The Topology of Existential Experience: Wittgenstein and Derrida (Between Reality and Construction)

Abstract

If, as Wittgenstein postulates in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the world is a
compilation of facts not of things and, if a form of the world means the
possibility of its structure, what is the possible form of the world like. What
does it mean that the world, being a structure of state of affairs, is my world.
Trying to, at least, look at a possible answer, we should reflect on the
existential copula ‘to be’.

If ”to be” does not mean “to exist” but “to reflect a sentence” and if giving the
essence of the sentence is to give the essence of the world, do we not have here
a gesture aiming at synthetical compilation of some statements of Tractatus,
such as:
1. Every defined sign can be deconstructed by other signs that defines
it,
2. What is not expressed in signs, is shown in using them,
3. Logical statements describe the structure of the world and do not
represent it,
4. And the thesis of Investigations which refers to a possible meaning
of a sign as a sign of a certain activity resulting from its being
placed in some factuality?


Taking the above statements into consideration we can say that every semiotic act
of constitution is delayed and deferred and that the conception of facts as
constituents of some external reality must be abandoned.

The term ‘existential experience’ reflects the non-possible constitution of
referentiality.