Time and Reality of Phenomenal Becoming

Sergio Galvan


In the current debate on the nature of time one can identify two competing positions: the eternalist (B-series) and the Aristotelian (A-series) position. Which is the adequate one? We argue for the reality of becoming (A-series) on the basis of the experience, undeniable even for an eternalist, of the change of appearance in consciousness. We begin with formal characterizations of the A-theory and the B-theory on the general phenomenon of becoming. It follows an analysis of the notion of change of appearing to consciousness. It turns out that it is not possible to provide an account of it in B-theoretical terms. For at least one state of affairs p of phenomenal nature it is certain that the reality of becoming is given: A(before, p) ∧ ¬A(now, p).


20th century philosophy; philosophy; philosophy of time; Wittgenstein Ludwig; A-series; A-theoretical analysis of phenomenal becoming; A-theory vs B-theory; becoming as change of appearing to consciousness; tensed theory of time; time and becoming

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