Über das Unaussprechliche beim frühen und späten Wittgenstein

Abstract

The early Wittgenstein determines the religious as the mystical one about which
you cannot talk, because he identifies it with the logical form of a proposition
which can only be shown, but cannot become a topic itself. This semantic
conception is based on ontological assumptions which must be taken to get a
unique-reference theory and difference-criteria to appropriate what makes sense
and nonsense. By changing the linguistic conception, the Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations no longer supposes ontological objects, but sets
the focus on the usage of language. Talking about objects within the world in a
reasonable way is now guaranteed through a high network of „Sprachspielen,“. By
changing the semantic conception, it can be shown that the conception of the
religious has been changed, too. It is not located in the conditions of a
logical symbolism anymore, but has to be located within the practice of
language, i.e. its execution.