Bild:
From *Satz* to *Begriff*

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'Concept' is something like a picture
with which one compares objects.
(BGM V, § 50)

Wittgenstein set up different conceptions of *Bild* through the periods of his thought, from the *Tractatus* up to *On Certainty*. We will focus on just three moments of its elaboration; first in the *Tractatus*, then in the period between 1929 and 1932, and finally in the *Investigations*, attempting to highlight the conceptual contexts in which the changes occurred, and the corresponding philosophical functions attributed to it.

Picture in the *Tractatus*:
The Logicist Point of View

We would like to draw attention to three characteristics of the proposition as logical picturing, according to the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (TLP), which were the first difficulties faced by Wittgenstein when attempting to apply the Tractarian pure logic to the phenomena in the visual field—thus distancing himself gradually from a couple of important theses present in that book. The first characteristic is the independence between the elementary propositions (TLP 4.211), stemming from the equivalent independence between the facts of the world. The second characteristic is the uniformity of such propositions, according to the conception of the *Tractatus* (TLP 4.22–4.24), which was based on the form of the natural language (SRLF p. 32). And the third

characteristic is the idea of exactitude of the propositional representation, according to the Fregean conception of the criteria of truth and falsity for the sense of concepts (TLP 4.02–4.24; 4.063). The first two difficulties will explicitly emerge in his 1929 article, *Some Remarks on Logical Form* (SRLF), where Wittgenstein tries to propose an adequate symbolic notation to express the phenomena of the visual field; the third difficulty will emerge in the first years of the 1930s, when he is faced with the irreducible imprecision of the phenomena in the visual field. The sense-data bring out new situations, a diversity of internal relations and forms of organization, unforeseen by the *Tractatus*, presenting difficulties to the conception of a pure logical space, as well as to the conception of elementary proposition.

One of the most important questions that the *Tractatus* tries to answer is how thought can *represent* (*darstellen*) reality. The answer bears the mark of Frege's anti-psychologist heritage in his book. Indeed, all the different forms of representation—spatial, temporal, chromatic, sonorous, etc.— have the logical isomorphism between the sign and its denotation (TLP 2.182) in common. This isomorphism concerns the logical or mathematical multiplicity between the elements involved in the relation of representation (TLP 4.04–4.041), which marks the strictly logical, and not psychological, nature of the theory of representation. Such form of representation is named, metaphorically in the *Tractatus*, *Abbildung*, or *picturing*, and it is carried out through *logical pictures* (*logische Bilder*), of which the *proposition* (*der Satz*) is the privileged case in the book. The exclusively logical conception of representation will be modified after the *Tractatus*, but not leading to an exploration of psychic elements of thought, the Fregean heritage being thus preserved up to the end of Wittgenstein's œuvre. Already in aphorism 3, this heritage marks its presence in the *Tractatus*, when thought is presented as a logical picture of facts. This conception will allow that thought be explored from the linguistic viewpoint, through the logical analysis of its sensible and perceptual manifestation, which is the proposition (TLP 3.11).

However, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein places logical analysis on a level that will cause him difficulties when he resumes, at the end of the 30s, some questions left unchecked in that book. The *Tractatus* distinguishes two formal levels of picturing, noted in aphorism 2.182, namely, the level of the different forms of picturing—spatial, temporal, colorful, sonorous, etc.—and the level of the form common to all those, i. e., the logical form of picturing. Note that the examples of several forms of picturing correspond to what is indicated

as also being the *forms of objects*, or 'the space of possible states of affairs' (TLP 2.013)—or better, the fact that the simple objects come to combine themselves always in states of affairs according to the spatial, temporal, chromatic, sonorous, etc., forms (TLP 2.0131–2.0141; 2.0251). Now, in the *Tractatus* the logical analysis is developed exclusively to clarify the general logical form of pictures, and not the forms which are particular to each type of picturing. This is a way of placing logical analysis at the transcendental (TLP 6.13) and *a priori* level, in which there will be no need to make use of any information about the world to resolve questions of logic (TLP 5.551). The distinction between the two levels will be better explored from the end of the 1930s onwards, and will have consequences for the original conception of picture (*Bild*).

To this logical distinction there corresponds another, of an ontological nature, between the level of the substance of the world, that is common to the real world and the world represented in thought, on the one hand, and the level of the facts pictured, on the other hand. The substance is the fundament of the picturing relation, the logical form that warrants the autonomy of sense of the picturing, relative to what occurs, whereas the facts are the criterion to decide about the picture's truth-value (TLP 2.0211–2.0212). As a consequence, at the same time that the picturing pictures reality according to its internal properties (TLP 4.023), regardless of what occurs in the world, it pictures the outside facts, truly or falsely (TLP 2.173). Hence the double aspect of the picture: on the one hand, autonomous in its sense, relative to the logical form, and, on the other hand hypothetical, relative to the facts that it represents.

The *Tractatus* recognizes, then, the existence of several forms of picturing, but it is only interested in analyzing what is common to all those, i.e., their logical form. As a consequence, it does not deal with the truth-value of pictures; it is exclusively concerned with the possibilities of truth and falsity that fulfill the whole of the logical space. It will be this logicist viewpoint, and its consequences, that will lead Wittgenstein to deepen the conception of picturing (*Abbildung*).

The Challenges of the Perceptual Space

The first difficulty is regarding the central thesis of the *Tractatus*, that the elementary propositions are independent. The 1929 article presents the

first symptoms of the changes that the theory of the proposition (*Satz*) as picture (*Bild*) will endure, and at the same time it shows Wittgenstein's efforts to preserve some elements of the Tractarian conception of sense—such as the requirement of logical isomorphism between the proposition and the fact that is represented. By taking an interest in the phenomena of the visual field and in the attribution of degrees of qualities, in the article, Wittgenstein resumes the Tractarian idea of the *forms of objects*, or better, the idea of a 'space of color', of sound, of touch, etc. (TLP 2.0251), which are nothing more than the graduated systems of qualities, now located in the visual field. The article invites one to explore the forms of the logically simple object, or its qualitative dimensions, through the linguistic expression of the transitions, combinations and compositions between the tonalities of color, the pitches of sounds, etc., in the perceptual space—so that the logical analysis be applied to the phenomena, and not only to the calculus of the possibilities of their forms, as was the case in the *Tractatus*. It is now a question of *applying* (*anwenden*) logic (TLP 5.557) to situations in the actual world, thus keeping away from the pure logical space. There emerge, then, the first difficulties, unforeseen by the book's point of view, regarding the conception of the elementary proposition.

Indeed, in the visual field, the degrees of qualities form organized systems by *internal relations* (SRLF pp. 33, 35), i.e., relations whose absence would render unthinkable the terms that they relate—such as the relation between the lighter and the darker tones of a color (TLP 4.123). Now, the ascription of degrees to qualities is always *complete*, because it excludes all the other degrees of the same quality, there being no place for hypotheses: if the temperature is eighty degrees, then ninety, or any other degree is excluded. The relation of exclusion is internal between each degree and all the other ones. Here we have a situation of a tautological nature, as Wittgenstein puts it, trivial in the everyday life and regardless of experience (SRLF p. 34).

In fact, this same situation of exclusion had been thematized in aphorism 6.3751 of the *Tractatus*, where the impossibility that 'two colors be concomitantly in the same place in the visual field' was considered as logically senseless, because the logical product of the respective propositions is a contradiction. This means that the relation of exclusion between colors was analyzed, in the *Tractatus*, from the viewpoint of the wide logical space, and not of the space of colors. Indeed, the exclusion between colors leads to a logical contradiction because the propositions that express the degrees of color, and their relations, are considered complex—i.e., analyzed in elementary

propositions. In this case, it will be possible to reduce the exclusion to the contradictory logical product p & $\neg p$. However, if these propositions are to be considered elementary, the logical product between them will counter the rule of the corresponding truth-table, for the composition of the two attributions of truth would be false, in the case of the exclusion. Thus, in the *Tractatus*, colors are not logically simple and, consequently, the complex propositions that describe them represent truly or falsely, according to the form of the hypothesis.

