WAB: "Fragments" | The following contribution is a pre-print from Roman Kopytko: Philosophy and pragmatics: A language-game with Ludwig Wittgenstein. Original publication on WAB's website (2004.9.20).

Roman Kopytko: Philosophy and pragmatics: A language-game with Ludwig Wittgenstein

Keywords: Wittgenstein, language-games, rule-following, social practice, private language argument, non-Cartesian pragmatics

(...) From among the philosophers who could be associated with or assimilated to pragmatic research such as René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Michael Foucault (cf. Kopytko 2000, 2001a, 2001b), or Ludwig Wittgenstein, the latter is definitely the most pragmatics-oriented; moreover, on account of his contextualized view of social interaction (or the stream of conversation) investigated in terms of language-games embedded in forms of life, he may be considered a proto-pragmatician. The rejection of logical atomism (and its concepts such as 'proposition', 'logical form' and others), psychologism, and philosophy proved to be the first significant step towards holistic account of logic and then that of linguistic interaction (see Stern, 1995).

Furthermore, Wittgenstein also (1) abandons the idea of language as calculus in favor of 'language-games', (2) the inner vs. outer dichotomy, and (3) the view of grammar as the mirror of reality; (4) replaces essences with family resemblance, and (5) mentalism with social constructionism; moreover, (6) advocates the idea of meaning as use, and (7) reinterprets mentalist concepts such as understanding, recognition, memory, certainty, etc., as well as sensations (pain) and emotions (anger) in social terms; finally, (8) he construes description, rule, and language-game as family resemblance concepts, ((9) weakens the idea of the rule and (10) contextualizes utterances in terms of language-games embedded in forms of life. These ten radical changes in Wittgenstein's thinking about investigating language in its holistic context indicate clearly his pragmatic stance. At the same time, it is easy to see how developments in Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas influence his view of linguistic interaction and vice versa. As a result, language (grammar) wins the game over philosophy and reality (facts), this is so because, according to Wittgenstein, grammar determines reality and essence is expressed in grammar (PI §371).

Although to a different degree, the six features of ratioempirical pragmatics (see Section 3) are also characteristic of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Accordingly, we note (1) contextuality of pragmatic phenomena; (2) non-modularity (Wittgenstein's language-games and forms of life); (3) non-reductionism (but Wittgenstein's manifestly over-reduced cognitive aspects of the mind; (4) non-essentialism (but rule-governed language behavior); (5) non-discreteness (but on one hand fixed rules and rules viewed as a family resemblance concept on the other). Clearly, Wittgenstein shows some inconsistence and uncertainty in regard to the six features, which is not surprising, because they should be viewed as a scalar, non-discrete, and fuzzy phenomena.

Wittgenstein's philosophy is a paradigmatic case of non-Cartesianism. He rejects all fourteen features associated with Cartesianism (see Section 3). Thus, Wittgenstein repudiates Cartesian dualism and makes only a minor concession to innateness hypothesis (we are not born tabula rasa). He manifestly rejects (or does not consider) Cartesian claims associated with modern cognitivism such as the hypotheses concerning (a) the modularity of the mind, (b) common cognitive processing mechanism, (c) the representational view of the mind, (d) cognitive rationality, (e) essentialism, and (f) discreteness.

Wittgenstein overcomes skepticism by the social practice. Thus the universality of rules or claims (and predictiveness associated with them) is grounded in the latter. Finally, the claim concerning the priority of the 'knower' over the 'known' stands in opposition to Wittgenstein's beliefs and practice (recall the lack of interest for the role of the player). In large measure, Wittgenstein's ideas, accord with those advocated by non-Cartesian pragmatics; nonetheless, there appear also some significant differences concerning the scope and practice of pragmatic investigations (summarized below).

In view of Wittgenstein holistic claims (cf. Stern, 1995; and Williams, 1999) expressed in terms of similes such as 'language-game', 'forms of life' or the 'stream of life' it is crucial to examine (1) how he handles this intricate issue and to what effect, and (2) how does it relate to the holistic claims of non-Cartesian pragmatics.

It may be assumed that language-games or linguistic interactions consist minimally of the following indispensable elements: (1) players, (2) rules, (3) actions and interactions, and (4) (perlocutionary) effect. In his analysis, Wittgenstein focuses mainly on rules and to some extent on actions and interactions. Surprisingly, players and results clearly do not attract his attention, or interest. Note that for him rules (rule following), interactions, and understanding are autonomous social skills/abilities grounded in the social practice. Markedly, the perlocutionary effect appears to be crucial for the understanding and decision how to go on (in linguistic interaction). A false understanding and decision brings about interactional confusion, uncertainty about how to proceed, or virtual understanding. Wittgenstein fails to account for those issues.

