

**Philosophical Investigations 293:
Private versus Public Beetles¹**

Some years ago when I read Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka's book *Investigating Wittgenstein* I found their "most surprising, and ... most controversial, thesis", the thesis of "Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism, that is to say, the claim that for Wittgenstein there really were private event-like experiences, including pains and other such sensations" [p. 265]. At first I simply considered this to be an original but absolutely wrong interpretation of the *Philosophical Investigations*. It seemed to be not just a *courageous but daredevil interpretation* - as E. v. Savigny said in his *Wittgensteins "Philosophische Untersuchungen"* [Vol. I, p. 344]. But meanwhile I have observed - perhaps my attentiveness for these things has grown - that this thesis meets with approval by quite some people. Among these people there are some philosophers I highly estimate. Hence the matter seems to me worth dealing with in a serious manner.

I'm not surprised by the fact that some people *accept this thesis* ascribed to Wittgenstein, but by the fact that this thesis is *ascribed to Wittgenstein*. Therefore in the following it is not my main goal to argue against anybody's conviction that there are - in a philosophical or psychological sense - private sensations but

¹ A shorter German version of this essay appears in the Proceedings of th Conference ANALYOMEN, Saarbrücken 1998.

to argue against the thesis that this is the opinion of Wittgenstein inasmuch as his *meta-physical* positions are involved. However, I will strengthen my argument in such a way that it also attacks the weaker thesis that Wittgenstein's texts and especially *PI* 293, are compatible with the opinion ascribed to Wittgenstein by the Hintikkas.

As we know, our problem is first and foremost connected with the *Private Language Argument*, and meanwhile it is a widespread opinion - and in this I am in accordance with the Hintikkas - that the *PLA* has no self-contained standing in Wittgenstein's philosophy but, primarily, is a consequence, an application, of the argument on *Rule-Following*, developed in sections 143-242. Therefore, the Hintikkas say, we have to answer the question: "what are the language-games that connect our talk of private experiences to their subject matter and hence lend this talk its meaning?" [p. 246] Well, this question asks for a special kind of language-games but, at the same time, it makes a nice presupposition: to assume that there are private experiences! Again I agree with the Hintikkas - and I think, we all do so - that, following Wittgenstein, private languages are impossible. The point of disagreement is: I am a disciple of the "received view" - as the Hintikkas call it [cf. p. 246] - according to which Wittgenstein has simultaneously shown that there are no *private* languages and no *private* experiences, whereas the Hintikkas think that there are private experiences, solely the language about them cannot be private, has to be public (and they think that this is Wittgenstein's opinion, too). Thus, their slogan is: Wittgenstein does not criticize the *Cartesian metaphysics* but the *Cartesian semantics* [cf. p.250].

We also agree that Wittgenstein does not deny that we are able to speak about our own sensations, e.g., our own pains - and we do it in our normal, common language. But Wittgenstein states no *ontological thesis* about the existence or non-existence of sensations but shares with all of us and outside of all philosophy the opinion that there are sensations. Then, we could reformulate the disputed point: I think that there are sensations but they are not private, whereas the Hintikkas believe that our sensations are private.

Now, it may appear as if our discrepancy solely consisted in my usage of the words 'my sensations' (or 'our sensations') and the Hintikkas' usage of 'private sensations' or 'my private sensations'. I will argue that these different ways of using 'private' generate an important discrepancy in the understanding of language-games, and I will start with Wittgenstein's introduction of the problem of private languages in *PI* 243: "But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? - Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." Here, Wittgenstein construes a certain situation connected with a lot of assumptions; since we already have read the whole *PI* we know that this situation is construed for the sake of argument and later on will be shown as impossible, but let us look more cautiously at these assumptions: (1) There are *inner* experiences, sensations; this may be regarded as an *ontological thesis* (however, the word *inner* is connected with our concept of a

man, an individual, a person and, therefore, at least in some philosophical conceptions the thesis is not purely ontological). (2) Everyone can know his own sensations, but (3) another person cannot know the sensations of this person - these are *psychological* or *epistemological* assumptions - in our traditional understanding. (4) Everyone can refer with words to his own sensations - this belongs to the *philosophy of language*. And also (5): another person cannot understand this language for she does not know the reference of these sensation words.