It is important to stress that in MS 105, prior to the writing of the 1929 article, SRLF, Wittgenstein strives to establish a 'psychological doctrine of colors' (*eine psychologische Farbenlehre*) (MS 105, p. 90; WA1, p. 24) that would allow for the description of the chromatic phenomenon in perception, regardless of the physical production of colors, as well as of the subjective condition of perception (MS 105, pp. 88–90; WA1, p. 24; Salles 2002, First Part, in particular p. 143 ff). Wittgenstein analyzes, then, at length, the logical structure of the space of color, the internal relations of proximity and distance between colors, their compositions and exclusions. To that end, he resumes a chromatic model—probably stemming from psychological theories of color (see Salles 2002, p. 145), but for a conceptual, or philosophical use—which is the tridimensional figure of an octahedron, in which the diverse internal relations of the space of colors are represented (MS 105, *The Wittgenstein Papers*, 1968b, vol. 7, p. 98). This manuscript corresponds to the minute exploration of the specific space of colors, and not of the wide logical space in which the *Tractatus* operated, with its picture theory. Here is a first moment in which Wittgenstein ventures a logical analysis of one of the forms of the object, the space of color, outside the wide logical space, to which he will return, later, after the article from 1929.

Now, in this article, Wittgenstein recasts the analysis of exclusion between colors at the level of analysis of the wide logical space of the *Tractatus*, even resuming the same comparison made in that book between colors and physical objects (TLP 6.3751; SRLF p. 36). He indicates, in this way, the wide logical nature of the exclusion between degrees of qualities, due to the impossibility of expressing significantly the analysis of degrees within the visual space. This is the conclusion reached by Wittgenstein in MS 106, which covers the text of SRLF (MS 106 pp. 71–111; WA1, pp. 55–63). Indeed, from the viewpoint of the space of colors, there are specific logical relations of proximity, of passage, of complementarity, of combination and of exclusion

between colors; thus, for example, different colors can occupy the same point in the chromatic field, by composition, forming a new color; in these cases, colors can cover up colors which would then be imperceptible. From the point of view of the perceptual space, however, given the reciprocal saturation between perception and the colors, it is not possible to analyze possible blends of colors; it is just a question of knowing if two colors can occupy simultaneously the same place in perception. From this point of view, all colors have the same status, and therefore the article will consider that they all exclude themselves mutually—just as in aphorism 6.3751.

So, when resuming the question put forward in that aphorism, but now from the viewpoint of the perceptual space, Wittgenstein is faced with a new situation: the propositions that ascribe degrees of qualities are not analyzable as the logical product of simpler propositions, because the degrees of qualities *are* simple. Their linguistic expression must be carried out, then, by elementary propositions. Wittgenstein arrived at this result, certainly, from the incursion he had made in the strict space of colors (see MS 105), and from the consequences he thence derived to the perceptual space (cf. MS 106). Wittgenstein says in this manuscript:

> It means nothing to say that a bar with the length of 3 meters is also 2 m long because it has the length of $2 + 1$ m, for one can not say that it has the length of 2 m and also that of 1 m. The length of 3 m is something new. (WA1, p. 55; MS 106, p. 73)

The same argument is applied in SRLF to two symmetrical examples, both gathered in a different qualitative dimension: the space of physical objects and the space of colors (SRLF, p. 35). If those propositions were not elementary, a clause of completeness would always be needed to close the domain, still uncertain, of the meaning corresponding to each degree—as is the case, for example, of the description of the set of objects I have in my pocket, where, after the enumeration of different objects, one has to add the clause of completeness (SRLF, p. 35). However, each degree of quality occupies a logical place within that quality's closed system of degrees, so that each ascription of degree is a complete description, which excludes all the other degrees, and does not stem from the logical product of simpler, mutually independent propositions. This is the first great novelty of the article, with regard to the *Tractatus*.

Thence it follows a first consequence that conflicts with the *Tractatus's* picture theory (*Bildtheorie*): since the degrees of qualities are simple and bear internal relations of mutual exclusion, the elementary propositions that express them must also exclude each other. The Tractarian thesis of the independence between the elementary propositions will be relinquished—and, with this, the logical relations seem to enter, through the visual field, the domain of the phenomena in time and space. Here is a difficulty to be faced by the faithful heir of Frege's formalism and anti-psychologism.

At this point there emerges a notable change in the conception of picture (*Bild*): when picturing each degree excluding the others, the elementary proposition no longer presents truly or falsely isolated and mutually independent facts, which will confirm it, or not, in the manner of a hypothesis. The fact of representing a degree of quality in the perceptual space corresponds to present its effective insertion within a system, and no longer to present the possibilities of the fact in the wider logical space. Each elementary proposition carries with it the whole set of propositions it excludes within the graduated system.

The second difficulty relates to the inadequate conception of elementary proposition, in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein will say, in the 1929 article, that the logical form of elementary propositions was conceived according to the single and limiting model of the natural language, namely, the form 'subject-predicate and relational propositions with two or more terms further, perhaps propositions relating predicates and relations to one another, and so on' (SRLF, p. 32). Now, this limitation prevents the truth-functional notation from expressing transitions between degrees of qualities, as well as, according to Wittgenstein's emphasis in the article, the relation of logical exclusion between them, when situated in the context of perceptual space. In the *Tractatus*, the exclusion between qualities was treated negatively, by its reduction to an unthinkable situation, deprived of sense and logically impossible, a situation that the truth-functional symbolism relegated to a contradiction, showing it in the form of a symbolic dissolution (TLP 4.462–4.4661). Actually, in the *Tractatus* the exclusion between qualities is considered to be contradictory, in order for them to break no combinatory rules of the truth-tables (see TLP 6.3751, end). Now, the difficulty of the article is that it resumes the question of the color exclusion situating it within the *Tractatus's* wide logical space, but, at the same time, and unlike the *Tractatus*, it takes the qualities as simple, and the propositions that express them as elementary. The exclusion is now

considered as meaningful, and, thus, it must be expressed in adequate symbolism. The impasse arrived at is the following: the exclusion between degrees of qualities does not lead to the contradiction—within the wide logical space in which, however, the exclusion is contradictory. The solution the article comes up with, is to acknowledge a place for the exclusion between elementary propositions and, at the same time, to preserve them from the contradiction. So the multiplicity of the logical space is altered, and an adequate notation to picture the multiplicity of forms of the phenomena in the perceptual space will have to be constructed. Such a notation will have to evade the contradictory and meaningless combination of symbols, and at the same time to reckon the exclusion between elementary propositions.

Indeed, the different combinations and transitions between degrees of qualities do not reduce themselves to the forms extracted from natural language, and expressed in the *Tractatus's* truth-functional notation. This notation is only adequate to depict (*abbilden*) combinations of elementary facts that are mutually independent. This is a logical requirement, and it is this requirement that warrants the autonomy of sense relative to the truth-value of propositions—and allows for the exhaustive combinatory of the possibilities of truth and falsity of the elementary propositions. Such combinatory is effected in the pure logical space without aiming at any factual situation of the world, and, in this space, room is actually made for a kind of combination deprived of sense, contradictory and logically impossible; it is the case of incompatibility between the degrees of qualities when considered complex. Nevertheless, the perceptual space corresponds to a logical space in which the degrees will be considered as elementary and no longer independent, and, in this case, the exclusion between them is not senseless. According to Wittgenstein (SRLF p. 34) we know *a priori* that in the perceptual space there are no contradictory, or logically impossible situations, but rather situations that exclude others within a system. Thus, Wittgenstein is now prepared to explore logically the diverse formal spaces of the different systems of qualitative degrees, the forms of the object—or better, he is prepared to apply logic to the perceptual phenomena—without giving up, yet, the placement of analysis within the *Tractatus's* wide logical space.

