

K. Cahill, A. Pichler:
Introduction to Wittgenstein

7th lecture 28.9.2020:

Family resemblances; Übersichtliche Darstellung; Grammar
[Some slides at the end make re-use of slides by S. Säätelä]

Introduction to the PI (§§1-88) under 7 headings


- 1) Mistakes of the «Augustinian picture»
- 2) Acting
- 3) Language game
- 4) There is no philosophical language game
(«einfach», «Bedeutung», «Satz» ...)
- 5) Form of life
- 6) Family resemblance
- 7) Übersichtliche Darstellung

Family resemblances

Universals –


What is the justification for general concepts
(«Allgemeinbegriffe»)?

«Homo = animal + rationale»




(Graphic from *Wikibooks*, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikibooks/de/8/84/Mengenlehre_schnittmenge.png)

«Male human = Human with one X and one Y chromosome in each cell»




(Graphic from <http://snvbrwvobs2.snv.at/matura.wiki/index.php/Mengenlehre>)

«Bachelor = human + male + able
to marry + unmarried»




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
A traditional view: Definitions give us the necessary and sufficient conditions of a thing, its «essential» properties / its «essence»



Student = ? + ? + ? + ... ?



Game = activity + competitive +
social + ... ?



Wittgenstein's suggestion: Family resemblances

Most everyday (general) concepts (*Allgemeinbegriffe*) **don't have essences** and

...

... are not like areas [«Bezirke»] with centers and sharp borders. Our everyday concepts do not work on the basis of essence and exactness (and don't actually presuppose essences and exactness either); see PI §71:

71. One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges.— "But is a blurred concept a concept at all?"—Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often exactly what we need?

Frege compares a concept to an area [Bezirk] and says that an area [Bezirk] with vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all. ... For any general definition can be misunderstood too. The point is that *this* is how we play the game. (I mean the language-game with the word "game".)

Rather, most of our general concepts
are more like **ropes** [*Seil, Tau*] or
threads [*Faden*]

... we twist fibre [*Faser*] on
fibre. And the strength of
the thread does not reside
in the fact that some one
fibre runs through its
whole length, but in the
overlapping of many
fibres.



PI §66: Not *one* defining characteristic / property needs to be in common

66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There *must* be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"—but *look and see whether there is anything common to all.*—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!—Look for example at **board-games**, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to **card-games**; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to **ball-games**, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of **games like ring-a-ring-a-roses**; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

PI §67: «Family resemblances»


67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances«; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: 'games' form a family.

And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a—direct—relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

Summary: Most of our concepts do not have sharp borders, nor do they have an "essence", nor do they need any of the two


- Instances of a concept do not need to have a single defining feature in common in order to be instances of that concept. (PI §§66-67)
 - There is not *one defining* thing which the instances of game (Bridge, Ludo, Tennis ...) need to have in common in order to be games.
 - There is not *one defining* thing which the members of a family need to have in common in order to be members of that family.
- A concept does not need to have sharp borders in order to function well. (PI §71)

Wittgenstein's suggestion for understanding the nature of (some, not all!) universality / generality: Family resemblances



* Common properties (F) are still possible!

Cf. intersection



(Graphic by Manfred Aulbach,
<http://heimwerker-mathematik.aulbach-philosophy.de/-Schnittmenge/-schnittmenge-.html>)

Which of the concepts below are «family resemblance concepts»?

game, tree, chair, number, art, rationality, meaning, animal, language, acting, understanding, reading, thinking, male, female, human being, citizen, Bergenser, stortingsrepresentant, photosynthesis, electricity, modus ponens, diabetes type 2, bachelor student ...

Family resemblances vs. Definition

- The notion of family resemblances proves illuminating for a wide range of concepts: "game", "number", "understanding", "language", "proposition", "art", ...
- Definition by giving necessary and (collectively) sufficient conditions ("Homo est animal rationale") or putting up a disjunction ("A game is either ... or ... or ...") for the use of a word is often not possible, and where possible, not always helpful, and where helpful, not always true to our *actual* ways of using the concept.
- **However, nothing in Wittgenstein's remarks about family resemblances amounts to the view, that all concepts are «family resemblance concepts» or that definitions would *never* be required or in place.**

It can be difficult to come up with good *definitions* of our everyday expressions ...

156. This will become clearer if we interpolate the consideration of another word, namely "**reading**". First I need to remark that I am not counting the understanding of what is read as part of 'reading' for purposes of this investigation: reading is here the activity of rendering out loud what is written or printed; and also of writing from dictation, writing out something printed, playing from a score, and so on.