I have already accepted the first assumption - on inner sensations - , but now, in connection with the other assumptions these inner sensations are also *immediate, hidden, private* sensations. It seems to me that there is a big muddle around the words *inner, hidden, private*; in some arguments one of these words may be substituted by the others, in other arguments this cannot be done; sometimes one word is used to define the others, sometimes the reverse is the case, but without declaring the terms as synonymous.

Therefore, I regard it as useful to follow Anthony Kenny in distinguishing two ways of using 'privacy': one meaning is *inalienable, belonging to me solely* ("Another person can't have my pains.", PI 253), the other use is *not communicable* (not expressible), *verifiable by me solely* ("only I can know whether I am really in pain", PI 246).

"Another person can't have my toothache." - In this sense my toothache is private; but for everyday psychology it is also a hidden and inner state or event. Another person also cannot have my blood circulation or my foot though both are not psychological entities and my foot is not even internal and, at least sometimes, is

not hidden. Wittgenstein construes fictitious situations in order to imagine how, even so, it could be that another person has my pains, my blood circulation, my foot. But these constructions require another language-game; in this new language-game we could not characterize these events or states as *private*, neither, however could we characterize them as *my pains* etc. Now, when we realize that these are grammatical declarations we need not get more upset about the privacy of my toothache than about the privacy of my foot.

My blood circulation is hidden, especially: my blood circulation is hidden to *me*. But let us assume: "I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer shews that my blood-pressure rises. So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result." [PI 270] Neither the privacy (the concealment) of the blood circulation is a philosophical problem for us, nor is the assumed ability to perceive its increase by means of certain perceptions (at least not in this context).

Another person, however, needs the manometer to determine changes in my blood circulation for my blood-pressure as well as my sensations are hidden to him. But also my foot and other parts of my body are hidden to him. And: that I cannot reveal the blood circulation in the same way as the foot, again, is not the philosophical problem we are worried about. It is another thing with the sensations; now this hiddenness is not the same as the one of the inner organs and of their changes of state in contrast to the external ones. Here, *concealment* and *internality* means something else: while my blood circulation is also hidden to me, this is not the case with my toothache. If we really want to maintain this

divergent use of *concealment* and *internality* which has to guarantee that my toothache is not *hidden to me but to you*, then there exists - I think - only one possible solution: My sensations are not hidden to me because *I'm myself inside my body*.

I am sure that *this is not Wittgenstein's solution*. And, therefore, there cannot be a solution in the sense of Wittgenstein which resorts to language-games and at the same time asserts the privacy, internality, concealment of sensations. - With respect to the concept of *language-games* we can now give a more precise account of the divergence to the Hintikkas; as I can see, there are two possible lines of argument against the existence of a private language:

- (1) It is wrong that a person and only this person knows the sensations of this person and is able to refer to these sensations by means of language.

Therefore:

- (1.1) It is wrong that a person knows his/her own sensations and is able to refer to them by means of language.

or

- (1.2) It is wrong that one person cannot know the sensations of another person (or cannot refer to these sensations by means of language).

- (2) Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations another person is able to understand the language this person uses to speak about those sensations.

And following Wittgenstein's description of this language of sensations in PI 243, we can split this into:

(2.1) Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations another person is able to establish the referential relation between the expressions this person uses and the sensations of this person and, therefore, to understand this language.

or

(2.2) Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations and also that another person cannot establish the referential relation between the expressions this person uses and the sensations of this person, another person can understand this language.

