

The rule-following problematic PI §§ 134-242

[Some slides make re-use of slides by A. Pichler]

1

Why are rules important for Wittgenstein?

TLP: logical syntax as system of rules for
meaningful combination of signs

Middle period: language is described as as a
collection of calculi or of self-contained language-
games (chess analogy)

3

Why are rules important for Wittgenstein?

PI:

- Language is compared to games (involves following rules)
- “Meaning as use” (use has to be in some way regular)
- Conception of a philosophical investigation as a grammatical investigation (grammar is about rules of use)

4

PI preface, 1945

—And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.—The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings.

The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. [...]

6

Remember the shop-keeper from § 1?

Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip of paper marked “five red apples”. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then then he says the series of elementary number-words — I assume that he knows them by heart — up to the word “five”, and for each number-word he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.

7

§ 1 continues...

— It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words. — **“But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?”** — Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.

8

What is problematic about rules?
(according to the philosopher)

- What kind of entity are they? (ontological question)
- How do we grasp them? (epistemological question)
 - How can they guide action? (normative question)

9

But remember...be wary of «What
is?» questions

PI § 383: We do not analyse a phenomenon (for example, thinking) but a concept (for example, that of thinking), and hence the application of a word.

10

Language as calculus

In the middle period , language is compared to a calculus

A calculus has fixed rules: every eventuality is covered

Some uses of language are like this

However, if we claim all language is (or should be) essentially a calculus, we make a false generalization

We are misled by the comparison: we take the analogy to describe the essence of language

12

In philosophy we are [Wittgenstein was] tempted by this kind of false generalization. In the long and winding discssion of rules W wants to show us how to get rid of this temptation

All this [...] can appear in the right light only when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear **what misled us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus according to definite rules.**

13

«language-game»

NB: Wittgenstein does not introduce the analogy between language and game as an alternative theory of language or meaning, or as a description of the essence of language

Instead, it is a methodological tool, an object of comparison that can be used to remind us of important but often overlooked or forgotten features of language use and linguistic meaning

14

Language-game as object of comparison

130. Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language. [They] are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.

131. For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison -- as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)

15

Language-game as object of comparison

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view, one out of many possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook.

16

PI § § 81-85 discusses "language as calculus" vs. "language as game"

How are rules at work in ordinary use of language? Here, the analogy between language and games can be enlightening: games are not everywhere bounded by rules, there is e.g. no rule for how high one may throw the ball in tennis; "yet tennis is a game for all that, and has rules too" (PI § 68).

Similarly, we do not have rules covering every possible application of a word (cf. "the disappearing chair" in PI § 80).

Are we to say that we do not attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?

17

Are games always rule-bound?

83. Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another for a joke and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a ball-game and following definite rules at every throw.

18

(cont.)

And is there not also the case where we play and—make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them—as we go along.

19

This kind of softening of the demand that application of words must be regulated by fixed rules makes the interlocutor worried:

«But then the use of the word is unregulated – the ‘game’ we play with it is unregulated.»
(PI § 68)

Wittgenstein’s answer to this is that the interlocutor is still enthralled by the picture of language as a calculus with exact rules:

20

[I]n philosophy we often compare the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language **must** be playing such a game.—But if you say that our languages only approximate to such calculi you are standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For then it may look as if what we were talking about were an ideal language [...] better, more perfect than our everyday language [...]

PI § 81

21

The interlocutor's worry: does this not make meaning indeterminate?

This worry seems to get even more fuel from the kind of paradox Wittgenstein introduces in PI § 84-86 and develops in § 185:

The formulation of a rule always seems to leave room for doubt about whether a person actually follows it as we meant it (rules have loop-holes).

There seems to be a gap between the rule and its application, that has somehow to be explained away.

23

A rule stands there like a sign-post. —Does the sign-post leave no doubt about the way I have to go? [W]here does it say which way I am to follow it? PU § 85



24

The interlocutor thinks that rules must somehow secure the correct understanding of a rule:

[E]very doubt merely revealed a gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is possible only if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove these doubts.

