

A. Pichler, S. Säätelä:
Introduction to Wittgenstein

Lecture 4 12.9.2023:

- From the Tractatus to the PI
- Wittgenstein's later philosophy: Focus on behaving and acting

From the Tractatus to the PI

1. Meaning revisited – and re-defined: from reference to rules; from rules to acting and practice
2. From philosophical concepts to everyday language
3. From linear and gapless series to ...

1.

Meaning:

If not reference – what is it then?

If meaning (incl. sense and reference) and truth are not established through the elementary proposition that (through its simple names) connects with the world - what is it then that gives our language and thought meaning and truth?

From reference to rules

- *Tractatus*: Sense comes from **elementary propositions** consisting of **names** which (in the context of the proposition) **refer** to simple objects in the world.
- If there are no such elementary propositions – how can sense and reference be accounted for?
- "Middle period": Meaning is established through language-internal **rules** rather than language-external **reference**.
 - The meaning of a sentence does not come from reference to objects, but from a system of linguistic rules.

➤ **NB: RE-DEFINITION OF «MEANING»!**

The chess analogy: Rules

The meaning of chess figures is given by rules:

- The chess figure is part of a game with **rules**. Its meaning does not come from a relation of representation (picture theory!), but from a chess-internal system of **rules**. What would a chess figure represent / refer to? The **rules** for what we can (when playing chess) do with a chess figure are purely conventional and not bound by reference to ontological entities. What would it mean that the chess rules are bound by «reality»?



- Meaning is ruled by **rules**.

The chess analogy: Rules

Words are like chess figures in several aspects:

- Words are part of a game with **rules** - which also means that they are part of an activity (→ «language **game**»).
- A word's meaning does not depend on reference / representation, but on the language game internal **rules**.
- The **rules** for how to use words are purely conventional and not bound by reference to ontological entities.
- Language is autonomous and independent of the world.

From rules to practice*

- The "Meaning is rules"-view can be challenged on the basis of the "Rules regress" and the "Authority regress" problems.
 - Rules regress: If not through reference to the language-external world – where do the words and sentences get their meaning from? From rules. But *what rules the rules?* Other rules. Other rules? What is it that rules the rules which rule the rules? Again other rules? ...?
 - Authority regress: Who decides, *which* rules to adopt? Who decides which are the rules we should agree upon? And which changes are permitted? Even if rules are conventional – don't we still need an authority to approve of the convention, or to approve of its change? Where does such authority come from? ... ?
- "Primacy of practice", "Meaning is use"

* See A. Newen & E. von Savigny, *Analytische Philosophie: Eine Einführung*, 1996; p. 92f

- The *Tractatus* has largely been a product of thinking about what it is that must be the case if there is to be meaning, sense, truth, reference ...
- PI §66: Don't think, but look!
- Look at what?
 - At the language game
 - At the language game – as it is embedded in life

PI: Not logic; not reference; not even meaning and rules - but **practice** comes first

- Meaning, rules and authority are established by
 - **our practices** (linguistic and other)

- Language is
 - **an activity**
 - embedded in **social practices**
 - embedded in **(forms of) life** (PI §19:....
And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.)

A certain picture ...

A certain picture of the human language ...

PI §1: (...) the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names. (...) Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

– This was the picture endorsed by the *Tractatus*

- **There is more to language than reference only**
- **It is *speakers* who refer to things, not words**
 - The human agent
 - Cf. PI §1: Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. ...

1. Focus on action rather than meaning

PI §1:

Now think of the following use of language: I **send** someone shopping. I **give** him a slip marked "five red apples". He **takes** the slip to the shopkeeper, who **opens** the drawer marked "apples"; then he **looks up** the word "red" in a table and **finds** a colour sample opposite it; then he **says** the series of cardinal numbers—I **assume** that he knows them by heart—up to the word "five" and for each number he **takes** an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—**It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.**—"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"—Well, I **assume** that he **acts** as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used.