To put the position of the Hintikkas in its proper place we have to remember our agreement on the thesis of the impossibility of a private language. - By the way, the Hintikkas say: Wittgenstein "is not in reality arguing against the *possibility* of private languages in general, but against their *necessity* in the particular area of the language people use of their inner sensations and feelings". [p. 245, my italics] This would remarkably weaken their goal of argumentation. But at other places they speak clearly enough of the *impossibility* of a private language about sensations. [Cf. p. 242, 245] The main difference to the "received view" is the assumption that according to Wittgenstein "there really are private experiences, and there really are expressions naming them and referring to them" [p. 247]. But, to speak intersubjectively of these private experiences we need - as the Hintikkas say - a publicly available framework: the language about private experiences has to be a public language.

Thus, in our classification the position of the Hintikkas should be assigned to type (2): There are private experiences but another person can

understand the language a person uses to speak of them. - The further assignment to type (2.1) or (2.2) depends on the question of whether or not another person is able to relate the private experience of a person to the expressions used by that person to speak of his/her private experiences. For the Hintikkas again and again refer to *PI* 293, and since this passage is so beautiful let me quote it in its full length:

"If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the *one* case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that *he* knows what pain is only from his own case! - Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? - If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." [*PI* 293]

In addition to this passage the Hintikkas declare that Wittgenstein criticizes the wrong semantical paradigm, the "model of >object and designation<", for this model "results in rele-

gating the putative representative relationships between sensation-language and sensations entirely to the realm of the private and thus in rendering these relationships otiose. It is the privacy of these semantical relations, not the privacy of what is represented by their means, that Wittgenstein is criticizing." (p. 250) Thus, since these relations between the sensations and the expressions of sensations are not private we can assign the position of the Hintikkas to type (2.2). (They argue that there is a special kind of public language-game which fulfills the task of correlating sensations and their expressions - the *physiognomic* language-games.²

The Hintikkas have a strategy of argumentation which makes attacks against them more difficult in two respects: on the one hand they state that Wittgenstein still holds the *Tractatus* thesis of the ineffability of semantics but is never willing to utter - a la *Tractatus* - nonsensical sentences about semantical matters. Thus - they say - we have to add Wittgenstein's "unspoken assumptions" [p. 252] in order to realize that Wittgenstein *if he were willing* to speak in a realistic mode on private experiences and their properties, could say, "there *is* an actual beetle in each person's box visible only to that person" (p. 248] "Of course we cannot say in language that sensations and their ilk are private, according to Wittgenstein. But this is not the problem. It is only one of the consequences of the ineffability of semantics. The real question is: Are those philosophers right who say that *there are no private experiences* according to Wittgenstein?" [p. 265] Here, to get involved in a dispute would mean to make

² Cf. Richard Raatzsch's essay on PI 244 in this volume.

ontological derivations from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language instead of rejecting the question: not because of the ineffability of semantics but because of the irrelevance of the question to this kind of philosophy of language. (And, by the way, if there were nothing else to criticize, then it would be enough to qualify this argument about the "unspoken assumptions" and the counterfactual speech about what Wittgenstein would do if he could do what he cannot do as highly un-Wittgensteinian - the Hintikkas may be right or wrong in their thesis on private experiences but this has nothing to do with the late Wittgenstein.)

The other difficulty - connected with this one - is that the Hintikkas criticize the "received view" because there "private experiences disappear from the picture" [p. 246], solely public behavior remains, whereas Wittgenstein's problem according to them is to say in what way it is possible to speak intersubjectively on private experiences within a public language-game. [Cf. p. 246, 247f.] Naturally, this would shift the topic of our discussion: the *privacy* of the experiences is assumed already, therefore, an attack on *private* psychological experiences challenges the existence of the psychological experiences. Thus, we have to be careful not to slip from the level of philosophy of language into making psychological, epistemological, ontological statements about the existence of experiences etc., and at the same time we have to be careful not to challenge the existence of psychological experiences together with the *privacy* of these experiences. (The reproach of behaviorism is not new: "The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of

the use of the word >to remember<. We say that this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is." [PI 305] "'Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction? - If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction." [PI 307])

Now, our argument against the Hintikka interpretation has to contain two things: on the one hand we have to attack the thesis that according to Wittgenstein there are private psychological experiences. And, when this is done and we are content with it, we cannot confine ourselves to it: We also have to challenge that our public language functions in the way the Hintikkas describe, for our result, after all, ought to be that the Wittgensteinian concept of a language-game is not neutral with respect to the question whether or not there are private psychological experiences.