The use of this word in the ordinary circumstances of our life is of course extremely familiar to us. But the part the word plays in our life, and therewith the language-game in which we employ it, would be difficult to describe even in rough outline. ...

... but definitions *are* often possible and do also make sense in specific contexts – contexts of language being *at work*

132: ... Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. **But these are not the cases we have to do with.** The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.

- N.B.: We should not forget that there indeed also already exist concepts which are precisely defined – see for example concepts from the sciences, political administration, medicine, pharmacy, or the transportation sector.
- N.B.: Nothing in Wittgenstein's remarks about family resemblances amounts to the view, that the instances falling under «family resemblance concepts» could not have properties in common. Of course they can – the question is whether the properties in common are *defining* properties!
 - All family members are humans; all games are activities (PI §66: "proceedings" ☺); all trees are plants; etc. etc.

The need for and the power of the example

71. ... I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I—for some reason—was unable to express; but that he is now to *employ* those examples in a particular way. Here **giving examples** is not an *indirect* means of explaining—in default of a better. For any **general definition** can be misunderstood too. The point is that *this* is how we play the game. (I mean the language-game with the word "game".)

- We learn to understand and master «family resemblance concepts» by being given examples rather than by being given definitions!

The argumentative locus of discussing family resemblances in the PI

65. ... Denn man könnte mir nun einwenden: "Du machst dir's leicht! Du redest von allen möglichen Sprachspielen, hast aber nirgends gesagt, was denn das Wesentliche des Sprachspiels, und also der Sprache, ist. Was allen diesen Vorgängen gemeinsam ist und sie zur Sprache, oder zu Teilen der Sprache macht. Du schenkst dir also gerade den Teil der Untersuchung, der dir selbst seinerzeit das meiste Kopfzerbrechen gemacht hat, nämlich den, die allgemeine Form des Satzes und der Sprache betreffend.,,

Und das ist wahr. - Statt etwas anzugeben, was allem, was wir Sprache nennen, gemeinsam ist, sage ich, es ist diesen Erscheinungen garnicht Eines gemeinsam, weswegen wir für alle das gleiche Wort verwenden, - sondern sie sind mit einander in vielen verschiedenen Weisen verwandt. Und dieser Verwandtschaft, oder dieser Verwandtschaften wegen nennen wir sie alle "Sprachen". Ich will versuchen, dies zu erklären.

Übersichtliche Darstellung

Philosophers ask: *What is X?* And think that there is one thing that makes an X an X. Wittgenstein's investigations into family resemblances show, that there *needn't* be this one thing. That the unity of the concept is made up by «nothing but» family resemblances.

Most everyday (general) concepts (*Allgemeinbegriffe*) are ...

... not like areas [«Bezirke»] with centers and sharp borders, but rather like **ropes** [*Seil, Tau*] or **threads** [*Faden*]: **ABCD BCDE CDEF DEFA EFAB FABC ...** .

game1	game2	game3	game4	game5	game6	game7	game8
green	yellow	purple	orange	lightblue	grey	green	yellow
teal	green	yellow	purple	orange	lightblue	grey	green
magenta	teal	green	yellow	purple	orange	lightblue	grey
grey	magenta	teal	green	yellow	purple	orange	lightblue

... Und wir dehnen unseren Begriff der Zahl aus, wie wir beim Spinnen eines Fadens Faser an Faser drehen. Und die Stärke des Fadens liegt nicht darin, daß irgend eine Faser durch seine ganze Länge läuft, sondern darin, daß viele Fasern einander übergreifen. ... (PI §67)

... And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. ... (PI §67)

But usually things in the world don't line up as nicely as on the previous slide 😊
 (where one could see the connection from one to the other) – that's why we
 need **übersichtliche Darstellung!**

	Entity 1: ADEF	Entity 2: BCF	Entity 3: BCDEF	Entity 4: ABCF	Entity 5: ACDF	Entity 6: ABEF	Entity 7: BDEF
Prop. A	A			A	A	A	
Prop. B		B	B	B		B	B
Prop. C		C	C	C	C		
Prop. D	D		D		D		D
Prop. E	E		E			E	E
Prop. F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F

NB: Common properties are still possible! See property F.

The field of our everyday concepts (as understood by the PI): A complicated web of properties overlapping and criss-crossing

- $G(\text{ame})_1 - a - G_2 - b - G_3 - a - G_4 - c - G_5 - c - G_6 - a - G_7 - b - G_8 \dots$
- «Übersichtliche Darstellung» (as understood by the PI) helps to find the threads running through / connecting the nodes, the „mediating links”, the “intermediate cases” between the nodes – the properties common to some of the nodes (a, b, c ...) – but also the **differences**.