This situation corresponds to not altering the truth-tables—interfering neither with the isomorphism between proposition and reality nor with the autonomy of sense—, and at the same time it corresponds to the recognition that the qualities are logically simple and have a formal specificity in the

perceptual field, namely, a kind of exclusion that is not contradictory and senseless. Such is the ambiguous stand of the 1929 article, in which the phenomena of the world start to elicit attention, and Wittgenstein's new way of looking at things emerges. The power of the logical model begins to be questioned, which will lead to the relinquishing of the thesis of the independence of elementary propositions.

As a consequence of this difficulty, the logical analysis will not be able to predict *a priori* the possible forms of the elementary propositions, there being a need to build new symbolic instruments according to another method, says Wittgenstein, 'in a sense *a posteriori*', after consulting the phenomena (SRLF p. 32), to express with the same logical multiplicity the diversity of unpredictable forms of phenomena in perceptual space. The phenomena of perception will now have something to say about their own logical form. Wittgenstein seems to give up, in this way, a crucial principle of the *Tractatus*, that one must not look at the world to solve logical problems.[1] Consequently, the idea of the autonomy of sense seems to lose the weight it had with the support of the logical model, and seems, even, to be lost amidst the phenomena and empirical processes. This will not be the case, but it will come up as a new difficulty to be faced by Wittgenstein, as heir, also, of the Fregean anti-empiricism, when faced with the formal configuration of phenomena in perceptual space.

Finally, there is still a third difficulty to be faced, that of the irreducible imprecision of the sense-data. How is it possible to represent in an exact fashion what is constitutively vague and imprecise? ('Das Problem der "Unbestimmtheit" der Sinnesdaten': WA2, p. 99; MS 107, p. 171) The difficulty is that, in order to represent the imprecision of perceptual space, with the transitions and compositions of degrees, the propositions must be isomorphic to the facts, but can not be hypothetical, since perceptual space is thetical, and not hypothetical: we completely see what we see, albeit in an imprecise fashion. Indeed, its imprecision can not be corrected, differently from the facts represented in the space of physics, where the propositions represent truly or falsely, according to the model of the *Tractatus*. Any attempt to correct it would modify the sense of what is perceived. If the theory of the proposition as picture (*Bild*) is adequate to exactly depict (*abbilden*) reality in the space of physics, by means of hypotheses to be tested, one will have to set up a notation in which the propositions represent directly and completely the characteristic imprecision of phenomena in perceptual space. However, in order to represent

the imprecision of the visual space, the propositions will always be hypotheti-
cal, since the language will have to bear a logical multiplicity superior to that
of the represented system—if it has an inferior multiplicity, it will not be able
to represent what is more complex, and, if it is isomorphic, it will not be able
to represent the imprecision, it would simply double it. As a consequence, a
phenomenological language is not possible. The abandonment of the project
of building a language specially designed to represent the imprecision of
the phenomena in the visual space corresponds to the abandonment of the
Tractarian ideal of logical exactness. This space is logically hazy, imprecise
('"ungefähr", "beiläufig"': WA2, p. 122; MS 107, pp. 212–213), there
being no question of exactly delimiting it without so adulterating it, and
modifying the sense of what is perceived. This is the third difficulty cast on
the theory of the proposition as picturing by the imprecision of the percep-
tual space, and by its thetical nature, admitting no correction, nor tests by the
facts. It is as if, in the perceptual space, the imprecision which is constitutive
of the sense of the perceived facts was given outside the measurable space and
time of physics; as if the form of perceptual space had its own autonomy.

   The two ideas, of representation as complete and non-hypothetical
description, and of logical analysis applied to the forms of phenomena in
the perceptual field, mark the beginning of what will later constitute, as we
would call it, the 'grammatical turn' in Wittgenstein's thought. This move-
ment is characterized by taking the logical analysis of internal relations away
from absolute space, and by elaborating a different type of analysis that also
seeks to clarify internal and *a priori* relations, though taking into account, as it
were, the friction of phenomena where this friction is a constitutive element
of those relations. Perhaps we should so interpret Wittgenstein's project when
he sought to elaborate, by the time of the MS 105, a conceptual doctrine
of colors: 'What I need is a psychological doctrine of colors, that is neither
physical nor physiological' (MS 105 p. 90; WA1, p. 24). There we could hear
echoes of a philosophical theory of knowledge, an idea advanced, by the
way, in the *Tractatus* itself, that the theory of knowledge is a philosophy of
psychology, or better, a conceptual reflection on epistemological concepts
(TLP 4.1121)—but not an empirical theory of mental processes.

   From the late 1920s on, Wittgenstein seems to be realizing this idea of
philosophical clarifications (*Erläuterungen*) of psychological concepts, when he
applies logic to the internal relations of the phenomena in perception. At
first, at the beginning of the 1930s, the new analysis is applied to the data of

sensations, bringing in pragmatic elements, and secondly, ever increasingly, the uses of words. It is what Wittgenstein would call his 'new method', which allow him to find 'a real resting place' to reach 'something settled' (see Drury's report, corresponding to the early 1930s, 'Conversations with Wittgenstein' in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, edited by Rush Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), by which logic will gradually be incorporated into the grammar of uses, and the philosophical activity will bear the function of a therapy of thought.

Facing Challenges: A Horizon with Friction

One important result of Wittgenstein's reflections in that period was, as we have seen, that the qualities in the perceptual field are logically simple, since the propositions that describe them, ascribing them degrees, are elementary. Thence stem two challenges to be faced: to describe unhypothetically what is simple and to express the difference between simple elements—which, despite having no internal properties that distinguish them in logical space, mutually exclude and distinguish themselves internally *a priori* in perceptual space. These challenges can be summarized in the following statement by Wittgenstein:

> When asked "what is the difference between blue and red", we feel like answering: one is blue and the other is red. But of course that means nothing and in reality what we are thinking of is the distinction between the surfaces or places that have these colours. For otherwise the question makes no sense at all. (WA3, p. 280; MS 110, p. 213; PG p. 208)

An equivalent situation of logical indiscernibility had been signaled in the *Tractatus* (TLP 2.0233–2.02331), between objects with the same internal properties, and the conclusion that it is impossible to point at (*hinweisen*) one of them through a description. Now, in the perceptual space, the ostensive gesture (*das Hinzeigen*) will allow us the distinction *a priori* of what the logical space renders indiscernible because they have the same internal properties. This will be the solution pointed at by Wittgenstein's path in this period. On the other hand, it will be natural language itself to provide the adequate instruments for the expression both of the simplicity of the objects of perception and of the constitutive imprecision of perceptual space.

Among the material Wittgenstein left us from the period of 1929–1932, there are several manuscripts (by Wittgenstein himself, MS 105 to MS 114), as well as the important material of the dictations to Waismann (published as *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*), and those dictations to Waismann that should have been sent to Schlick (found in Waismann's *Nachlass* after his death, cf. Baker 1997: *Dictées de Wittgenstein à Waismann et pour Schlick*—henceforth DW/S—, volume 1, pp. xiii–xiv). These texts are programmatic, and reflect well the process of research and creation of new conceptual instruments. The analyses are provisional, there are no systematic argumentations on individual themes, they contain trials, essays, and above all many intersections. Considering the great variety of themes, but thanks to their intersection, it is necessary, and possible, to suggest an access entry in order to follow the path of the notion of *Bild*, from the situation described in the 1929 article. We suggest the correlated themes of the understanding of sense and the ostensive definition (*die hinweisende Erklärung*), around which many of the analyses of the material are centered. The point, to Wittgenstein, is one of clarifying the question of the limits between propositional sense and extra-linguistic reality, as he asks himself if the understanding of sense presupposes the apprehension of something outside of language. One may point at a couple of lines of force guiding the reflections on those themes. In the first place, to assimilate in the analysis of the linguistic meaning, of the propositional representation and of thought—central concerns of the *Tractatus*—non-linguistic symbolic forms and also psychological concepts involved in the idea of propositional representation. In the second place, and complementing this, to remain explicitly within the field of conceptual analysis, avoiding any empirical, sociological, psycho-physiological or mentalist analysis.