2. Focus on **use**

- If meaning is tied to action, then one method for dealing with philosophical problems arising from questions of meaning is to pay attention to actual **use** of language in action.
- Studies of how words actually are used in contexts of action become key to the method of philosophy!
 - For any use there is a *context* of action
 - Variety and multiplicity: Not *one* "general form of proposition"; not *one* meaning of "simple" ...
 - Use in **ordinary language**
 - NB: Surface grammar vs. Depth grammar
- Focus on concrete examples of use in action
- Focus on the role of examples for learning language, communication – even «basic concepts» (see PI §208)

PI preface

Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.

2.

From philosophical concepts
to everyday language

Tractatus

- 1) Philosophical problems come from not seeing / misunderstanding the depth structure of our language.
- 2) In order to correctly see and understand the the depth structure of our language, we need

- logical analysis and notation

and terminology / exact concepts / a controlled vocabulary for

- Bedeutung, Sinn, Abbildung, Bild, Satz, Gedanke, Zeichen, Symbol, Einfachheit, Vollständigkeit, Bestimmtheit, Analysierbarkeit, einfacher Name, einfacher Satz, zusammengesetzter Satz, logischer Operator, logische Operation, logische Möglichkeit, logische Notwendigkeit, logische Unabhängigkeit, Allgemeinheit, Tautologie, Kontradiktion, Wahrheit, Wahrheitsfunktion, Wahrheitswert, einfacher Gegenstand, Komplex, Sachverhalt, Tatsache, sagen, zeigen, sinnvoll, sinnlos, unsinnig ...

... i.e. an entire system of terms, definitions etc.!

Later Wittgenstein

- 1) Philosophical problems come from not seeing / misunderstanding the depth structure of our language.
 - 2) In order to correctly see and understand the depth structure of our language, we need nothing more than to see and to understand the depth grammar of *everyday* language, and to acknowledge that philosophical language becomes *philosophical* language and produces philosophical problems simply by unjustly *deviating* from the depth grammar of everyday language
 - 3) In order to understand the depth grammar of *everyday* language, we need to see it together with the learning of language, behaving, acting, interacting, and form of life.
 - 4) Philosophical terminology is part of the problem – not part of the solution!
- Leave philosophical terminology behind!
- The *Tractatus* concept of *Bedeutung*, which by the *Tractatus* was conceived as part of the solution to philosophical problems, is really itself part of the problem, and rather than dissolving it, re-iterates and continues it by misleading into new philosophical problems.

PU §1

... Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked "apples"; then he looks up the word "red" in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—up to the word "five" and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words.—"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?"—Well, I assume that he *acts* as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.—**But what is the meaning of the word "five"?**—**No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used.**

PI §1

- Language has to be *learned!*
 - See already TLP 4.02, 4.024.
- Meaning is much more than reference only.
- Language is tied to action - and substantially itself acting.
- The locus of language is the *language game*.
- The philosopher should, instead of focusing on philosophical (and often highly technical!) concepts («Sinn», «Bedeutung», «Wahrheit» ...), look at the actual speaking and acting = the language game!
- The language game is the new home of meaning and truth

... against the background of my old way of thinking

TLP philosophy of language	PI
?	Persons, humans (PI §1)
?	Body language (PI §1)
?	Human behaviour (PI §244)
?	Human acting (PI §1)
?	Examples (PI §1)
?	Real, everyday language and life (PI §§1, 108, 156, 241)
?	Life, biology (PI §§19, 23, 142, 441, 472; PI II xii / §365f)
The general form of proposition	Many kinds of sentences (PI §23)
The simple objects as perennial «substance of the world»	(Synchronic and diachronic) variation (PI §§ 11, 12, 14, 18, 23)
The problem of the nature of the proposition	Many problems (PI §133)
Logical analysis	Many methods (PI §133)
Reference	Use (PI §§ 1, 43, 432)
Determinacy and exactness	Vagueness and open-endedness (PI §§ 18, 66f, 71, 133)
Linear ladder structure	Criss-cross album structure (PI preface, §68)

3.

