

A. Pichler, S. Säätelä:
Introduction to Wittgenstein

Lecture 5 16.9.2024:

Introduction to the PI
(§§1-88)

Middle Wittgenstein

- 1) From reference to rules
- 2) From rules to practice (shared activities and actions)

From reference to rules

- *Tractatus*: Sense comes from **elementary propositions** consisting of **names** which (in the context of the proposition) **refer** to simple objects in the world.
- If there are no such elementary propositions – how can sense and reference be accounted for?
- "Middle period": Meaning is established through language-internal **rules** rather than language-external **reference**.
 - The meaning of a sentence does not come from reference to objects, but from a system of linguistic rules.

The chess analogy: Rules

The meaning of chess figures is given by rules:

- The chess figure is part of a game with **rules**. Its meaning does not come from a relation of representation (picture theory!), but from a chess-internal system of **rules**. What would a chess figure represent / refer to? The **rules** for what we can (when playing chess) do with a chess figure are purely conventional and not bound by reference to ontological entities. What would it mean that the chess rules are bound by «reality»?
- Meaning is ruled by **rules**.

The chess analogy: Rules

Words are like chess figures in several aspects:

- Words are part of a game with **rules** - which also means that they are part of an activity (→ «language **game**»).
- A word's meaning does not depend on reference / representation, but on the language game internal **rules**.
- The **rules** for how to use words are purely conventional and not bound by reference to ontological entities.
- Language is autonomous and independent of the world.

From rules to practice*

- The "Meaning is rules"-view can be challenged on the basis of the "Rules regress" and the "Authority regress" problems.
 - Rules regress: If not through reference to the language-external world – where do the words and sentences get their meaning from? From rules. But *what rules the rules?* Other rules. Other rules? What is it that rules the rules which rule the rules? Again other rules? ...
 - Authority regress: Who decides, *which* rules to adopt? Who decides which are the rules we should agree upon? And which changes are permitted? Even if rules are conventional – don't we still need an authority to approve of the convention, or to approve of its change? Where does such authority come from? ...
- "Primacy of practice", "Meaning is use"

* See A. Newen & E. von Savigny, *Analytische Philosophie: Eine Einführung*, 1996; p. 92f

- The *Tractatus* has largely been a product of thinking about what it is that must be the case if there is to be meaning, sense, truth, reference ...
- PI §66: Don't think, but look!
- Look at what?
 - At the language game
 - At the language game – as it is embedded in life

PI: Not logic; not reference; not even meaning and rules - but **practice** comes first

- Meaning, rules and authority are established by
 - **our practices** (linguistic and other)

- Language is
 - **an activity**
 - embedded in **social practices**
 - embedded in **(forms of) life** (PI §19:....
And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.

From philosophical concepts to everyday language

Tractatus

1) Philosophical problems come from not seeing / misunderstanding the depth structure of our language.

2) In order to correctly see and understand the depth structure of our language, we need

- logical analysis and notation

and terminology / exact concepts / a controlled vocabulary for

- Bedeutung, Sinn, Abbildung, Bild, Satz, Gedanke, Zeichen, Symbol, Einfachheit, Vollständigkeit, Bestimmtheit, Analysierbarkeit, einfacher Name, einfacher Satz, zusammengesetzter Satz, logischer Operator, logische Operation, logische Möglichkeit, logische Notwendigkeit, logische Unabhängigkeit, Allgemeinheit, Tautologie, Kontradiktion, Wahrheit, Wahrheitsfunktion, Wahrheitswert, einfacher Gegenstand, Komplex, Sachverhalt, Tatsache, sagen, zeigen, sinnvoll, sinnlos, unsinnig ...

... i.e. an entire system of terms, definitions etc.!

