Some Reflections about Wittgenstein´s Bezugssystem

Abstract

The fact that Wittgenstein´s philosophy has been faced traditionally from a
theoretical angle seems to have led many philosophers, time and time again, to see
grammatical propositions merely as the tacit rules of the language-games and forms of
life we share. Philosophical practice itself, however, reveals there are grammatical
propositions which can be understood but are not shared by all the members of a
specific linguistic community: I have called these propositions “individual
grammatical propositions” for stressing the great influence they can have on those
persons who assimilate them as such. In fact, individual grammatical propositions
should lead us to talk in terms of individual paradigms through which a specific
person will judge experience: in this paper I show how, because of an individual
grammatical proposition, some persons are not able to see themselves in certain ways
which all of us think they should have no problem to see themselves.