W dismisses this worry:

25

The signpost is in order – if, under normal circumstances, it fulfills its purpose. 87

But this appeal to «normal circumstances» is not enough for the interlocutor: he feels that we need a more secure foundation to bridge the gap between the rule and its application

26

431. [...]The *order*—why, that is nothing but sounds, ink-marks.—"

432. Every sign *by itself* seems dead. *What* gives it life?—In use it is *alive*. Is life breathed into it there?—Or is the *use* its life?

27

The interlocutor's worry gets even more fuel from the scenario W introduces at § 185

28

The parable of the “aberrant child”

PI § 185:

[A]t the order "+ 1" [the pupil] writes down the series of natural numbers.—Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1000.

Now we get the pupil to continue one series (say "+2") beyond 1000—and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.

We say to him: "Look what you're doing!"—He doesn't understand. We say, "You should have added *two*: look how you began the series!"—He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I *had* to do it."—Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I did go on in the same way."—It would now be no use to say, "But can't you see ...?"—and go over the old explanations and examples for him again. —In such a case, we might perhaps say: this person finds it natural, once given our explanations, to understand the order as we would understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000, and so on."

29

PI § 186:

How is it decided what is the right step to take at any particular point?—"The right step is the one that is in accordance with the order—as it was *meant*."—So when you gave the order +2 you meant he was to write 1002 after 1000—and did you then also mean that he should write 1868 after 1866, and 100036 after 100034, and so on—an infinite number of such sentences?—"No: what I meant was, that he should write the next but one number after *every* number that he wrote; and from this, stage by stage, all those sentences follow."

30

The skeptical challenge

But now we can extend this to any person's use of any word: if we assume that meaning something with a word involves «pre-determining» or «anticipating» the correct pattern of application of this word (cf. § 188)

- How can we tell that a person attaches the «standard» instead of the «deviant» meaning to a word?

32

This seems to lead to a skeptical paradox:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. (PI § 201)

33

Formal logic and mathematics are paradigms of rule-following activity, indeed they seem to be constituted by rules. They are often also given as examples of human practices where our knowledge can be certain.

But how can we be sure that we follow a rule correctly? If the skeptic's worry gets a foothold here, then general skepticism seems to follow: how can we *ever* know that we apply a sign in the correct way?

34

How does the rule guide me?

The interlocutor feels that the skeptical challenge can be met only if we get a philosophical answer to questions such as

«How do we get from the rule to rule-following? How do I make the transition from the rule to its application? Which is the mediating step between the two? What is to count as following the rule correctly? How do I overcome the gap between sign and symbol?»

35

Wittgenstein considers (and rejects) different answers to such questions

- Mentalism
- Determinism/mechanism
- Interpretationalism
- Platonism

- See Glock Wittgenstein Dictionary

36

Mentalism

Claim: the understanding or grasping of a rule is
(essentially) a mental state or process (see e.g.
PI § § 139, 146, 152-154, 205, 210)

See Child pp. 107-111 on "imagism"

37

Mentalism (§ § 143-184)

Claim: the understanding or grasping of a rule is (essentially) a mental state or process (see e.g. PI § § 139, 146, 152-154, 205, 210)

to have got the system (or, again, to understand it) can't consist in continuing the series up to this or that number: that is only applying one's understanding. The **understanding itself** is a state which is the source of the correct use

38

The temptation is to say that understanding does not consist in the *application* of, say, a formula, but is actually a mental state or process "behind" the rule-following behaviour.

However,

If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance of the formula' it is *particular circumstances*, which warrant my saying that I can go on—if the formula occurs to me. (PI § 154)

39

Mechanism/determinism

- Claim: rule-following means that a rule is encoded in the neural system, and manifested as a disposition to act in a certain way:

149. If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a **state of an apparatus of the mind (perhaps a state of the brain)** by means of which we explain the *manifestations* of that knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition.