Later Wittgenstein

- 1) Philosophical problems come from not seeing / misunderstanding the depth structure of our language.
 - 2) In order to correctly see and understand the depth structure of our language, we need nothing more than to see and to understand the depth grammar of *everyday* language, and to acknowledge that philosophical language becomes *philosophical* language and produces philosophical problems simply by unjustly *deviating* from the depth grammar of everyday language
 - 3) In order to understand the depth grammar of *everyday* language, we need to see it together with the learning of language, behaving, acting, interacting, and form of life.
 - 4) Philosophical terminology is part of the problem – not part of the solution!
- Leave philosophical terminology behind!
- The *Tractatus* concept of *Bedeutung*, which by the *Tractatus* was conceived as part of the solution to philosophical problems, is really itself part of the problem, and rather than dissolving it, re-iterates and continues it by misleading into new philosophical problems.

Introduction to the PI (§§1-88) under 7 headings

Lectures 4-5:

- 1) Philosophy of language needs to focus on human activity and action
- 2) The language game
- 3) Can there be a philosophical language game? («einfach», «Bedeutung», «Satz» ...)
- 4) Form of life
- 5) Mistakes of the «Augustinian picture»

Lecture 9:

- 6) Family resemblance(s)
- 7) Übersichtliche Darstellung

Philosophical Investigations

§1 and §43

1. ... These words, it seems to me, give us a **particular picture of the essence of human language**. It is this: **the words in language name objects — sentences are combinations of such names. — In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.** [This was the picture endorsed by the *Tractatus!*] ...

Now think of the following use of language: I **send** someone shopping. I **give** him a slip marked "five red apples". He **takes** the slip to the shopkeeper, who **opens** the drawer marked "apples"; then he **looks up** the word "red" in a table and **finds** a colour sample opposite it; then he **says** the series of cardinal numbers—I **assume** that he knows them by heart—up to the word "five" and for each number he **takes** an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—**It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.**—"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"—Well, I **assume** that he **acts** as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—**No such thing was in question here**, only how the word "five" is used.

... [the *Sprachspiel*]

43. For a *large* class of cases of the employment of the word "meaning"—though not for *all*—this word can be explained in this way: **the meaning of a word is its use in the language.**

And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*.

1) Activity and action

Focus on **human agents**

- cf. *Tractatus*

- Language has to be *learned!*
 - See already TLP 4.02, 4.024
- Meaning is much more than reference only.
- It is *speakers* who refer, not words.
- There is more to language than reference only.
- Language is tied to action - and substantially itself acting.
- The locus of language is the *language game*.
- Focus on (language in) activity and action, rather than on meaning:
 - The philosopher should, instead of focusing on philosophically engineered (and therefore often highly technical!) concepts («Sinn», «Bedeutung», «Wahrheit» ...), look at the actual speaking and acting = the language game!
- The language game is the new home of meaning and truth.

Acting

OC §204:

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; **it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.**

Ms-175,4v f:

Die Begründung aber, die Rechtfertigung der Evidenz kommt zu einem Ende; – das Ende aber ist nicht daß uns gewisse Sätze unmittelbar als wahr einleuchten, also eine Art Sehen unsrerseits, sondern **unser Handeln, welches am Grunde des Sprachspiels liegt.**

PI §206

206. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. One is trained to do so, and one reacts to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts to the order and training *thus*, and another *otherwise*? Who is right, then?

Suppose you came as an explorer to an unknown country with a language quite unknown to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on?

Shared human behaviour is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.

PI §206, original German

206. Einer Regel folgen, das ist analog dem: einen Befehl befolgen. Man wird dazu abgerichtet und man reagiert auf ihn in bestimmter Weise. Aber wie, wenn nun der Eine so, der Andere *anders* auf Befehl und Abrichtung reagiert? Wer hat dann Recht?

Denke, du kämst als Forscher in ein unbekanntes Land mit einer dir gänzlich fremden Sprache. Unter welchen Umständen würdest du sagen, daß die Leute dort Befehle geben, Befehle verstehen, befolgen, sich gegen Befehle auflehnen, u. s. w.?