Having given up a phenomenal/phenomenological language (DW/S p. 157 ff.; F62), Wittgenstein slowly takes distance from the unilateral understanding he had in the *Tractatus* of propositional logical representation, and starts to consider other forms of symbolic representation, comparing them with the proposition. Furthermore, he analyzes several psychological concepts also linked with the idea of representation and its linguistic expression—such as to understand (*verstehen*), to expect (*erwarten*), to intend (*meinen*), etc. In all of those cases, Wittgenstein insists on criticizing the tendency to interpret the concept of the understanding of sense as corresponding to a process which would lead us to get in touch with the facts exterior to language, regardless of operations with signs. The proposition is then compared with genre

paintings, which portray historical or social scenes, with portraits, ornaments, etc. (DW/S, p. 10 ff., F102). What justifies the comparison of the proposition with, for example, the genre painting (*Genrebild*) is the possibility of painting the picture according to a description, and of translating the painting into a description causing sense to transit between the different forms of representation and language. Just as with the proposition, we can understand the painting at once, or slowly, drawing comparisons and analogies with known situations. The painting, like the proposition, can be understood by the resemblance it has with other situations, and not by the actual existence of what will be represented—the understanding of its sense being thus independent of what occurs.

> But when I say: "Imagine a room ....." and then describe a room and an event taking place in it. Such a sentence has, regarding its proposition, the same relation of a painting in general regarding a portrait. When, for example, I observe a Dutch genre painting, I don't think that the people in it are real people, but, on the other hand, their resemblance with people is essential to the understanding of the painting. (WA3, p.125; MS 109, pp. 232–233).

In the case of the ornament, the understanding of sense might not be immediate, but demand more attention to the details of the plastic composition. In every case, including that of the proposition, it is also possible that the sense may not be understood. To understand and not understand is to operate with signs, and not to depart from language to get in touch with a supposed reality that would be the fundament of sense.

Wittgenstein imputes this tendency to conceive the understanding of sense as a spiritual departure from language towards reality to the technique of ostensive definition used to explain the meaning of words. This technique would lead one, according to him, to conceive sense as an entity to be found outside language, to where the ostension points. We notice this constant concern of Wittgenstein's in reflections like the following:

> The opposite of this conception is the idea that understanding a proposition consists in stepping outside language (*heraustreten*), that one establishes a connection between language and reality. The model for this stepping outside language and establishing a relation to reality is given to us by ostensive definition. An ostensive definition replaces one sign by another one. One can

say: it replaces word-language by a gesture-language. […] There remains even in a pure gesture-language the difference between the fact that I say that p is true and the fact that it is true. One could express this roughly by the claim that we never step outside language by any explanation of word-meaning, not even by an ostensive definition, and that language is, in this sense, self-contained. (DW/S p. 3, F84 *'Does understanding step outside language?'* / *'Tritt das Verstehen aus der Sprache heraus?'*)

Wittgenstein insists, in texts from that period, that the understanding of sense—be it propositional, or of other symbolic forms—is always an operation carried out within language and through signs. An important result of those reflections is that language keeps close relations with different forms of symbolic representation, so that words can be used in many ways, according to different techniques, in addition to the propositional technique described in the *Tractatus*. For instance, words can be applied as tags or as ornaments, as well as the latter can be applied as the former—and we will always be operating with signs within language.

During this process of research, Wittgenstein relates several forms of representation and organizes them according to differences and resemblances. Some will be drawn closer to the proposition as *Bild*, because their sense corresponds to the representation of possible situations, by resemblance or isomorphism, and others will be drawn closer to one another, because their sense corresponds to the representation of situations the existence of which is current, regardless of any mediation by resemblance or isomorphism. For instance, early in the manuscripts there appears the theme of the linguistic function of sample (*Muster*), performed by several non-linguistic objects—as in the following passage:

A table (*Tabelle*) can connect words with words, but also words with samples, and here /again/ there are samples in quite different senses. But what about the connection between language and reality? […] However, what about the case that I explain the meaning of the word 'apple' by pointing to an apple? Did I thereby not set up a connection between language and reality? The proper response is: the gesture of pointing (*des Hinzeigens*) corresponds to placing two signs next to each other in a table; however, what I point to is not at all the kind apple, but rather only a sample of this kind. In this case the apple itself is only a component of my language. After all, one can see this also from the fact that

instead of an actual apple, I could just as well have used a drawn apple. (DW/S, p. 112; F36, *'The connection of language with reality'/ 'Verbindung der Sprache mit der Wirklichkeit'*; also *The Voices of Wittgenstein*, p. 221)

The sample technique also supposes a path, in Wittgenstein's thought during this period, going through, for example, the concept of portrait (*Porträt*), which was taken, then, in counterpoint with the technique of the proposition (see J.C. Salles, 'The Notion of Porträt in Wittgenstein', in *Wittgenstein and Themes of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 15–42, *Analytica*, vol. 7, n. 2, 2003, Rio de Janeiro). Wittgenstein seeks to clarify the enigma left by the article of 1929, of expressing the difference between the indiscernibles, the simple objects as colors, by means of a non-hypothetical symbolism, but no longer phenomenological. He thus reaches the idea of complete and direct forms of representation, as the portrait, which present that which they are supposed to represent; in reality, in these cases there is no representation of a propositional kind, as description of possible properties, but instauration of properties. A portrait, for example, describes nothing, draws no hypothesis, but, on the contrary, places what it portrays as being the portrayed, even if there exists outside the portrait no individual corresponding to it. The portrayed, however, exists as such and is presented by the portrait. As Wittgenstein puts it:

> A portrait of a man that does not exist is an absurdity. The man it represents belongs to his portrait. "This must be him", there resides the whole problem of representation [*der Darstellung*]. (WA2, p. 304; MS 108, p. 241)

Wittgenstein thus gets nearer to non-hypothetical, and at the same time non-phenomenological, forms of expression. Such is the function of the samples: non-linguistic objects that are used as models for the application of words. Such objects, invested with this function, then count as rules of language, and not for their physical properties: they are symbolic models, integrated into language as one of its tools. It is the case of the color samples, where each colored surface is the model of the color to which we point when pronouncing its name, distinguishing it from other colors. Each sample presents actually and completely what it presents, its function being thus stressed as a normative model by presenting the simple object that bears no description. We apply the word 'red' according to this norm and it is thus

that we distinguish it from the word 'blue': just pointing with fingers and words, through the respective samples, to what doesn't let itself be described. The technique of sampling integrates into language a diversity of objects that are outside language, so that we always remain within language. Any colored surface will be able to fulfill the function of a sample of colors, just as the drawing of an apple will be able to fulfill that function, instead of the real apple which had been assigned the same function.

Thus is outlined the theoretical role that will come to be played, later, by the concept of use (*Gebrauch*) in Wittgenstein's thought. The function of sampling is a typical case of symbolic transformation of the extra-linguistic reality—empirical, mental or ideal—performed by the *praxis* of language, by integrating new instruments into linguistic symbolism. On the other hand, besides that integrative action, the linguistic practice performs also, and more deeply, an action which is *constitutive* of sense, by means of the employment of these instruments. Indeed, the combination between a color sample and the gesture of ostensive pointing to it, associating it to its name, does not describe any property of the color, but, on the contrary, it is an *attribution* of identity. It is thus that we distinguish colors, by constituting their identity through the association between samples, gestures and the pronunciation of words. There is nothing before, or beyond these techniques, that explains the simplicity of the objects without properties, which, nevertheless, can be distinguished one from the other *a priori*, and which mutually exclude each other, in the perceptual field.