Achieving surveyability

PI §411:

- 1) “Are these books *my* books?”
- 2) “Is this foot *my* foot?”
- 3) “Is this body *my* body?”
- 4) “Is this sensation *my* sensation?”

PI §422:

422. What am I believing in when I **believe that men have souls**? What am I believing in, when I **believe that this substance contains two carbon rings**? In both cases there is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the application of the picture is **not easy to survey**.

PI §122: Übersichtliche Darstellung lets us see the connections and herewith provides *understanding*

122. Es ist eine Hauptquelle unseres **Unverständnisses**, daß wir den Gebrauch unserer Wörter nicht übersehen. - Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an Übersichtlichkeit. - Die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das **Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, daß wir die 'Zusammenhänge sehen'**. Daher die Wichtigkeit des Findens und des Erfindens von Zwischengliedern.

Der Begriff der übersichtlichen Darstellung ist für uns von grundlegender Bedeutung. Er bezeichnet unsere Darstellungsform, **die Art, wie wir die Dinge sehen**. (Ist dies eine 'Weltanschauung'?)

122. A main source of our **failure to understand** is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that **understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'**. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*.

The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, **the way we look at things**. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)

Other passages about «Übersicht» and «übersichtliche Darstellung»

5. Wenn man das Beispiel im §1 betrachtet, so ahnt man vielleicht, inwiefern der allgemeine Begriff der Bedeutung der Worte das Funktionieren der Sprache mit einem Dunst umgibt, der **das klare Sehen** unmöglich macht. - Es zerstreut den Nebel, wenn wir die Erscheinungen der Sprache an primitiven Arten ihrer Verwendung studieren, in denen man den Zweck und das Funktionieren der Wörter **klar übersehen** kann.

Solche primitive Formen der Sprache verwendet das Kind, wenn es sprechen lernt. Das Lehren der Sprache ist hier kein Erklären, sondern ein Abrichten.

5. If we look at the example in §1, we may perhaps get an inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes **clear vision** impossible. It disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can **command a clear view** of the aim and functioning of the words.

A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.

92. Dies drückt sich aus in der **Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache**, des Satzes, des Denkens. - Denn wenn wir auch in unsern Untersuchungen das Wesen der Sprache - ihre Funktion, ihren Bau - zu verstehen trachten, so ist es doch nicht *das*, was diese Frage im Auge hat. Denn sie **sieht in dem Wesen nicht etwas, was schon offen zutage liegt und was durch Ordnen übersichtlich wird**. Sondern etwas, was *unter* der Oberfläche liegt. Etwas, was im Innern liegt, was wir sehen, wenn wir die Sache durchschauen, und was eine Analyse hervorgraben soll....


92. This finds expression in **questions as to the essence of language**, of propositions, of thought.—For if we too in these investigations are trying to understand the essence of language—its function, its structure,—yet *this* is not what those questions have in view. For they **see in the essence, not something that already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement**, but something that lies *beneath* the surface. Something that lies within, which we see when we look *into* the thing, and which an analysis digs out.

(cont.)

<p>125. Es ist nicht Sache der Philosophie, den Widerspruch durch eine mathematische, logisch-mathematische, Entdeckung zu lösen. Sondern den Zustand der Mathematik, der uns beunruhigt, den Zustand vor der Lösung des Widerspruchs, übersehbar zu machen. (Und damit geht man nicht etwa einer Schwierigkeit aus dem Wege.)</p> <p>Die fundamentale Tatsache ist hier: daß wir Regeln, eine Technik, für ein Spiel festlegen, und daß es dann, wenn wir den Regeln folgen, nicht so geht, wie wir angenommen hatten. Daß wir uns also gleichsam in unsern eigenen Regeln verfangen.</p> <p>Dieses Verfangen in unsern Regeln ist, was wir verstehen, d.h. übersehen wollen. ...</p>	<p>125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs <i>before</i> the contradiction is resolved. (And this does not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.)</p> <p>The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.</p> <p>This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of). ...</p>
<p>132. Wir wollen in unserm Wissen vom Gebrauch der Sprache eine Ordnung herstellen: eine Ordnung zu einem bestimmten Zweck; eine von vielen möglichen Ordnungen; nicht <i>die</i> Ordnung. Wir werden zu diesem Zweck immer wieder Unterscheidungen <i>hervorheben</i>, die unsre gewöhnlichen Sprachformen leicht übersehen lassen. Dadurch kann es den Anschein gewinnen, als sähen wir es als unsre Aufgabe an, die Sprache zu reformieren.</p>	<p>132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not <i>the</i> order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language.</p>
<p>422. Woran glaube ich, wenn ich an eine Seele im Menschen glaube? Woran glaube ich, wenn ich glaube, diese Substanz enthalte zwei Ringe von Kohlenstoffatomen? In beiden Fällen ist ein Bild im Vordergrund, der Sinn aber weit im Hintergrund; d.h., die Anwendung des Bildes nicht leicht zu übersehen.</p>	<p>422. What am I believing in when I believe that men have souls? What am I believing in, when I believe that this substance contains two carbon rings? In both cases there is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background; that is, the application of the picture is not easy to survey.</p>