Die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise ist das Bezugssystem, mittels welches wir uns eine fremde Sprache deuten.

Focus on specifically **acting (Handeln)**,
rather than mere behaviour (Benehmen)
only – cf. *Tractatus*

... Die *gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise*
[my italics] ist das Bezugssystem, mittels welches
wir uns eine fremde Sprache deuten.

- Not “the common *behaviour* of mankind”, but
rather “mankind’s common ways of *acting* /
common human ways of carrying out an *action* /
humanity’s shared ways of performing an *action*”

PI: handeln

- 1 Denke nun an diese Verwendung der Sprache: Ich schicke jemand einkaufen. Ich gebe ihm einen Zettel, auf diesem stehen die Zeichen: "fünf rote Äpfel". Er trägt den Zettel zum Kaufmann; der öffnet die Lade, auf welcher das Zeichen "Äpfel" steht; dann sucht er in einer Tabelle das Wort "rot" auf und findet ihm gegenüber ein Farbmuster; nun sagt er die Reihe der Grundzahlwörter - ich nehme an, er weiß sie auswendig - bis zum Worte "fünf" und bei jedem Zahlwort nimmt er einen Apfel aus der Lade, der die Farbe des Musters hat. - So, und ähnlich, operiert man mit Worten. - "Wie weiß er aber, wo und wie er das Wort 'rot' nachschlagen soll und was er mit dem Wort 'fünf' anzufangen hat?" - Nun, ich nehme an, er **handelt**, wie ich es beschrieben habe. Die Erklärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende. - Was ist aber die Bedeutung des Wortes "fünf"? - Von einer solchen war hier garnicht die Rede; nur davon, wie das Wort "fünf" gebraucht wird.

PI: handeln

- 6 Wenn aber das das hinweisende Lehren bewirkt, - soll ich sagen, es bewirkt das Verstehen des Worts? Versteht nicht der den Ruf "Platte!", der so und so nach ihm **handelt**? - Aber dies half wohl das hinweisende Lehren herbeiführen; aber doch nur zusammen mit einem bestimmten Unterricht. Mit einem anderen Unterricht hätte dasselbe hinweisende Lehren dieser Wörter ein ganz anderes Verständnis bewirkt.

- 7 In der **Praxis** des Gebrauchs der Sprache (2) ruft der eine Teil Wörter, der andere **handelt** nach ihnen; im Unterricht der Sprache aber wird sich dieser Vorgang finden: Der Lernende benennt die Gegenstände. D.h. er spricht das Wort, wenn der Lehrer auf den Stein zeigt. - Ja, es wird sich hier die noch einfachere Übung finden: der Schüler spricht die Worte nach, die der Lehrer ihm vorsagt - beides sprachähnliche Vorgänge.

PI: handeln

23 Führe dir die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele an diesen Beispielen, und andern, vor Augen: Befehlen, und nach Befehlen **handeln** - Beschreiben eines Gegenstands nach dem Ansehen, oder nach Messungen - Herstellen eines Gegenstands nach einer Beschreibung (Zeichnung) - Berichten eines Hergangs - Über den Hergang Vermutungen anstellen - Eine Hypothese aufstellen und prüfen - Darstellen der Ergebnisse eines Experiments durch Tabellen und Diagramme - Eine Geschichte erfinden; und lesen - Theater spielen - Reigen singen - Rätsel raten - Einen Witz machen; erzählen - Ein angewandtes Rechenexempel lösen - Aus einer Sprache in die andere übersetzen - Bitten, Danken, Fluchen, Grüßen, Beten.

- NB: The examples given in PI §23 are all examples of linguistic *actions*.

