Einstellung, Aspect and Hinges in Wittgenstein’s Work

Abstract

The paper has its point in a section of the remarks dedicated to the theme of aspect
seeing in Wittgenstein’s work, especially those devoted to the distinction between
aspects and aspects of organization. This kind of aspect plays the role of a
grammatical ground, a a sort of frame that organizes the discourse constituting a
field of possibilities for its meaning. Taking the step from two imagined and
apparently different language games, the first theoretical, the second practical, I
combine them in a unique category thanks to the analogy between aspects of
organization and Einstellungen, practical dispositions showed in any kind of
behaviour, that function like the hinges of the game. This grammatical level,
strictly embedded in the language game, gives us the opportunity to take the
conclusion that in Wittgenstein’s thought action and perception are one and the same
process of constituting the grammar of our language.