Provided that we agree in the position that the question of the *privacy* of experiences is not to be put and to be answered as an epistemological or ontological question but as a question of philosophy of language - and this is what I will do in the following - we can start with PI 246: "In what sense are my sensations *private*? - Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. - In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain. - ... It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I *know* I am in Pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I *am* in pain?" [PI 246]

This could be the place, now, to show how Wittgenstein in the following passages argues against the privacy of sensations [cf., e.g., sections 247 - 252, 272 - 280] but I will concentrate on what the Hintikkas offer as evidence of the privacy of sensations. They quote *PI* 272: "The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have *this* or something else. The assumption would thus be possible - though unverifiable - that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another." [*PI* 2] I am sure this is *not* direct evidence for private sensations as the Hintikkas believe [cf. p. 265f.] but just the opposite: *if* there are private sensations of red and *if* they differ, then this does not play any role in our use of the word *red*. And this is not so because of our adherence to a certain conception in the philosophy of language but because in our language-game this distinction does not appear! And: if anyone believes that, e.g., red-green color-blindness plays a role in special language-games, he surely is right but should be reminded that this phenomenon can play a role just because it is not private.

And the Hintikkas also misinterpret *PI* 271, which is about the case suggested by Wittgenstein's fictitious opponent of someone who cannot keep in mind what the word *pain* means and therefore again and again calls different things *pain*. They believe that Wittgenstein wants to indicate "that comparisons between my own experiences at different times are also problematic" [p. 248]. But to take part in the language-game I neither need the ability to compare my recollections of private experiences nor methods to increase the accuracy of the comparison; Wittgenstein finishes 271 with: "a wheel that can

be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism" [PI 271].

I could present also other misunderstandings: assumed examples of private experiences or of the naming of private experiences [cf. PI 257, 261, 265, 270, 384] are misinterpreted by regarding the speech of the fictitious opponent as Wittgenstein's own position; often Wittgenstein uses words or phrases belonging to the opponent's usage for the sake of argument - and the Hintikkas regard this as acceptance of this usage; they regard Wittgenstein's willingness to speak of *inner* experiences as an admission of the existence of *private* experiences etc. [cf. pp. 249f., 259, 260f.].

And now, let us make - together with Wittgenstein - a concession to the opponent: there are private psychological experiences. What could be the public framework that gives the language community the possibility to speak of these experiences? The Hintikkas refer to PI 244: "How do words refer to sensations? - There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? - of the word 'pain' for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensations and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour." [PI 244] The Hintikkas think that such language-games "can lend our talk of pains and other sensations its meaning" [p. 257] and say: "This is an apt example of one kind of public framework which ... enables

different persons to compare their respective sensations". [Ibid.] The last sentence which the Hintikkas quote from PI 244 - "They teach the child new pain-behaviour." - was strictly speaking too much; it goes together with the next sentence which they, for good reasons, did not quote: "'So you are saying that the word >pain< really means crying?' - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it." [PI 244] Inasmuch as the linguistic pain behavior solely is a substitute for the natural, spontaneous, pain behavior, it is not a report on pains, has not the state of a description. Wittgenstein gives us an example of drilling linguistic pain behavior, not of the comparison of private pains. If the original pain behavior of the child (and also that of the animal) can give us information about its pain then also the new one (which the animal cannot learn) can do it; but inasmuch as the new, linguistic pain behavior solely substitutes the old one, it cannot teach us *more* about the state of the child than the old. Therefore, if we liked to speak on the concealment of pains we should do this already with reference to the child's original pain behavior. And, if we here cannot find any philosophical problem we should not look for it in the case where the new behavior solely substitutes the old one.