PI: sich benehmen, sich verhalten

193"Die Maschine scheint ihre Wirkungsweise schon in sich zu haben" heißt: wir sind geneigt, die künftigen Bewegungen der Maschine in ihrer Bestimmtheit mit Gegenständen zu vergleichen, die schon in einer Lade liegen und nun von uns herausgeholt werden. - So aber reden wir nicht, wenn es sich darum handelt, das wirkliche **Verhalten** einer Maschine vorauszusagen. Da vergessen wir, im allgemeinen, nicht die Möglichkeit der Deformation der Teile, etc. - Wohl aber, wenn wir uns darüber wundern, wie wir denn die Maschine als Symbol einer Bewegungsweise verwenden können, - da sie sich doch auch ganz anders bewegen kann.

244Wie beziehen sich Wörter auf Empfindungen? - Darin scheint kein Problem zu liegen; denn reden wir nicht täglich von Empfindungen, und benennen sie? Aber wie wird die Verbindung des Namens mit dem Benannten hergestellt? Die Frage ist die gleiche, wie die: wie lernt ein Mensch die Bedeutung der Namen von Empfindungen? Z.B. des Wortes "Schmerz". Dies ist eine Möglichkeit: Es werden Worte mit dem ursprünglichen, natürlichen, Ausdruck der Empfindung verbunden und an dessen Stelle gesetzt. Ein Kind hat sich verletzt, es schreit; und nun sprechen ihm die Erwachsenen zu und bringen ihm Ausrufe und später Sätze bei. Sie lehren das Kind ein neues **Schmerzbenehmen**.

PI: sich benehmen, sich verhalten

246 Man kann nicht sagen, die Andern lernen meine Empfindung nur durch mein **Benehmen**, - denn von mir kann man nicht sagen, ich lernte sie. Ich habe sie.

250 Warum kann ein Hund nicht Schmerzen heucheln? Ist er zu ehrlich? Könnte man einen Hund Schmerzen heucheln lehren? Man kann ihm vielleicht beibringen, bei bestimmten Gelegenheiten wie im Schmerz aufzuheulen, ohne daß er Schmerzen hat. Aber zum eigentlichen Heucheln fehlte diesem **Benehmen** noch immer die richtige Umgebung.

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310, 1[2]et2[1]

- In the actual use of this language, one man calls out the words as orders, the other **acts** according to them.

Ms-115, 118[5]et119[1]et119[2] | EPB p. 117

- Im praktischen Gebrauch dieser Sprache ruft der Eine die Wörter als Befehle, der Andre **handelt** nach ihnen.

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,14[2]et15[1]et16[1]

- Now it is queer that on closely looking at cases of comparing, it is very easy to see a great number of **activities** and states of mind, all more or less characteristic of the **act** of comparing.

Ms-115,133[2] | EPB p. 126

- Wenn wir nun irgendwelche Vorgänge des Vergleichens genau ins Auge fassen, so sehen wir leicht eine Anzahl von **Handlungen**, Gedanken, Empfindungen, die alle für das Vergleichen mehr oder weniger charakteristisch sind.

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,70[2]

- The change which took place was one which we might call a change in the general **behaviour** of the pupil, ...

Ms-115,198[3]et199[1] | EPB p. 174

- Die Veränderung, als der Schüler zu lesen anfang, war eine Veränderung seines **Verhaltens**, ...

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,64[2]

- ... we are strongly inclined to use the metaphor of something being in a peculiar state for saying that something can **behave** in a particular way.

Ms-115,192[2] | EPB p. 170

- ... Wir neigen dazu, im **Verhalten** von etwas die Folge seines Zustands zu sehen.

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]

- In fact we could easily imagine the numeral 159 to be used on such occasions, in connection with such gestures and forms of **behaviour** as would make us say that this numeral plays the role of an unsurmountable ...

Ms-115,147[2]et148[1] | EPB p. 137

- Wir können uns leicht das Zahlzeichen '159' bei solchen Anlässen, in Verbindung mit solchen Gesten und Formen des **Benehmens** gebraucht denken, daß wir sagen müßten, dieses Zeichen spielt bei ihnen die Rolle einer unübersteigbaren oberen Grenze.

