf Empfindungen? - Darin scheint kein Problem zu liegen; denn reden wir nicht täglich von Empfindungen, und benennen sie? Aber wie wird die Verbindung des Namens mit dem Benannten hergestellt? Die Frage ist die gleiche, wie die: wie lernt ein Mensch die Bedeutung der Namen von Empfindungen? Z.B. des Wortes "Schmerz". Dies ist eine Möglichkeit: Es werden Worte mit dem ursprünglichen, natürlichen, Ausdruck der Empfindung verbunden und an dessen Stelle gesetzt. Ein Kind hat sich verletzt, es schreit; und nun sprechen ihm die Erwachsenen zu und bringen ihm Ausrufe und später Sätze bei. Sie lehren das Kind ein neues **Schmerzbenehmen**.

# PI: sich benehmen, sich verhalten

246 Man kann nicht sagen, die Andern lernen meine Empfindung nur durch mein **Benehmen**, - denn von mir kann man nicht sagen, ich lernte sie. Ich habe sie.

250 Warum kann ein Hund nicht Schmerzen heucheln? Ist er zu ehrlich? Könnte man einen Hund Schmerzen heucheln lehren? Man kann ihm vielleicht beibringen, bei bestimmten Gelegenheiten wie im Schmerz aufzuheulen, ohne daß er Schmerzen hat. Aber zum eigentlichen Heucheln fehlte diesem **Benehmen** noch immer die richtige Umgebung.

# Translations: The Brown Book complex

*Ts-310, 1[2]et2[1]*

- In the actual use of this language, one man calls out the words as orders, the other **acts** according to them.

Ms-115, 118[5]et119[1]et119[2] | EPB p. 117

- Im praktischen Gebrauch dieser Sprache ruft der Eine die Wörter als Befehle, der Andre **handelt** nach ihnen.

# Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,14[2]et15[1]et16[1]

- Now it is queer that on closely looking at cases of comparing, it is very easy to see a great number of **activities** and states of mind, all more or less characteristic of the **act** of comparing.

Ms-115,133[2] | EPB p. 126

- Wenn wir nun irgendwelche Vorgänge des Vergleichens genau ins Auge fassen, so sehen wir leicht eine Anzahl von **Handlungen**, Gedanken, Empfindungen, die alle für das Vergleichen mehr oder weniger charakteristisch sind.

# Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,70[2]

- The change which took place was one which we might call a change in the general **behaviour** of the pupil, ...

Ms-115,198[3]et199[1] | EPB p. 174

- Die Veränderung, als der Schüler zu lesen anfang, war eine Veränderung seines **Verhaltens**, ...

# Translations: The Brown Book complex

## Ts-310,64[2]

- ... we are strongly inclined to use the metaphor of something being in a peculiar state for saying that something can **behave** in a particular way.

Ms-115,192[2] | EPB p. 170

- ... Wir neigen dazu, im **Verhalten** von etwas die Folge seines Zustands zu sehen.



# Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]

- In fact we could easily imagine the numeral 159 to be used on such occasions, in connection with such gestures and forms of **behaviour** as would make us say that this numeral plays the role of an unsurmountable ...

Ms-115,147[2]et148[1] | EPB p. 137

- Wir können uns leicht das Zahlzeichen '159' bei solchen Anlässen, in Verbindung mit solchen Gesten und Formen des **Benehmens** gebraucht denken, daß wir sagen müßten, dieses Zeichen spielt bei ihnen die Rolle einer unübersteigbaren oberen Grenze.

# PI §206

... Die *gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise* [my italics] ist das Bezugssystem, mittels welches wir uns eine fremde Sprache deuten.

- the common *behaviour* of mankind?
- mankind's common ways of *acting* / of carrying out an action / of pursuing an action?

# PI: handeln

- Also see PI § § 21, 36, 51, 54, 168, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 211, 212, 232, 243, 330, 420, 460, 486, 487, 489, 490, 505, 519, 534, 556, 613-616, 627-629, 631, 632, 638, 642, 653