This would mean that rule-following functions in a machine-like manner:

If we know the machine, everything else—that is the movements it makes—seem to be already completely determined. (PI § 193)

47

Mechanism/dispositionalism

However, the mechanistic view turns reasons into causes, understands the relation between a rule and the action it guides as external.


48

Ws diagnosis

196. In our failure to understand the use of a word we take it as the expression of an odd *process*. (As we think of time as a strange medium, of the mind as an odd kind of being.)

49

A rule stands there like a sign-post. —Does the sign-post leave no doubt about the way I have to go? ...Where does it say which way I am to follow it? PU § 85



51

Interpretationalism

Claim: A rule in itself is nothing but sounds or ink-marks or bodily movements. So every action according to a rule must be an interpretation, and this settles the right or wrong way of acting.

- An interpretation is supposed to provide the missing content of the rule, but this leads to a regress: every interpretation can be further interpreted; e.g. every beginning of a series is viable to a reinterpretation.

“But how can a rule teach me what I have to do at this point? After all, whatever I do can, on some interpretation [Deutung], be made compatible with the rule.”—No, that’s not what one should say. Rather, this: every interpretation hangs in the air together with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. (PI § 198)

53

Instead,

there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”.

(PI § 201)

55

Platonism

- A picture that naturally gives itself when we reflect upon the nature of (especially mathematical) rules: the rule is some kind of abstract entity that *already contains* all the possible applications or steps that can be taken
- "Rules as rails": not causal or psychological, but *logical* necessity
- Problem: How are we to grasp the such rules with unlimited application?

56

218. Whence the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule.

219. "All steps are really already taken" means I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space.

57

The question remains:

—But if something of this sort really was the case,
how would it help me?

58

Incoherence of the Platonist view

- Even if rules had some kind of "Platonic" existence, this would not guard us from error in applying them (PI § 213-214)
 - Because this application is dependent on some kind of intuition or decision which is in itself in principle uncertain
- Platonism is only a "mythological description", a picture that can give no further content to the idea of logical compulsion (PI §§ 220, 221)

59

Platonism is, at bottom, a kind of "super-interpretationalism" that tries to block the regress of interpretations by applying to the actual "meaning" of the rule.

What one wishes to say is 'Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn't be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.' (BB, 34)

60

Skepticism?

Does Wittgenstein's rejection of all proposed explanations of rule-following amount to skepticism? I.e., must we accept that there really is no way of telling correct from incorrect application?

206. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?

61

Is this what we must conclude?

Since the application of the rule is *in no way prepared*; there is *nothing* which bridges rule and application; there is no way to account for how we bridge the *gap* between the two.

Many interpreters think so, especially inspired by Saul Kripke's reading of the PI.

62

A skeptical solution?

- Saul Kripke: *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982)
- The rule following paradox in PI is "the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date" (p. 60)
- Wittgenstein presents "a sceptical solution to a sceptical problem"
- "The skeptical problem" is highlighted in the scenario W introduces at § 185

63

Kripke's thought experiment

There is "no fact of the matter" that can determine whether I follow a rule or not (ontological challenge). This is shown by the following:

- Suppose that you have never added numbers greater than 50 before.
- Further, suppose that you are asked to perform the computation '68 + 57'.
- Our natural inclination is that you will apply the addition function as you have before, and calculate that the correct answer is '125'

64

The paradox leads to a general meaning-skepticism, because the application of every word is susceptible to a similar treatment.

67

The skeptical solution:

- Normativity emerges if we consider the individual in relation to a larger community of language-users.
 - The background of agreement in a community is the criterion by which we judge if someone has followed a rule or not.
- Truth-conditions are replaced by *assertability conditions* (i.e. the meaning of a sentence is given by the conditions under which it can be asserted).

68

The solution is skeptical since it is the contingent fact of widespread agreement that decides whether something is to be accepted as following a rule or not following a rule.

Cf. PI § 202 :

it's not possible to follow a rule 'privately'

69

Communitarianism

Kripke's outline of the «skeptical solution» has inspired a «communitarian» answer to the rule-following problematic:

What counts as the correct application of a rule is decided by communal agreement:

Whether you followed the rule or not, and whether you followed this rule or that rule, is *post-determined* by what *others* say / the community says if asked these questions, or what *others do* / the community does in the same situation.