First uses of the expression


Context 1: Colour-octahedron




Colour-octahedron from *Philosophical Remarks* §221; cf. Ms-105,90; Ms-105,98, Ms-108,89.

«Damit ist das Farbenoktaeder von einem Teil der phänomenologischen Notation zu der übersichtlichen Darstellung eines Teils der Grammatik unserer Alltagssprache geworden.»
(Sarah Szeltner Uffelmann: *Vom System zum Gebrauch*, Bergen 2016, p. 99f)


Ms-108,89 (1930): Discussing the colour-octahedron




The colour-octahedron in Ms-105,98 (1929)



Context 2: Discussing Frazer discussing rituals (Ms-110,256f, 1931)



(cont.)



Context 2: J.G. Frazer

W. *pace* J.G. Frazer: In order to achieve an *understanding* of the rituals and beliefs of other cultures, we need – rather than causal explanations and descriptions of these rituals and beliefs with the scientific world view of our own culture as golden standard - an "übersichtliche Darstellung".

I believe that the attempt to explain is already therefore wrong, because **one must only correctly piece together what one knows**, without adding anything, and the satisfaction being sought through the explanation follows of itself. ...

Here one can **only describe** and say: this is what human life is like. ...

The historical explanation, the explanation as an hypothesis of development, is only *one* way of assembling the data—of their synopsis. **It is just as possible to see the data in their relation to one another and to embrace them in a general picture without putting it in the form of an hypothesis about temporal development.** ...

(cont.)

Context 2: J.G. Frazer (cont.)

"And so the chorus points to a secret law" one feels like saying to Frazer's collection of facts. I *can* represent this law, this idea, by means of an evolutionary hypothesis, or also, analogously to the schema of a plant, by means of the schema of a religious ceremony, but also **by means of the arrangement of its factual content alone, in a `perspicuous' representation.**

The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental importance for us. It denotes the form of our representation, the way we see things. (A kind of 'World-view' as it is apparently typical of our time. Spengler.)

This perspicuous representation brings about the understanding which consists precisely in the fact that we "see the connections". Hence the importance of finding *connecting links*. ...

But I can also see the evolutionary hypothesis as nothing more, as the clothing of a formal connection.
(Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, cited after PO pp. 121, 131, 133)

Context 3: The Goethe connection

- Goethe's "morphologisches Ableiten", **showing (for plant life) the connections between the archetypal form and all the variations:**
"Dieses Ableiten, so wollen wir vorwegnehmend andeuten, ist weder ein deduktives noch ein induktives Verfahren, sondern **ein schrittweises Übergehen von einem Element zum anderen in einer konstruierten oder durch Ordnen hergestellten Reihe von Phänomenen.** (...) Auf diese Weise gelangen wir dahin, im Blumenblatt z.B. sowohl die ausgebildete Pflanze wie auch das Staubwerkzeug zu erkennen, doch diese Möglichkeit beruht nicht nur auf bloßer unmittelbarer Sinneserfahrung plus Einbildungskraft; sie **setzt voraus, dass die Erfahrungen in der richtigen Ordnung gemacht werden, dass sie *übersichtlich* und der Reihe nach dargestellt werden, so dass die Gestalten gleichsam auseinander hervorgehen und durch die Leistung der Einbildungskraft in eine zusammenhängende Kette und damit letztlich in *ein* Bild projiziert werden können.** (Schulte 1990: p.15,23)
- Cf. *Brown Book's* logical-linear series of language games!