From linear and
gapless series to ...

PI preface

The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things. I have written down all these thoughts as *remarks*, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject, while I sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another.—It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I pictured differently at different times. But the essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another **in a natural order and without breaks**. [*dass darin die Gedanken von einem Gegenstand zum andern in einer natürlichen und lückenlosen Folge fortschreiten sollten*].

After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. ... And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction. ... **Thus this book is really only an album.**

G. Frege: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol. 1, 1893: Einleitung

„Durch die **Lückenlosigkeit** der Schlussketten wird erreicht, dass jedes Axiom, jede Voraussetzung, Hypothese, oder wie man es sonst nennen will, auf denen ein Beweis beruht, ans Licht gezogen wird; und so gewinnt man eine Grundlage für die Beurtheilung der erkenntnistheoretischen Natur des bewiesenen Gesetzes. ... Herr Dedekind sagt oft nur, dass der Beweis aus den und den Sätzen folge; er gebraucht Pünktchen, wie in „M(A, B, C, ...)“; nirgends ist bei ihm eine Zusammenstellung der von ihm zu Grunde gelegten logischen oder andern Gesetze zu finden, und wenn sie da wäre, hätte man keine Möglichkeit, zu prüfen, ob wirklich keine andern angewendet wären; denn **dazu müssten die Beweise nicht nur angedeutet, sondern lückenlos ausgeführt sein. ... Und worin ich seinen Werth nicht zum geringsten Theile sehe, die strenge Lückenlosigkeit der Schlussketten wird ihm, wie ich fürchte, wenig Dank einbringen.**“

“Lückenlos”, “Album” ... → Formfragen

Wittgenstein cared about the *form (gestalt)* of his works. Some claim that it is important (important for understanding his *philosophy*) that we pay close attention to the specific *gestalt* each of his philosophical works received. That it, for example, is important to see that the *Tractatus* received the *gestalt* of a *hierarchical tree*, ... or of a *ladder*.

How to read the Tractatus?

- 1 The world is everything that is the case.
- 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- 1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being *all* the facts.
- 1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.
- 1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
- 1.2 The world divides into facts.
- 1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same.
- 2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
- ...


[Quotations from Wittgenstein are marked blue.
If not indicated otherwise, the Ramsey & Ogden translation of the Tractatus is quoted.]

See the author's own note about the Tractatus' decimal numbering

The decimal figures as numbers of the separate propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the emphasis laid upon them in my exposition. The propositions $n.1$, $n.2$, $n.3$, etc., are **comments** on proposition No. n ; the propositions $n.m1$, $n.m2$, etc., are **comments** on the proposition No. $n.m$; and so on.

Linear vs. "tree"-reading (Bazzocchi 2010)

<http://www.bazzocchi.com/wittgenstein/tractatus/>



- 1.1 is a branch of 1 and should therefore be read as a *comment* on 1;
- 5.631 is a branch of 5.63 and should therefore be read as a *comment* on 5.63;
- 5.64 is on the same hierarchical level as 5.63 and should therefore (rather than 5.631) be read as the continuation of 5.63
- 6.54 is a branch of 6.5 and should therefore should be read as a *comment* on 6.5; etc. etc.

See also the Iowa Tractatus map at <http://tractatus.lib.uiowa.edu/>

«Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* consists of a series of numbered remarks, arranged in numerical order. The seven most important are numbered 1 to 7; decimal numbers are used to indicate the structure of the supporting paragraphs. A footnote, attached to the first remark, tells the reader that

The decimal figures as numbers of the separate propositions indicate the logical importance of the propositions, the emphasis laid upon them in my exposition. The propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc., are comments on proposition No. n; the propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc., are comments on the proposition No. n.m; and so on....

The site is built around a subway-style map, with the aim of displaying the overall structure of the numbering system, and making it easy to look at the sequences of propositions described in the introductory footnote, together with the remark that they comment on.»

