Critique of Language and Sense of the World: Wittgenstein’s Two Philosophies

Abstract

This paper does not deal with the usual distinction of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
language into two phases, namely a first one, concerning the investigation of the
logic of language, and a second one, dedicated to the description of language games
and forms of life. I’d rather try to distinguish in Wittgenstein two kinds of
philosophical activity: a technical one, oriented to language, which aims at
understanding its functioning in order to avoid philosophical confusions; and a deep
one, oriented to the subject who practises it, which results in a personal change in
the way one sees the world. While Wittgenstein modifies his philosophy oriented to
language, he does not change his philosophy of subject. Furthermore, these two
activities are strictly connected to one another and reveal a deep unity in
Wittgenstein’s investigations.