PI: handeln

- Also see PI § § 21, 36, 51, 54, 168, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 211, 212, 232, 243, 330, 420, 460, 486, 487, 489, 490, 505, 519, 534, 556, 613-616, 627-629, 631, 632, 638, 642, 653

2) Focus on action = Focus on language game («Sprachspiel»)

- Acting with language
- Parts of acting with language
- Types / Kinds of acting with language
 - Language learning!
 - Method of philosophy

PI §23

23. [Types, kinds of linguistic actions / of acting with language] But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a *rough picture* of this from the changes in mathematics.)

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

Review the **multiplicity of language-games** in the following examples, and in others:

Giving orders, and obeying them—

Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—

Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—

Reporting an event—

Speculating about an event—

Forming and testing a hypothesis—

Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—

Making up a story; and reading it—

Play-acting—

Singing catches—

Guessing riddles—

Making a joke; telling it—

Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—

Translating from one language into another—

Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.)

PI §7

7. In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. [The actions and activities of teaching and learning language] However, in instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points at the stone. — Indeed, there will be an even simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher — both of these being speech-like processes.

[The actions and activities of teaching and learning language] We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as **one of those games by means of which children learn their native language**. I will call these games “language-games” and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game.

[Parts of linguistic actions] And **the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone** might also be called language-games. Think of certain uses that are made of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.

[The unity of language and action] I shall also call **the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven**, a “language-game”.

PI §5

5. If we look at the example in § 1, we may perhaps get an inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. - [Language games as elements of philosophical method] It disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words.

[The actions and activities of teaching and learning language]
A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.

What is a "language game"? Five important aspects

- 1) *Types, kinds of linguistic actions*: Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others: ... [§23]
- 2) *Parts of linguistic actions*: Und man könnte die Vorgänge des Benennens der Steine und des Nachsprechens des vorgesagten Wortes auch Sprachspiele nennen. [§7]
- 3) *The actions and activities of teaching and learning language*: Linguistic "games" of a simple/primitive character, actually existing in the learning of first language: Wir können uns auch denken, daß der ganze Vorgang des Gebrauchs der Worte in (2) eines jener Spiele ist, mittels welcher Kinder ihre Muttersprache erlernen. [§7]
- 4) *The unity of language and action*: Ich werde auch das Ganze: der Sprache und der Tätigkeiten, mit denen sie verwoben ist, "das Sprachspiel" nennen. [§7 Fictive, constructed linguistic "games" of a simple / primitiv]
- 5) *Elements of philosophical method*: Fictive, constructed linguistic "games" of a simple / primitive character; elements of philosophical method; objects of comparison [§5]

Language games as philosophical method

The PI §1 shopping example, from
a slightly different perspective

Language game-method

If we say thinking is essentially operating with signs, the first question you might ask is: “What are signs?” – – – Instead of giving any kind of general answer to this question, **I shall propose to you to look closely at particular cases which we should call “operating with signs”**. Let us look at a simple example of operating with words. I give someone the order: “fetch me six apples from the grocer”, and I will describe a way of making use of such an order: The words “six apples” are written on a bit of paper, the paper is handed to the grocer, the grocer compares the word “apple” with labels on different shelves. He finds it to agree with one of the labels, counts from 1 to the number written on the slip of paper, and for every number counted takes a fruit off the shelf and puts it in a bag. – – – And here you have one use of words. I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language-games. These are processes of using signs simpler than those which usually occur in the use of our highly complicated everyday language. Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. The study of language-games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages. If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought. ([Ts-309,26](#) / Blue Book p. 16f)

Language games as philosophical method

- If you have a philosophical problem (typically, a “What is ...?” question): Find a simple everyday language game (a simple use of words that is intertwined with *action*) where the words / concepts that make up your problem, function in non-problematic ways.
- Compare your philosophical use of the words to the unproblematic use in the language game where it is tied to action.
- See that your philosophical and problematic use of the word is not actually tied to action / activity and thus has no (depth) grammar.
 - For **philosophical** problems arise when language *goes on holiday*. (PI §38)
- Find a language game for which your philosophical conception of the use of the word is correct.
 - See the PI §2 builders’ language. What can you learn from that language game? Is the PI §2 builders’ form of life the form of life where you want your philosophical concept to function in?