Issues

- «übersichtliche Darstellung» can mean a number of things:
 - Perspicuous presentation of our colour system; of our perception; olympic, bird's eye view of the rules of grammar; tool providing mediating links, and thus helping to see similarities, differences, and connections; ...
- A good translation, please?
 - Perspicuous representation, perspicuous presentation, clear view, overview, surview, survey, surveyability, synopsis ...
- Is übersichtliche Darstellung sufficient for dissolving philosophical problems and *producing the philosophical understanding*? Is it necessary?
 - Depends on what is meant by it. But cf. PI §133 - Many methods are needed: aspect change, change of the will, übersichtliche Darstellung, argument, ...
 - Also see the „difficulty of the will“.

Achieving an overview of *grammar*

The notion of "grammar"

- In the PI, Wittgenstein seems to think that philosophy consists of "grammatical" inquiries, remarks or reminders. See e.g. PI §90:

Our inquiry is [...] a grammatical one. Such an inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.—Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called an "analysis" of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart.

The grammar of "to mean"

An example (PI §35Z):

Can I say "bububu" and mean "If it doesn't rain, I shall go for a walk"?—It is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shows clearly that the grammar of "to mean" is not like that of the expression "to imagine" and the like.

Depth grammar vs. surface grammar

PI § 664:

664. In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use—one might say—that can be taken in by the ear.—And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about.

→cf. TLP on “logical grammar” that is hidden in “the language of everyday life” 3.323-3.325!

The grammar of "to mean"

PI §665:

665. Imagine someone pointing to his cheek with an expression of pain and saying "abracadabra!"—We ask "What do you mean?" And he answers "I meant toothache".—You at once think to yourself: How can one *'mean* toothache' by that word? Or what did to *mean* pain by that word *amount* to? [...]

But—can't I say "By 'abracadabra' I mean toothache"? Of course I can; but this is a definition; not a description of what goes on in me when I utter the word.

Achieving an overview
by ... crisscross
procedure?

Frontmatter

- Title
 - Philosophische Untersuchungen
- Motto
 - Überhaupt hat der Fortschritt das an sich, dass er viel größer aussieht als er wirklich ist. (Nestroy)
- **Preface**

PI preface, 1945

The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for **the last sixteen years**. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, **the foundations of mathematics**, states of consciousness, and other things. I have written down all these thoughts as *remarks*, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject, while I sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another.—**bring all this together in a book** whose form I pictured differently at different times. But the essential thing was that **the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks**.

After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination.—**And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.**—The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings.

The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. ...

Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: **that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.**

For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize **grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book.** I was helped to realize these mistakes—to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate—by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank **Ramsey**, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life. Even more than to this—always certain and forcible—criticism I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr. P. **Sraffa**, for many years unceasingly practised on my thoughts. I am indebted to *this* stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book.

Earlier draft to a preface, 1930

(Published in CV 1998, p.9e ff / Preface to *Philosophical Remarks*)

... Our civilization is characterized by the word **progress**. Progress is its form, it is not one of its properties that it makes progress. Typically it constructs. Its activity is to construct a more and more complicated structure. And even **clarity** is only a means to this end & not an end in itself.

For me on the contrary clarity, transparency, is an end in itself

I am not interested in erecting a **building** but in having the foundations of possible buildings transparently before me.

So I am aiming at something different than are the scientists & my thoughts move differently than do theirs.

Each sentence that I write is trying to say the whole thing, that is, **the same thing over and over again & it is as though they were views of one object seen from different angles.**

I might say: if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a **ladder**, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really have to go is one that I must actually be at already.

Anything that can be reached with a ladder does not interest me.

One movement orders one thought to the others in a series, the other keeps aiming at the same place.

One movement constructs & takes (in hand) one stone after another, the other keeps reaching for the same one.

Earlier draft to a preface, 1930 (cont.)

- Cf. R. Carnap's (preface to) *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928; transl. 1961): "Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. ... This requirement for justification and conclusive foundation of each thesis will eliminate all speculative and poetic work from philosophy. ... in slow careful construction insight after insight will be won. ... Thus stone will be carefully added to stone and a safe building will be erected at which each following generation can continue to work."

Content of the *PI*

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The Augustinian picture

Language games

Ostensive definition

§§ 37-88 Names and the determinacy of sense

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PI: Genesis and completion

Joachim Schulte thinks that text-genetically the PI consists of three different parts:

- I: §§1-188
- II: §§189-421
- III: §§421-693

Of part I, Schulte (2005, 362) says «Wittgenstein was as satisfied with this material as he ever came to feeling satisfied with anything he wrote», whereas II and especially III are much less finished.