Surveyable Representations, the "Lecture on Ethics", and Moral Philosophy

Benjamin De Mesel

Abstract


I argue that it is possible and useful for moral philosophy to provide surveyable representations (as the later Wittgenstein understands the concept) of moral vocabulary. I proceed in four steps. First, I present two dominant interpretations of the concept “surveyable representation”. Second, I use these interpretations as a background against which I present my own interpretation. Third, I use my interpretation to support the claim that Wittgenstein’s “Lecture on Ethics” counts as an example of a surveyable representation. I conclude that, since the lecture qualifies as a surveyable representation, it is possible to provide surveyable representations of moral vocabulary. Fourth, I argue that it is useful for contemporary moral philosophy to provide surveyable representations, because it may help to dissolve problems in current debates. I provide an example of such a debate, namely, the debate between cognitivists and non-cognivitists.

Keywords


Wittgenstein Ludwig; surveyable representation; ethics; moral philosophy; Lecture on Ethics

Full Text:

Fulltext PDF

References


De Mesel, B., 2015. “De Semantische Uniformiteit van het Morele. Over een Vooronderstelling in de Hedendaagse Metaethiek” [“The Semantic Uniformity of Morality. On an Assumption in Contemporary Metaethics”] Tijdschrift voor Filosofie (forthcoming).

Diamond, C., 1996. “Wittgenstein, Mathematics and Ethics. Resisting the Attractions of Realism”. In: H. Sluga and D. G. Stern, ed. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 226-260.

Diamond, C., 2002. “What if x isn’t the number of sheep? Wittgenstein and Thought-Experiments in Ethics”. Philosophical Papers 31, pp. 227-250.

Eldridge, R., 1987. “Hypotheses, Criterial Claims, and Perspicuous Representations. Wittgenstein’s ‘Remarks on Frazer’s The Golden Bough’”. Philosophical Investigations 10, pp. 226-245.

Gill, M., 2008. “Metaethical Variability, Incoherence, and Error”. In: W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. 2008. Moral Psychology. Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, pp. 387-401.

Gill, M., 2009. “Indeterminacy and Variability in Meta-Ethics”. Philosophical Studies 145, pp. 215-234.

Glock, H.-J., 1996. “Overview”. In: H.-J. Glock. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 278-283.

Hacker, P. M. S., 1996. Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hacker, P. M. S., 2001. “Developmental Hypotheses and Perspicuous Representations. Wittgenstein on Frazer’s Golden Bough”. In: P. M. S. Hacker., 2001. Wittgenstein. Connections and Controversies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 74-97.

Hutchinson, P., and Read, R., 2008. “Toward a Perspicuous Presentation of ‘Perspicuous Presentation’”. Philosophical Investigations 31, pp. 141-160.

Hutto, D., 2007. “Getting Clear about Perspicuous Representations: Wittgenstein, Baker and Fodor”. In: D. Moyal-Sharrock, ed. 2007. Perspicuous Presentations. Essays on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 299-322.

Johnston, P., 1991. Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. London/New York: Routledge.

Kelly, J., 1995. “Wittgenstein, the Self, and Ethics”. The Review of Metaphysics 48, pp. 567-590.

Kuusela, O., 2008. The Struggle against Dogmatism. Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy. Cambridge (Mass.)/London: Harvard University Press.

Loeb, D., 2008. “Moral Incoherentism: How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit Out of a Semantic Hat”. In: W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. 2008. Moral Psychology. Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, pp. 356-385.

Monk, R., 1991. Wittgenstein. The Duty of Genius. London: Vintage.

Richter, D., 1996. “Nothing to be Said. Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian Ethics”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 35, pp. 243-256.

Schmitz, B., 2006. “Grammatical Propositions”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 71, pp. 227-249.

Schroeder, S., 2004. “The Demand for Synoptic Representations and the Private Language Discussion. PI 243-315“. In: E.

Ammereller and E. Fischer, eds. Wittgenstein at Work. Method in the Philosophical Investigations. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 147-169.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W., 2009. “Mixed-Up Meta-Ethics”. Philosophical Issues 19, pp. 235-256.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W. and Wheatley, T., 2012. “The Disunity of Morality and Why It Matters to Philosophy”. The Monist 95, pp. 355-377.

Wisnewski, J., 2007. Wittgenstein and Ethical Inquiry. London: Continuum.

Wittgenstein, L., 1966. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 1969. The Blue and Brown Books. Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 1993. Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951. Edited by J. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

Wittgenstein, L., 1998. Philosophical Remarks. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 1998. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 1998. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume II. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 2004. Zettel. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 2005. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York/London: Routledge.

Wittgenstein, L., 2006. Culture and Value. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L., 2009. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.


Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.


Bookmark and Share