PI §2ff: Positive use of Augustine's account → **Language games**

2. ... Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right.

...

- PI §§ 2, 6, 7, 8, ... 23 ...
- Cf. Brown Book (1934-35)

3) Bringing philosophy back to
everyday language games
(see PI §116):
“einfach”, “Bedeutung”, “Satz”

Focus on the actual **use** of words – cf. *Tractatus*

- If meaning is tied to action, then dealing with philosophical problems arising from questions of meaning includes paying attention to actual **use** of language in action.
- Studies of how words actually are used in contexts of action become key to the method of philosophy!
 - For any use there is a *context* of action
 - Variety and multiplicity: Not *one* "general form of proposition"; not *one* meaning of "simple" ...
 - Use in **ordinary language**
 - Use: Surface grammar vs. Depth grammar
- Focus on concrete examples of use in action
- Focus on the role of examples for learning language and even «basic concepts» (see PI §208)

The PI's description / diagnosis of the Tractatus' reasoning behind "simple names- / simple objects-philosophy":

There is no philosophically separated / separable meaning of «einfach»

The *Tractatus* used the word «einfach» wrongly: PI §47

... We use the word "composite" (and therefore the word "simple") in an enormous number of different and differently related ways. (Is the colour of a square on a chessboard simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure yellow? And is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow?—Is this length of 2 cm. simple, or does it consist of two parts, each 1 cm. long? But why not of one bit 3 cm. long, and one bit 1 cm. long measured in the opposite direction?)

PI §39

39. But why does it occur to one to want to make precisely this word into a name, when it evidently is *not* a **name**?—That is just the reason. For one is tempted to make an objection against what is ordinarily called a name. It can be put like this: *a name ought really to signify a **simple***. And for this one might perhaps give the following reasons: The word "Excalibur", say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" makes *sense* whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But **if "Excalibur" is the name of an object**, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence "Excalibur has a sharp blade" would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. **But it does make sense**; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists. **So the word "Excalibur" must disappear** when the sense is analysed and its place be taken by words which name simples. It will be reasonable to call these words the real names.

PI §59

59. "A *name* signifies only what is an *element* of reality. What cannot be destroyed; what remains the same in all changes." ...We see *component parts* of something composite (of a chair, for instance). We say that the back is part of the chair, but is in turn itself composed of several bits of wood; while a leg is a simple component part. **We also see a whole which changes (is destroyed) while its component parts remain unchanged. These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality.**

PI §60

- 60. When I say: "**My broom is in the corner**",—is this really a statement about the broomstick and the brush? Well, it **could at any rate be replaced by a statement giving the position of the stick and the position of the brush**. And this statement is surely a further analysed form of the first one.—But why do I call it "further analysed"?—Well, if the broom is there, that surely means that the stick and brush must be there, and in a particular relation to one another; and this was as it were hidden in the sense of the first sentence, and is *expressed* in the analysed sentence. ...

The reasoning behind the Tractatus' philosophy of «simples»

- 1) A sentence built with "Excalibur" (see PI §39)* seems to have sense even if the object which "Excalibur" refers to, no longer exists (or never existed).
- 2) For a sentence to make sense, it is a precondition that it contains elements which refer to objects.
- 3) Therefore, the object of reference cannot be Excalibur, and the expressions which refer to objects cannot be words like "Excalibur".
- 4) Therefore, there must be **simple** names which refer ("bedeuten"), and **simple** objects which are the target of their reference («Bedeutungen»):
 - So the word "Excalibur" must disappear when the sense is analysed and its place be taken by words which name simples. (PI §39)

* Alternatively, think of a sentence about the lost / destroyed ring from *The Lord of the Rings*.