Far more important is however the question concerning the roles of players in holistic approaches to linguistic communication. In Wittgenstein's view, players (in the non-Cartesian pragmatics Ens Cognoscens (see Section 3)) are perfect rule-followers or social clockwork mechanisms blindly obedient to and grounded in the social practice. Such practices certainly are not uncommon; hopefully however, some individuals take advantage of specific cognitive faculties to achieve their communicative objectives. To avoid the pitfalls of rule skepticism, according to some commentators, Wittgenstein deliberately concentrates on the social communicative certainty guaranteed by fixed rules grounded in social practices. However, as indicated above, players almost constantly have to handle the situations of communicative uncertainty associated with the dynamic, unstable context, emergent interactional phenomena, different pragmabilities and affectabilities of other players, very frequent instances of linguistic creativity and innovation, spontaneity and improvisation, etc., and finally, such phenomena as misunderstanding, non-understanding, misinterpretation, jumping to conclusions, false inferences, linguistic and cultural relativism, etc.

Clearly, game certainty is a matter of degree. Thus we could suggest a social-cognitive space of relative, context dependant determinacy and a vast space (continuum) of indeterminacy, and uncertainty. The critical role of players in language-games cannot be overlooked. Thus, unlike for instance, the game of multiplication where the role of players is minimal, language games which involve negotiating, controlling interaction, strategic communication, or even constituting the rules of the game (interaction) show the significance of the participants in the game. Furthermore, we may hold that it is frequently the case that different players constitute different games. Relatedly, it should be also emphasized that (1) the concept of certainty/uncertainty is gradable, (2) absolute certainty is a grammatical fiction (see note 6), (3) despite Wittgenstein's claim that “uncertainty could never lead to action" (see Section 4.1) we have to take action frequently in the situation of social, cognitive, and communicative uncertainty.

To conclude, a holistic approach to linguistic practices has to account for the vast space of communicative uncertainty, linguistic variation, creativity, and innovation as well as spontaneity and improvisation, that is, phenomena not accounted for by Wittgenstein's language-games (recall the suggested continuum from games to non-games in Section 4.1).

Another central aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy concerns the private vs. public or the individual (mental) vs. social dichotomy. The social wins over all other contestants and reigns supreme. Thus, rules, meaning, language, understanding, sensations, and emotions are socially constituted and grounded in the social practice. The social reinterpretations of those concepts belong to Wittgenstein's greatest and most penetrating insights. On the whole, his critique of cognitivism should be welcome. As a matter of fact, he attempted to make the private public, which proved to be a success but only in some measure. Thus it may assumed that language-game players have no private means (language) to express their private thoughts but rather have to rely on the social code (language) of their specific, linguistic community. However, players reveal manifestly different pragmabilities and affectabilities which along with the dynamic contextual phenomena constitute the main source of communicative uncertainty. As a result, communicators have to handle the double or multiple articulation of linguistic signs.

It should be also noted that the relation between the social and the private is certainly not that of complete overlap, that is, players do not mirror the social practices, but most of the time they rather show family resemblance, or reflect the social imperfectly to a certain degree only or even show false reflection. Thus, in practice, language-game players have to relate themselves to a continuum from the relative (context-dependent) rule certainty through rule uncertainty to rule skepticism (non-game). In other words, linguistic practices take advantage of different types of rules such as strict rules, principles, and non-rules. Most important, the dynamic communicative context 'overrules' the linguistic practices, rules, meanings, and understandings of specific players.

Wittgenstein's social constructionism brought about considerably reduced and marginalized version of cognitivism/mentalism, which is to some extent justified; however, such a situation means that the mental context of linguistic communication is completely unaccounted for. Again, a holistic approach to linguistic practices has to investigate the mental context (the cognitive-affective-conative triad), unless we shall be satisfied with a view of the language-game player as a rule-following, blindly obedient, clockwork mechanism grounded in the social practice. As indicated above, the pragmability of the player is more than merely blind-obedience to linguistic social practices.

In conclusion, Wittgenstein falls short of presenting a holistic account of linguistic practices. Nonetheless, his invaluable insights and the 'social critique of everything', especially of Cartesianism, mentalism, and cognitivism is still valid and manifestly reveals his genius. He was a rationalistic thinker (in a non-Cartesian sense) rather than an empirical researcher, notwithstanding that his significance and contribution to modern science (cf. Chapman and Dixon, 1992), the philosophy of mind (Schroeder, 2001), and philosophy of science (cf. Winch, 1958; Bloor, 1983) cannot be overestimated. Does that mean that rational thinking still has a future?

    ABBREVIATIONS

  • BEE Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition . Oxford University Press. 2000.
  • CE Cause and effect: intuitive awareness. Edited by Rush Rhees, translated by Peter Winch. Philosophia 1976/6. 392-445.
  • CV Culture and Value. Edited by G. H. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman, translated by Peter Winch. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980.
  • OC On Certainty. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1969.
  • PG Philosophical Grammar. Edited by Rush Rhees. Translated by Anthony. J. P. Kenny. Blackwell, Oxford, 1974.
  • PI Philosophical Investigations. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.
  • RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Edited by G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1978.
  • RPP I Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. I. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
  • TPL Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by David F. Pears and Brian F. McGuinness. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
  • Z Zettel. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Blackwell: Oxford, 1967
  • .

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