Using XML to generate research tools for Wittgenstein scholars by collaborative groupwork


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  Brief an Russell, datiert mit [vor 20.1.1913]    
  In seinem Brief an Russell, datiert mit [vor 20.1.1913] schreibt Wittgenstein:

I have changed my views on "atomic" complexes: I now think that Qualities, Relations (like Love) etc. are all copulae That means I for instance analyse a subject-predicate prop, say, "Socrates is human" into "Socrates" & "Something is human["] (which I think is not complex). The reason for this, is a very fundamental one: I think that there cannot be different Types of things! In other words whatever can be symbolized by a simple proper name must belong to one type. And further: every theory of types must be rendered superfluous by a proper theory of the symbolisme: For instance if I analyse the prop. Socrates is mortal into Socrates Mortality & (E x, y) e1 (x, y) I whant a theory of types to tell me that "Mortality is Socrates" is nonsensical, because if I treat "Mortality" as a proper name (as I did) there is nothing to prevent me to make the substitution the wrong way round. But if I analyse (as I do now) into Socrates & (E x) x is Mortal or generally into x & (Ex) phi (x)* it becomes impossible to substitute the wrong way round, because the two symbols are now of a different kind themselves. What I am most certain of is not however the correctness of my present way of analysis, but of the fact that all theorys of types must be done away with by a theory of symbolisme showing that what seem to be different kinds of things are symbolised by different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another's places. I hope I have made this fairly clear! [...] *Props which I formerly wrote e2 (a, R, b) I now write R(a, b) & analyse them into a, b, & (E x, y) R (x, y)