Does it make a difference?

- Reading the *Tractatus* linearly, you will read #2 probably much later than in the case when you approach the *Tractatus* tree- or subway- or ladder-wise.
- If you read the *Tractatus* tree- or subway- or ladder-wise, you will also read the target of many references by "this", "here" ... differently.

Example from Bazzocchi (Kirchberg 2012 paper)

- **5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm).**
- 5.631 ...
- 5.632 ...
- 5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.
- 5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this. ...
- 5.634 **This** is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is. Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a priori order of things.
- **5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.**
- 5.641 ...

See Hacker 2015

- “The book was constructed as a logical tree, with propositions 1 to 6 as the basic propositions. From these, various branches are constructed as numerical sequences (e.g. 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). From each of these nodes further branches stem. Bazzocchi demonstrates that the book was not meant to be read linearly (as we all read it), but sequentially. This renders the argument of the book perspicuous, illuminates the anaphoric references, makes clear the dependence of proposition 7 on 6, rather than on 6.54. It shows that the conception of the book as a 526-rung ladder, as suggested by the American Wittgensteinians, is misguided.”

P.M.S. Hacker (2015): “How the Tractatus was Meant to be Read”,
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 65, Issue 261, 648–668

TLP 6.54 only a comment on TLP 6.5? And
TLP 6.5 only a comment on TLP 6?

TLP 6: The general form of truth-function is: $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$.

This is the general form of proposition.

TLP 6.5: For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.

The riddle does not exist.

If a question can be put at all, then it *can* also be answered.

TLP 6.54: My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless [*unsinnig*], when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

The Tractatus' main "branches"

1. Die Welt ist alles, was der **Fall** ist.
2. Was der **Fall** ist, die **Tatsache**, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.
3. Das **logische Bild** der **Tatsache** ist der **Gedanke**.
4. Der **Gedanke** ist der sinnvolle **Satz**.
5. Der **Satz** ist eine **Wahrheitsfunktion** der Elementarsätze.
(Der Elementarsatz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion seiner selbst.)
6. Die allgemeine Form der **Wahrheitsfunktion** ist: $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$.
Dies ist die allgemeine Form des Satzes.
7. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.

Reading the Tractatus' tree-wise lets you also better see its main "branches" and their connections («**chaining**»)

1. The world is everything that is **the case**.
2. What is **the case**, **the fact**, is the existence of atomic facts.
3. The **logical picture** of **the facts** is **the thought**.
4. **The thought** is the significant **proposition**.
5. **Propositions** are **truth-functions** of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
6. The general form of **truth-function** is $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$.
This is the general form of proposition.
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

The *Tractatus* as a ladder

- Rung 1: The world is everything that is the case.
Rung 2: What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
Rung 3: The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
Rung 4: The thought is the significant proposition.
Rung 5: Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
Rung 6: The general form of truth-function is: $[p, \bar{x}, N(\bar{x})]$.
This is the general form of proposition.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Climbing the *Tractatus* ladder means reaching the insight of TLP 6 – i.e. **taking in the formula that shows the general form of the truth-function and of the proposition!**



The PI

Introduction to the PI (§§1-88) under 7 headings

- 1) Acting
- 2) The language game
- 3) Can there be a philosophical language game?
(«einfach», «Bedeutung», «Satz» ...)
- 4) Form of life
- 5) Mistakes of the «Augustinian picture»
- 6) Family resemblance
- 7) Übersichtliche Darstellung
- 8) *Formfragen*

1) Acting

Acting

OC §204:

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; **it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.**

Ms-175,4v f:

Die Begründung aber, die Rechtfertigung der Evidenz kommt zu einem Ende; – das Ende aber ist nicht daß uns gewisse Sätze unmittelbar als wahr einleuchten, also eine Art Sehen unsrerseits, sondern **unser Handeln, welches am Grunde des Sprachspiels liegt.**

