‘The riddle does not exist’: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy Revisited in the Context of the Ignorabimus-Dispute

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s philosophy is notorious for its interpretative difficulties and
diversities. Beyond exegetical and hermeneutical issues that revolve around
particular sections (such as the world/reality distinction, the Frege/Russell
connection to the Tractatus, or the influence on Wittgenstein
by existentialism and phenomenology) there are a few fundamental disagreements of
interpretation. One of these disagreements relates to the continuity and
discontinuity of Wittgenstein’s early and later thought. I will try to give an answer
to this question by focusing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the context of the
so-called Ignorabimus-Dispute. To be more precise, I will look
at one of its most controversial issues, the demarcation problem, i. e. the problem
of how and where to demarcate science from non-science, e.g. from ethics or
religion.