We will not deny the existence of pains, nor do we in the case when the child has not yet mastered linguistic pain behavior. After all: If the child cannot say it, "but at least it could point to the place where it has the pains; if a child is able to cry so much then just as well it can point" - says Karl Valentin [p. 32 - my transl.]. Or is he wrong? He is wrong, if indisputably the child *has* pains but *does not know* them, and if the new pain behavior cannot teach us more about the state of the child but can

teach *the child* something, namely, to speak about its pains. ("William James, in order to shew that thought is possible without speech, quotes the recollection of a deaf-mute, Mr. Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had thoughts about God and the world. - What can he have meant? - Ballard writes: 'It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: how came the world into being?' - Are you sure - one would like to ask - that this is the correct translation of your wordless thought into words?" PI 342]

When the child has learned this linguistic pain behavior then the possibility arises of concealing or pretending pains by using forms of natural or linguistic pain behavior as signs, symptoms of pain. This is the child's socio-cultural learning (which the animal cannot acquire: for such behavior it lacks the proper surroundings). [Cf. PI 250] If privacy, concealment could play a role at all, then here. To learn to conceal or pretend sensations cannot change the *ontological* state of these pains but, perhaps, the grammar of the word *pain*. If someone thinks that this case could support the thesis of the privacy of sensations he is in disagreement with Wittgenstein, also in the case of pretence: "from a person's behaviour you can draw conclusions not only about his pain but also about his pretence." [LW, 1, 901]

We agree with the Hintikkas: the grammar of the word *pain* is "constituted by a language-game which essentially includes, over and above having certain sensations, also their normal spontaneous expressions" [p. 264] Nevertheless, here "having *certain* sensations" cannot indicate

a comparison whether or not the same (private) experience is given.

It is correct, also, that Wittgenstein in *PI* 270 (and elsewhere, too) rejects the question whether I have properly recognized my experience [cf. p. 264]. The Hintikkas go on with the following: "Before the correlation (between my sensations and the correlated public expression, Ph.) has been established, there is nothing to know or to make a mistake about. After it has been established, the connection between the public correlate and the sensation is not subject to epistemic mistakes, because it is a conceptual connection." [Ibid.] However, where error is impossible there truth and knowledge also are impossible! "It can't be said of me at all ... that I know I am in pain." [*PI* 246] I am in pain. - That I cannot be wrong in identifying my sensations, that is because I do not identify them! Therefore, from here you cannot clear the path to the comparison of sensations of different persons assumed as private and you cannot clear the way to the comparison of these sensations with public behavior.

Now, we can come back to the famous beetle example of *PI* 293. The Hintikkas argue: "Our opponents could try to defend their position by saying that by a rejected private object they mean something that is *logically* impossible for others to witness. But suppose it were logically impossible for others to see my beetle in my box, but that I could compare it with public beetles outside the box. Why could I not then speak of my beetle and also of yours? ... it is compatible with Wittgenstein's ideas to imagine ... a situation in which each person has access only to his or her own beetle, but that beetle-owners can nevertheless happily converse with each other about their pets by relating their

own beetle to suitable public objects of comparison." [p. 266] And as an answer to the objection that in this case it would be impossible for the other to verify my comparisons of my private beetle and the public beetles they declare: "There are public ways of checking my skill and veracity in making such comparisons, such as testing my eyesight, calling character witnesses, administering lie detector tests, etc." [Ibid.] Well, these public control procedures exist just there where I am comparing *public* beetles with each other, and not in the case of comparing them with my *private* beetle. And: with one exception the examples of control procedures are procedures of testing my *veracity*; I am sure, there are many everyday situations in which it is useful to know whether or not somebody is sincere, but this is not the way to solve *philosophical* problems. Isn't it a quite ridiculous proposal to test my eyesight? As if I, perhaps, could see the public beetles blurred solely and as if because of this all the philosophical trouble occurred - or do they really want to test my aptitude to see sharply my inner, private beetles?!