70

"Kripkenstein"

Is this a viable interpretation of what Wittgenstein says?

Kripke himself says this is not an exposition of Wittgenstein's argument, but of «Wittgenstein's argument, as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him» (p. 5)

71

Problems with Kripke's interpretation

It diverges from the text:

Kripke quotes section § 201 as follows: “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.”

§ 201 continues

“The answer was: if everything could be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.”

Which (together with the examples in § 200) seems to support Kripke’s view, but

72

But PI does not seem to accept that there is a problem

§ 201 continues further:

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another one standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases.

73

Cf. also

A doubt was possible in certain circumstances.
But that is not to say that I did doubt, or even
could doubt. (PI § 213)

74

“Our paradox” in PI § 201 can be understood as
the *interlocutor's* paradox, which is based on a
misunderstanding that the “voice of correctness”
wants to correct.

76

Problems with communitarianism

How do we determine what a community actually accepts as correct?

In what sense does this agreement *explain* rule-following behaviour and the notion of a rule?

Can the community's practices be identified *independently* of a reference to the actual following of specific rules? (i.e., reference to communal practices does not seem to identify anything *distinct* from rule-following behaviour)

77

But what about the answer given to the paradox in PI § 202?

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.

78

Does this not place the normativity of rules in a community of rule-followers (language users) in a similar way as communitarianism?

79

Some of the things W says seem to support communitarianism/
constructivism

- The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language. PI § 206

PI § 202 :

it's not possible to follow a rule 'privately' cf PI

- Does this mean that meaning and rules are *essentially* social?

81

Some things W says sound like communitarianism

199. Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?—This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey a rule".

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on.—**To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).**

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.

82

Some things W says sound like communitarianism

But there are crucial differences

W's remarks are not explanations of what it means to follow a rule

W never offers the «community view» as an answer to rule-skepticism

Instead, he wants to shift focus from the rules to the application, or the actions that we call rule-following or applications of a rule.

«Practice speaks for itself»

Agreement is crucial but it is an aspect of rule-following, not an explanation of it.

Consider again the following remark

83

206. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?

Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. **In what circumstances** would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on?

The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.

84

NB that the «system of reference» is not a «system of rules»!

This does not mean that rule-following is «justified by» or «grounded in» community agreement. Following a rule correctly is not justified by me «doing what most people do». Indeed, I act «without justification» and follow the rule «as a matter of course» if I understand it.

85

W's final answer?

PI § 217:

"How am I able to obey a rule?"—If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my acting in *this* way in complying with the rule.

Once I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

(Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of sham corbel that supports nothing.)

86

Practice

To follow a rule is a practice.

PI § 201: ... It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another one standing behind it. What this shows is that **there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.**

PI § 202: That's why 'following a rule' is a practice. ...

87

Cf. PI § 197

[Is it] that all the rules [of chess] are contained in my act of intending [to play chess]? [...] And if that is nonsense – what kind of super-rigid connection obtains between the act of intending and the thing intended?—Where is the connection effected between the sense of the words "Let's play a game of chess" and all the rules of the game?—**Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the day-to-day practice of playing.**

88

«In the beginning was the act!»

PI § 1: ... Explanations come to an end somewhere.

PI § 211: No matter how you instruct him in continuing the ornamental pattern, how can he *know* how he is to continue it by himself?" —Well, how do *I* know? — If that means "Have I reasons?", the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.

PI § 326: ... the chain of reasons has an end.

89

Some lessons

Each of the positions discussed as explanations of rule-following (Determinism, Platonism, Interpretationalism and Mentalism, Decisionism, Skepticism, Communitarianism) gets something right; as general positions or explanations, however, they are *wrong*.

Rule-following is *learned* in specific language games and practiced in specific language games – which gives it *order and support* (pace idea of total lack of link between rule and application of the rule).