No philosophically separated
/ separable meaning of
«Bedeutung»

The *Tractatus* used the word "Bedeutung" illicitly: PI §40

- 40. Let us first discuss *this* point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to **note that the word "meaning" ["Bedeutung"] is being used illicitly** if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the *bearer* of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies **one says** that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."

No philosophically separated
/ separable meaning of
«Satz»

The *Tractatus* used the word «Satz» illicitly: PI §23 (cf. TLP #4.5, #6)

23. **Wieviele Arten der Sätze gibt es aber? Etwa Behauptung, Frage und Befehl? – Es gibt *unzählige* solcher Arten: unzählige verschiedene Arten der Verwendung alles dessen, was wir "Zeichen", "Worte", "Sätze", nennen.** Und diese Mannigfaltigkeit ist nichts Festes, ein für allemal Gegebenes; sondern neue Typen der Sprache, neue Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können, entstehen und andre veralten und werden vergessen. (Ein *ungefähres Bild* davon können uns die Wandlungen der Mathematik geben.)

Das Wort "Sprachspiel" soll hier hervorheben, daß das *Sprechen* der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform.

Führe dir die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele an diesen Beispielen, und andern, vor Augen: (...)

- **Es ist interessant, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Werkzeuge der Sprache und ihrer Verwendungsweisen, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Wort- und Satzarten, mit dem zu vergleichen, was Logiker über den Bau der Sprache gesagt haben. (Und auch der Verfasser der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung.)**

PI §124

124. Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it. ...


124. Die Philosophie darf den tatsächlichen Gebrauch der Sprache in keiner Weise antasten, sie kann ihn am Ende also nur beschreiben. ...

”Meaning is use”: PI §43

43. For a *large* class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*.

Why can't philosophy have its own language game?



Why shouldn't I apply words in opposition to their original usage? Doesn't e.g. Freud do that when he calls even an anxiety dream a wish-fulfilment dream? Where is the difference? In the scientific approach the new use is justified through a *theory*. And if this theory is false then the new extended use has to be given up too. But in philosophy the extended use is not supported by true or false opinions about natural processes. No fact justifies it (&) none can overturn it.

(CV 1998: 50 = http://wittgensteinsource.org/BFE/Ms-127,72_f)

4) Form of life

PI §19

19. Man kann sich leicht eine Sprache vorstellen, die nur aus Befehlen und Meldungen in der Schlacht besteht. – Oder eine Sprache, die nur aus Fragen besteht und einem Ausdruck der Bejahung und der Verneinung. Und unzähliges Andere. – Und eine Sprache vorstellen heißt, sich eine Lebensform vorstellen. ...

19. It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others.—And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. ...

➤ To imagine language and language use should not only involve imagining the **actions** with which it is interwoven, but to imagine also **the context in life which the language use is a part of. This includes not only social and cultural factors, but also behaviour, biology and physical facts of nature.**

PI §§ 23-24

23. Wieviele Arten der Sätze gibt es aber? Etwa Behauptung, Frage und Befehl? – Es gibt unzählige solcher Arten: *unzählige* verschiedene Arten der Verwendung alles dessen, was wir "Zeichen", "Worte", "Sätze", nennen. Und diese Mannigfaltigkeit ist nichts Festes, ein für allemal Gegebenes; sondern neue Typen der Sprache, neue Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können, entstehen und andre veralten und werden vergessen. (Ein *ungefähres* Bild davon können uns die Wandlungen der Mathematik geben.)

Das Wort "**Sprachspiel**" soll hier hervorheben, daß das *Sprechen* der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder einer **Lebensform**.

Führe dir die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele an diesen Beispielen, und andern, vor Augen: ...

24. Wem die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele nicht vor Augen ist, der wird etwa zu Fragen geneigt sein, wie dieser: "Was ist eine Frage?" ...