However, more important is another thing: *there are no public beetles!* The Hintikkas still have the aim of upholding the distinction between my private sensation of pain and my public pain behavior. No doubt, both are conceptually connected, but if there were no difference the private sensations of pain would get lost. This must be true for another person too, so that I can compare my *private* pain sensations with his *public* pain behavior, solely, and not with his *public* pain sensations. Let me remind you, Wittgenstein's construction is: "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is

only by looking at *his* beetle." [PI 293] Let us not be seduced by the fact that we indeed know various public beetles, may-bugs, lady-birds, stag-beetles, etc.; and if someone comes back from the forest and tells us about a beetle never seen before, then there really is a framework which allows us to put the right questions. But in Wittgenstein's example it has to be no lie, naturally, when everybody says, he knows what a beetle is, only by looking at *his* beetle.

Therefore, the following interpretation is misleading at least: Eike von Savigny who gives an interpretation of PI 293, with which I agree on all other points, argues on the section 293-sentences "Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing." [PI 293] with the following words: "A continually changing thing cannot be distinguished from a series of different things, and the box - sometimes or always - could be empty, for what the argument can set forth for any series 'beetle - fly - bee - louse - ...' it can also set forth for the series 'contains a beetle - contains a fly - contains nothing - contains a louse - ...' etc." [Savigny, p. 342 - my transl.] It is correct that a changing thing, different things and nothing in the box may play the same role - and here, together with Wittgenstein and for the sake of argument, we speak in a realistic manner - but then if I were looking into my inside I could not distinguish the changing thing from different things and, therefore, if I have no reasons to exchange the names for the changing thing, I also have no reasons to name the different things by different names *beetle*, *fly*, *bee*, etc. These different names used by Savigny indicate the possibility of a comparison with outer things. Just this, howev-

er, cannot be done.

To avoid such misunderstandings let us call what we are talking about not *beetle* but *teeble*. Another person tells me: "My teeble is sharp." (Compare, at least in German: "Ein spitzer Schmerz" - "A sharp pain".) And I ask him: "*Sharp* like what? Like a needle? At one end or at both?" Here something goes wrong! The correct answer would be: "*Sharp* in the mode as *teebles* sometimes are." But in our example this answer is not permitted for I have to compare my private *teeble* with outer *beetles* or other outer things. Therefore, it is also not permitted to answer "*Sharp* like your teeble the other day." for I cannot compare my private *teeble* with your private *teeble*. - Nevertheless, I like these answers and, therefore, let us turn the whole matter upside down: these answers are permitted, for we know many *teebles*, especially, I know yours. The pains are not private, are not hidden, but, naturally, they exist! And often we know the pains of another person, though *he* sometimes hides them, for: what he cannot do is to hide his pains *systematically*! - This is a *grammatical* declaration.

Now, let me sum up my argument: I assigned the position of the Hintikkas to type (2.1) "Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations another person is able to establish the referential relation between the expressions this person uses and the sensations of this person and, therefore, understands this language". I argue that this position is wrong; I will not argue against type (2.2) "Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations and also another person cannot establish the referential relation between the expressions this person uses and the sensations of this person, another person can understand this

language". I had logical reasons, solely, to present this mysterious position. Thus, I plead for type (1), especially I sustain position (1.2) "It is wrong that another person cannot know the sensations of a person"; then - together with other premisses - it can be concluded that (1.1) "It is wrong that a person knows his/her own sensations and is able to refer to them by means of language" itself is wrong - I am able to refer to my sensations *because* other persons according to (1.2) can do it. But, this discussion needs another paper.

Finally, if my interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is correct, then Wittgenstein's position in the following sense is not neutral with respect to the thesis that there are private psychological events or states: There is no argumentation about the formation and the functioning of language-games which uses this thesis and is compatible with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. - Certainly, one could keep up the "thesis on Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism" if he were to add that this is one of Wittgenstein's private, hidden attitudes.

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