At the same time, learning to follow a rule *does not pre-determine and pre-contain* all upcoming cases of rule-following (pace deterministic and Platonistic ideas).

Rule-following is to be treated as a *matter of practices rather than of cognition and volition* (pace Mentalism, Interpretationalism, Decisionism).

Practices are typically communal, but the question whether a rule has been followed is *not* decided by community agreement (pace Communitarianism)

- (Later) Wittgenstein wants to connect “rule” and “rule-following”, as he wants to do with *all* concepts constituting philosophical problems, with *action* and *practice*, rather than treat them in traditional epistemological and ontological terms.

90

Conclusions

There is a temptation to construe Wittgenstein’s remarks as a theory of rule-following or as an analysis of the concept of a rule.

However, we could, as Wittgenstein himself, characterize these remarks about rules as notes “*on the grammar of the expression ‘to follow a rule’*” (§ 199).

The investigation is purely descriptive, and the aim is to dispel misunderstandings that are deeply rooted in our ways of speaking about human beings, meaning, and actions.

91

Morale

We should resist the temptation to presuppose that rules and rule following *must* be analyzable in terms of something more basic (a mental process, logical compulsion, community agreement...)

What "makes it true" that I am following one rule instead of another is simply that I am following the rule («deflationism»)

We do not get (or need) an account of normativity, but a reminder of where to look for it.

93

W's final answer?

PI § 217:

"How am I able to obey a rule?"—If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my acting in *this* way in complying with the rule.

Once I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

(Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of sham corbel that supports nothing.)

94

Once you have described the procedure of this teaching and learning, you have said everything there can be said about acting according to a rule.

(RFM VII § 26)

95

238. The rule can only seem to me to produce all its consequences in advance if I draw them as *a matter of course*. As much as it is a matter of course for me to call this colour "blue".

...

240. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don't come to blows over it, for example. **This belongs to the scaffolding from which our language operates** (for example, yields descriptions).

241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"—What is true and false is what human beings *say*; and it is in their *language* that human beings agree. **That is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.**

96

So Wittgenstein does not say that rule-following is «grounded in» or «justified by» the agreement with a community of language-users. Instead, he seems to be viewing community agreement as a «framework condition» («scaffolding»): unless we could agree on what counts as following a rule correctly, we would not engage in that practice.

97

This agreement is part of our «form of life» and cannot be further justified without a regress: bedrock. We should not reify the rules into some kind of super-entity that has normative power: it is, instead the practice of engaging in the rule following activity that gives the rules sense. There is no «gap» between the rules and the practice or rule-following activity. To understand the rule is to apply it. A kind of practical, not theoretical knowledge

98

Once again, the point seems to be to remind us of the «grammar» of our concepts, our use of words like «meaning», «understanding», «rule»; and that

the game with these words, their use in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved — the role of these words in our language is other than we are tempted to think. (PU § 182)

99

Results

- Dissolution of ontological quandary: what we call a rule is connected to regularity in actions. It can have many different roles in our language-games (cf. PI § 54, 82-83)
- Dissolution of epistemic quandary: what makes it true that I am following rule A instead of rule B is simply my following rule A.
- Dissolution of the normative quandary: what makes rule A into a norm for my conduct is simply that I follow the rule A, "as a matter of course", and can use it as a justification for my going on in a particular way

100

Cf. PI § 197

[Is it] that all the rules [of chess] are contained in my act of intending [to play chess]? [...] And if that is nonsense – what kind of super-rigid connection obtains between the act of intending and the thing intended?—Where is the connection effected between the sense of the words "Let's play a game of chess" and all the rules of the game?—**Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the day-to-day practice of playing.**

101

W's account is

- anti-reductionist (does not attempt to explain rule-following in terms of something else)
- anti-systematic (it is not a general account or systematic theory about rule-following)
- contextual (what a rule is and how it functions is determined by the context, the complex surroundings, in which it occurs)
- "deflationist"? "How am I able to obey a rule? [...] This is simply what I do."

102