Wittgenstein gradually arrives at techniques of linguistic representations that move away from the case of propositional logical representation and fulfill the theoretical function performed in the *Tractatus* by the concept of *substance*: to allow for the linking between language and reality through the *substitution* (*Vertretung*) of objects by names in the proposition. The mysterious and unexplored relation of substitution will now be replaced, or clarified, by the pragmatic liaisons of a symbolic nature and with normative function: it is the models used as linguistic rules to attribution of identity to the simple objects of reality—the portraits, the samples, the tables associating words to objects, and, more widely, the paradigms. Non-hypothetical expressions of the simple, these symbolic techniques involved with language allow the presentation of the objects instituting their identity, and so to establish the elementary links between language, thought and reality—links that cannot be described, but only shown by the use we make of words, as Wittgenstein will later say. Names do not just substitute objects, labeling them, but are now the baptism

of their identity, their civil record in language, that is expressed through the elementary propositions.

So Wittgenstein accomplishes the task of a theory of knowledge, which would be that of clarifying the nature of the elementary propositions, as announced in the 1929 article, by exploring what remained unexplored in the *Tractatus*, because it is unexplorable in the logical space, namely, the space of objects. With this, the conception of picture (*Bild*) as a model of reality (TLP 2.12) stands side by side with another conception of model, now in perceptual space, the elementary propositions: models of a pragmatic nature, constitutive and normative of sense, no longer hypothetical nor truth-functional. This means that the autonomy of sense and the hypothetical form of the proposition as picture (*Bild*) rest on these pragmatic expressive forms, unhypothetical and normative, which the elementary propositions reveal themselves to be. It is what Wittgenstein notes regarding to the composition of the propositions as logical pictures:

> For in such fictional sentences, words have the same meaning as in the other ones, red, blue, to the right, to the left, head, foot, mean the same as they usually do. That is, there is a link with reality. At least in <u>one</u> sense; – however, the link with the here and now is missing. (Let us recall, however, the way the meaning of a word is fixed.) (WA3, p. 16; MS 109, p. 26).

The fundament of the picture (*Bild*) is glimpsed in a *pragmatizing*—but not empirical—horizon, whose first elements are gathered in this period of Wittgenstein's reflection, bringing this concept closer to the ideas of norm, standard, paradigm, all linked to the practice of language. The notion of *use* is outlined as being the pragmatic, or *grammatical* aspect of the forms of sense, distinct from the empirical aspect of the pragmatic contents. In the end, we have several theoretical tools that will contribute to a new conception of *Bild*, very different from the one we can find in the *Tractatus*. But one must still wait for the consolidation of the idea of *conceptual therapy*, an important aspect of the 'new method' arrived at by Wittgenstein in the early 1930s, and above all for the crucial concept of language game, as it appears in its finished form in the 'album', the *Philosophical Investigations*—a concept that will bring consistency to the horizon hinted at as involving the *praxis* of language. It is this final moment we will choose as our focus, when the proposition as picture (*Bild*) is a picture (*Bild*) that slowly vanishes.

Therapeutic aspect of the 'new method'

The conception of picture (*Bild*) present in the PI, which we intend to stress, is linked to the conception of the 'new method' whose elaboration Wittgenstein announces at the beginning of the 1930s, in the period of his conversations with Waismann (Waismann 1959: 'How I see philosophy', in A.J. Ayer, *Logical Positivism*, The Free Press, Glencore Ill. USA., 1959; Baker 'A Vision of Philosophy', translated by J.-P. Narboux as 'Une vision de la philosophie', in *F. Waismann—Textures logiques*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2008.) Wittgenstein assigns to the method a *therapeutic* function regarding thought, not regarding emotions, that must be applied to individuals and not abstractly to concepts. Among these individuals, Wittgenstein is the exemplary patient: the self-therapy being, then, a model, or sample, of the therapy. The internal link between the philosophical *method* and the idea of *therapy* stems from the fact that, to Wittgenstein, the biggest difficulties of philosophy are obstacles of the will, and not of the intellect—an idea noted in the title of paragraph 86 of the *Big Typescript*, in the chapter on philosophy, which Wittgenstein develops in the subsequent paragraphs:

> Difficulty of philosophy, not the intellectual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of a change of point of view. One must overcome the resistances of the <u>will</u>. (*Big Typescript* §§ 86 ff.)

The task is one of developing a method that is able to persuade the will—with no guarantee of success—and not to convince the intellect through a chain of arguments—contrary to what has been done in the philosophical tradition. The philosophical activity is no longer a critique of language, and is turned into a therapy of thought.

Such would be the novelty of the philosophical method that seems to have aroused Wittgenstein's enthusiasm: a therapy applied to the *resistances of the will* in seeing other aspects of the conceptual sense—and no longer a method applied to the intellect, in search of truth. The psychoanalytic inspiration of the method is clear, as is also clear the distance Wittgenstein takes from Freudian therapy: it is a work on the resistances of the will of individuals, which has as its goal, however, to dissolve (*lösen*) (PI § 133) their *conceptual* confusions, and not their emotional conflicts—even if those confusions may be accompanied by emotions. This *internal relation* between the philosophical

method and the therapeutic function explains, no doubt, the specific form of *album* and the *polyphonic style* of the PI, as well as it justifies its use as a possible *sample* of the author's self-therapy (see ARM, 'Como ler o álbum?', in *Como ler o álbum?*, Coleção CLE, nr. 55, 2009 ['How to read the album?'])

Now, the new conception of picture (*Bild*) characterizes the disease to be combated by the philosophical therapy, its main target. To understand what a picture is, in the new conceptual context, one has to outline some aspects of the new method. Wittgenstein says:

> *My way of doing philosophy still strikes me as new, and increasingly so, and therefore I must so often repeat myself. To another generation it will have become flesh and blood, and it will find the repetitions tedious. To me they are necessary.*—This method is essentially the transition from the question of <u>truth</u> to the question of <u>sense</u>. (WA1, p. 177; MS 105, p. 46)

In the beginning of the 1930s, between 1933 and 1934, when the *Blue Book* was being organized, Wittgenstein already had a clear idea about the origin of the disease to be fought and the difficulty of circumscribing it, about the therapeutic procedure to be adopted by the philosopher, and about what to expect from this procedure:

> Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us. […] Whenever we make up 'ideal languages' it is not in order to replace our ordinary language by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone's mind by thinking that he has got hold of the exact use of a common word. That is also why our method is not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but rather deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd appearance.
>
> When we say that by our method we try to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies, it is important that you should understand that the idea of an analogy being misleading is nothing sharply defined. […] The use of expressions constructed on analogical patterns stresses analogies between cases often far apart. And by doing this these expressions may be extremely useful. […] Every particular notation stresses some particular point of view. (*Blue Book*, in BB, pp. 27 f.)

These texts present, summarily, important indications regarding: (a) the origin of the disease and the difficulty of circumscribing it: the unrest caused

by certain linguistic analogies that bewilder us, by the idea that we know the truth about facts—or, the exact form of use of certain words—and, at the same time, the difficulty of defining exactly that analogical source of mistakes; (b) the therapy's operative procedure: repetitive and tedious presentation, but essential to the author, both of linguistic expressions of habitual uses, and also, and expressly, of unusual and apparently absurd uses; (c) how, with this procedure, one can expect that new aspects, or clarifying analogies, be stressed by the new linguistic expressions, thus making us pass from the question of the supposed knowledge of facts to the question of the sense of concepts.

One could say that, by proposing this new philosophical method of training to look in different directions, as it were, without thinking (cf. PI §66), and above all without proposing new theses by means of good arguments, Wittgenstein is striving to avoid the circle of infinite arguments directed against ever renewed arguments of the intellect—a circle the skeptic is well acquainted with, and traditional procedure of philosophy. In the case of philosophical therapy, on the contrary, it is an exercise mainly of the will to accept to relinquish certain images that confuse the intellect, since good arguments are not enough to do this—and may even, at times, stimulate new confusions. Thence the difficulty of theoretically situating the philosophical therapy: exercise of the will by means of arguments, albeit organized under the form of an 'album' and not linearly, with neither leaps nor repetitions. If we do not want to give up on arguments, they will have to be organized in a different way than they were by traditional philosophical argumentation, since the will shall not let itself be convinced by them: the 'album' is the form reached by Wittgenstein, after several attempts of producing a traditional book, without either leaps or gaps. The will was stronger than the intellect, but the latter fought bravely for at least sixteen years, until the final decision made by Wittgenstein to publish the texts organized in the form of an album, the *Philosophical Investigations* (cf. PI, *Preface*).

