The Imagination's Piano In Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen

Abstract

Our purpose is to take into account Wittgenstein's analyses about imagination in the
Philosophische Untersuchungen, in order to articulate them and elaborate a concept of
imagination (Vorstellung). My first claim is that it is possible. My second claim is
that the role of this concept has not been taken into consideration (See Arrington R.
and Glock,H.-J. 1991; Hallett, G. 1977; Sluga, H. and Stern, D. 1996; Vohra, A.
1986). In some other cases, imagination has been taken into account only partially
(Genova, J. 1995; Schulte, J. 1993, Chapter 7 about "Memory"). Some other accounts
about Wittgenstein's concept of imagination are more developed (Glock, H.-J. 1996,
see the word "imagination" in his Dictionary; Budd, M. 1989, see Chapter V; White, A.
1990, see Chapter 10), but we disagree with some of their conclusions. Our third
claim concerns our disagreements.