The Wittgensteinian Idea of Analysis as a Base for Constructive Contemporary Scepticism

Abstract

Examining Wittgenstein’s remarks from Philosophical Investigations about the
philosophical idea of analysis, I argue that his view of philosophy can be treated as
a useful base for constructive contemporary scepticism. In order to enrich the
understanding of the matter, I will first call your attention to the more general
idea of philosophy understood as a special kind of descriptive analysis. Trying to
show that scepticism can be seen as a useful and fruitful philosophical approach, I
will shortly present such a form of scepticism and demonstrate how it can be derived
from the Wittgensteinian idea of analysis. I will conclude ex¬pressing the conviction
that the Wittgensteinian idea of philosophising is a good starting point and a rich
source for pluralism in philosophy – a position Wittgenstein exhorted us to take in
his late philosophy.