Pl: handeln

- 1 Denke nun an diese Verwendung der Sprache: Ich schicke jemand einkaufen. Ich gebe ihm einen Zettel, auf diesem stehen die Zeichen: "fünf rote Äpfel". Er trägt den Zettel zum Kaufmann; der öffnet die Lade, auf welcher das Zeichen "Äpfel" steht; dann sucht er in einer Tabelle das Wort "rot" auf und findet ihm gegenüber ein Farbmuster; nun sagt er die Reihe der Grundzahlwörter - ich nehme an, er weiß sie auswendig - bis zum Worte "fünf" und bei jedem Zahlwort nimmt er einen Apfel aus der Lade, der die Farbe des Musters hat. - So, und ähnlich, operiert man mit Worten. - "Wie weiß er aber, wo und wie er das Wort 'rot' nachschlagen soll und was er mit dem Wort 'fünf' anzufangen hat?" - Nun, ich nehme an, er **handelt**, wie ich es beschrieben habe. Die Erklärungen haben irgendwo ein Ende. - Was ist aber die Bedeutung des Wortes "fünf"? - Von einer solchen war hier garnicht die Rede; nur davon, wie das Wort "fünf" gebraucht wird.

Pl: handeln

- 6 Wenn aber das das hinweisende Lehren bewirkt, - soll ich sagen, es bewirkt das Verstehen des Worts? Versteht nicht der den Ruf "Platte!", der so und so nach ihm **handelt**? - Aber dies half wohl das hinweisende Lehren herbeiführen; aber doch nur zusammen mit einem bestimmten Unterricht. Mit einem anderen Unterricht hätte dasselbe hinweisende Lehren dieser Wörter ein ganz anderes Verständnis bewirkt.
- 7 In der **Praxis** des Gebrauchs der Sprache (2) ruft der eine Teil Wörter, der andere **handelt** nach ihnen; im Unterricht der Sprache aber wird sich dieser Vorgang finden: Der Lernende benennt die Gegenstände. D.h. er spricht das Wort, wenn der Lehrer auf den Stein zeigt. - Ja, es wird sich hier die noch einfachere Übung finden: der Schüler spricht die Worte nach, die der Lehrer ihm vorsagt - beides sprachähnliche Vorgänge.

PI: handeln

23 Führe dir die Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachspiele an diesen Beispielen, und andern, vor Augen: Befehlen, und nach Befehlen **handeln** - Beschreiben eines Gegenstands nach dem Ansehen, oder nach Messungen - Herstellen eines Gegenstands nach einer Beschreibung (Zeichnung) - Berichten eines Hergangs - Über den Hergang Vermutungen anstellen - Eine Hypothese aufstellen und prüfen - Darstellen der Ergebnisse eines Experiments durch Tabellen und Diagramme - Eine Geschichte erfinden; und lesen - Theater spielen - Reigen singen - Rätsel raten - Einen Witz machen; erzählen - Ein angewandtes Rechenexempel lösen - Aus einer Sprache in die andere übersetzen - Bitten, Danken, Fluchen, Grüßen, Beten.

- NB: The examples given in PI §23 are all examples of *acting*.

PI: sich benehmen, sich verhalten

193"Die Maschine scheint ihre Wirkungsweise schon in sich zu haben" heißt: wir sind geneigt, die künftigen Bewegungen der Maschine in ihrer Bestimmtheit mit Gegenständen zu vergleichen, die schon in einer Lade liegen und nun von uns herausgeholt werden. - So aber reden wir nicht, wenn es sich darum handelt, das wirkliche **Verhalten** einer Maschine vorauszusagen. Da vergessen wir, im allgemeinen, nicht die Möglichkeit der Deformation der Teile, etc. - Wohl aber, wenn wir uns darüber wundern, wie wir denn die Maschine als Symbol einer Bewegungsweise verwenden können, - da sie sich doch auch ganz anders bewegen kann.