The uneasiness referred to by Wittgenstein, an unquiet caused by the belief that we know the truth, has its origin in the philosophical tendency to—or in the will to—base our thought on the paradigm of scientific activity, the knowledge of facts, and in our generalizing this paradigm to questions of sense. In this respect Wittgenstein says, in the same period:

> Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with
> the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of

natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. (*Blue Book*, in BB, p. 18)

This conceptual obscurity is accompanied by an uneasiness when we realize that we are not able to justify (*rechtfertigen*) the knowledge we claim to possess—as Augustin says about the knowledge we supposedly have of time *as long as* nobody asks us for explanations thereof (cf. PI §89). This uneasiness, of conceptual origin, might be accompanied, of course, by emotions, but these are not the target of the philosophical therapy; its target is the *pictures* (*Bilder*) stemming from the philosophical attitude that leads one to confuse questions of sense with questions of fact:

> Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphysics: that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it. A metaphysical question is always in appearance a factual one, although the problem is a conceptual one. (RPP vol. I, §949; cf. Z §458).

Now, as Wittgenstein says in 1931, this attitude pervading Western culture since Ancient Greece is not determined by a supposedly immutable nature of language—we are no longer in the essentialist universe of the *Tractatus*—but it is dependent on certain confusing and constant uses we make of our linguistic expressions, when we postulate metaphysical entities where there are but concepts—as, for example, when substantiating adjectives, as 'identical', 'true', 'false', etc., when rendering uniform such verbs that are very different, as 'being' and 'drinking', 'eating', etc., when making reference to time as if it was the flow of a river, etc. (cf. CV p. 22) Language is a form of life, and so the forms it might come to assume are unpredictable: the grammar of the uses shows the way it has been, and the therapeutic description strives to detect diseases that thought is overcome by, registering them in memory with the aim of presenting them in a panoramic view, as Wittgenstein will later say (PI §§125–127). Thus, in spite of their generality, Wittgenstein strives to treat these secular philosophical confusions of thought applying the therapeutic

method to individuals, and not abstractly. The condition for the individualized treatment is that each person must recognize the fact of being taken by the same confusions of the therapist, such as the latter shows it to be the case through self-therapy. Wittgenstein says, in the same year:

> I must be nothing more than the mirror in which my reader sees his own thinking with all its deformities & with this assistance can put it in order. (CV p. 25; MS 112: 22 November 1931)

This recognition depends on whether the resistances of the will are made to accept a change of viewpoint (cf. *Big Typescript* § 86 ff.), and for that there is no unique method, but different treatments, as different therapies (cf. PI § 133). The individualized application of the philosophical therapy explains, certainly, the 'album'-style taken by the PI, with its proliferation of different aspects of the same questions, and the polyphony of voices (cf. Moreno 2009), which stands in contrast to a linear argumentation, with neither leaps nor gaps (cf. PI, *Preface*).

Wittgenstein's new method consists, then, in trying to reproduce the diversity of forms that the secular conceptual confusions might take in each individual, through the therapeutic simulation of points of view that succeed one another in the polyphony of voices, proposing ever new objections to the interlocutors and presenting new solutions, questions and answers from new examples, up to a point of rupture, in which thematic leaps emerge in the self-therapeutic discourse. The diseases are, certainly, secular, albeit not universal, since they result from the praxis of language that remained unaltered. And the cure to those diseases is individualized, and does not pretend to be universal: it is a question of persuading the will of each individual to look at what is ahead of him, thereby liberating his thought from confusions he himself may have detected. The philosophical cure does not aim at eliminating beliefs of individuals, nor does it aim at teaching them new theses, but its goal is to change their will so they might think otherwise, according to criteria which are different from the habitual ones—in particular, differently from the scientificistic attitude. This seems to be the originality of the method. Wittgenstein notes in this respect, to his students:

> I don't try to make you <u>believe</u> something you don't believe, but to make you <u>do</u> something, you won't <u>do</u>. (MS 155, p. 42r).

I am not teaching you anything. I'm trying to persuade you to do something. (MS 158, p. 34r).

In this conceptual context, a new conception of picture (*Bild*) begins to be outlined, based on two results of Wittgenstein's reflection during the short period in question: on the one hand, the *model function* of the sample, as well as of other techniques of representation, for a non-hypothetical expression of the simple object, and, on the other hand, the idea of a therapy of *philosophical thought* which aims at persuading the *individual will* to admit other viewpoints on questions of sense, and thus breaks its one-sided diet (cf. PI § 93).

A Picture That Slowly Vanishes[2]

We can consider that the period between 1929 and 1932 corresponds to the beginning of Wittgenstein's self-therapy of the Augustinian picture of meaning, which was dominant in the *Tractatus*, namely:

> These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects— sentences are combinations of such names.—In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. (PI § 1).

Here we recognize the conception of language present in the *Tractatus*, now resumed by Wittgenstein with a self-therapeutic purpose. The cure was made through the exploration of the nature of the elementary proposition—as he announced this exploration in the 1929 article as being the difficult task which the theory of knowledge was just beginning to tackle (cf. SRLF p. 32). From this exploration resulted the discovery of several techniques of representation, different from the one made by the proposition, the picturing (*abbilden*). In particular those techniques that ascribe meaning to what they present by means of operations involving elements that are not words, but that exert the function of linguistic rules. Techniques that incorporate into language elements exterior to it, ascribing them the function of one of its instruments, which now operate as signs within these technical contexts. The important result of the self-therapy was, in this case, the conception of

paradigm, or better, of the set of techniques involving language and extra-linguistic elements allowing to build *models*, *rules* or *norms* to the application of words—for example, samples used for the application of words to colors, as well as standard objects to the application of the words 'meter' or 'sepia', and also associative tables between words and objects, or between words and words, etc., combined with ostensive gestures, as the pronunciation of words, of explanations, with the presentation of examples, etc. Such artifacts are used as linguistic instruments, or means of representation (*Mittel der Dar-stellung*), belonging to language. In this sense, Wittgenstein can then respond to the traditional philosophical question he was so concerned with in the *Tractatus*, about what *must* exist so that an object might have a name, claiming that it is not something outside language. On the contrary, it is something that belongs to it from the moment it is presented as norm to the application of a word as name: for example, the sample of a color to the name of the color, or the standard-meter to the names of measures, or the portrait to name the portrayed (cf. PI §50). What must exist is an instrument of language, for, if it exists without belonging to language, it might be anything or nothing (cf. PI §304).

The cure resulted, in this case, in the dissolution of confusions of the *Tractatus* regarding the links between language and world, between name and object—as well as of the difficulty to express non-hypothetically the simple without the aid of an untenable phenomenological language. Indeed, the construction of paradigms corresponds to a preparation (*Vorbereitung*) to the use of words (cf. PI §§26, 49, 290) because the paradigms just indicate the place of words in the language games and not everything that can be done with them (PI §§5 ff.); names are simply ascribed to objects (cf. PI §1, see the Augustinian model, and the examples in §§2 and 4). The introduction of the place of a word through a paradigm is not yet a 'move in a language game' (*ein Zug im Sprachspiel*) (PI §49), since we can neither 'talk about things' nor 'describe them' (PI §§26, 49) just with names; with the paradigm, all we do is to put 'labels' onto objects. The process of denominating (*Benennen*), or nam-ing, is a preparation to the descriptive use, which is when we can already talk about things. This conception of paradigm, as a preparatory linguistic tech-nique to the use of words, was clarifying to Wittgenstein, because it allowed him to 'disperse the fog' around the concept of meaning (PI, §5), in the same way as the 'clear and simple' language games, proposed as 'objects of com-parison', allow one to 'throw light on the relations of our language' (PI §130,

transl. modified). In both cases, we have situations in which one can see in a clearer way the links between sign and object, where 'one can command a clear and comprehensive view (*übersehen*) of the aim (*Zweck*) and functioning (*Funktionieren*) of words' (PI §5, transl. modified).