23. But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a *rough picture* of this from the changes in mathematics.)

Here the term "**language-game**" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a **form of life**.

Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:

...

24. If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?" ...

PI §241: Correctness / falsehood is an aspect of statements – agreement is a matter of shared practices and form of life rather than of language games only

241. "So sagst du also, daß die Übereinstimmung der Menschen entscheide, was richtig und was falsch ist?" – Richtig und falsch ist, was Menschen *sagen*; und in der *Sprache* stimmen die Menschen überein. Dies ist keine Übereinstimmung der Meinungen, sondern der **Lebensform**.

241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"—It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is **not agreement in opinions but in form of life**.

Issues arising from making «form of life» into something substantial

- One or many human forms of life?
 - A universal human form of life? Common human nature? (cf. PI §§ 25, 415)
 - **Many autonomous and separated forms of life?**
- Is it biological or anthropological or social or cultural or lingual only?
 - Agreement in the language one uses is agreement in form of life. (PI §241)
 - Or all of them? (cf. PI §§ 25, 415)
- Is it specific or general?
 - Specific forms of greeting, saying Goodbye, ... as "forms of life" (see Majetschak 2010: "Forms and Patterns of Life: A Reassessment of a So-Called Basic Concept in the Late Philosophy of Wittgenstein")
- For discussion of «form of life», see:
 - <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0472C6A422204BFB4480C84BAC1ABE5D/9781108931151AR.pdf/wittgenstein-on-forms-of-life.pdf>
 - <http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/issue/view/NWR%20Special%20Issue%202015>

5) «Augustine's mistakes»

How did you learn to speak?

Ms-110,89f

Drury sagte mir heute, er habe überlegt, **daß man sich nicht des Zustandes erinnern könne wo man noch nicht sprechen konnte || es unmöglich sei sich des Zustands zu erinnern vor der Erlernung der Sprache.** – Man könnte natürlich Erinnerungsbilder aus jener Zeit besitzen, aber man kann sich nicht an ein Fühlen des Mangels der Sprache erinnern, da man keinen Begriff der Sprache haben kann, ehe man spricht & freilich auch nachher nicht, weil es einen solchen Begriff nicht gibt. **Auch kann man sich nicht an das Bedürfnis nach dem sprachlichen Ausdruck erinnern, denn wo das vorhanden ist, gibt es schon eine Sprache in der man denkt.**

«Augustine's mistake(s)»:

They can all be regarded mistakes of the *Tractatus*!

1. "Cum ipsi (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis indicante affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sentiis locis suis posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim colligebam, measque jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis ore, per haec enuntiabam." (Augustine, *Confessions*, I. 8.)

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.—In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. [Factual mistake: «There is only one type of words».] If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself. [«Ethical mistake: Let's deal with this later, if at all.»]

Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. ...

2. That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours.

Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. ... The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out;—B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.—Conceive this as a complete primitive language.

«Augustine's mistake(s)»:

They can all be regarded mistakes of the *Tractatus*!

3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe."

It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules..."—and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games.

4. Imagine a script in which the letters were used to stand for sounds, and also as signs of emphasis and punctuation. (A script can be conceived as a language for describing sound-patterns.) Now imagine someone interpreting that script as if there were simply a correspondence of letters to sounds and as if the letters had not also completely different functions. Augustine's conception of language is like such an over-simple conception of the script.

5. ... If we look at the example in §1, we may perhaps get an inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze ...

6. ... But if the ostensive teaching has this effect,—am I to say that it effects an understanding of the word? Don't you understand the call "Slab!" if you act upon it in such-and-such a way?—Doubtless the ostensive teaching helped to bring this about; but only together with a particular training. With different training the same ostensive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different understanding. ... [Factual mistake: «Ostensive definition stands at the beginning of learning language.»]

32. ... Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already *think*, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself". [Factual mistake: «Learning to speak functions like learning a second language.»]