244Wie beziehen sich Wörter auf Empfindungen? - Darin scheint kein Problem zu liegen; denn reden wir nicht täglich von Empfindungen, und benennen sie? Aber wie wird die Verbindung des Namens mit dem Benannten hergestellt? Die Frage ist die gleiche, wie die: wie lernt ein Mensch die Bedeutung der Namen von Empfindungen? Z.B. des Wortes "Schmerz". Dies ist eine Möglichkeit: Es werden Worte mit dem ursprünglichen, natürlichen, Ausdruck der Empfindung verbunden und an dessen Stelle gesetzt. Ein Kind hat sich verletzt, es schreit; und nun sprechen ihm die Erwachsenen zu und bringen ihm Ausrufe und später Sätze bei. Sie lehren das Kind ein neues **Schmerzbenehmen**.

PI: sich benehmen, sich verhalten

246 Man kann nicht sagen, die Andern lernen meine Empfindung nur durch mein **Benehmen**, - denn von mir kann man nicht sagen, ich lernte sie. Ich habe sie.

250 Warum kann ein Hund nicht Schmerzen heucheln? Ist er zu ehrlich? Könnte man einen Hund Schmerzen heucheln lehren? Man kann ihm vielleicht beibringen, bei bestimmten Gelegenheiten wie im Schmerz aufzuheulen, ohne daß er Schmerzen hat. Aber zum eigentlichen Heucheln fehlte diesem **Benehmen** noch immer die richtige Umgebung.

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310, 1[2]et2[1]

- In the actual use of this language, one man calls out the words as orders, the other **acts** according to them.

Ms-115, 118[5]et119[1]et119[2] | EPB p. 117

- Im praktischen Gebrauch dieser Sprache ruft der Eine die Wörter als Befehle, der Andre **handelt** nach ihnen.

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,14[2]et15[1]et16[1]

- Now it is queer that on closely looking at cases of comparing, it is very easy to see a great number of **activities** and states of mind, all more or less characteristic of the **act** of comparing.

Ms-115,133[2] | EPB p. 126

- Wenn wir nun irgendwelche Vorgänge des Vergleichens genau ins Auge fassen, so sehen wir leicht eine Anzahl von **Handlungen**, Gedanken, Empfindungen, die alle für das Vergleichen mehr oder weniger charakteristisch sind.

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,70[2]

- The change which took place was one which we might call a change in the general **behaviour** of the pupil, ...

Ms-115,198[3]et199[1] | EPB p. 174

- Die Veränderung, als der Schüler zu lesen anfang, war eine Veränderung seines **Verhaltens**, ...

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,64[2]

- ... we are strongly inclined to use the metaphor of something being in a peculiar state for saying that something can **behave** in a particular way.

Ms-115,192[2] | EPB p. 170

- ... Wir neigen dazu, im **Verhalten** von etwas die Folge seines Zustands zu sehen.

Translations: The Brown Book complex

Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]

- In fact we could easily imagine the numeral 159 to be used on such occasions, in connection with such gestures and forms of **behaviour** as would make us say that this numeral plays the role of an unsurmountable ...

Ms-115,147[2]et148[1] | EPB p. 137

- Wir können uns leicht das Zahlzeichen '159' bei solchen Anlässen, in Verbindung mit solchen Gesten und Formen des **Benehmens** gebraucht denken, daß wir sagen müßten, dieses Zeichen spielt bei ihnen die Rolle einer unübersteigbaren oberen Grenze.

PI §206

... Die *gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise* [my italics] ist das Bezugssystem, mittels welches wir uns eine fremde Sprache deuten.

- the common *behaviour* of mankind?
- mankind's common ways of *acting* / of carrying out an action / of pursuing an action?

PI: handeln

- Also see PI § § 21, 36, 51, 54, 168, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 211, 212, 232, 243, 330, 420, 460, 486, 487, 489, 490, 505, 519, 534, 556, 613-616, 627-629, 631, 632, 638, 642, 653