The Linguistic Optimism: On Metaphysical Roots of Logic in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Abstract

In opposition to the positivist interpretation, represented paradigmatically by
Vienna Circle philosophers, I defend that philosophy of logic from
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus has strong realistic and
metaphysical roots. However, his realism in logic is different from Frege’s and
Russell’s realist account of logic. It demands, as a precondition, the
assumption of an essential isomorphism between world and language. As a result,
I hold this tractatian principle of “all-embracing world through language” as a
peculiar kind of linguistic optimism. The main objective of this paper is to
give a contribution to the current debate on philosophy by showing that the
status of logic in Tractatus requires _ optimismcally _ that language can fully
cover the world. Its secondary aim is to ground the statement that the
tractatian philosophy of logic is metaphysical and, even more, it is realist.