The idea to be stressed here is that the 'primitive' or 'preparatory' links between name and object are, in fact, links of sense established between signs, or better, between tools of language, and not empirical or metaphysical links between two different and irreducible domains of reality, i.e., between language and world. And these links are built within techniques we ourselves elaborate, conventional and non-necessary techniques that, however, engender necessity. Asking himself about the link between name and object, Wittgenstein will say that there is no 'one type-link', but rather 'different possibilities' for the language game (PI §§53–54), or, in other words, different possibilities of presentation of paradigms. The rules that establish the primitive, or preparatory links, can play different roles (*Rollen*), can be applied in different manners to the language games. These rules determine the initial limits to the building of sense and are its conventional fundament—we could say they are its paradigm. This was the result of the self-therapy initiated by Wittgenstein when exploring the nature of the elementary propositions of the perceptual field, in the article of 1929, and discovering, during the first half of the 1930s, the techniques of construction of paradigms that throw onto the world linguistic antennas incorporating facts into language—and no longer touching them from outside, as the *Tractatus* considered, regarding the elementary proposition. This is how Wittgenstein can state in the PI, about his former fascination for the metaphor of necessity, incorporated in our forms of expression—'it is not like this! but it must be like this!'—, and applied to the conception of proposition:

> A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. (PI §115)

He then indicates the path towards the cure:

> What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI §116)

By applying the therapeutic method to different areas of knowledge, Wittgenstein does not intend to build theories of objects—logical, mathematical,

psychological, linguistic, etc.—but, on the contrary, he intends to dissolve confusions originated when conceptual questions, relative only to sense, start to be treated as if they were questions of fact and knowledge. For example, when the mathematician begins from concepts and starts to make claims about the 'objectivity and reality of the facts of mathematics' (PI §254), and, consequently, regarding also the *knowledge* he has of those supposed facts.[3] Wittgenstein starts referring to these conceptual confusions as *images* (*Bilder*) from the mid-1930s on, in a way that is systematic enough to allow for the outline of a new conception of the concept of *Bild* that is already quite distant from the original *Tractatus* concept—with which, however, it does not cease to keep internal links.

There is an important proximity, to Wittgenstein, between the concepts of *concept* and *picture*, from the point of view of the functions we ascribe to them in the organization of the experience in general. The concepts correspond to 'a particular way' (*bestimmten Behandlung*) of organizing situations (*Sachlagen*) (RFM, V, §46), or to a 'technique of describing or of representing' (*Abbilden*) objects (RFM, V, §50), or, furthermore, to a 'practice' (RFM, V, §49); it is this practice that establishes the frame of reference with which 'objects are compared'. The concept is a frame of reference, an instrument the degree of precision of which may vary—a norm, in the case of Mathematics, a rule which only indicates a direction, in other cases—, which we establish by convention to organize experience. At this point appears the proximity between concept and picture: both are frames of reference with which we compare objects (RFM, V, §50). What, then, would be the specificity of the picture in respect to the concept? If the philosophical therapy bears on the images, we can ask ourselves if concepts would also be subjected to the same therapeutic cure. Let us then retrace the process of appearance and installation of the images in our thought and, above all, the reason why Wittgenstein sets out to apply his therapy to them.

The Emergence and Force of the Images

The images appear, according to Wittgenstein, when we misinterpret (*miss-deuten*) our everyday expressions and draw 'the queerest conclusions' (*die selt-samsten Schlüsse*) from them (PI §194). Let us first see some examples, provided by the philosopher himself, of everyday expressions, and of the corresponding

interpretations that cause no conceptual problems, and, then, of the confused interpretations that generate images.—Let us take the following five expressions:

1) The algebraic expression determines all numerical steps.
2) The order '+3' determines all steps from one number to the next.
3) When giving the order '+2' I knew one had to write 1002 after 1000. (PI §§ 187, 189)
4) The machine contains in itself all its possible movements. (PI §§ 193–194)
5) Reading is an activity that consists of rendering out loud something written or printed. (PI § 156)

When employed in everyday life, these expressions do not cause any problem, but they can become 'queer' (PI § 195) when interpreted philosophically, i. e., when language 'goes on holiday' (PI § 38). Let us see their everyday employment, which causes no conceptual problems, the employment in which language does not go round in a void:

1) People that learned the technique of calculus obtain, all of them, the same results, when they apply an algebraic formula. (PI §189)
2) The order '+3' determines entirely, for the people that learned this operative technique, 'the passage from one number to the next number', but not for those people who haven't learned the technique. (PI §198)
3) If someone had put the question when I gave that order, I could have answered correctly. (PI §187)
4) The movements of an empirical machine depend both on the form of construction and on the material with which it was built. (PI §§ 193 ff.)
5) To read is to do something that is different from what one does when one imitates reading or when one recites by heart, out loud, etc. (PI §§ 156, 178).

Let us now examine the images we build out of the same linguistic expressions:

1) The algebraic formula is an expression the meaning of which anticipates reality: it takes all the steps in 'a unique way' (*einer einzigartigen Weise*) (PI §188).
2 & 3) When giving the order '+3' or '+2' my thought actually traverses all the numerical steps, independently of their empirical realization (PI §§187–188).

4) The ideal machine already contains, in a 'queer way' (*in einer seltsamen Weise*), all its movements (PI §§ 194–195).

5) Reading is 'a special conscious activity of mind' (*eine besondere bewusste geistige Tätigkeit*) (PI § 156).

Now, these interpretations, according to Wittgenstein, invite us (*fordern*) to make a certain application (PI § 425), they lead us to determine sense (*Sinn*) in an 'unequivocal' (*eindeutig*) way (PI § 426), they contain a suggestion of application, namely, a 'normal' (*normalen*) case of application (PI §§ 139, 141); moreover, these interpretations seem to 'compel' to a certain application (PI § 141), to force our thought, driving it in an 'unequivocal' direction. In this sense, they can be considered as models, i. e., normative references with which we compare objects—as Wittgenstein says when putting them in parallel with concepts, calling them images (RFM V, § 50). The force of the images is manifested in the necessity we ascribe to them when we think that 'it is not possible to imagine the contrary' of what the picture suggests to us: for example, that 'my pain' may not be a private sensation, or that all bodies may not have extension (PI § 251), or that an object may not be identical to itself (PI §§ 80, 253), as well as the contrary of what the five images above, taken as examples, say.

The difficulty we have of 'imagining the contrary' of what a picture says does not stem from a limitation of the imagination. It is always possible to imagine the contrary of what a picture suggests, and this is precisely what Wittgenstein does with his method of variation of examples and, even, of creation of unusual and apparently meaningless examples. It is enough that we know what we have to do in order to imagine the contrary of what a picture says. In other words, we just have to know what the use of the expression 'to imagine the contrary of x' is, so that we can, without further difficulties and with good will, fulfill the operation of imagining 'non-x'. The fictitious experiences Wittgenstein suggests to us, show that the necessity ascribed to the images and the difficulty of imagining their contrary are just linked to the fact that, in our forms of life, there are no provisions of situations to the application of the linguistic expressions that are contrary to what the images say—which clearly does not imply that they could not as easily come to be part of other forms of life, or that they could not be applied in other everyday situations (see PG § 127; BGP, I, § 132; Z §§ 350, 351; LW, vol. I, §§ 202–205; PI §§ 140,141).

However, there emerges here another question: even if we are able to imagine, for example, that this object in front of us may not be identical to itself—in

case it changed constantly and randomly—, why will we persist, anyway, in considering the principle of identity necessary? Would there be any entity or any metaphysical principle that would oblige the intellect to accept the truth of what the picture says and to refuse to relinquish it, even though it is possible to imagine its opposite? Why would we still be held captive by the images, even after challenging their absolute necessity?

The difficulty we have in letting go of the images stems from their being founded on conventions with deep roots in our forms of life, for they regard the uses we make of language to express what makes sense to us. Even if we manage to imagine the contrary of the images, it is difficult to relinquish what they state, because they correspond to principles that organize our life and our thought, as, for example, the principle of identity, the idea that the algebraic formula and the machine already contain all the cases of their future applications, as well as the idea that thought apprehends immediately the whole meaning of a concept through the act of understanding, or even the picture that love, what matters, 'is not a feeling (*Gefühl*), but something deeper, which merely manifests itself in the feeling' (BPP, vol. I, §115). It is more difficult to change the will than the intellect. There emerges, then, the most significant question from the point of view of the philosophical therapy: for what reason should the philosopher intend to change the will regarding these images that are so important in our lives?

The problem with the images is their *metaphysical application*, or better, as Wittgenstein frequently points out, the confusing passage from conceptual questions, questions of sense, to questions of fact. The confusions appear when we respond to questions asked to us, regarding what we declare to know with certainty, looking outside language for the entities and objects suggested by the images. The images lead to interpretations with which the difficulties (*Schwierigkeiten*) *start*, instead of presenting solutions (PI §425), when we seek a 'closer inspection' (PI §171), 'to make subtle distinctions' (PI §§71, 78), to determine the 'peculiar' way, or the 'queer way' in which the algebraic formulas ideally carry out all the steps, or to determine how 'thought', 'to mean' (*meinen*) come to 'grasp in a flash' (*mit einem Schlag erfassen*) (PI §191) all the applications of a word or a mathematical formula, or how the object may be compared with itself to see its identity, as if by a fitting (*passen*) (PI §216), or, still, when we look for the well-determined mental processes to which the true act of reading, or the emotion of true love, correspond. In these cases, we arrive at difficulties without solution, for we have not been able to find what we think is the

good solution—and, even, what we believe is the necessary solution. We only have, as Wittgenstein puts it, 'the crossing of different pictures' (PI §191), confusing linguistic expressions—a 'super-expression', a 'philosophical superlative' (PI §§191, 89, 90).

At this point, we make another step, saying that the difficulty is temporary, and we forward its solution to a future moment in which, for example, the knowledge of the brain and of the nervous system will be more complete and will be able to indicate precisely the neuronal and psychophysical link corresponding to each one of the states of mind—a link that *must* exist (PI §§158, 308). The necessity of the picture, expressed in the *it must be like this*, guarantees our provisional satisfaction with the solution, pointing, in the future, to the discovery of such a 'link of reading' that must exist (PI §158) in order to tell the true reading from the false one, and, thus, to indicate the precise meaning of the concept, the object substituted by the word. Another way would be to build a philosophical system to solve the difficulty, as if it was an experiment with super-objects and super-concepts. In both cases, factual solutions are sought to conceptual difficulties, difficulties of sense: one seeks the object that the word substitutes, as if it was its meaning. Hence the interest of the therapeutic treatment of thought that must bear on the exclusivist, and therefore metaphysical, application of the referential model in respect to sense. In fact, we fail to notice that we use certain linguistic expressions as norms of sense and not as descriptions of facts, and this is why we never find the facts to which those expressions seem to point. We make language go round in a void when we search for facts when there are but concepts, and we do not see what is ahead of us and was built by ourselves.

The force of the Augustinian picture of language (PI §1) stems from our not admitting that words might be applied in different manners without there corresponding to them, in each application, a determined reference (PI §156) outside language. This is the secular use of language, going back to Ancient Greece, to which Wittgenstein refers. The exclusivist application of the referential model, like in the *Tractatus*, leads us to make 'subtle distinctions' between the true meanings—i.e., the concepts with reference and truth-value which are well-determined by the facts—and the vague or referenceless meanings—which one should discard as 'useless' (PI §§71, 78)—and to believe in the exclusive legitimacy of the exact concepts. The therapy bears on this application of the referential model, and not on the concepts: there is nothing to 'treat' (*behandeln*) as concepts are concerned, but only in

relation to the interpretations we make of their necessity, of their reality and their reference, through the images. We set out in search of chimeras, as Wittgenstein says, and, instead of sticking to concepts, we build super-objects.

Picture: From Hypothetical Model to Necessary Model

In this brief journey, we were able to appreciate the path run by the idea of *Bild* from the *Tractatus* onwards. The dominant idea was that of *Bild* as *logical representation* (*Abbildung*), characterized, on the one hand, by its *isomorphism* regarding reality, and, on the other hand, by its *hypothetical* form regarding the pictured facts. The proposition is the privileged case of *Bild* studied in the book, and it is considered as having essentially the form of a truth-function. The proposition as *Bild* is a model of reality by logical representation of what exists outside language.

From 1929 on, Wittgenstein discovers the logical specificity of perceptual space, and the inadequacy of the proposition, as truth-function, to represent the simple object given through the characteristic imprecision of perception. Wittgenstein compares, then, the proposition as *Bild* with other forms of representation, and discovers the existence of symbolic techniques that do not rest on the isomorphism with the represented facts, and at the same time are not hypothetical. Wittgenstein contrasts these forms of representation with the proposition because they do not rest on likenesses, but they ascribe identity to what they express: symbolic forms that, more than represent, *constitute* through language what they represent, such as painted pictures and samples. These symbolic forms start to be considered by Wittgenstein as paradigms, or models of reality that they present themselves; models used *linguistically* as norms of sense, and no longer as representation of what exists outside of its mode of representation, i. e., outside language. These symbolic forms are the links between language and word; they concentrate the material of which the elementary propositions are made, no longer hypothetical nor truth-functions of themselves. This is the step that led Wittgenstein to a new conception of *Bild*.

The new conception appears gradually during the course of the 1930s. The application of the word *Bild* corresponds, then, to the idea of a conventional and normative model of sense. This new function is exerted by propositions of a mixed nature, or better, in a descriptive way—propositions

that can not be falsified. It is the mixed nature of those propositions, according to Wittgenstein, that allows us to make the metaphysical step of looking for facts where there are but concepts. This step is the central theme of the philosophical therapy: the application of the referential model to those propositions when only their descriptive aspect is explored, covering up the conceptual aspect. It is easy to understand the reason for this secular procedure, since those propositions—also called 'grammatical' by Wittgenstein—seem to bring new information about the facts of the world. Actually, as the therapy shows us, they introduce rules of sense, they constitute meanings, but neither new knowledge of facts, nor knowledge of new facts. This is the point of the conceptual therapy.[4]

With this, it seems that we have arrived at a *grammatical* reinterpretation—in the pragmatical sense ascribed by Wittgenstein to this notion, of *use* (*Gebrauch*) of language—of the mysterious synthetic *a priori* propositions, that caused such a headache to the post-Kantian philosophical tradition.

Notes

1   Ramsey, in his paper 'Facts and Propositions', published in 1927, notes this same difficulty, of there being a contradiction between elementary propositions—for example, relative to colors—but that the formal logic should not be concerned with this kind of contradiction, for it is empirical and not formal (R. P. Ramsey 1978, in *Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics*, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1978).

2   We summarize here, in an abbreviated manner, some results of the book *Wittgenstein–through the pictures*, Ed. Unicamp, 2nd. edition, 1993, Campinas, São Paulo, Brazil.

3   Note that this same theme will be widely discussed in Wittgenstein's last writing, from the viewpoint of the relations between knowledge and certainty. In this text, we can appreciate an amplified application of the notion of picture presented in the PI, under the form of the concept of *Weltbild*: the system of reference for our certainties.

4   We would just like to mention that the final step in the conception of *Bild* will be made in the later 1940s, through the psychological concepts, and will be marked, in his last text *On Certainty*, by the grammatical therapy of the grammatical propositions themselves. In this text, the descriptive and normative functions of these propositions will no longer be ascribed to their mixed or ambiguous nature, but exclusively to the uses we make of them.

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